GST

The Monsoon of Tax ‘Reform’ 

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It’s raining tax ‘reform’. Income Tax Bill, 2025 (‘IT Bill, 2025’) will soon replace the six decades old Income Tax Act, 1961. Goods and Services Tax (‘GST’) will ostensibly be simplified by Diwali of 2025. And we will have a two-tier GST consisting of 5% and 12%, with a ‘special’ tax rate of 40% applicable to select goods and services. Income Tax Return forms are being simplified, money limits for filing appeals across all tax domains are being enhanced to reduce tax litigation. Cumulatively, the changes – we are informed – are part of the larger goal of ushering in ‘Next-Generation Reforms’. There is a lot of activity, but something seems amiss.

Substantive tax reform is amiss. 

IT Bill, 2025: Simple Language, Uncertain Policy 

The use of simple, comprehensible, and coherent legal language is a goal worth spending thousands of hours. But such an exercise proves to be shallow and limited if the underlying policy is unclear and operating at cross purposes. Is faceless assessment scheme now the default manner of assessment or some aspects of human interaction are to be retained permanently? Do CSR activities deserve an unqualified tax-free status? What is the appropriate manner to levy tax on trusts? If the questions seem too narrow and pointed, what about the broader ones. Do we decisively move to the new tax regime and shed the old tax regime? Do we provide revenue targets to officers, but ensure that they don’t adopt absurd positions? Can we ensure that the Revenue Department does not adopt a position that is contrary to plain language of the statute? Do we repose faith in taxpayers and make policies from that starting point or is the default position otherwise? Should every tax treaty now be necessarily notified or was it just a convenient argument adopted by the Income Tax Department to deny benefits to a handful of taxpayers? I can go on, but you get the gist. 

If core income tax policies are in a state of flux, the language to express that policy can only provide limited clarity. Ironically, most clarity emerges in only in provisions which endow powers to the Income Tax Department. This includes powers of search and seizure, powers of arrest, and now that the dust has settled a bit: powers to reopen assessments. Otherwise, use of phrases such ‘tax year’ for ‘assessment year/previous year’ or use of ‘irrespective’ instead of ‘notwithstanding’ is a choice in favor of alternate words, not necessarily clarity. The IT Bill, 2025 may be more readable compared to its predecessor. The unending provisos and explanations may have been removed, redundant provisions to some extent been deleted, and use of legalese comparatively lesser. But improved readability should not be confused with clarity.    

GST: Multiple Tax Rates are not THE Enemy

Multiple tax rates in GST only take the heat because they are an obvious and low hanging target on which we like to hang all the flaws of GST. But the truth is that the Union and States cannot express their GST governance in clear and unambiguous terms. Why are purchaser’s dependent on suppliers to file their returns to claim Input Tax Credit? Why is provisional attachment of taxpayer properties so commonplace that courts must intervene repeatedly, and caution about the draconian nature of the power of provisional attachment? What policy is guiding levy of GST on health and life insurance? Why was online gaming target of ludicrous GST claims despite the law being obviously silent on come crucial issues? Why cannot the Revenue Department not digest any loss in courts? Any major loss in courts for the Revenue Department immediately triggers an amendment to nullify the decision. If possible, a through retrospective amendment. You want examples of these amendments? I’ve enlisted some here. 

The upward trajectory of GST collections hides the many flaws of GST governance. Instead of undertaking long, painful substantive reform, and building on the many gains of GST, we have chosen to focus on tinkering with GST rates. It is an easy sell on the political front. Come Diwali, it is easy to sell reduction of GST rates on cars and claim brownie points. But does that solve the broader issues caused by multiple tax rates in GST. The classification disputes – though source of occasional amusement – are unlikely to see end of the day until GST magically adopts a single-rate structure. Is revenue neutral rate now completely irrelevant to determine GST tax rates? If GST Compensation Cess is phased out, will the new policy be of no more cesses on GST? Because if the Union and States are simply going to levy ad hoc cesses on narrowed down tax slabs to compensate for revenue loss, we may as well stick with the current tax rates. And, while we at it, can someone tell me: why do gold and precious stones that they deserve a tax rate of their own?    

Tax Administration IS Tax Policy

There is a credible viewpoint in tax law scholarship: tax administration IS tax policy. You can understand this pithy quote in any number of ways. First, that tax administration can elevate or bury the most prudent tax policy. Delay in processing bona fide tax refunds can defeat a well-intentioned policy of reducing tax burdens of certain taxpayers. Cancelling GST registrations for sham reasons can defeat the policy of providing registrations within three working days of filing an application of registration. The above viewpoint can also be understood to mean that tax administration is an integral part of tax policy. Or if not integral, tax policy is certainly not distanced from tax administration. And that any tax reform or change in tax policy that does not bring a simultaneous change in tax administration is a flawed, if not a doomed tax reform. 

We cannot expect a rewrite of a law or a change in the tax rates to simply reduce unnecessary litigation, improve compliance, or otherwise improve tax governance. We need accompanying changes in attitudes of tax officers which in turn may require a broader systemic change in the administration of our Revenue Departments. Forsaking pedantic interpretation of law, aspiring for tax coherence, letting go of smaller tax demands in the short run for long term gains of simplicity and coherence can be some of the changes. But, as I write and advocate for these changes, I’m already convinced that they will take a long time to be realized. If at all.   

Conclusion – Buzzwords Abound  

The landscape of tax law and policy is increasingly being populated by buzzwords of no consequence. ‘One Nation, One Tax’ was a slogan that hid the reality that some indirect taxes will survive the implementation of GST. Now the ‘Diwali gift’ of GST tax rates restructuring is being thrown around as if sane tax policy is a largesse of the state and not a basic expectation of taxpayers. Income tax law has a ‘new look’ while it retains its old soul. And, while one cannot grouse political priorities because buzzwords sell, it is vital to understand the substance or the lack of it that hides behinds these quasi-marketing slogans. India’s tax landscape needs reform – deep, wide, and substantive. Anything else is activity, not meaningful change.    

Competition Law and the IBC: An Alternate Perspective on the Supreme Court’s Balancing Act

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Introduction

Recently, the Supreme Court (‘Court’) in Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd v Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors resolved an interpretive uncertainty involving the interface of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) with the Competition Act, 2002. The narrow question before the Court was whether the approval of a resolution plan by the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) must mandatorily precede the approval of the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’) under the proviso to Section 31(4), IBC. The proviso states that:

 Provided that where the resolution plan contains a provision for combination as referred to in section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003), the resolution applicant shall obtain the approval of the Competition Commission of India under that Act prior to the approval of such resolution plan by the committee of creditors.

The majority opinion, relying on a plain and literal interpretation, held that prior approval by the CCI was mandatory and not directory. The interpretive disagreement did not arise due to any ambiguity in the provision per se, but due to anxiety about delays in the resolution process. It was argued that mandating the prior approval of the CCI for all resolution applicants, instead of only the successful resolution applicant, would delay the completion of the resolution process under the IBC, and time is of the essence in a resolution process to protect and maximise the value of the corporate debtor’s assets. The issue – before, and even after the Court’s judgment – has been largely looked at from the prism of efficacy of the resolution process under the IBC and the need to respect timelines. Even the resolution professional in the impugned case seems to have interpreted the requirement of prior approval as directory to preserve time.  

I suggest that there are alternative ways to examine the issue. First, the prior approval of the CCI ensures respect for the commercial wisdom of the CoC as it prevents an ex-post alteration of the latter’s decision. The above sequence will help preserve the design of the IBC, which entrusts the CoC with the final say on commercial decisions in the resolution process. Second, I propose that insistence on prior approval of the CCI should be viewed as an eligibility requirement for resolution applicants instead of a procedural hurdle. The requirement of the prior approval of the CCI may dissuade insincere resolution applicants, and prevent submission of resolution plans that may crumble at the implementation stage. Cumulatively, both arguments cohere with the framework of the IBC and provide us a better understanding of its aims and procedures.  

Respect For Commercial Wisdom Of The CoC 

In most cases where petitioners have challenged the CoC’s approval of a resolution plan, courts have invoked the supremacy of the commercial wisdom of the CoC. The policy design of the IBC confers powers on the CoC to take commercial decisions, and courts can only intervene in limited and specific instances. The narrow window for judicial interference with decisions of the CoC has been rightly justified by courts by invoking limited grounds for appeal under the IBC. Courts have, thus, termed decisions of the CoC as being of paramount importance. How does the CoC’s supremacy translate into, and become relevant, in the context of the interface of the IBC and the Competition Act, 2002?

The Court in the impugned case relied on the commercial wisdom of the CoC to observe that the lack of prior approval will dilute the aforesaid design of the IBC. For example, if the CoC approves a resolution plan before it receives approval by the CCI, it would leave open the possibility of the latter suggesting modifications to the resolution plan. Permitting ex-post changes by the CCI would also strike at the finality of the CoC’s decision, and, more pertinently, alter the CoC’s position as the final arbiter of corporate debtors’ destiny. The Court underlined the paramount importance of the commercial wisdom of the CoC and reasoned that it can only be exercised assiduously if the CCI’s approval precedes the CoC’s approval. Otherwise, the CoC would be forced to exercise its commercial wisdom without complete information.   

Providing the CoC with the final say on commercial aspects of the resolution plan has remained a core idea since the initial stages of discussion on the IBC. The Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (‘BLRC’) had noted that one of the flaws of the pre-IBC regime was to have entrusted business and financial decisions to judicial forums. The BLRC opined that it was not ideal to let adjudicatory bodies take commercial decisions as they may not possess the relevant expertise. To overcome the flaws of the pre-IBC regime, the IBC was designed to empower only the CoC to take business decisions, as it comprises of financial creditors who may bear the loss in the resolution process. The bifurcation of roles was clear, the legislature and courts were to control and supervise the resolution process, however, all business decisions were the remit of the CoC, though it would arrive at the decision after consultation and negotiations with the corporate debtor. In a similar vein, the Court in Swiss Ribbons v Union of India noted that the financial creditors, comprising mainly of banks and financial institutions, are from the beginning involved in assessing the viability of the corporate debtor, and are best positioned to take decisions on restructuring the loan and reorganisation of the corporate debtor’s business when there is financial stress.         

The resolution applicant also suggested that the CCI’s approval could be sought by the successful applicant after the CoC’s approval but before the NCLT’s approval. First, the suggestion contravenes the plain language of the proviso. Second, the suggestion, if accepted, would still leave open the window of the CCI suggesting amendments to the CoC-approved resolution plan and strike at the IBC’s aim to give the CoC the final say on commercial aspects of the resolution plan.

In fact, the CoC approving a resolution plan which has not received the CCI’s approval would also be in contravention of other provisions of the IBC. The Court specifically mentioned that a resolution plan which contains a provision for combination is incapable of being enforced if it has not secured prior approval of the CCI. Such a plan cannot be approved by the Court as it would violate Sections 30(2)(e), 30(3), and 34(4)(a) of the IBC on grounds of being in contravention of the laws in force. Apart from the above provisions, it may be worth mentioning Section 30(4), which obligates the CoC to approve a resolution plan after considering its feasibility and viability. Clearly, evaluation of the feasibility and viability of a resolution plan must precede the CoC’s approval. The CoC should not be put in a position where it approves a resolution plan and only subsequently considers its feasibility and viability based on the CCI’s opinion, as that would disregard the IBC’s mandate.   

 Proviso To Section 31(4) As An ‘Eligibility Requirement’

 I suggest that the proviso to Section 31(4) should be viewed as an eligibility requirement for the resolution applicant. My suggestion is predicated on an analogy with Section 29A(c). Briefly put, Section 29A(c) declares that a person is ineligible to submit a resolution plan if such person or any other person acting jointly, or in concert with, it has an account classified as a non-performing asset for one year. The proviso removes the ineligibility if the person makes payment of all overdue amounts before the submission of the resolution plan. One of the resolution applicants in Arcelor Mittal India Pvt Ltd v Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors had argued that insistence on the prior payment of overdue amounts would reduce the pool of resolution applicants as their plan may not be eventually approved by the CoC, and that the proviso should be interpreted in a ‘commercially sensible’ manner wherein overdue amounts should be allowed to be paid as part of the resolution plan and not before the submission of the resolution plan.

Justice S.V.M Bhatti, in his dissenting opinion in the impugned case, has attempted to interpret proviso to Section 31(4) in a similar fashion. He has observed that insistence on prior approval by the CCI would limit the number of eligible resolution applicants. Further, he noted that the requirement of prior approval by the CCI raises a question of prudence since the resolution applicant would seek approval of its plan, which may eventually not be acceptable to the CoC.    

 In Arcelor Mittal, the Court dismissed the above line of arguments and held that the plain language of the proviso to Section 29A(c) makes it clear that the ineligibility is removed if overdue payments are made before the submission of the resolution plan. Making the overdue payments may be worth the while of the applicant as the dues may be insignificant compared to the possibility of gaining control of the corporate debtor. The Court added that it would not disregard the plain language of the proviso to avoid hardship to the resolution applicant. The above reasoning squarely applies to the proviso to Section 31(4) and is more persuasive than the dissenting opinion in the impugned case.  

 In fact, one could further engage with the argument about the proviso limiting the number of eligible resolution applicants by stating that the mandate of prior approval of the CCI may act as a filtering mechanism and attract only sincere applicants with concrete resolution plans. The receipt of the CCI approval may diminish the possibility of the resolution plan crumbling at the implementation stage due to the inability or disinclination of the resolution applicants to comply with the subsequent conditions that the CCI may impose. Knowledge of the CCI’s stance prior to the approval of the resolution plan will help in setting realistic timelines and conditions for the successful resolution applicant. 

 Section 31(4) permits the successful resolution applicant to obtain the necessary approvals required under any law for the time being in force, within one year from the date of approval by the adjudicating authority.  The proviso to Section 31(4) carves out one exception and states that if the resolution plan contains a provision for combination, the resolution applicant shall obtain the approval of the CCI prior to the approval of such resolution plan by the CoC. The language of the proviso is clear, unambiguous, and the legislative intent is unmistakable. As the Court noted in its majority opinion, courts must respect the ordinary and plain meaning of the language instead of wandering into the realm of speculation. An exception has been made in the proviso wherein resolution applicants need the prior approval of the CCI. To interpret ‘prior’ to mean ‘after’ would amount to the judicial reconstruction of a statutory provision. There is also no room to interpret the requirement of prior approval as being directory and not mandatory. Analogous to the proviso to Section 29A(c), obtaining the prior approval of the CCI may be ‘worth the while’ of the resolution applicants and this would be a  minor hardship compared to the possibility of controlling the corporate debtor.  

 Prior approval by the CCI should be viewed as an eligibility requirement for resolution applicants instead of a procedural burden. Typically, resolution professionals prescribe requirements of net worth, expertise, etc. for resolution applicants. If compliance with such conditions is not viewed as a hurdle, why view a regulatory approval only through the lens of time, as a procedural hurdle? Instead, it is better viewed as a safeguard to prevent future legal hurdles, smoothen the implementation of approved resolution plan, and to preserve the IBC’s design.  

Understanding The Anxiety About Delay

The Court, in the impugned case, has cited statistics to blunt the argument on delay. The statistics about the speed of decision-making by the CCI reveal that delays may not be significant. The Court cited the Annual General Report of the CCI for 2022-23, as per which, the average time taken by the CCI to dispose of combination applications was 21 days, and there was no recorded instance of the CCI taking more than 120 days to approve a combination application. The track record of the CCI partly convinced the Court that arguments about delays were exaggerated.

While there is merit in arguing that the insistence on prior approval by the CCI may delay the resolution process, it is important to add two caveats: first, even in cases not requiring the approval of the CCI, timelines of the IBC are not frequently respected for various reasons. This is not to suggest that additional delays would do no harm, but that delays are par for the course even when the CCI’s approval is not required. So, it is not accurate to ascribe the possible delay only to the requirement of the CCI’s prior approval. Second, prior approval by the CCI will be needed in relatively few instances, and thus there is good reason to adopt a relaxed view of timelines in such cases to avoid competition law issues after the CoC has approved the resolution plan. The additional time consumed in seeking the CCI’s approval will be for a valid reason, i.e., to address the interface of the IBC with competition law. The IBC cannot be implemented in a sealed bubble. where no extraneous factor  ever influences the speed and progress of the resolution process.  

Conclusion

I have tried to establish that once we take a step back from the time-centric arguments, we can cast a different lens on the issue of the interface of competition law and the IBC.  We can understand that the decision-making of the CoC, and other procedural requirements also need to be respected to maintain the integrity of the resolution process. Time, despite being vital, cannot solely dictate the entire resolution process. When the resolution process implicates other areas of law, such as competition law, adopting a relatively relaxed approach to the time limits of the IBC may ensure smooth approval and implementation of the resolution plan. In fact, the prior approval of the CCI aligns with the key design of the IBC, which strives to reserve final decisions on the resolution process to the CoC, subject to minimal judicial supervision. If the CCI unpacks and modifies the CoC-approved resolution plans ex-post, it will in fact, undermine the sanctity of the resolution process.

[This post was first published at NLSIR Online in May 2025.]

Service Charge, its Similarity with Tax, and a ‘Double Whammy’ for Consumers: Some Thoughts

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Introduction 

The Delhi High Court (‘High Court’) recently ruled that levy of mandatory service charge by restaurants violates customer rights. The High Court’s reasoning, anchored in consumer protection laws, termed a mandatory service charge as deceptive and misleading for consumers. The High Court also made a few casual references to tax laws. For example, the High Court took umbrage at the nomenclature of ‘service charge’ and its potential to confuse customers with a tax levied by the Government. There is merit to the High Court’s observation, but service charge and tax have a deeper connection that is only superficially referred to in the judgment. In this article, I try to scratch the surface a bit deeper.  

I elaborate on two potential misgivings about service charge that the High Court’s judgment may entrench: 

First, the High Court noted that addition of service charge below the cost of food followed by levy of GST in the bill, created a ‘double whammy’ for the customers. I argue that restaurants by adding service charge before calculating GST were adhering to the mandate under CGST Act, 2017. In complying with GST laws, restaurants seem to have tripped over the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Unless there is a change in any of the two laws, restaurants are now faced with the challenge of squaring a circle.  

Second, the High Court’s view that service charge can be confused for a tax prompted it to recommend that a change in nomenclature may be worth exploring. The High Court recommended that the Central Consumer Protection Authority (‘CCPA’) can permit restaurants to levy ‘tip’, ‘gratuity’, or ‘fund’ on a voluntary basis. The nomenclature issue was two-fold: first, service charge per being mistaken for a tax by customers; second, use of abbreviations by restaurants – such as ‘charge’, ‘VSC’, ‘SER’ – which further misled the customers if the levy was a mandatory levy by the State or restaurants. I query whether ‘confusion’ is the touchstone to determine if a levy by private entity should be disallowed or is its perceived mandatory nature?  

GST on Food Cost + Service Charge 

The High Court noted in its judgment that: 

Moreover, when the bills of establishments are generated, it is noticed that the service charge is added right below the total amount of the cost of the food, followed by GST and taxes. For any consumer who does not examine the bill thoroughly, the impression given is that the service charge is a component of tax; (para 122)

The High Court’s above observation hints at two things: 

one, the restaurants are trying to inflate the cost of food bill by calculating GST on the cumulative of food bill and service charge;  

second, the mention of service charge just before GST creates a confusion that the former is a tax. 

Let me examine the first implication in this section.  

Section 15(2)(c), CGST Act, 2017 states that the value of supply of goods or services or both shall include:

incidental expenses, including commission and packing, charged by the supplier to the recipient of a supply and any amount charged for anything done by the supplier in respect of the supply of goods or services or both at the time of, or before delivery of goods or supply of services; (emphasis added)

Thus, if a restaurant was adding service charge to the food bill before computing GST, it was adhering to the mandate of GST law and not trying to ‘inflate’ the bill on its own accord. Once a restaurant decides to levy any additional charge including packing charges, etc., then as per Section 15(2)(c) it needs to be added to the total cost in a bill before computing GST. Adding all the ancillary costs ensures that the base value for calculating GST is as high as possible. Enhancing underlying value of the supply is a statutory policy aimed to enhance revenue collections, and leaves business entities such as restaurants no option to exclude charges such as service charge from the cost. One could question the statutory policy, but I doubt restaurants at fault for adding service charge to the food cost before computing GST.   

In adding the service charge to food cost, as per the mandate of CGST Act, 2017, restaurants though seem to have tripped over the consumer protection law. How to ensure compliance with both? The High Court has offered a suggestion that service charge could be renamed to something that cannot be confused with a tax, though its payment should remain voluntary.    

Service Charge Can be Confused With Tax 

The High Court, as noted above, was concerned about mention of service charge just above GST in the restaurant bill and its potential to confuse customers former with a tax. The High Court also noted that:     

In some cases, service charge is being confused with service tax or a mandatory tax imposed by the government. In fact, for the consumers, the collection of service charge is proving to be a double whammy i.e., they are forced to pay service tax and GST on the service charge as well. This position cannot be ignored by the Court. (para 123)

Latter part of the High Court’s judgment, of course, is a bit inaccurate. Service tax has been subsumed by GST since July 2017. Also, payment of GST on service charge is not a ‘double whammy’ as the High Court observes. It is, as noted above, payment of GST as per statutory mandate. It is simply, a ‘whammy’ as inclusion of service charge in value of supply though prejudices the taxpayer, is not qualitatively dissimilar from inclusion of any charges that suppliers compulsorily collect from their recipients.  

The first part of the observation points out that service charge can be confused with a tax by consumers who may think they have no option but to pay it, may be misled into paying a private compulsory levy. The misleading part is on two counts, as per the High Court. 

First, the mention of service charge just above GST. This can be corrected by tinkering billing software and doesn’t seem like a substantive issue that it beyond correction. One could perhaps mandate restaurants to specifically mention in the bill itself that service charge is discretionary and not a levy by the State.    

Second, is the phrase ‘service charge’ itself, which gives consumers the impression that it is a tax. But will a service charge by any other name taste just as bitter? Perhaps. 

Even if the CCPA permits restaurants to rename service charge to let us say a ‘tip’, it would have to be on a voluntary basis. Technically, as per CCPA guidelines, service charge was discretionary even before the Delhi High Court’s judgment. And if CCPA permits levy of ‘tip’, we would enter similar issues of restaurants arguing that the ‘tips’ are voluntary and customers can request it to be waived off while customers claiming that the voluntary nature is only a ruse. Restaurants effectively collect ‘tip’ as if it’s a mandatory charge. Equally, GST will have to levied on food cost and ‘tip’, if paid. Thus, the ‘double whammy’ may persist. 

Can consumers confuse a ‘tip’ with a ‘tax’? Well, ideally, they should not confuse a service charge with a tax either. Not after July 2017, since the terms service charge and GST are not eerily similar. However, one should not take the view of a tax professional but deploy the standard of an average reasonable consumer. It is difficult to predict with mathematical certitude, but a ‘tip’ or ‘gratuity’ seems like a relatively less confusing option. If CCPA can mandate that no restaurants cannot use abbreviations or alternate names which can lead to confusion as in the case of service charge. There should be one voluntary levy and its name uniform across all restaurants.  

Finally, I’m prompted to ask a question: do we mistake any other levy by private entity as a tax? Is there any comparable example? 

There have been instances of conmen masquerading as tax officers, and fooling people into paying money, but I cannot think of a comparable levy where an average person has been confused that the money is not being collected by the State, but a private entity. Perhaps some people were confused if the maintenance fee paid to their resident associations was a State levy, but the confusion doesn’t seem as widespread as for service charge. The confusion seems a rather peculiar and unique problem to service charge. And one that may require an innovative solution. Though, equally possibly, restaurants may eschew the path of levying or collecting any ‘tip’ and may simply raise prices of food to compensate. Wait and watch, I guess.  

Fraudulent Sale is Supply Under GST: Three Errors of the Advance Ruling

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A recent advance ruling by Gujarat AAR is a frustrating read. AAR held that sale by a seller constitutes as supply under GST laws even if the seller was defrauded and did not receive any consideration for such goods. In this article, I argue that there are three obvious errors in the advance ruling, which encompass flaw in applicant’s arguments and AAR’s approach. The three errors are: 

First, the applicant’s framing of question. 

Second, AAR’s reasoning and identification of relevant provision. 

Third, applicant’s argument on why a fraudulent sale should not constitute a supply. 

The facts involved a peculiar and may I daresay a novel question that should have led to an interesting analysis of the relevant legal provisions and hopefully a defensible answer. Instead, what we receive via the advance ruling is a superficial analysis and a facile answer. 

The basic facts in application were: the applicant supplied submersible pumps for two months and generated several invoices for the said sales only to discover that it had been defrauded. The applicant did not receive any consideration for the supply of goods as the order documents were forged by a fraudulent purchaser by using the name of a reputable purchaser. Applicant approached AAR seeking an answer whether GST can be levied on the above transaction.  

First Error 

The question before AAR should have been whether such a fraudulent sale of goods constitutes a supply under GST laws, even in the absence of a consideration? Instead, applicant framed the question as:      

Whether the goods supplied by us [becoming victim of fraud without receiving consideration] could be considered as supply of goods under the provisions of section 21 under the IGST Act? 

Grammatical errors in the question aside, the legal question would be why did the applicant invoke Section 21, IGST Act, 2017? The impugned provision states that import of services made on or after the appointed day shall be liable to tax regardless, whether the transactions for import of such services had been initiated before the appointed day. However, the applicant’s transaction in question was an inter-State supply and nothing to do with import of services. Clearly, the applicant approached AAR with a question that referred to the wrong provision. And AAR also noted the applicant’s reference to the above provision and observed: 

How this will be applicable to supply of goods made by the applicant to the recipient in the State of Assam is not understood. We find that the question, at best is vaguely framed. (para 9)

The applicant’s query could not have been answered by referring to the wrong provision and thus another approach was necessary. 

Second Error 

In adopting the alternate approach, the AAR made an error by referring to Section 12, CGST Act, 2017 which states the time of supply of goods. Time of supply goods is a concept under GST which helps us determine at what point in time did the supply in question took place. To delineate and cohere various situations, the provision lays down certain rules including deeming fictions. AAR referred to Section 12 and noted that time of supply of goods is either the date of issue of invoice by the supplier or date on which the supplier receives payment with respect to the supply, whichever is earlier. Applying the above rules to the facts, AAR noted that the supplier had issued invoices in June 2023 and July 2023, thus the point of taxation in respect of supply of goods will be the date of issue of invoice. AAR thereby concluded that the applicant had supplied goods under relevant provisions of GST laws. 

The error in the above analysis by AAR is that it did not consider if supply had been made. Time of supply as the phrase indicates is only relevant for a supply. The more relevant question for AAR was if a supply had been made and not the time of supply. Latter was contingent on the former. AAR, instead, assumed that the supply had been made and relied on time of supply and invoices to state that a supply had been made. 

Third Error 

This leads us to the third error: applicant’s argument that no supply had taken place. The applicant relied on Sales of Goods Act, 1930 to argue that a valid sale had not taken place since all the essential ingredients of a sale were not satisfied in absence of a consideration. AAR declined to accept applicant’s above argument and referred to Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 which defines supply. However, instead of analysing if the ingredients of supply were satisfied in the impugned case, AAR took a short route and simply noted that ‘it is not disputed that a supply has been done by the applicant’. (para 14) AAR concluded that while a fraud may vitiate the contract of sale, the applicant has not explained how a fraudulent sale moves outside the ambit of supply. 

The error here is actually two-fold: first, the applicant invoking Sales of Goods Act, 1930 instead of categorically stating that the ingredients of supply are not satisfied in the impugned case; second, AAR only reproducing the definition of supply in its ruling rather than examining if a supply can take place under Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 even if the purchaser pays no consideration. To be fair though, AAR would not undertake the latter exercise if the applicant doesn’t argue for it. And it seems the four people representing the applicant before AAR didn’t make the argument and instead surprisingly relied on Sales of Goods Act, 1930 to argue that a sale had not taken place.      

Conclusion 

The first instinct is to club Gujarat AAR’s impugned ruling with the wide swathe of sub-par advance rulings under GST. While AAR is not completely faultless in this ruling and did commit its own error, the applicant approached AAR with a wrongly framed question and made some misjudged arguments. There is only so much that AAR can do when the applicant adopts such a flawed approach. AAR to some extent did salvage the situation. But just about. Irrespective, I doubt we have heard the last word on this issue. 

Legislative Intent or Error: Puzzle of Indian Tax Policy

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Introductory Questions 

Let me start with a question: how does one discover legislative intent in a provision of tax statute? Through a plain reading of the provision or through a subsequent statement by the State’s legal counsel stating its intent? Positivist thinking would point us to the former, and rightly so. A statement, even a sworn statement in a court shouldn’t override what is contained in the statute. Deference to the legislature cannot extend to a point where despite what the statute contains, court interprets the provision based on legislature’s statement explaining its intent. 

The question in your mind may be: why am I asking this question? Well, for those who follow tax developments, you may already know. For others, I’m asking the question in the context of Safari Retreats case and the latest amendment to CGST Act, 2017 via the Finance Act, 2025. 

One key question that the Supreme Court had to answer in Safari Retreats case was: Did the legislature intentionally use the conjunction ‘or’ instead of ‘and’? Or did the legislature commit a mistake? A simple question that acquires tremendous urgency if a taxpayer needs the answer to assess its tax liability which in this was a few crores. 

During the hearing, the State’s counsel argued that use of the conjunction ‘or’ was a legislative error and further pressed that ‘or’ should be read as ‘and’. What should have been the ideal response of the Supreme Court? One view – subscribed by the State – is that Supreme Court should have declared ‘or’ means ‘and’ and interpreted the provision accordingly even if it meant throwing all grammar and interpretive rules out of the court complex. Or was there more justification in the Supreme Court responding the way it did: legislative intent can only be revealed by the legislative text and not by the State counsel’s statement about the text. And in doing so, restrict the amount of deference that courts accord to the legislature in tax laws.   

And equally importantly, how should we respond? Resign to yet another retrospective amendment to a tax statute and raise our hands in exasperation while letting out a huge sigh. Or do we try to understand this entire episode like a puzzle and use it as an example of how Indian State approaches tax policy. I prefer to do the latter, and hence this article.  

‘Or’ Means ‘And’

I’ve commented on the case in detail here and here. In this article, I intend to provide a limited overview of the controversy with an aim to highlight Indian State’s tax policy choices. 

In 2019, the Orissa High Court allowed taxpayer to claim Input Tax Credit (‘ITC’) on construction of a shopping mall. In 2024-25, one of State’s arguments before the Supreme Court was that use of ‘or’ instead of ‘and’ was a legislative error. The reason for the argument, from a revenue perspective, was straightforward: it would ostensibly allow the State to block the taxpayer’s ITC claim. But the State was aware of the ‘legislative error’ since 2019, why not correct the error via a legislative amendment and bury the issue instead of making elaborate arguments before the Supreme Court? Commenting on the same the Supreme Court in its judgment observed the following: 

The writ petition in which the impugned decision was rendered is a six-year-old writ petition. If it was a drafting mistake, as suggested by learned ASG, the legislature could have stepped in to correct it. However, that was not done. In such circumstances, it must be inferred that the legislature has intentionally used the expression “plant or machinery” in clause (d) as distinguished from the expression “plant and machinery”, which has been used in several places. (emphasis added) (para 43)

As is evident, the Supreme Court rejected the State’s claim of an error. If use of ‘or’ was indeed an error, there was ample time for the State to step in and rectify it. And its failure to do so, in my books, counts as lack of bona fide. For the Supreme Court it was sufficient to dismiss the entire argument and proceed solely on the basis of what was written in the statute.  

What did the State achieve by not amending the law and correcting what it claimed was a ‘legislative error’? For one, if the Supreme Court had actually ruled that ‘or’ should be read as ‘and’, it would have armed the State with a decision that could have been conveniently used by it to block ITC in the future as well. 

Second, if the Supreme Court refused to interpret ‘or’ to mean ‘and’, the State could have claimed that the decision did not reflect ‘legislative intent’. Both things did happen. The latter is no longer a surprise. Each time the State loses a major tax case, its response is that the judicial decision does not reflect legislative intent. And subsequently, it leads to an amendment of the provision in question. And even more often, the amendment is given retrospective effect.   

Legislative Intent – Legislative Error 

The Supreme Court in its above cited paragraph makes it sufficiently apparent that legislative intent must be reflected through the statute itself. If the State claims that a legislative error crept into the statute, it should have rectified it in the intervening 6 years it had to act on it. 

Legislative intent thus cannot be superimposed on a statute by the State on discovering its error or mistake. That would upset the balance of power in State’s favor and would violate a cardinal rule of tax law interpretation, i.e., strict interpretation of tax statutes is necessary to determine the taxpayer’s liability. 

But does that mean that legislative error can never be acknowledged by courts? Apparently so.

One, there is no telling if an error is truly an error. In Safari Retreats case, the petitioners pointed out that:

In the model GST law, which the GST Council Secretariat circulated in November 2016 for inviting suggestions and comments, the expression “plant and machinery” was used both in clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5). However, while enacting the law, the legislature has advisedly used the expression “plant and machinery” in clause (c) and “plant or machinery” in clause (d) of Section 17(5). Therefore, the intention of the legislature cannot be brushed aside by contending that the use of the word “or” in Section 17(5)(d) is a mistake of the legislature. (para 9)

In such circumstances, who is to know if the legislature intentionally replaced ‘and’ with ‘or’ when finalising the text of the bill or an error crept in while editing the Model law. Presumably only the State can reveal the mystery through detailed document history and accompanying notes on the provisions. But do we want to go down that rabbit hole. Forget us, I doubt the State would like that like that level of transparency in law making. 

Second, it would defeat a core tenet of not just tax law but also law in general. Tax liability is as per the law that exists and not what the law was intended to be. A taxpayer has no way of knowing what the legislature ‘intended’ to enact except by interpreting the provisions as they exist. And if one argues that the legislative debates, and other pre-legislative reports would provide a clue, it is a heavy burden to impose on the taxpayer. Then not only must the taxpayer know the law but also whether the law contains an error or not. Hardly just or fair. And one would argue such a stance is also devoid of common sense.

Puzzle of Indian Tax Policy

Hidden in the steps of Safari Retreats case and its aftermath is the puzzle of Indian tax policy decisions. 

One, why wait for the Supreme Court’s decision and then amend the provision retrospectively? Because beyond the immediate urgency of losing or wining a case, was a question of policy. Do we allow taxpayers to claim ITC on construction of shopping malls when they further rent it for business? While a timely amendment of ‘or’ to ‘and’ may not have answered the question with certainty, it would have provided a clear signal of proactive policy making including correcting errors. Instead, the post-decision amendment reveals a policy of amending laws as per convenience.   

Two, where were the States? Since the entire dispute centred around CGST Act, 2017 we expect response from the Union, but GST is a federal levy. Why didn’t any State openly and persuasively argue for an amendment and perhaps end a long winding litigation? It was only after the Supreme Court’s judgment, that States were visible. But just about. States were on board for the GST Council’s recommendation for amendment. Or at least no State objected to the amendment. So, my impression is that either ALL States were either clueless about the litigation or all of them unanimously approve retrospective amendments to GST laws instead of proactive amendments to thwart resource consuming litigation. Maybe, this is the kind of uniformity that was aimed through GST. 

Third, why file a review after deciding to introduce the amendment? Again, it seems the Court’s stamp of approval or its views on the amendment will prevent sprouting of similar issues from the provision. In this case, though the litigation may not end because even the amendment may not prove enough as courts will still need to interpret the phrase ‘plant and machinery’. But a review seems like a circuitous way of making tax policy when there can be direct and straightforward ways. Only we prefer to be clever by half and like to prevent transparency on fundamental tax policy issues. Else, the State may be held to its word and that is not something it will enjoy. 

Way Forward 

The promise of no retrospective amendments to GST laws was buried long ago. And now it is dead. We can only hope for a more sane approach to tax disputes and a saner reaction to court decisions that are not in the State’s favor. Else, the familiar cycle of dispute, decision, amendment will continue till perpetuity until one fine day we feel the need to ‘simplify’ GST by removing all the Provisos and Explanations which were added via numerous reactive amendments.    

Powers of Arrest under CGST Act, 2017 and Customs Act, 1962: Constitutionality and their Scope

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The Supreme Court in a recent judgment upheld the constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in Customs Act, 1962 and CGST Act, 2017. The Court also elaborated on the scope of arrest powers under CGST Act, 2017 and safeguards applicable to an arrestee. The judgment reiterates some well-established principles and clarifies the law on a few uncertain issues. In this article, I examine the judgment in 3 parts: first, the import of Om Prakash judgment and Court’s opinion on arrest powers under Customs Act ,1962; second, the issue of constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in CGST Act, 2017, and third, the scope and contours of arrest-related powers under GST laws along with a comment on Justice Bela Trivedi’s concurring opinion and its possible implication. 

Part I: Om Prakash Judgment and Customs Act, 1962 

Om Prakash Judgment 

In Om Prakash judgment, the Supreme Court heard two matters relating to Customs Act, 1962 and Central Excise Act, 1944. The issue in both matters was that all offences under both the statutes are non-cognizable, but are they bailable? The Court held that while the offences were non-cognizable, they were bailable. The Court referred to relevant provisions of the CrPC, 1973 and statutes in question to support its conclusion. For example, the Court referred to Section 9A, Central Excise Act, 1944 and held that the legislative intent is recovery of dues and not punish individuals who contravene the statutory provisions. And the scheme of CrPC also suggests that even non-cognizable offences are bailable, unless specifically provided. 

The Supreme Court in Om Prakash judgment also clarified that even though customs and excise officers had been conferred with powers of arrest, their powers were not beyond that of a police officer. And for non-cognizable offences, the officers under both statutes had to seek warrant from the Magistrate under Sec 41, CrPC, 1973.  

Amendments to Customs Act, 1962 

Section 104, Customs Act, 1962 was amended in 2012, 2013, and 2019 to modify and to some extent circumvent the application of Om Prakash judgment. Supreme Court’s insistence on tax officers seeking Magistrate’s permission before making an arrest was sought both – acknowledged and modified via amendments to the Customs Act, 1962. To begin with, Customs Act, 1962 bifurcated offences into two clear categories: cognizable and non-cognizable and the amended provisions clearly specified which offences were bailable or non-bailable. These amendments which were the subject of challenge in the impugned case. 

The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and held that petitioner’s reliance on Om Prakash judgment was incorrect. But were the pre-conditions for arrest in Customs Act, 1962 sufficient to safeguard liberty? Were there sufficient safeguards against arbitrary arrest to protect the constitutional guaranteed liberties? 

The Supreme Court clarified that the safeguards contained in Sections 41-A, 41-D, 50A, and 55A of CrPC shall be applicable to arrests made by customs officers under the Customs Act, 1962. The arrestee would have to informed about grounds of arrest, the arresting officer should be clearly identifiable through a badge being some of the protections available to an arrestee. Court added that mandating that said safeguards of CrPC shall apply to arrests by customs officers ‘do not in any way fall foul of or repudiate the provisions of the Customs Act. They complement the provisions of the Customs Act and in a way ensure better regulation, ensuring due compliance with the statutory conditions of making an arrest.’ (para 29) 

The Supreme Court further added that safeguards provided in Customs Act, 1962 were in itself also adequate to protect life and liberty of the persons who could be arrested under the statute. The Supreme Court noted that the threshold of ‘reason to believe’ was higher than the ‘mere suspicion’ threshold provided under Section 41, CrPC. And that the categorisation of offences under the Customs Act, 1962 wherein clear monetary thresholds were prescribed for non-cognizable and non-bailable offences enjoined the arresting officers to specifically state that the statutory thresholds for arrest have been satisfied. 

Finally, the Supreme Court read into Section 104, Customs Act, 1962 the requirement of informing the accused of grounds of arrest as it was in consonance with the mandate of Article 22 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court exhorted the officers to follow the mandate and guidelines laid down in Arvind Kejriwal casewhere it had specified parameters of a legal arrest in the context of Sec 19, PMLA, 2002. 

While dismissing the challenge to constitutionality of arrest-related provisions of Customs Act, 1962 the Supreme Court cautioned and underlined the need to prevent frustration of statutory and constitutional rights of the arrestee. 

Overall, the Supreme Court was of the view that pre-conditions for arrest specified in Customs Act, 1962 were not constitutional and safeguarded the liberties of an arrestee while obligating the custom officers to clearly specify that the conditions for arrest were satisfied. The Court also clarified that various safeguards prescribed in CrPC, 1973 were available to an arrestee during arrests made under Customs Act, 1962.  

Part II: Constitutionality of Arrest-Related Provisions in CGST Act, 2017

Article 246A Has a Broad Scope 

The constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in CGST Act, 2017 was previously upheld by the Delhi High Court in Dhruv Krishan Maggu case, as I mentioned elsewhere. The Supreme Court in impugned case also upheld the constitutionality of provisions.  The arguments against constitutionality of arrest-related provisions in CGST Act, 2017 were similar in the impugned case as they were before the Delhi High Court. The petitioner’s challenge was two-fold: first, Parliament can enact arrest related provisions only for subject matters contained in List I; second, powers relating to arrest, summon, etc. are not incidental to power to levy GST and thus arrest-related provisions cannot be enacted under Article 246A of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court’s rejection of petitioner’s argument on constitutionality was in the following words: 

The Parliament, under Article 246-A of the Constitution, has the power to make laws regarding GST and, as a necessary corollary, enact provisions against tax evasion. Article 246-A of the Constitution is a comprehensive provision and the doctrine of pith and substance applies. The impugned provisions lay down the power to summon and arrest, powers necessary for the effective levy and collection of GST. (para 75) 

Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of liberal interpretation of legislative entries, wherein courts have noted that the entries need to be interpreted liberally to include legislative powers on matters that are incidental and ancillary to the subject contained in legislative entry. Relying on above, the Supreme Court concluded that: 

Thus, a penalty or prosecution mechanism for the levy and collection of GST, and for checking its evasion, is a permissible exercise of legislative power. The GST Acts, in pith and substance, pertain to Article 246-A of the Constitution and the powers to summon, arrest and prosecute are ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect goods and services tax. In view of the aforesaid, the vires challenge to Sections 69 and 70 of the GST Acts must fail and is accordingly rejected. (para 75) 

The Supreme Court has correctly interpreted Article 246A in the impugned case. The Court liberally interpreted the scope of Article 246A in a previous case as well. The Court’s observations in the impugned case align with its previous interpretation wherein the Court has been clear that Article 246A needs to be interpreted liberally – akin to legislative entries – and include in its sweep legislative powers not merely to levy GST but ancillary powers relating to administration and ensuring compliance with GST laws. 

The nature of Article 246A is such that it needs to be interpreted akin to a legislative entry since there is no specific GST-related legislative entry in the Constitution. The power to enact GST laws and bifurcation of powers in relation to GST are both contained in Article 246A itself investing the provision with the unique character of a legislative entry as well as source of legislative power in relation to GST. 

Part III: Scope and Contours of Arrest Powers under CGST Act, 2017

Reason to Believe and Judicial Review  

The Supreme Court referred to the relevant provisions of GST laws to note that there is clear distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable offences under the GST laws. And bailable and non-bailable offences have also been bifurcated indicating the legislature’s cognizance of Om Prakash’s judgment. Further, the nature of offence is linked to the quantum of tax evaded. While the threshold to trigger arrest under CGST Act, 2017 is the Commissioner’s ‘reason to believe’ that an offence has been committed. In this respect, the Court emphasized that the Commissioner should refer to the material forming the basis of his finding regarding commission of the offence. And that an arrest cannot be made to investigate if an offence has been committed. The Supreme Court also pronounced a general caution about the need to exercise arrest powers judiciously. 

Another riddle of arrest that the Supreme Court tried to resolve was: whether a taxpayer can be arrested prior to completion of assessment? An assessment order quantifies the tax evasion or input tax credit wrongly availed. And since under CGST Act, 2017 the classification of whether an offence is cognizable or otherwise is typically dependent on the quantum of tax evaded, this is a crucial question. And there is merit in stating that the assessment order should precede an arrest since only then can the nature of offence by truly established. In MakeMyTrip case – decided under Finance Act, 1994, the Delhi High Court had mentioned that an arrest without an assessment order is akin to putting the horse before a cart. And in my view, in the absence of an assessment order, the Revenue’s allegation about the quantum of tax evaded is merely that: an allegation. And there is a tendency to inflate the amount of tax evaded in the absence of an assessment order. And an inflated amount tends to discourage courts from granting bail immediately and can even change the nature of an offence.  

However, the Supreme Court in the impugned case noted that it cannot lay down a ‘general and broad proposition’ that arrest powers cannot be exercised before issuance of assessment orders. (para 59) There may be cases, the Supreme Court noted where the Commissioner can state with a certain degree of certainty that an offence has been committed and in such cases arrest can be effectuated without completion of an assessment order. 

Here again, the Supreme Court stated that the CBIC’s guidelines on arrest will act as a safeguard alongwith its previous observations on arrest by custom officers, which will also apply to arrest under GST laws.      

The issue is that CBIC issued the guidelines on arrest in 2022, and yet the Supreme Court noted that there have been instances of officers forcing tax payments and arresting taxpayers. And though the arrests led to recovery of revenue, the element of coercion in tax payments cannot be overlooked. If the coercive element during arrest was present even despite the guidelines, then perhaps an even stronger pushback is needed against arbitrary and excessive use of arrest powers. While the Supreme Court has done well in stating that various safeguards will apply to arrests such as those enlisted in various provisions of CrPC and requirements of warrants from Magistrates in non-cognizable offences, even the numerous safeguards, at times, don’t seem enough to protect taxpayers.   

Justice Bela M. Trivedi’s Concurring Opinion  

Justice Bela M. Trivedi’s concurring opinion prima facie dilutes safeguards provided to taxpayers. The Revenue is likely to use her words to argue against any judicial interference and deny bail to accused. Justice Trivedi clearly noted that when legality of arrests under legislations such as GST are challenged, the courts must be extremely loath in exercising their power of judicial review. The courts must confine themselves to examine if the constitutional and statutory safeguards were met and not examine the adequacy of material on which the Commissioner formed a ‘reason to believe’ nor examine accuracy of facts. 

Justice Trivedi was emphatic that adequacy of material will not be subject to judicial review since an arrest may ordinarily happen at initial stages of an investigation. The phrase ‘reason to believe’, she observed, implies that the Commissioner has formed a prima facie opinion that the offence has been committed. Sufficiency or adequacy of material leading to formation of such belief will not be subject to judicial review at nascent stage of inquiry. The reason, as per Justice Trivedi was that ‘casual and frequent’ interference by courts could embolden the accused and frustrate the objects of special legislations such as GST laws. Limited judicial review powers for powers exercised on ‘reason to believe’ is a recurring theme in the jurisprudence on this standard. Reason to believe is a standard prescribed under IT Act, 1961 as well and courts have clear about not scrutinizing the material which forms the basis of the officer’s belief. 

However, some of Justice Trivedi’s observations seem at odds with the lead opinion which requires written statements about Commissioner’s belief, reference to material on basis of which the Commissioner forms the ‘reason to believe’ that lead to arrest. The majority opinion is also clear about power of judicial review in case of payment of tax under threat of arrest, power of courts to provide bail even if no FIR is filed, among other safeguards. Though in the leading opinion there is no clear opinion about scope of judicial review at preliminary or later stages of investigation.  

One possible manner to reconcile Justice Trivedi’s concurring opinion with the lead opinion is that her observations about narrow judicial review are only for preliminary stages of investigation. And that courts can exercise wider powers of judicial review at later stages of investigation. And that her view is only limited to ensuring that once the statutory safeguards have been met, courts should not stand in the way of officers to complete their inquiries and investigations else aims of the special laws such as GST may not be met. But her views are likely to be interpreted in multiple manners and the Revenue will certainly prefer her stance in matters relating to bail, not just at the initial stage of investigation but during the entire investigative process.   

Conclusion 

In the impugned case, the Supreme Court has advanced the jurisprudence on arrests under tax laws to some extent. But the observations are not in the context of any facts but in a case involving constitutional challenge. Thus, numerous safeguards that the Court has noted will apply to arrests made by customs officers or under GST Acts will be tested in future. Courts will have to ascertain if the arrests were made after fulfilment of the various safeguards, whether taxes were paid under threats of arrests, and other likely abuse of powers. The crucial test will be how and if to grant bail including anticipatory bail in matters where FIR is not registered. 

Finally, ‘reason to believe’ is admittedly a subjective standard. It is the opinion of an officer based on the material that comes to their notice. And courts while may examine the material, cannot replace their own subjective view with that of the officer. The test in such cases is if a reasonable person will arrive at the same conclusion based on the material as arrived at by the Commissioner. Thus, ‘reason to believe’ as a standard per se, limits scope of judicial review and confers immense discretion to the Commissioner to exercise powers of arrest. The jurisprudence on this issue – both under the IT Act, 1961 and GST laws – is evidently uneven due to the subjective nature of standard. And courts have not been able to form a clear and unambiguous stance on the scope of judicial review with respect to the ‘reason to believe’ standard. And this unevenness and relatively weak protection afforded to taxpayers is likely to continue in the future as well despite the Supreme Court’s lofty observations in the impugned case.             

            

Long Wait for GSTATs: July 2017 … and Counting. 

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GSTATs have been envisaged as the first appellate forum under GST laws. And yet, 7.5 years since implementation of GST, not a single GSTAT is functioning. Reason? Many. Some are easy to identify, others are tough to understand. Nonetheless, here is a small story of the ill-fated GSTATs since the implementation of GST laws in July 2017. 

Provision is Declared Unconstitutional 

CGST Act, 2017, as originally enacted, provided that the no. of technical members in GSTATs would exceed the no. of judicial members. Both the Union and States wanted to ensure their representation on GSTATs via technical members which led to each GSTAT accommodating at least 2 technical members, i.e., technical member (Centre) and technical member (State). But CGST Act, 2017 provided for only one judicial member on the Bench of GSTAT. The Madras High Court ruled that the strength of technical members in tribunals cannot exceed that of judicial members, as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The relevant provision – Section 109(9) as originally enacted – was struck down as unconstitutional. There was a simultaneous challenge on the ground of Article 14 wherein the petitioners argued that under CGST Act, 2017 advocates were not eligible to become members of GSTATs and it violated their fundamental right to equality. The High Court refused to accept this plea and requested the Union to reconsider the ineligibility of advocates. Making advocates ineligible to become members of GSTAT is rather strange since a similar disqualification does not exist for ITATs under the IT Act, 1961.     

No Appeal Against the Decision  

The Union didn’t appeal against the Madras High Court’s decision. Surprising, since the Union likes to defend all its decisions including its interpretation of tax statutes until the last possible forum. Or perhaps in this instance the Union decided it was prudent to agree with the High Court’s decision. Or it wanted to use the High Court’s decision as a shield to defend the delay in operationalizing GSTATs. Irrespective, the Union’s decision to not file an appeal against the High Court’s decision meant it had to explore options to operationalize the GSTATs. During 2019-2021, the GST Council did discuss the options and feasibility of GSTATs in various States and the required no. of Benches, but the discussions didn’t prove to be immediately fruitful. One possible option of breaking the logjam was by amending the respective provision of CGST Act, 2017. 

Provisions are Amended 

The Finance Act, 2023 amended the provisions relating to composition of GSTATs. Below are the relevant provisions before amendment and post-amendment respectively: 

Pre-Amendment

Section 109(3):

The National Bench of the Appellate Tribunal shall be situated at New Delhi which shall be presided over by the President and shall consist of one Technical Member (Centre) and one Technical Member (State). 

Section 109(9): 

Each State Bench and Area Benches of the Appellate Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial Member, one Technical Member (Centre) and one Technical Member (State) and the State Government may designate the seniormost Judicial Member in a State as the State President. 

Post-Amendment 

Section 109(3): 

The Government shall, by notification, constitute a Principal Bench of the Appellate Tribunal at New Delhi which shall consist of the President, a Judicial Member, a Technical Member (Centre) and a Technical Member (State). 

Section 109(4): 

On request of the State, the Government may, by notification, constitute such number of State Benches at such places and with such jurisdiction, as may be recommended by the Council, which shall consist of two Judicial Members, a Technical Member (Centre) and a Technical Member (State). 

In summary, the amendments via the Finance Act, 2023 have ensured that the no. of judicial members are equal to technical members, if not more. This is because the President of GSTAT is usually the senior most judicial member. The balance of judicial and technical members needed to be met on two fronts: ensuring balance of representation between the Union and States inter-se needs and the balance between judicial and technical side to avoid executive domination. Now that the initial hurdle to constitute GSTATs was officially removed via Finance Act, 2023, one would have expected speedy and decisive steps towards constitution of GSTATs. But that wasn’t the case.  

Benches, Chairperson, Website … and Other Puny Steps 

Since the provisions relating to GSTATs have been amended, the Union has taken multiple – but tiny – steps towards operationalizing the GSTATs. With each step, the tax community has raised its hopes for quick operationalization of GSTATs. But each step seems a step too far. 

In May 2024, the Minister of Finance administered oath to the first President of GSTAT, New Delhi. Since GSTATs are not yet operational and do not hear cases, I’m not sure what the President of GSTAT does to earn his salary.  

In July 2024, in another step forward, the Ministry of Finance notified various Benches of GSTATs, with the Principal Bench in New Delhi. 

Recently, the tax community was rejoicing at GSTATs having a dedicated website. It is hard for me to understand the joy of having a functional website for an institution that itself isn’t functional. And the purpose of having a website is difficult to comprehend due to a recent report in January 2025, mentioning that GSTATs will take another 6 months to begin their functioning. When the formalities for appointing personnel have not completed, IT infrastructure is yet uncertain, and real estate for GSTATs has not been finalized, even 6 months seem like an ambitious target. Especially due to the track record of the Union and States on this aspect of GST.  

Constitutional Courts are Impatient  

Since GSTATs, ideally the first appellate forum for GST-related disputes, are not functioning, the burden has shifted to constitutional courts. High Courts and the Supreme Court end up hearing matters that typically should not have received attention beyond GSTATs. Supreme Court has recognized the effect of not having GSTATs and has recently raised the following query in one of its orders:

We would like to first know at the earliest why the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal has not been made functional till this date.  

The Union is supposed to reply to the above query in three weeks, but do not expect any fireworks and new revelations. 

Supreme Court’s question was prompted after it noted that the petitioner had the remedy to file an appeal under CGST Act, 2017 but had to approach the High Court via writ petition due to GSTATs not functioning. Many such cases that did not deserve or should not have been heard by High Courts and Supreme Court are currently in limbo because these constitutional courts do not have the advantage of GSTATs judgments and fact finding.   

Previously, the Allahabad High Court also tried to make the Union act quickly. But, despite the High Court’s eagerness to constitute GSTATs in the State of UP, there wasn’t much headway. 

Additionally, GSTATs are necessary to ensure harmony in interpretation and coherence in jurisprudence which has, for a long time, been at the mercy of AARs and AAARs. Both are intended to be interpretive bodies, not dispute resolution bodies but their several sub-par interpretations have caused tremendous confusion on various matters.

To conclude, I cannot say for sure when GSTATs will start functioning, but it is imperative that they do. And they function efficiently. A reform such as GST cannot be truly called a bold or a transformative reform until the accompanying rule of law infrastructure is operational. And GSTATs are a vital cog of that infrastructure. Until then, GST has certainly transformed the landscape of indirect tax in India. But, the promise of fair and speedy resolution of disputes remains a distant and unfulfilled promise.  

CERC Is Exempt from GST: Delhi HC 

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The Delhi High Court in a recent judgment held that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (‘Commission’) were not liable to pay GST. The Revenue sought to levy on the fees and tariff that Commission received from the power utilities. The Revenue contended that functions performed by the Commission were ‘support services to electricity transmission and distribution services’ under a 2017 Notification issued by CBIC. The Revenue clarified that while no GST was payable on services provided via electricity transmission and distribution services, but support services rendered in the contest of electricity transmission and distribution were subject to GST. 

The Delhi High Court ruled in favor of the Commission. 

Facts and Arguments 

Commission receives various amounts under different heads such as filing fee, tariff fee, license fee, annual registration fee and miscellaneous fee. Commission took the stance that GST is not payable on such amounts since it is performing statutory functions under the Electricity Act, 2003 and is essentially not engaged in any trade or commerce. 

Revenue’s argument – derived from its Show Cause Notices (SCNs) – before the High Court was that the Commission awards licences for distribution and transmission of electricity and charges licence fees. Thus, the definition of business read with consideration under CGST Act, 2017 makes it amply clear that the Commission is supplying services. And any such amount received is taxable under GST.  

The Revenue relied on two major elements to strengthen its argument about liability of the Commission to pay GST: 

First, it relied on FAQs where the CBIC had clarified that Commission is not a Government for the purpose of GST but is appropriately classified as a regulatory agency. And any financial consideration received by the Commission for any service provided by it was liable to GST. Since the regulatory activities performed by the Commission for which it received money amounted to ‘business’, the Commission was classified as a business entity under the said FAQs.  

Second, and the Revenue reasoned this in its SCN as well: the Commission performs both regulatory and adjudicatory functions. That regulatory functions of the Commission fall outside the purview of quasi-judicial functions and while performing such functions it does not have the trappings of a full-fledged court. Further, the licence fee is received by the Commission for its regulatory functions. The Revenue argued that it is immaterial if the regulatory functions of the Commission are mandated by the statute or not, as long as consideration is received by it is for supply of, services it amounts to a supply for which GST is liable to be paid.   

The Commission questioned the Revenue’s bifurcation between its regulatory and adjudicatory functions and contended that discharge of statutory duties by it in public interest cannot be subjected to GST. 

Relevant Provisions of GST 

The High Court reproduced the relevant provisions of CGST Act, 2017 relating to supply, business, and consideration. 

Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 defines supply to include all forms of supply of goods or services or both made for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of business. 

Clause 2, Schedule III, CGST Act, 2017 states that services provided by a Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force will not be considered either as supply of goods or supply of services.  

Definitions of business and consideration under CGST Act, 2017 are as follows: 

―2. Definitions. —In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- 

      xxxx                    xxxx                    xxxx

(17) ―business‖ includes— 

(a) any trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any other similar activity, whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit; 

(b) any activity or transaction in connection with or incidental or ancillary to sub-clause (a); 

(c) any activity or transaction in the nature of sub-clause (a), whether or not there is volume, frequency, continuity or regularity of such transaction; 

(d) supply or acquisition of goods including capital goods and services in connection with commencement or closure of business; 

(e) provision by a club, association, society, or any such body (for a subscription or any other consideration) of the facilities or benefits to its members; 

(f) admission, for a consideration, of persons to any premises; 

(g) services supplied by a person as the holder of an office which has been accepted by him in the course or furtherance of his trade, profession or vocation; 

(h) activities of a race club including by way of totalisator or a license to book maker or activities of a licensed book maker in such club; and; 

(i) any activity or transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State Government or any local authority in which they are engaged as public authorities;‖ 

―2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— 

      xxxx                    xxxx                    xxxx

(31) ―consideration‖ in relation to the supply of goods or services or both includes—

(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government; 

(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government: 

Provided that a deposit given in respect of the supply of goods or services or both shall not be considered as payment made for such supply unless the supplier applies such deposit as consideration for the said supply;

The Delhi High Court examined the above two definitions in detail to reject Revenue’s contention. 

Decision 

The Delhi High Court noted that the Commission certainly acts as a tribunal, but the Revenue seeks to distinguish between the adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the Commission. The bifurcation warranted an examination of the definition of business and consideration in tandem with supply as defined under Section 7, CGST Act, 2017. 

As regards the definition of business, the Delhi High Court observed that clause (a) was the applicable clause. But the High Court observed that it cannot fathom how the power of regulation statutorily vested in the Commission can be included in any of the activities enlisted in the definition of business. Further, while clause (i) included activities undertaken by the Central or State Governments, the High Court noted that the Commission being a statutory body could not be equated with either of the two entities. 

As regards the definition of consideration, the Delhi High Court noted that it draws colour from the definition of business and it needs to be in relation or response to inducement of supply of goods or services. And here two elements need to be satisfied: first, the payment received must be outcome of an inducement of supply of goods or services; second, the supply must be in the course of or furtherance of business. 

As regards the first element, the High Court noted that: 

Suffice it to note that it was not even remotely sought to be contended by the respondents that the payments in the form of fee as received by Commissions were an outcome of an inducement to supply goods or services. (para 29) 

The above observation is not entirely accurate, since the SCN did mention that the Commission was providing support services for electricity transmission and distribution services. 

Nonetheless, even if one accepts that the money received by the Commission was in response to inducement of supply of goods or services, the said money must be in course or furtherance of business. To this end, the Delhi High Court observed that the functions performed by the Commission cannot be included in the term ‘business’ as defined under Section 2(17), CGST Act, 2017 and concluded: 

We find ourselves unable to accept, affirm or even fathom the conclusion that regulation of tariff, inter-State transmission of electricity or the issuance of license would be liable to be construed as activities undertaken or functions discharged in the furtherance of business. (para 33)

Finally, what about the bifurcation between regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the Commission? As per the Delhi High Court that the Electricity Act made no distinction between regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the Commission and that the statute had enjoined the Commission to regulate and administer electricity distribution. 

Conclusion 

The Delhi High Court’s decision stands on firm footing. And despite the CBIC and the GST Council having recommended otherwise, the High Court arrived at a clear and well-reasoned decision that the Commission was a tribunal. Even if it was accepted that the Commission received consideration in exercise of regulatory functions, it was not in course or furtherance of business. 

Finally, the Delhi High Court clarified that merely because was a heading: “Support services to electricity, gas and water distribution” which is placed under Group Heading 99863 of the CBIC Notification does not mean that the statutory exemption under Schedule III where services provided by a tribunal are excluded can be bypassed. The High Court helpfully clarified: 

What we seek to emphasise is that a notification would neither expand the scope of the parent entry nor can it be construed as taking away an exemption which stands granted under the CGST Act. There cannot possibly be even a cavil of doubt that a Schedule constitutes an integral part and component of the principal legislation. (para 36) 

Whether the Revenue will appeal against this decision will be revealed in due course, but for now, a well-reasoned decision of the Delhi High Court has clarified the GST implications of the Commission’s functions. 

Assignment of Leasehold Rights is Immovable Property under GST: Guj HC 

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Introduction 

In a recent and much discussed judgment, the Gujarat High Court has held that assignment by sale and transfer of leasehold rights of a plot of land amounts to transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property. The High Court concluded that the transfer would not amount to a supply under Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 read with Schedule II of the Act.  

My usual lament is about length of judgments. This judgment is 280 pages and could very well have been less than half. But the Judges felt the need to reproduce the entirety of arguments and copiously cite precedents relied on by the parties to the case, even if several of them had no proximate bearing on the High Court’s conclusion. While this lament may sound repetitive, I believe it is important to constantly strive for more brevity and more clarity in our judgments.   

Regardless, a quick summary of the case is below. 

Issue before the Gujarat High Court 

The brief facts of case are: Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (‘GIDC’). GIDC acquires land and develops the same for industrial estate by creating infrastructure such as road, drainage, etc. and allots a plot of land on long term lease for 99 years to a person/entity. A registered deed is executed between GIDC and the lessee. The lease deed allows the lessee to further assign the leasehold rights and any interest in the land to a third person with approval of GIDC. In the impugned case, Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industries was the lessee and its case was that the transfer of leasehold rights to a third party did not attract GST. 

In the impugned case, the land was leased to the lessee, and the latter constructed a building on it. And the leasehold rights that were assigned related to both the land and the building so constructed.  The High Court thus framed the issue specifically as: whether assignment of leasehold rights alongwith the building thereon would be covered by the scope of supply to levy GST as per the CGST Act, 2017 or not?  

Arguments and Relevant Provisions 

The crux of lessee/petitioner’s argument was that leasehold rights are benefits arising out of land. A succinct logical flow of the argument can be stated as follows: 

  1. The definitions of immovable property under the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Registration Act, 1908 both include ‘benefits that arise out of land’.   
  2. Leasehold rights are benefits arising out of an immovable property. 
  3. Thus, transfer/assignment of leasehold rights amounts to transfer of an immovable property. 
  4. Since transfer of immovable property is not within the scope of ‘supply’ as defined under CGST Act, 2017 it cannot be subjected to GST. 

The Revenue’s case was that while sale immovable property is outside the scope of supply of GST laws, interest in immovable property like leasehold rights which is transferred by way of sale is a ‘supply of services’ is liable for GST. The Revenue further argued that transfer of right to occupy a land by GIDC to lessee constitutes a supply of service. And that the nature of interest in land would not change merely because the lessee makes an absolute transfer of leasehold rights to a third party. 

To buttress its argument that leasehold rights were benefits arising out of a land, the petitioner’s relied on a galaxy of judgments in the context of TPA, 1882 where courts have elaborated on what constitutes a movable or immovable property.

Supply has been defined under Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 to include sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration in the course or furtherance of business. Further, Clause 5(a), Schedule II, CGST Act, 2017 states that renting of immovable property shall be treated as supply of services. Thus, while renting/leasing is within the scope of supply the assignment of leasehold rights is not specifically included in the definition of supply.  

Reasoning and Conclusion 

The Gujarat High Court did not accept the Revenue’s argument. The High Court noted that the first transaction between GIDC and lessee merely transferred the right of possession to the latter as the right of ownership of the plot remained with GIDC. The second transaction wherein the lessee assigned all the leasehold rights in the property to a third party involved transfer of absolute rights. The High Court added: 

when the lessee-assignor transfers absolute right by way of sale of leasehold rights in favour of the assignee, the same shall be transfer of “immovable property” as leasehold rights is nothing but benefits arising out of immovable property which according to the definition contained in other statutes would be “immovable property”. Therefore, the question of supply of services or place of supply of services does not arise … (para 52)

Thus, transfer of land for lease of 99 years by GIDC to lessee is taxable under GST as per clause 5(a), Schedule II, CGST Act, 2017. But transfer of such leasehold rights would be nothing but transfer of immovable property since the consideration paid is as much an alienation as sale or mortgage. (para 64) The High Court also invoked the meaning of term ‘assignment’ to mean that it includes transfer of all rights of a property, the whole interest with rights and liability to sue and be sued. (para 67-68) And the implication of the above understanding of assignment was that the lessee was removed from the picture on transfer of leasehold rights.   

But can the lessee transfer a title superior to the one they received? If the lessee only received leasehold rights from GIDC can it transfer/assign absolute rights to a third party? To this end, the High Court emphasised that GIDC only leased the plot of land and the lessee constructed a building and developed a land for the purpose of business. The entire land and building was therefore transferred along with leasehold rights and interests in land which is a capital asset in the form of immovable property. The lessee, therefore, earned profits by operating a building which constitutes ‘profit a pendre’ which in turn constitutes as immovable property as per the Anand Behra case. 

Legislative Intent or Strict Interpretation? 

The Gujarat High Court has relied on both: strict interpretation of tax statutes and legislative intent to hold that assignment of land the building does not amount to a supply under GST. Using both interpretive techniques in a single judgment is a bit strange. The default approach in interpreting tax statutes is – strict interpretation. Courts usually resort to discovering legislative intent if there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the relevant provisions. In the impugned case, the Gujarat High Court declared that it must follow strict interpretation of law since regard must be given to clear meaning of the terms since entire issue is governed by language of the provisions. (para 58) And yet in the succeeding paragraphs the High Court goes into legislative intent and history in detail before arriving at its conclusion. (paras 60-62)

The Gujarat High Court specifically invoked legislative intent when it noted that when legislative intent is not to levy GST on sale of immovable property, the Revenue’s argument of treating assignment of leasehold rights as equal to renting of immovable property would be contrary to legislative intent. (Para 82) This issue could have been easily adjudicated upon by relying on the strict interpretation of statutes by holding that Clause 5(a), Schedule II, CGST Act, 2017 only mentions ‘renting of immovable property’ and cannot by interpretive gymnastics be held to include ‘assignment of leasehold rights’.   

 This interpretive approach where the High Court was trying to rely on two different interpretive methodologies without reconciling them is indicative of a ‘let cover all bases’ approach instead of a narrow inquiry into the issue at hand.        

Conclusion 

It is important that the ratio of this case is understood in the specific context of this case. The specific context is that the lessee received leasehold rights of a plot of land from GIDC. The lessee in turn developed the land, constructed a building, and assigned the leasehold rights over the land and building to a third party. The High Court stressed on the development of land made by the lessee after receiving the leasehold rights and that the assignment by sale by the lessee was of both the land and building. The conclusion may have been different if the land received on land was further leased to a third party on ‘as is where is’ basis.      

Telecommunication Towers are Movable Property under GST: Delhi HC

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The Delhi High Court in a recent decision held that telecommunication towers are best characterized as movable property under Section 17(5), CGST Act, 2017 and are eligible for input tax credit (‘ITC’). 

Facts 

Indus Towers filed a writ petition impugning the showcause notice issued under Section 74, CGST Act, 2017. The notice issued a demand for tax along with interest and penalty. Indus Towers was engaged in the business of providing passive infrastructure services to telecommunication service providers. And the notices denied it ITC on inputs and input services used for setting up passive infrastructure on the ground. The Revenue’s argument was that the inputs were used in construction of telecommunication towers and fell in the ambit of Section 17(5)(d), CGST Act, 2017. The relevant portions of the provision are below to help us understand the issue better: 

17. Apportionment of credit and blocked credits. 

xxxxx

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of Section 16 and sub-section (1) of Section 18, input tax credit shall not be available in respect of the following, namely:-  

xxx

(d) goods or services or both received by a taxable person for construction of an immovable property (other than plant or machinery) on his own account including when such goods or services or both are used in the course or furtherance of business. 

Xxx

Explanation.- For the purposes of this Chapter and Chapter VI, the expression “plant and machinery” means apparatus, equipment, and machinery fixed to earth by foundation or structural support that are used for making outward supply of goods or services or both and includes such foundation and structural supports but excludes – 

  • land, building or any other civil structures; 
  • telecommunication towers; and 
  • pipelines laid outside the factory premises. 

Revenue’s reading of the above extracted provisions was: plant and machinery is not immovable property and is eligible for ITC, but clause (ii) of the Explanation expressly excludes telecommunication towers from the scope of plant and machinery. Thus, telecommunication towers should be considered as immovable property on which ITC is blocked. 

Petitioner’s Arguments 

Petitioner’s assertion was that telecommunication towers more appropriately classified as movable and not immovable property. Petitioner argued that telecommunication towers are movable items of essential equipment used in telecommunications. The towers can be dismantled at site and are capable of being moved. The concrete structure on which the towers are placed could be treated as the immovable element of the equipment, but all other parts can be easily moved and shifted to other locations. And since the underlying concrete structure is essentially for the purpose of providing stability to the towers, it would not detract from the basic characteristic of towers as being a movable property. 

Precedents and Generic Principles of Immovable Property 

The Delhi High Court cited two major precedents: Bharti Airtel and Vodafone Mobile Services cases. The Supreme Court in the former and the Delhi High Court in the latter had opined that telecom towers are intrinsically movable items and liable to be treated as inputs under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The Revenue’s contention was that both decisions should be distinguished. Under GST, the Explanation appended to Section 17, CGST Act, 2017 specifically excludes telecommunication towers from the ambit of plant and machinery, and thereby they should be treated as immovable property. The Delhi High Court relied on the above two precedents to disagree with the Revenue’s contentions.   

Additionally, the Delhi High Court cited a host of other principles enunciated in the context of TPA, 1882 where courts have tried to distinguish movable property from immovable property. Some of the principles to determine the nature of a property include: nature of annexation, object of annexation, intention of parties, functionality, permanency, and marketability test. 

The Delhi High Court cited Supreme Court’s observations in the Airtel case and how after applying the said tests, the Court had concluded that towers were not permanently annexed to the earth, but could be removed or relocated without causing any damage to them. And that the annexation of telecommunication towers to the earth was only to make them stable and wobble free. 

Expressing its complete agreement with Supreme Court’s observations, the Delhi High Court noted that the telecommunication towers were never erected with an intent of conferring permanency and their placement on concrete bases was only to help them overcome the vagaries of nature. The Revenue’s argument that telecommunication towers were immovable property, was as per the Delhi High Court, completely untenable.      

High Court Interprets Section 17(5) & the Explanation in a Curious Manner  

The Delhi High Court noted that telecommunication towers are not an immovable property in the first place and do not fall within the ambit of Section 17(5)(d). While the Explanation specifically excludes telecommunication towers from the ambit of the expression ‘plant and machinery’, the High Court observed that: 

… the specific exclusion of telecommunication towers from the scope of the phrase “plant and machinery” would not lead one to conclude that the statute contemplates or envisages telecommunication towers to be immovable property. Telecommunication towers would in any event have to quality as immovable property as a pre-condition to fall within the ambit of clause (d) of Section 17(5). Their exclusion from the expression “plant and machinery” would not result in it being concomitantly held that they constitute articles which are immoveable. (para 18) 

The High Court interpretation is a curious one. The legislative scheme under CGST Act, 2017 is: plant and machinery are not to be treated as immovable property, but telecommunication towers are specifically excluded from ambit of plant and machinery. Does mean that telecommunication towers move back into the category of immovable property since they are excluded from the exception? Prima facie, yes. But the Delhi High Court answered in negative. The High Court’s reasoning is that telecommunication towers are not an immovable property in the first place. The High Court’s opinion is not entirely convincing. Explanation to Section 17(5) excludes three specific things from the ambit of plant and machinery, i.e., 

  • land, building or any other civil structures; 
  • telecommunication towers; and 
  • pipelines laid outside the factory premises. 

Category (i) and (ii), are prima facie immovable property. Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, one can argue that telecommunication towers also fall in the same category. Even if the generic principles of the concept of immovable property suggest that telecommunication towers are a movable property that is an answer in abstract. In the context of Explanation to Section 17(5), a case can be made that telecommunication towers are treated as immovable property by a deeming fiction. Section 17(5) read with the Explanation clearly suggests that telecommunication towers are to be treated as immovable property. The Delhi High Court’s opinion that telecommunication towers are not an immovable property in the first place does not adequately examine the interplay of the Explanation with the text of Section 17(5) and that the predecents cited were in the context of CENVAT Credit Rules and not GST law. This issue of telecommunication towers and their appropriate classification under GST may need a revisit in the future.   

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