CBIC

Much Ado About Demo Vehicles: Ambiguity on ITC Clarified

by

The CBIC recently issued a Circular clarifying availability of ITC in respect of demo vehicles. The Circular, as I briefly mentioned elsewhere, seems like an exercise in law making rather than a mere interpretation of law. But I will keep that view aside for the purpose of this article. In this article, I focus on the ambiguity that emerged on ITC availability for demo vehicles, due to divergent views of AARs/AAARs, the relevant statutory provisions, and then describe how the recent CBIC Circular clarifies the law. I conclude that the confusion regarding availability of ITC on demo vehicles was avoidable if AARs/AAARs had adopted a more rigorous interpretive approach. However, going forward it may be prudent to align with the CBIC’s view expressed in its latest circular in the interest of taxpayers. 

ITC is Blocked, but there are Exceptions 

Section 17(5)(a), CGST Act, 2017 states that: ITC shall not be available in respect of motor vehicles for transportation of persons having approved seating capacity of not more than thirteen persons (including the driver), except when they are used for making the following taxable supplies, namely –  

(A)  further supply of such motor vehicles; or 

(B)  transportation of passengers; or 

(C)  imparting training on driving such motor vehicles; 

The policy rationale behind blocking ITC for motor vehicles of the above description is unclear and so is the reason for exceptions incorporated in the provision. And while the CBIC in its Circular and AAR/AAARs in some of their rulings have said that they are trying to decipher the ‘intent of law’, the phrase has been used erroneously. Neither the CBIC nor AAR/AAARs have referred to any legislative debates or other legislative instruments to decipher legislative intent behind the above provision. The phrase ‘intent of law’ has been used to merely describe the process of statutory interpretation. In fact, I would argue that the attempt to decipher legislative intent in the above instances is nothing except but second guessing legislative policy. It is best to understand the attempts by AAR/AAARs and CBIC as an attempt to clarify the meaning of the above provision through a process of interpretation. And nothing more.  

Advance Rulings are Decidedly Ambiguous   

The advance rulings – of AAR and AAAR – on the issue can be broadly grouped into two categories: one category has allowed ITC on demo vehicles, while the other category has disallowed it. An overview of both categories of advance rulings is below. 

In one ruling the Madhya Pradesh AAAR expressed its agreement with the AAR and held that the sale of demo vehicle in the subsequent year when depreciation has been charged shall be treated as sale of a second hand vehicle. It negatived the appellant’s contention that there was no time limit for ‘further supply’ of the demo vehicles under sub-clause (A) and that ITC should be available on sale of demo vehicle. AAAR’s emphasis was on the fact that demo vehicles are capitalised by the car dealer and serve a particular purpose for a limited period. Thereafter, the dealer sells the demo car as a second hand car. AAAR refused to engage with the appellant’s argument that the demo vehicles were used for further supply of such motor vehicles, and its focus on depreciation and capitalisation almost nudged the appellant to claim depreciation on the tax component under IT Act, 1961 instead of claiming ITC under GST laws. 

In another ruling, the Haryana AAAR expressed a similar opinion as the Madhya Pradesh AAAR and noted that sale of a demo vehicle is akin to sale of a ‘second hand good’ which is different from a new vehicle and it cannot be said that ‘demo vehicle is for further supply of such vehicles’. Haryana AAAR expressed the apprehension that: 

If the contentions of the applicant is allowed then in that case all the motor vehicles, irrespective of the nature of Supply will be eligible for ITC across the industries. It will no longer be a restricted clause for Car Dealers , but will be an open-clause for all the trade and industry to avail the ITC on all the Vehicles purchased by them. 

As per the Haryana AAAR, the legislative intent was to allow ITC on motor vehicles only in limited conditions such as when there is further supply of such vehicles. However, a demo vehicle is put to different uses and then sold as a second hand good making it ineligible to claim ITC. 

At the same time, other AARs have held that ITC is available on demo cars. Goa AAR, simply held that demo cars are an indispensable tool for providing a trial run to the customers and are used in the course or furtherance of business. Thus, ITC is available on demo cars whenever they are sold. The Bengal AAR, delved a bit deeper into the provision and clarified that claim for ITC under Section 17(5)(a)(A) is not time barred nor is it barred on the ground that the outer supply was made at a lower price than the purchase price. Interpreting the provision in a pointed fashion, the AAR opined that: 

In our considered opinion, the word ‘such’ as used in the expression ‘further supply of such vehicles’ relates to the vehicle only that was purchased. It is a fact that the condition of a demo vehicle at the time of its further supply might have undergone some deterioration from the spick and span condition in which it was at the time of its purchase. But that does not detract from the reality that the vehicle when supplied by a car dealer has ceased to be such vehicle that was purchased. (para 4.11)

The Bengal AAR clarified an important interpretive point which seems to have bypassed other AARs: whether the outward supply should be of the demo vehicle or other similar vehicles? Bengal AAR’s view was that used of the word ‘such’ qualifies and clarifies that outward supply has to be of the vehicle purchased, i.e., the demo vehicle. And the demo vehicle may have deteriorated due to its use by the car dealer, but it does not detract from the intent and scope of the provision. Kerala AAR also took a similar view and held that the demo vehicles are purchased for further supply and sale after their use for a certain period of time. Thus, the sale of such demo vehicles satisfies the requirement of ‘further supply of such vehicles’ as prescribed under Section 17(5)(A) and ITC is available on demo vehicles.  

The denial of ITC on sale of demo vehicles was premised their sale being comparable to second hand goods, the fact that they were capitalised in books of the car dealer while allowance of ITC was based on the fact that demo vehicles were used for furtherance of business and there was no express restriction on ITC even if the demo vehicles were used by the dealer before being sold. Except for the Bengal AAR, no advance ruling provided clarity or attempted to provide it by interpreting if the phrase ‘supply of such motor vehicles’ included only the demo vehicle or other motor vehicles that were sold by using the demo vehicle. To its credit, only CBIC engaged with this crucial interpretive issue in its Circular. 

CBIC Clarifies and Decodes ‘Intent of the Law’ 

CBIC has intervened to clarify the law on the point, since the rulings of various AARs and AAARs failed to provide any certainty and clarity. The Circular notes a few elemental points and clarifies a few crucial ones: 

First, the Circular notes a fairly obvious point: the intent of the law seems clear that based on the nature of outward supplies, ITC in respect of motor vehicles is blocked in several instances. 

Second, that sub-clauses (B) and (C) are inapplicable in situations involving sale of demo vehicles. And only clause (A) of the exception is relevant to determine if ITC can be claimed on sale of demo vehicles. Interpreting the expression ‘such motor vehicles’, the Circular states: 

… the usage of the words “such motor vehicles” instead of “said motor vehicle”, in sub-clause (A) of the clause (a) of section 17(5) of CGST Act, implies that the intention of the lawmakers was not only to exclude from the blockage of input tax credit, the motor vehicle which is itself further supplied, but also to exclude from the blockage of input tax credit, the motor vehicle which is being used for the purpose of further supply of similar type of motor vehicles. (Para 4.4) 

The Circular added that since demo vehicles are used by authorised dealers to provide trial runs to the customers, display features of the vehicle and help consumer purchase similar features, they can be considered by the dealer as being used for making ‘further supply of such vehicles’. Thus, ITC is available in respect of sale of demo vehicles. 

However, the Circular clarifies that when demo vehicles are used to transport employees/management, etc. ITC will be blocked. Equally, ITC will be blocked when the dealer merely uses the demo vehicle for advertising on behalf of the manufacturer and is not directly involved in the sale and purchase of the vehicles. Since in such cases, the invoice is issued by the manufacturer and sale of the vehicle is not made by the dealer on his own account. 

Finally, the Circular also clarified – what should have been obvious and a straightforward conclusion for AAR/AAARs – that capitalisation of demo vehicle in the books of the dealer does not affect the availability of ITC. Under Section 16 read with Section 17 of the CGST Act, 2017, ITC is available on both capital and non-capital goods as long as the goods are used in the course or furtherance of business. In clarifying the capitalisation aspect, CBIC through its Circular has effectively negated a line of inquiry adopted by certain AAR/AAARs that treated capitalisation of the demo vehicles as vital in determining if ITC is available on their sale. 

Conclusion 

The entire saga on availability of ITC on demo vehicles seems like much ado about nothing. The entire issue revolved around whether the demo vehicle can be included in the expression ‘further supply of such motor vehicles’, with the word ‘such’ being crucial. The Bengal AAR interpreted ‘such’ to only include the vehicle in question, while CBIC has adopted a comparatively wider approach and included vehicles purchased to make further supply of similar motor vehicles. Demo vehicles are now undoubtedly included in the expression. But, does this mean – an anxiety expressed by Haryana AAAR – that now ‘all vehicles’ purchased by a dealer could be included in the exception of sub-clause (A) and on all such vehicles ITC can be claimed? Unlikely. The proximate relationship of the purchased vehicle and further supply will need to be established to claim ITC, which can be easily done in case of demo vehicles. Establishing the same would be much tougher for ‘all other vehicles’ that a dealer may purchase. Thus, the anxiety of Haryana AAAR may turn out to be hollow. Or at least it should be unless AAR/AAARs decide to another unwanted twist to the issue.  

Finally, if the AAR/AAARs had kept the interpretive question narrow and focused on the words and expressions of Section 17(5)(a) that demanded an interpretation, we would have had better and perhaps coherent answers to the taxpayer’s queries. The tangents of sale of demo vehicles being akin to sale of second hand vehicles, and undue emphasis on capitalisation of the demo vehicles by AAR/AAARs prevented a more prudent answer from emerging through various advance rulings. Hopefully, we will witness better advance rulings going forward, at least on this issue which seems to have gained great clarity with the issuance of CBIC’s circular.  

Single Administrative Interface under GST: Identifying Two Rough Patches  

by

GST is a dual nationwide tax implying that both the Union and States concurrently levy it on supply of goods or services. While a single indirect tax jointly administered by the Union and States is supposed to augur well for ease of doing business and improve other economic efficiencies, it also requires demarcating administrative responsibilities to prevent the taxpayer from being subjected to proceedings by two different authorities. One such issue is demarcating and assigning tax base to tax authorities of the Union on one hand and the States/Union Territories on the other. GST laws anticipated overlap of tax administration in a dual tax such as GST and incorporated a specific provision – Section 6, CGST Act and Section 6 in SGST Act/UTGST Acts to prevent taxpayer harassment.  

Section 6, CGST Act, 2017 is pari materia with SGST and UTGST and provides for the following: 

First, officers appointed under SGST and UTGST Acts are authorized to be proper officers for purposes of CGST Act as well; 

Second, where a proper officer issues an order under CGST Act he shall also issue an order under the SGST or UTGST Act under intimation to the jurisdictional officer of State tax or UT tax. 

Third, where a proper officer under the SGST Act or UTGST Act has initiated any proceedings on a subject matter, no proceedings shall be initiated by the proper officer under CGST Act on the same subject matter. 

Finally, any proceedings for rectification, appeal, and revision, wherever applicable, of any order passed by an officer under CGST Act shall not lie before an officer appointed under the SGST Act or UTGST Act.        

While the cross empowerment of officials is a sound policy encoded in Section 6, there are two dominant uncertainties that prevail in the interpretation and implementation of the impugned provision: first, is the meaning and scope of the term ‘intelligence-based’ enforcement action’; second, is the implication of the term ‘proceedings on the subject matter’. The former term is not used in Section 6 but is proving to be crucial in allocation of tax administrative responsibilities. I will discuss the uncertainties that revolve around both phrases.   

Intelligence-Based Enforcement Action 

The 9th GST Council meeting discussed the issue of cross empowerment of tax officials under GST. There was detailed discussion on the issue of allocation of tax base as per turnover of the taxpayer, powers relating to audits, and issues relating to administration of IGST. In so far as is relevant to the current discussion, the GST Council agreed that:

Of the total number of taxpayers below Rs. 1.5 crore turnover, all administrative control over 90% of the taxpayers shall vest with the State tax administration and 10% with the Central tax administration; 

In respect of the total number of taxpayers above Rs. 1.5 crore turnover, all administrative control shall be divided equally in the ratio of 5O% each for the Central and the State tax administration; (para 28)

In view of the same, the CBIC issue a Circular reiterating the same as well as prescribing broad guidelines for computing turnover of the taxpayers.  

Apart from the above division of tax base to smoothen administration of GST, there was another agreement reached in the GST Council, i.e., both the Union and State administrations shall have the power to take ‘intelligence-based enforcement action’ across the entire value chain. The import of the GST Council’s above decision was clarified via a letter issued on 05. 10. 2018. Two important things that were clarified through the letter were:

First, that irrespective of assignment of taxpayer base as per turnover, both the Union and State are empowered to initiate intelligence-based enforcement action on the entire tax base which includes entire process of investigation, issuance of SCN, recovery, appeal, etc. 

Second, it added that:

If an officer of the Central tax authority initiates intelligence based enforcement action against a taxpayer administratively assigned to State tax authority, the officers of Central tax authority would not transfer the said case to its Sate tax counterpart and would themselves take the case to its logical conclusions. (para 4)  

The initial allocation of taxpayer base is thus subject to intelligence-based enforcement action, and once the latter is initiated by any authority it will retain the jurisdiction over that particular taxpayer and take the case to its logical conclusion.   

Reading both the above legal instruments alongside minutes of the 9th GST Council meeting clarify the division of taxpayer base amongst the State and Union tax officers, but the term ‘intelligence-based enforcement action’ adds a layer of uncertainty. To what extent and what action exactly amounts to such an ‘intelligence-based action’ remains unclear. The phrase indicates that the action is based on some information obtained by tax officers and not a random scrutiny of taxpayer. But, the scope and limit of the phrase needs a more precise understanding which is currently lacking. And the same will, hopefully, be available as the jurisprudence on the issue develops.  

‘Proceedings’ on Same ‘Subject-Matter’  

The other prong of uncertainty is if a taxpayer can be subjected to proceedings on the same subject matter by two different authorities – at the Union and State level. Section 6(2)(b) states:  

            … where a proper officer under the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act has initiated any proceedings on a subject matter, no proceedings shall be initiated by the proper officer under this Act on the same subject matter.  (emphasis added) 

While Section 6(2)(b) uses the phrases ‘proceedings’ and ‘subject matter’, they are not defined under GST laws. Courts in certain cases have attempted to unravel the meaning of the two terms ‘proceedings’ and ‘subject-matter’. The most prominent attempt was by the Allahabad High Court in GK Trading case where the petitioner’s contention was that once the Deputy Commissioner, Ghaziabad has conducted survey of its business premises and is investigating the matter pursuant to the survey, the issuance of summons by another authority – DGGSTI, Meerut – under Section 70 of CGST Act, 2017 is barred by Section 6(2)(b).

The Allahabad High Court relied on previous judicial decisions – largely unrelated to GST – to conclude that the term ‘inquiry’ used in Section 70, under which summons were issued and the term ‘proceedings’ used in Section 6(2)(b) had different meanings. The High Court noted that the term ‘inquiry’ under Section 70 was limited to requiring the presence of a person to produce evidence or documents and cannot be intermixed with steps that may ensue on conclusion of the inquiry. Noting that words ‘proceeding’ and ‘inquiry’ are not synonymous, the High Court held that: 

The word “proceedings” used in Section 6(2)(b) is qualified by the words “subject-matter” which indicates an adjudication process/ proceedings on the same cause of action and for the same dispute which may be proceedings relating to assessment, audit, demands and recovery, and offences and penalties etc. These proceedings are subsequent to inquiry under Section 70 of the Act. (para 17) 

The above observation implies that the power of inquiry under Section 70 – and issuance of summons – can be invoked against a taxpayer even if proceedings have been initiated by another tax authority, but the steps subsequent to inquiry cannot be taken if proceedings are underway. What is the point of inquiry if Section 6(2)(b) bars the inquiry authority to take steps subsequent to an inquiry? The answer is unclear, and the High Court does not delve into the issue, and rightly so. Nonetheless, the High Court’s strict interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions ensure that the bar under Section 6(2)(b) has been interpreted in a strict fashion, but the implications of the High Court’s interpretation will only become clear in due time.   

Conclusion 

On both the above discussed issues, single-interface GST administration is likely to remain in a state of flux. Given that ‘intelligence-based enforcement action’ is a phrase of uncertain scope and the words ‘proceedings’ and ‘subject-matter’ are not defined under the GST Acts, the tax officers are likely to interpret in differing manner and as per the facts of each case. While the Allahabad High Court has tried to demarcate the scope of latter, and to some extent succeeded, the meaning of the phrase ‘intelligence-based enforcement action’ remains even more elusive. And we are likely to witness some disputes over the same.     

LinkedIn