Indirect Tax

Delhi High Court Orders Refund of Tax Paid Under Protest

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In a recent decision[1] the Delhi High Court ordered that the tax paid by assessee under duress should be refunded. The High Court cited CBIC’s Instructions to reason that no recovery of tax dues can be made before passing an adjudication order and that no taxes can be paid while the search and seizure of assessee’s premises is ongoing, unless the tax is paid voluntarily by the assessee. 

Facts 

The petitioner was a company engaged in supply of services in New Delhi and registered under the CGST Act, 2017. Search operations were conducted on the premises of the petitioner on 20.10.2021 by the anti-evasion Dept of GST under Section 67(2). During the search, the petitioner, paid an amount of Rs 2,30,00,000/- and acknowledgement of the payment was issued by the Revenue Department via FORM GST DRC-03. On 21.10.2021 the petitioner wrote an email to the concerned Joint Commissioner that the said payment had been made under protest and the petitioner reserved the right to seek its refund. 

On 23.06.2022, the Revenue Department issued a Show Cause Notice (‘SCN’) to the petitioner under Section 74 read with Section 20 of CGST Act, 2017 demanding payment of GST amounting to Rs 36,53,359/- and sought to appropriate the amount of Rs 2,30,00,000/-. The petitioner under Section 54 had filed for refund of Rs 2,30,00,000/- paid under protest but the same was denied as the Revenue Department issued deficiency memos, i.e., memos indicating that the documents supplied by the petitioner in support of its refund claims were insufficient. Citing the insufficiency of documents, the application for refund was rejected twice. Against the order of refusal of refund, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court. 

Issues and Decision 

The main issue before the Delhi High Court was whether the petitioner paid Rs 2,30,00,000/- voluntarily or under protest. While the petitioner’s raised other issues regarding the legality of deficiency memos, the High Court’s decision hinged on determining if the payment was made voluntarily or under protest. The High Court concluded that the payment was made under protest and ordered a refund of the amount.

The Delhi High Court noted the relevant facts: that the petitioner made a deposit of cash through cash ledger on 20.10.2021 at 8:41pm. The search operations had started at 3:45pm on 20.10.2021 and continued well beyond business hours until 3am on 21.10.2021. Thus, the cash of Rs 2,30,00,000/- was paid by the petitioner while the search and seizure operation was undergoing. The High Court further noted that it was an admitted fact that the petitioner never admitted its liability to pay the tax and merely deposited the said amount under duress and compelling circumstances. The High Court then referred to Section 73(5) and 73(6) of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 73(1) states that a proper officer may serve a SCN on a person where it appears to the proper officer that the person has not paid the tax or short paid the tax or wrongly availed ITC. Section 73(5) states that: 

The person chargeable with tax may, before service or notice under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the statement under sub-section (3), pay the amount of tax along with interest payable thereon under section 50 on the basis of his own ascertainment of such tax or the tax as ascertained by the proper officer and inform the proper officer in writing of such payment.   

Section 73(6) that on receipt of the information, the proper officer shall not serve any notice on the said person. 

The Delhi High Court observed that the above provisions are clearly for the benefit of the taxpayer and voluntary payments can be made before issuance of SCN. However, once the taxpayer pays tax under Section 73(5) but subsequently refutes that  the payment was not voluntary, it must be accepted that the payments were not made voluntarily. The High Court also pointed that the Revenue Department did not follow the requisite procedure in the impugned case as the petitioner was not issued FORM GST DRC-04, which follows the issuance of acknowledgement FORM GST DRC-03. 

Finally, the Delhi High Court cited CBIC’s Instructions wherein it is clearly stated that unpaid tax or short paid tax can only be collected after following the due process, i.e., issuance of SCN and passing of an adjudication order. And no recovery of tax dues can take place during the search or seizure proceedings unless the taxpayer makes the payment voluntarily. 

Conclusion

The Revenue Department in the impugned case inter alia also tried to resist the issuance of refund on the ground that the SCN had been issued to the petitioner after the search proceedings and refund shall only be granted after the proceedings were complete. The High Court endorsed the petitioner’s argument that adjudication of SCN is not a pre-requisite for issuance of refund and that issuance of refund cannot be withheld merely because SCN was issued after the deposit. It is interesting that the Revenue Department tends to make certain claims that have no basis in law, e.g., no refund can be issued until SCN is adjudicated. And it is appreciable that the Courts, at times, if not always, tend to see the ridiculousness of such claims and reject them. 

[1] Sapphire Intrex Ltd v Union of India & Ors 2023: DHC: 8978-DB. 

Cancellation of GST Registration Needs to be Accompanied by Reasons

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Short Note

In a recent decision[1], the Delhi High Court held that the cancellation of an assessee’s registration under GST cannot be done in an arbitrary fashion and needs to be accompanied by objective reasons. 

Facts 

The assessee in the impugned case was carrying on the business as a sole proprietorship under the name ‘M/s P.S. Metal’ but closed business on 11.11.2019 on account of her ill health. The assessee filed an application on the same date for cancellation of her registration and her application was acknowledged, but not processed. Thereafter, on 12.021.2021, the proper officer issued a showcause notice to the petitioner proposing to cancel the assessee’s registration on the ground of non-filing of returns for a period of six months. The assessee was requested to appear before the proper officer failing which the case would be decided ex parte. The proper officer thereafter passed an ex parte order cancelling the petitioner’s registration, with the order stating that no reply was received to the showcause notice. However, the order did not mention any reasons for cancelling the registration even though the petitioner’s registration was cancelled with retrospective effect from 01.07.2017.  

The assessee challenged the order on various grounds: while the showcause notice asked the assessee to appear for a personal hearing, it did not mention the date, time or venue for personal hearing, the order for cancellation of registration was passed in violation of principles of natural justice, and that the order does not contain any reasons for cancellation of the assessee’s registration. 

Decision

The Delhi High Court accepted the assessee’s contention. The High Court referred to Section 29(2), CGST Act, 2017 which states that the proper may cancel the registration of a person from such date, including any retrospective date, as he may deem fit. The provision specifies various grounds under which the registration may be cancelled with retrospective effect including the registered person having contravened any of the provisions of the Act or not having filed returns for a financial year beyond three months from the due date, etc. The High Court observed that the discretion provided to the proper officer under Section 29(2) cannot be exercised arbitrarily and the decision to cancel registration from retrospective effect must be accompanied with some objective criteria. (para 6)

The Delhi High Court specifically noted the Revenue’s contention that cancellation of registration would have the effect of denying ITC to customers of assessee. The High Court observed that assuming that such a contention is true, it is incumbent on the proper officer to be ‘fully satisfied’ that the registration needs to be cancelled, and that too with retrospective effect. Though in the instant case no reason for cancellation of registration was provided, let alone a reason for cancellation of registration with retrospective effect. 

Accordingly, the Delhi High Court granted the assessee’s request that her registration be cancelled w.e.f. 11.11.2019 since she ceased her business from the said date. 

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s succinct decision in the impugned case throws light on certain practices that the Revenue Department sometimes tends to adopt: issuance of a showcause notice without providing adequate details to the person such as the date and venue for hearing on the notice and the exercise of discretion without providing adequate reasons. The officers have been granted wide and extensive powers under the GST laws to assist in implementation of GST laws and it is necessary that the same are exercised prudently.      

[1] Pratima Tyagi v Commissioner of GST & Anr 2023: DHC: 9025-DB. 

Bombay High Court Adopts ‘Purposive Interpretation’: Permits Rectification of GSTR-1

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In a recent decision[1], the Bombay High Court permitted the petitioner to rectify their GSTR-1 despite even though statutory deadline for rectification of such return had expired. The High Court cited the relevant provisions – Sections 37, 38, and 39 of CGST Act, 2017 – and stated that they need to be interpreted purposively and the law cannot be interpreted to mean that there is no room for correcting inadvertent errors in returns. 

Facts 

The petitioner, Star Engineers (I) Pvt Ltd, designed, manufactured, and supplied wide range of electronic components for industrial purposes. The petitioner was a regular supplier of the components to Bajaj Auto Limited and during the Financial Year 2021-22 supplied various components to third party vendors on ‘Bill-to-Ship-to-Model’ on instructions of Bajaj Auto Limited. The aforesaid Model allows a supplier to ship the goods to one entity, while issue the bill in favor of another entity. In this case, the petitioner was supplying goods to third party vendors and invoices were issued in the name of Bajaj Auto Limited. However, while filing GSTR-1 for the period July 2021, November 2021, and January 2022, the petitioner inadvertently mentioned GSTIN of the third-party vendors instead of Bajaj Auto Limited.

The above error in filing GSTR-1 meant that the supplies made by the petitioner for the said period were not reflected in GSTR-2B of Bajaj Auto Limited but in the GSTR-2B of the third-party vendors. Accordingly, Bajaj Auto Limited was unable to claim ITC for the said supplies. To compensate itself for the same, Bajaj Auto Limited reduced the payment amount to the petitioner equivalent to the GST stating its inability to claim ITC to that extent. 

In September 2023, the petitioner approached the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax requesting that it be allowed to rectify the error in GSTR-1 for the supplies made during the Financial Year 2021-22 as it was causing prejudice to the petitioner. However, the Deputy Commissioner rejected the request on the ground that while rectification of the error would not cause any loss the Government exchequer, it was past the due date prescribed under the statute. Against, the said decision the petitioner approached the Bombay High Court. 

Purposive Interpretation of Sections 37, 38, and 39 of CGST Act, 2017 

The Bombay High Court noted the relevant provisions of the CGST Act, 2017 which mandate the filing of returns and prescribe the outer time limit for rectification of errors that may creep into such returns at the time of filing. 

Section 37(1) requires all registered persons to furnish electronically all details of their outward supplies and the said information will be communicated to the recipient of such supplies. This provision has translated into the registered person filing GSTR-1 stating their outward supplies and the recipient receiving an auto-drafted ITC statement based on the information disclosed in GSTR-1. Section 37(3) allows for rectification or omission in the returns, but the Proviso states that no rectification shall be allowed after 30 November following the end of financial year to which the returns pertain.  Section 38 states that the details of outward supplies provided under Section 37 shall be communicated to the recipient. Section 39(1) also contains a similar obligation regarding both the input and output supplies and ITC paid or payable. While Section 39(9) allows rectification of errors and omissions. Proviso to Section 39(9) prescribes a similar outer time limit as Proviso to Section 37(3). 

The Bombay High Court perusing the above provisions observed that they ‘need to be purposively interpreted.’ (para 12) What did purposive interpretation mean in this context? The High Court elaborated that Section 37(3) cannot be interpreted to mean that the assessee cannot be allowed to rectify errors in returns and reflect an accurate record. Not allowing rectification of errors would lead to preservation of inaccurate records consisting of errors, which the High Court observed would not be in consonance with the purpose of GST. The High Court stated that the proviso cannot be allowed defeat the intent of provision especially if rectification of the error would not lead to loss of revenue. 

The Bombay High Court also reasoned that GST regime had inaugurated a regime where returns are completely online. It stated that there are a wide variety of traders in India and many may have limited resources and expertise as a result of which inadvertent errors may creep into the returns and the keeping the same in mind, assessees should be allowed to rectify errors in their returns and the provisions of law ‘should be alive’ to such considerations. (para 20)

Similar Judicial Precedents 

The Bombay High Court in allowing the petitioner to their rectify GSTR-1 beyond the due date followed a slew of precedents – M/s Sun Dye Chem v Assistant Commissioner (ST) & Ors[2], Pentacle Plant Machineries Pvt Ltd v Office of GST Council & Ors[3], Shiva Jyoti Constructions v Chairperson, CBEC & Ors[4], Mahalaxmi Infra Contract Ltd v GST Council & Ors[5] – where various High Courts have awarded a similar relief to the assessees. The High Court did cite the precedents in support of its reasoning and conclusion. In these precedents none of the High Courts expressly invoked purposive interpretation, but instead the relief was provided based on facts and Court’s satisfaction that errors of assesses in their returns were bona fide. Further, the common thread in all the cases is that the High Courts were convinced that the rectification of the returns would not lead to loss to the Government exchequer. The latter issue weighed with the High Court in the impugned case as well.    

Conclusion 

The Bombay High Court’s decision in the impugned case invoked the bona error of the petitioner, the fact that no illegality involved, and that the rectification of GSTR-1 would cause no loss to the exchequer. It was not a simple case of purposive interpretation wherein the High Court went beyond the statutory provisions to allow the petitioner to rectify returns even after expiry of the statutory deadline. In the absence of even one of the three factors mentioned above, the High Court’s decision could have been different. Finally, it is important to underline here that reliefs such as in the impugned case are ordinarily and perhaps can only be granted by Courts. Officers allowing rectification of returns after expiry of statutory deadlines is a possibility that is hard to foresee. 

[1] Star Engineers (I) Pvt Ltd v Union of India 2023:BHC – AS: 37549-DB. 

[2] 2020 TIOL 1858 HC MAD GST. 

[3] 2021-TIOL-604-HC-MAD-GST. 

[4] MANU/OR/0522/2023. 

[5] MANU/JH/1003/2022. 

Tea is an Agricultural Produce: Bombay High Court Rules

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In a recent decision[1], the Bombay High Court ruled that tea qualifies as an agricultural produce warehousing services in relation to it are exempt from GST as specified in Notification No. 12 of 2017. The writ was filed by the petitioner against rulings of advance and appellate advance ruling authorities which held that tea which underwent process of blending/mixing ceased to be an agricultural produce. The High Court also made a pertinent observation about the scope of a CBIC Circular and whether it can dilute a statutory Notification. 

Facts 

The petitioner was licensed for carrying the warehouse business under the Bombay Warehouses Act, 1959. The petitioner had let one if its warehouse to M/s Unilever India Export Ltd (‘Unilever’). Unilever would procure tea at public auctions and directly from manufacturers and would undertake blending and packing of the tea at the petitioner’s warehouse. The petitioner was of the view that tea was an agricultural produce under Clause 2(d) of the Notification No. 12 of 2017 and thus warehousing services provided to such a product were exempt form GST as specified under Serial No. 54(e) of the said Notification. 

The relevant portions of the Notification No. 12 of 2017 state that: 

Clause 2(d):

“agricultural produce” means any produce out of cultivation of plants and rearing of all life forms of animals, except the rearing of horses, for food, fibre, fuel, raw material or other similar products, on which either no further processing is done or such processing is done as is usually done by a cultivator or producer which does not alter its essential characteristics but makes it marketable for primary market;” 

And, Serial No. 54(e) of the Notification No. 12 of 2017 exempts from GST the loading, unloading, packing, storage or warehousing of agricultural produce. 

Reading both the provisions together suggests that warehousing services related to agricultural produce were exempt from GST. The petitioner’s primary contention was that manufacturing and packaging of tea undertaken by Unilever did not alter the essential characteristics of tea and were undertaken to make it fit for human consumption and marketable. It was further argued that every agricultural product undergoes some treatment to make it fit for human consumption, save it from perishing and to make it fit for transportation. The ‘minimal’ processes undertaken by Unilever, as per the petitioner, did not change the nature of tea and it retained the character of an agricultural produce. The Revenue, on the other hand, argued that the kind of processes undertaken by Unilever required plant and machinery and cannot be categorized as minimal processes undertaken to make tea fit for primary market. And that tea ceased to an agricultural produce after undergoing the processes undertaken by Unilever.  

High Court Relies on Supreme Court Decision

The Bombay High Court, in determining the nature of processes undertaken by Unilever and their effect on tea relied cited D.S. Bist and Sons case [2] (which was relied on heavily by the petitioners) where it was held that tea leaf that underwent the process of withering, roasting, crushing and fermentation continued to be an agricultural produce since the process was to ensure that the flavor and color of tea leaves was brought out, but tea still retained its essential characteristics. The High Court held that the facts and observations in D.S. Bist and Sons case should have persuaded the advance ruling authorities and appellate advance ruling authorities to have come to a similar conclusion. (para 26) As per the High Court tea, an agricultural produce, retained its essential characteristics even after the processes undertaken on it by Unilever. The High Court observed: 

In so far as the impugned orders are concerned, on a perusal of the orders passed by the AAR the emphasis appears to be more on the issue that the process by which the tea leaves are dried which results in emergence of a manufactured product, and therefore, tea ceases to be an agricultural produce. In our opinion, such reasoning would in fact go contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court as noted above for the reason that the essential characteristic of the tea being an ‘agricultural produce’ would not stand extinguish by mere processing and packing in whatever form. (para 31)

Circular Cannot Go Beyond Statutory Notification 

Another issue that the Bombay High Court addressed in its judgment was the interplay and effect of a Circular on the contents of a statutory Notification. The Revenue contended that their stance that tea that underwent the processes of fermentation, etc. was not an agricultural produce was in accordance with a CBIC Circular issued on 15 November 2017. The High Court, however held that a Circular cannot whittle down or scuttle an Exemption Notification. (para 29) What was the basis of High Court’s opinion? As per the High Court the Exemption Notification No. 12 of 2017 was issued in exercise of power under Section 11, CGST, Act, 2017 wherein the Government can grant exemption from tax on satisfaction in public interest and on recommendations of the GST Council. Thus, the clarification issued in Circular dated 15 November 2017 cannot amend a statutory Notification so as to take tea as an agricultural produce from the ambit of exemption. There is a precedent[3] to this effect, but the underlying premise of the High Court’s opinion is interesting in the context of GST. The Circulars issued by CBIC, admittedly in exercise of its administrative powers, often issue clarifications or state its interpretations of various clauses contained in a statutory Notification, i.e., a Notification issued in exercise of powers under a statutory provision. The High Court’s opinion on the scope of such Circulars will be tested in future as well to determine if a Circular is merely ‘interpreting’ a Notification and issuing a ‘clarification’ or does the Circular go beyond what the Notification states. In the impugned case, the Bombay High Court correctly held it to be the latter. However, it will be a tricky exercise and results are likely to be determined by facts of each case, but the High Court has opened doors for an examination of the scope of what a Circular can state in the context of GST. 

Conclusion The High Court’s observations in the impugned case are welcome and provide clarity on two crucial issues: the scope of the term agricultural produce and the scope of a Circular in terms of what kind of clarifications and interpretive clarities it can provide. Both these facets are likely to occupy judicial attention in the future as well and the dust is far from settled. However, we have a welcome decision that can become a reference point for future disputes. 

[1] Nutan Warehousing Company Pvt Ltd v The Commissioner, Central Tax, Pune – II, 2023: BHC-AS: 37052: DB. 

[2] Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lucknow v D.S. Bist and Sons, Nainital (1979) 4 SCC 741. 

[3] Sandur Micro. Circuits, Ltd v Commissioner of Central Excise, Belgaum (2008) 14 SCC 336. 

Kerala HC Clarifies Scope of Authorisation under Section 67, CGST Act, 2017

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In a recent judgment[1], the Kerala High Court clarified that the authorization provided by a Joint Commissioner for inspection, search and seizure could not be in specific terms, but is only granted in general terms. If the criteria of Section 67, Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 and/or relevant State GST legislation were fulfilled, the authorization cannot be assailed to be illegal. 

Facts

Petitioner filed a writ petition assailing the order of seizure as well as the order of confiscation passed by the Joint Commissioner. The search took place in the business premises of M/s Sobhana Jewellery after authorization given by the Joint Commissioner under section 67(2) of the Kerala Goods and Services Tax Act/Central Goods and Services Tax Act (KGST/CGST). During the search of premises, certain gold ornaments were found in a bag belonging to the petitioner which were accompanied by a delivery challan. The delivery challan was for transportation of the gold ornaments from the petitioner to M/s Sobhana Jewellery. The gold ornaments were verified by the officers and some discrepancies were found in the documents because of which the gold ornaments in the bag were seized.    

The petitioner’s objection to seizure of the gold ornaments was that it was the owner of the gold ornaments in question and that the persons who were present in the business premises of M/s Sobhana Jewellery were one of the partners of its firm and one of its employees. And that the authorization granted by the Joint Commissioner under Section 67(2) for search, seizure and inspection was not for seizing its gold ornaments and thus the seizure was null and void. The petitioner’s case, in effect, was that the authorization for search and seizure was regard to business premises of M/s Sobhana Jewellery and not the articles that belonged to them. 

Kerala HC Interprets Section 67

Relevant portion of Section 67(2), CGST Act, 2017 that was the subject of interpretation is as follows: 

Where the proper officer, not below the rank of Joint Commissioner, either pursuant to an inspection carried out under sub-section (1) or otherwise, has reasons to believe that any goods liable to confiscation or any documents or books or things, which in his opinion shall be useful for or relevant to any proceedings under this Act, are secreted in any place, he may authorise in writing any other officer or central tax to search and seize or may himself search and seize such goods, documents or books or things: (emphasis added)

There are two important ingredients that a Joint Commissioner needs to satisfy before granting authorization for search and seizure under Section 67(2): first, the Joint Commissioner must have a reason to believe; second, the authorization must be regard to goods or documents or books or things which will be useful or relevant to any proceedings under the Act. It is latter that is the subject of concern in the impugned judgment. It is evident that the Joint Commissioner cannot anticipate in granular detail the nature and kinds of goods, documents, etc. that the officers will encounter during their search and inspection. Thus, the authorization granted by a Joint Commissioner cannot specify which ones can be seized and which ones cannot. Recognizing the above elements, the Kerala High Court rejected the petitioner’s argument and observed that: 

Authorisation has to be in general terms and cannot be with respect to any specific books, items, things or documents. What is relevant is that while granting authorisation for search and seizure operations, the authority granting such permission, i.e., Joint Commissioner or Officer above the rank of Joint Commissioner, should have reasons to believe that the goods, documents or things hold relevance and are useful in any legal proceedings under the SGST/CGST Act 2017 and the same are secreted at a particular place. (para 5) 

The Kerala High Court added that the authorization cannot be in respect of each and every article, good, etc. The authorization is in respect of the business premises of the assessee. (para 5.2) In stating so, the High Court clarified that if goods, articles, etc. belonging to a person other than an assessee are found in the premises of the assessee and the officers find them to relevant or useful to any proceedings under the KGST/CGST, they can be confiscated. It is not necessary that the title to such seized items should belong to the assessee, the confiscated goods can belong to a third party if they are found in the business premises of the assessee. 

Conclusion The Kerala High Court’s decision is a correct interpretation of the scope of permission granted to officers under Section 67. If the officers were empowered to only seize articles belonging to the assessee whose premises were being inspected, it would reduce the efficacy of the entire exercise. The barrier of them finding the articles ‘relevant and useful’ though remains; but, the scope of this barrier is the subject of another discussion. 

[1] Velayudhan Gold LLP v Intelligence Officer, Intelligence Unit, Kottarakkara TS-561-HCKER-2023-GST. 

Delhi High Court Allows IGST Refund to Vodafone

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In a recent judgment[1], the Delhi High Court ordered the Revenue Department to refund Integrated Goods and Services Tax (‘IGST’) claimed by the petitioners in respect of telecommunication services rendered by them to Foreign Telecom Operators (‘FTO’). Petitioners had entered into agreements with FTOs whereby they provided connectivity services to inbound subscribers of the latter. However, the Revenue Department rejected their refund claim on the ground that the services provided by petitioners did not amount to export of services. The High Court held otherwise.    

Facts 

Petitioners had entered into agreements with FTOs wherein the former agreed to provide connectivity services to subscribers of the latter who were in India/inbound subscribers. There was no privity of contract between the petitioners and subscribers of FTOs, the payments for connectivity services were made by subscribers to FTOs who, in turn, made payments to petitioners as per the terms of the agreement. 

The Revenue Department rejected petitioner’s claims for refund on two grounds: first, that the petitioners filed their claim for refund under Section 54 beyond the limitation period; second, the services provided by petitioners did not amount to export of services since the services were provided to inbound subscribers who were present in India and services were consumed in India. The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that they entered into agreements with FTOs and provided services to the FTOs. The FTOs, in turn, provided services to inbound subscribers. Thus, the services provided by petitioners to FTOs amounted to export of services since the FTOs were located outside India and the place of supply of services was outside India.  

Delhi High Court did not delve deeply into the issue of whether the petitioner’s claim was filed after the period of limitation. This is because the period of limitation was extended by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs via a Notification dated 05.07.2022. Thus, the only issue that the High Court had to engage with was whether services in question constituted export of services within the meaning of Section 2(6), IGST Act, 2017. 

Delhi High Court Decides, Relies on Precedent  

Section 2(6), IGST Act, 2017 defines ‘export of services’ and states as follows: 

            “export of services” means the supply of any service when, – 

  • The supplier of service is located in India; 
  • The recipient of service is located outside India; 
  • The place of supply of service is outside India; 
  • The payment for such service has been received by the supplier of service in convertible foreign exchange; [or in Indian rupees wherever permitted by the Reserve Bank of India]; and 
  • The supplier of service and recipient of service are not merely establishments of a distinct person in accordance with Explanation 1 in section 8; 

(emphasis added)

In the impugned case, the petitioner’s argument was that the recipient of service were FTOs, located outside India while the Revenue’s case that the recipient of service was the inbound subscriber who received the connectivity service due to an agreement between the petitioner and FTO. Since the Revenue was arguing that the inbound subscriber was the recipient, it by extension contended that place of service was in India. Thus, the services provided by the petitioner was not export of services and not entitled to a refund. 

The Delhi High Court instead of adjudicating on facts as to whether the inbound subscriber could be legitimately treated as a recipient of the petitioner’s service, cited the definition of export of services under Rule 6A, Service Tax Rules, 1994 which is similar to Section 2(6), IGST Act, 2017. It then relied on Verizon Communication case[2], to state that the said case covers the issue in the impugned case based on which the Revenue Department has granted refunds to predecessor of the petitioner and thus it allowed the petitioner to claim refunds in the impugned case as well. 

Precedent of Verizon Communication Case  

The Delhi High Court had considered the issue in detail in Verizon Communication case, where similar facts involved domestic telecom service providers, Verizon India and Verizon US. Verizon India had entered into a Master Supply Agreement with Verizon US for rendering connectivity services for the purpose of data transfer. Verizon India had filed for refund of taxes paid on its input on the ground that its output service to Verizon US, i.e., business support service, constituted as an export of service. The Delhi High Court agreed with Verizon India and in allowing its claim for refund, observed that: 

The position does not change merely because the subscribers to the telephone services of Verizon US or its US based customers ‘use’ the services provided by Verizon India. Indeed in the telecom sector, operators have network sharing and roaming arrangements with other telecom service providers whose services they engage to provide service to the former’s subscribers. Yet, the ‘recipient’ of the service is determined by the contract between the parties and by reference to (a) who has the contractual right to receive the services; and (b) who is responsible for the payment for the services provided (i.e., the service recipient). This essential difference has been lost sight of by the Department. In the present case there is no privity of contract between Verizon India and the customers of Verizon US. Such customers may be the ‘users’ of the services provided by Verizon India but are not its recipients. (para 46)

The distinction between the ‘user’ of services and ‘recipient’ of services proved to be crucial in the Verizon Communication case, and the Delhi High Court in the impugned case relied on the same. 

Conclusion 

The distinction between the user of services and recipient of services has been articulated in various cases, only for the said controversy to rear its head again before the Courts. In the impugned case, there was little reason, on substantive grounds, for the Revenue Department to deny refund to the petitioners. Courts, for example, have clearly that the customer’s customer is not your customer and that if a service is provided to a third party at the behest of your customer, the recipient is the customer and not the third party.[3] In the impugned case, this was squarely applicable as the inbound subscribers were not the recipients of services by petitioners, but it was the FTOs. Thus, the service provided by the petitioners to FTOs constituted as export of services entitling them to refund of IGST. 

[1] Vodafone Idea Limited v Union of India & Others 2023: DHC: 7468-DB. 

[2] Verizon Communication India Pvt Ltd v Assistant Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi-III 2018 (8) GSTL 32. 

[3] See Vodafone Essar South Limited v CCE, Bangalore (Adn). Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/193357462/ (Accessed on 30 October 2023).  

Allahabad HC Quashes Letter Issued by YEIDA Demanding Payment of GST

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Allahabad High Court recently allowed a writ petition[1] and quashed a letter issued by the Advisor to Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA) requiring the petitioner to pay GST of 18% on the premium of Rs 3.80 crores charged by the YEIDA against an institutional plot allotted to the petitioner. The High Court inter alia observed that the YEIDA did not have the authority to demand payment of GST. 

Introduction 

The petitioner’s case was that it be allowed to claim tax exemption under Notification No. 12/2017 dated 28 June 2017 read with Notification No. 32/2017 dated 13 October 2017. The petitioner argued that YEIDA had doubt as to the applicability of the Notification to the case and had applied to Authority for Advance Rulings (‘AAR’) which had decided in petitioner’s favor. YEIDA, on the other hand, defended its demand of tax from the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner did not fulfil the requirement of exemption and further that its demand for tax was only provisional in nature and the petitioner could seek refund from the Revenue Department. 

Allahabad HC Decides 

Allahabad High Court examined the relevant entries of the Notifications wherein the exemption was claimed by the petitioner. The entries allowed exemption to upfront amounts such as premium, salami, development charges, etc. leviable in respect of the service of long term lease provided by the Development Corporations/Undertakings. The High Court observed that the plain letter of the law did not allow any doubt to arise with regard to applicability of the exemption to the impugned case. The only doubt that YEIDA had was whether the exemption was applicable to allotment of plots made for public health purposes. To this end, the High Court noted that YEIDA had approached AAR with a specific query, i.e., whether GST was chargeable on premium and lease rent on plots allotted to hospitals against lease granted for 30 years. And AAR had clarified that the GST was not applicable. 

Despite the advance ruling issued by AAR which was not challenged, YEIDA issued a letter to the petitioner demanding deposit of GST @18%. It was this letter which was the subject matter of challenge. 

The Allahabad High Court observed that the stand taken by YEIDA was wholly unfounded in law. And that any doubt that arose from the language of the exemption notification was resolved by AAR. Further, the High Court noted that the AAR had confirmed GST exemption subject to the conditions mentioned in the Notification. But a look at the Notification revealed that the legislature had chosen to give unconditional exemption with respect to upfront amounts paid for such plots. Thus, it concluded that: 

Consequently, the letter dated 24.08.2018 issued on behalf of YEIDA is wholly unfounded in law and also in facts. Besides absence of conditions imposed by the legislature while granting exemption, no fact allegation has been made in the said communication of any specific condition having been violated by the petitioner. (para 22) 

The Allahabad High Court thereby quashed the letter issued by YEIDA and ordered that any amount paid by the petitioner in pursuant of such communication be refunded.  

Conclusion 

The impugned case is one of those cases where one wonders why the dispute arose in the first place. YEIDA’s doubt – superfluous to begin with – as regards applicability of the exemption was clarified by AAR, but it still demanded payment of GST from the petitioner despite no claim by the Revenue Department that the transaction was exigible to GST. YEIDA’s argument that the demand for tax was ‘provisional’ and the petitioner could seek a refund missed the point completely. Why should the tax be paid if there is no liability to pay tax in the first place? Whether it will be refunded or not is immaterial.    

[1] M/S Ram Kamal Healthcare Pvt Ltd v Union of India & Ors 2023:AHC: 191485-DB. 

Sanctity of IBC Prevails Over Tax Claims: NCLT Mumbai

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In a recent order[1], NLCT Mumbai has ruled that the time bound process of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) will prevail over payment of belated Government dues, i.e., taxes. NCLT in the impugned case only reiterated an opinion expressed earlier, but the Revenue Department tends to need frequent reminders about certain elemental aspects of law. 

Facts 

In the impugned case, the Department of State (Tax) (‘Revenue Department’) filed an application under Section 60(5), IBC against the Resolution Professional of M/s Calchem Industries Pvt Ltd seeking directions that the Resolution Professional should deal with their claims and process them as per IBC. The Revenue Department had filed their claim with the Resolution Professional via letter/email on 08.10.2021 and the same was rejected by the latter on the ground that the Committee of Creditors had already approved the Resolution Plan on 13.10.2020. 

The Revenue Department assailed the rejection of their application as illegal and relied on Regulation 14 of IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Person) Regulations, 2016. As per Regulation 14 the Resolution Professional shall make best estimate of the amount of claim based on information available to him. The Revenue Department argued that since their claims are statutory dues, the Resolution Professional should have incorporated the same in his estimate. The Revenue Department cited certain precedents to support its claim and also argued, rather strangely, that the delay in their application was caused since they were following the due procedure of law. (para 14)

The Resolution Professional, on the other hand, largely defended its rejection of the Revenue Department’s application on the ground of delay. The Resolution Professional informed NCLT that the public announcement dated 1.10.2019 had clearly stated that the last date for filing of claims was 14.10.2019 while the Revenue Department filed its initial claim on 8.10.2021.  

NCLT Decides 

NCLT cited the RPS Infrastructure case[2] to reiterate that undecided claims cannot make the CRP process endless. And it concluded that: 

Therefore, any interruption in the CIR process at this belated stage by allowing the application might open the floodgate for the similar claims, causing unnecessary delays in the CIRP process. (para 22)

NCLT, engaged with the various precedents cited by the Revenue Department in some detail and observed that one of the arguments made in previous cases was that since government dues would always be reflected in the books of account of the corporate debtor, the Resolution Professional should take them into account in its estimate. NCLT distinguished facts of the impugned case from the precedents and observed that out of the total amount claimed by the Revenue Department only some amount was reflected in the books of account on the date of initiation of CIRP. And that the assessment orders for other amounts were passed after initiation of CIRP. Thus, the latter could not have been reflected in the books of account of the corporate debtor at the time of initiation of CIRP. 

NCLT emphasised on the objective of IBC which aimed for insolvency resolution of the corporate debtor in a time bound manner and that priority accorded to Government dues was different as compared to the Companies Act. In other words, government dues were not in top hierarchy under the waterfall mechanism of IBC. While the latter was not germane to the issue at hand, NCLT did well to remind the Revenue Department that is claims did not supersede ever other claim against the corporate debtor. NCLT, thus, disallowed the application of the Revenue Department except to the extent tax dues were reflected in the books of account of the corporate debtor on the date of preparation of the Memorandum of Information by the Resolution Professional. (para 27)

Conclusion 

NCLT’s judgment in the impugned case, is another in a series of decisions where the Revenue Department has been informed that its dues are not sacrosanct and need to be secured only as per the timelines, processes and waterfall mechanism provided in the IBC. While in the impugned case, the Revenue Department secured a partial victory, and rightly so, it is another in a disconcerting trend where the Revenue Department tends to think, almost incorrigibly, that its tax dues should be paid irrespective of what the letter of law says.  

[1] Department of State Tax v Resolution Professional of M/s. Calchem Industries (India Limited), IA/282/2022 & IA426/2022, available at https://nclt.gov.in/gen_pdf.php?filepath=/Efile_Document/ncltdoc/casedoc/2709138000222022/04/Order-Challenge/04_order-Challange_004_1696595733706984618651fff15f3463.pdf (Accessed on 13.10.2023). 

[2] RPS Infrastructure Ltd v Mukul Kumar & Anr (2023) ibclaws.in 102 SC. 

No Advertisement Tax on Name Boards or Sign Boards

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In a recent judgment[1], the Supreme Court set aside demand notices for advertisement tax issued by the Indore Municipal Corporation against the appellant. The demand notices for advertisement tax were issued to the appellant because they had displayed their name/sign boards outside their business premises which the Municipal Corporation deemed to be advertisement and thus liable to pay advertisement tax. The Supreme Court opined on the meaning of advertisement, cited relevant precedents, and concluded that sign boards do not constitute advertisements and are not exigible to advertisement tax. 

Facts 

The appellant in the impugned case was occupier of premises on AB Road, Indore and was carrying on the business of Hyundai passenger cars at the said premises. The appellant had displayed its trade name as well as the product and services offered by it in the premises where the business was being run. The Indore Municipal Corporation issued a notice to the appellant for recovery of advertisement tax for displaying the sign board at its premises. The notice was issued under the relevant Municipal Corporation statute read with the relevant Municipal Corporation advertisement by-laws. 

The appellant objected to the notice demanding advertisement tax on the ground that it was not displaying any advertisement but its own trade and business name. The appellant also argued that it was carrying on business outside the municipal limits of Indore and thus no tax was leviable on its activities. Appellant’s writ petition against the notices was rejected by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and it appealed before the Supreme Court. 

Arguments 

The appellant assailed the Madhya Pradesh’s judgment on various grounds: first, that the High Court relied on Bharti Airtel judgment[2] which was irrelevant to the facts at hand; second, mere display of name and business cannot amount to advertisement as the said information is only for identification purposes and providing information to the general public; third, the appellant contended that levy of advertisement tax on trade name would amount to violation of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution 

The State, on the other hand, contended that appellant’s displaying their trade name along with the products and services offered by them amounted to advertisement as the said information was communicated to the public not only for information purposes but also for commercial exploitation. 

Supreme Court Opines on Meaning of ‘Advertisement’

The Supreme Court framed the primary issue as: whether display boards, sign boards or name boards as displayed by the appellants would constitute as advertisements? The incidental question, as per the Supreme Court, was whether all modes of display would amount to advertisement? To answer this question, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the ICICI Bank case[3] where the meaning of advertisement in a comparable context had been examined. The Supreme Court in ICICI Bank case had noted that an advertisement should have a commercial purpose or exposition and should indicate business of the displayer with a view to attract people to its goods or services. The Supreme Court in ICICI Bank case opined on the issue of whether signs that illuminated ATM centres would constitute as advertisements. It did not give a clear answer and observed that signs of ATMs provide information to public as to a facility available at the said place but could also be used indirectly for commercial exploitation for commercial purposes. And the answer to this issue would depend on facts of each case. 

The Supreme Court said the guidelines in in ICICI Bank case, would prima facie indicate that in the impugned case:  

… as dealers of Tata Motors and Hyundai Vehicles appellants have displayed their name board of respective business establishment which is also depicting the nature of the respective vehicles which are being sold and it would be inseparable part of the appellants’ business establishment. By mere mentioning the name of the product in which the business establishment is being run would not partake the character of the advertisement until and unless by such display customers are solicited. (para 18)

 The Supreme Court added that in the absence of any name board or sign board it would be impossible to identify establishments and the sign boards displayed by appellants on their business premises only provide general information of the products offered by them and not to solicit customers or induce general public to purchase their products.  

Finally, the Supreme Court made a curious statement. It noted that under the relevant statutory provisions the Municipal Corporation was not authorized to demand tax for display of information through name boards. And that legislative was not to levy tax on sign boards but only on advertisements. It then noted that:

            Even in such circumstances, it is held that it amounts to advertisement, such levy would be without authority of law and would find foul of Article 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and Article 265 of the Constitution of India. (para 18) 

Does the above cited sentence mean that a sign board even if amounts to advertisement would not have been taxable under the relevant provisions? It is a curious sentence since it renders futile the entire argument made by the State. If the State, under the relevant provisions, could not tax a sign board even if it amounted to an advertisement what was the need to distinguish a sign board from an advertisement?  

Conclusion 

Presuming that distinguishing a sign board from an advertisement was crucial in the impugned case, it cannot be denied that distinguishing a sign board from an advertisement is a fraught exercise and the Supreme Court in ICICI Bank case was correct in laying down the broad parameters and stating that whether a particular information amounts to advertisement or not should be determined on the facts of each case. An attractive display of only the products and services offered by a business could amount to an advertisement in certain cases while it could be understood to be a mere sign board in other cases. In the impugned case, the Supreme Court favored the appellant relying on its assertion that its sign board was only aimed to identify its business and not solicit customers; though the distinction may not be as apparent in all cases. In ICICI Bank case, the Supreme Court noted that the non-commercial element of the illuminated ATM centre was that it was a public facility while in the impugned case the non-commercial element was that the sign board helps the general public identify a business place. It is reasonable to deduce from the above cases that if the non-commercial element dominates and is not intended to solicit customers it can be said to not amount to advertisement though the said issue can only be answered by looking at the signs in each case and after ascertaining the relevant facts. 

[1] M/S Harsh Automobiles Private Limited v Indore Municipal Corporation 2023 INSC 893. Available at https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/3032/3032_2018_8_1502_47486_Judgement_09-Oct-2023.pdf (Last accessed on 12 October 2023).  

[2] Bharti Airtel v State of Madhya Pradesh WP No. 2296 of 2012, decided on 12.01.2015. (This judgment addressed the issue of whether advertisement tax could be collected by appointing agents and was not relevant to the facts of impugned case. It was incorrectly relied on by the High Court and the Supreme Court correctly said that the Bharti Airtel case was irrelevant to the impugned case.). 

[3] ICICI Bank and Another v Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (2005) 6 SC 404. 

Allahabad HC Opines on Section 129, CGST Act, 2017

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In a recent case[1], the Allahabad High Court has reiterated an essential condition to invoke Section 129, CGST Act, 2017, i.e., an intention to evade tax. While a similar observation has been made by Supreme Court in M/s Satyam Shivam Papers case[2], the High Court’s reinforcement is perhaps necessary due to repeated transgressions by the Revenue Department.

Facts 

In the impugned case, the petitioner was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of industrial grade steel components such as channels, beams, etc. The petitioner was transporting the said goods to M/s Maa Ambey Steels with the relevant tax invoices, e-way bills, etc. During transport, the said goods were intercepted, and the relevant officers found that the e-way bill accompanying the goods had been cancelled by the purchaser, M/s Maa Ambey Steels. In the absence of a valid e-way bills, the goods were seized. The petitioner subsequently explained to the Revenue Department that all the relevant e-way bills had been completed but the it was unaware of the fact that e-way bills had been cancelled by the purchaser. The petitioner tried to convince the Revenue Department that the transaction in question was genuine and goods were being sold by a registered dealer to another registered dealer. Dissatisfied with the petitioner’s response, the Revenue Department passed an order under Section 129(3), CGST Act, 2017 and a penalty was imposed on the petitioner. The petitioner assailed the said order via writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. 

No Intention to Evade Tax 

The Allahabad High Court engaged with the arguments of the petitioner and the Revenue Department. The petitioner’s primary argument was that while an order was passed against it under Section 129 whereby a penalty imposed, but in the said order there was no reference to the petitioner’s intention to evade tax. The petitioner argued that in the absence of an intent to evade tax, the penalty should have been imposed on it under Section 122(ix), CGST Act, 2017 and not Section 129(3), CGST Act, 2017. (para 5) The Revenue Department, on the other hand, argued that Section 129 starts with a non-obstante clause and thus it overrides every other provision of CGST Act, 2017. (para 7) And that transporting goods without a valid e-way bill attracted Section 129, CGST Act, 2017. 

The Allahabad High Court observed that once the dealer had informed the Revenue Department of the attending and mediating circumstances that led to cancellation of the e-way bill, it was a minor breach on the petitioner’s end. The purchaser had cancelled the e-way bill due to valuation issues of the goods. And the petitioner had sold the goods in question to another purchaser subsequently. And thus the High Court observed that: 

The authority could have initiated proceedings under section 122 of the CGST Act instead of proceedings under section 129 of the CGST Act. Section 129 of the CGST Act must be read with section 130 of the said Act, which mandate the intention to evade payment of tax. Once the authorities have not observed that there was intent to evade payment of tax, proceedings under section 129 of the CGST Act ought not to have been initiated, but it could be done under section 122 of the CGST Act in the facts & circumstances of the present case. (para 10) 

The Allahabad High Court further added that while Section 129 deals with detention and seizure of goods and Section 130 with confiscation of goods; a purposive reading of both the provisions deals indicates that the legislature intended that an intent to evade tax is sine qua non to initiate proceedings under the aforesaid provisions. (para 11) 

Conclusion

The Allahabad High Court’s observations in the impugned case are not unprecedented. The Supreme Court in M/s Satyam Shivam Papers case had observed that the goods in question could not be transported in time due to factors beyond the taxpayer’s control and thus an intent to evade tax could not be attributed to the taxpayer. It is not unsurprising that an elemental issue needs reiteration by different Courts repeatedly to underline the legislative intent and scope of the provision. Hopefully, this judgment will prove constructive in enhancing the Revenue Department’s understanding of the scope of Section 129 and by extension, of the scope of Section 130 of CGST Act, 2017.    

[1] M/s Shyam Sel and Power Ltd v State of UP and Others 2023 LiveLaw (AB) 374. 

[2] Assistant Commissioner (ST) & Others v M/s Satyam Shivam Papers Pvt Ltd (2022) 134 taxmann.com 241.  

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