IGST Act

Limits of Deeming Fiction: Intermediaries under GST-I

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Constitutionality of Section 13(8)(b), IGST Act, 2017

Introduction

Constitutionality of Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act has attracted the attention of different Courts. The reason for suspect constitutionality of Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act is that incorporates a deeming fiction whereby the place of supply for services by an intermediary is in India, i.e., place of service provider instead of the place of recipient. The petitioner’s case was that Section13(8)(b), IGST Act departs from the destination-based character of GST, violates Fundamental Rights under Art 14 and Art 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, and is beyond the Parliament’s competence. There are multiple and varied judicial opinions on the issue and I will explore them in a two-part post. In the first part of this post, I will focus on the judgment pronounced by the Gujarat High Court and by a 2-Judge Bench of the Bombay High Court, both of which leave a lot to be desired. I argue that both decisions engage with the underlying issue superficially and adopt less than adequate reasoning to support their conclusions.    

The Gujarat High Court Upholds GST on Intermediaries

In Material Recycling Association of India case[1], petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act, 2017. Petitioners were intermediaries providing services to their clients located outside India and earning in foreign convertible currency. As per Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act, 2017 if a supplier provides intermediary service to a person situated outside India, place of supply of services is deemed to be where the supplier is located. This deeming fiction thereby treats such a transaction as liable to GST. The petitioner challenged the provision as ultra vires of Art 265, 286, Art 14, and Art 19 of the Constitution. Petitioner’s various arguments were underpinned by the central idea that their services constituted as export of services. And export of services or goods could not be subjected to GST since it was a destination-based tax whereunder exports were zero-rated. Further, since the supply of services took place outside India the Parliament lacked competence to enact such a provision.

The Gujarat High Court’s analysis is pithy, and essentially gives a free pass to the legislature by stating that the petitioner’s services could not be considered as an export of services ‘in order to levy CGST and SGST’ and that:

            … it would not qualify to be export of services, more particularly when the legislature has thought it fit to consider the place of supply of services as place of person who provides such service in India. (para 66)

It then curiously did not even agree with the petitioner that the provision in question was a deeming provision and instead upheld the constitutionality of the provision by relying on the fact that a similar situation existed in the pre-GST regime and noted: 

            Therefore, this being a consistent stand of the respondents to tax the service provided by intermediary in India, the same cannot be treated as “export of services” under the IGST Act, 2017 and therefore, rightly included in Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act to consider the location of supplier of service as place of supply so as to attract CGST and SGST. (para 67)

Both reasons collapse under the burden of scrutiny. First, let’s decode ‘legislature’s wisdom’. As per the Gujarat High Court, the legislature ‘thought it fit’ to include various transactions in the scope of GST to maximize revenue collection. Legislature enacting provisions to increase revenue collection in no way precludes Courts from examining if the provisions under challenge transgress the Constitution. In fact, one would argue that the primary function of a constitutional Court is to examine if the legislature is enacting provisions within the constitutional limits. For example, in this case, it was incumbent on the Gujarat High Court to examine if the impugned provision satisfied the requirements of Art 286 and/or Art 269A of the Constitution, and whether Art 14 and Art 19(1)(g) were not violated; but the judgment is completely bereft of any such analysis. 

The second reason proffered by the Gujarat High Court was that a similar legal position prevailed in the pre-GST regime. To conclude that a similar provision existed in the pre-GST regime is evidence of the constitutionality of a provision enacted under the IGST Act, 2017 is an unwarranted and unreasonable statement especially when the High Court could not cite any precedent that squarely covered the issue. The Gujarat High Court’s reliance on the fact that similar provision existed in service tax regime to conclude that the Revenue Department has a ‘consistent stand’ and creates a presumption of constitutionality in favour of the provision is a dereliction of duty by a constitutional Court. And, even if there was a judicial decision that upheld the constitutionality of the pre-GST provision, it was incumbent on the Gujarat High Court to examine if the decision remained valid after the constitutional changes that accompanied GST. Nonetheless, the Gujarat High Court’s decision did not conclusively settle this matter as a similar matter was argued before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court.       

Division Bench of The Bombay High Court Issues a Split Verdict 

The Bombay High Court in Dharmendra M. Jani case[2] decided a similar petition almost a year after the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Material Recycling Association of India case, but it ended in a stalemate with the Division Bench rendering a split decision.  

Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, held that Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act, 2017 was unconstitutional and rested his conclusion on three observations. First, he examined the aforesaid provision on the touchstone of Art 286 of the Constitution and noted that the supply of service by an intermediary was outside Maharashtra and India. As per him, Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act, 2017 had created a deeming fiction treating the export of service by an intermediary as an intra-State supply and it was definitely ‘an artificial device created to overcome a constitutional embargo.’ (para 49) Second, he observed that creating a deeming provision such as Section 13(8)(b) where the location of the recipient of service provided by an intermediary though outside India has been treated in India ‘runs contrary to the scheme of the CGST Act as well as the IGST Act besides being beyond the charging sections of both the Acts.’ (para 54) His third reason referred to the transaction’s lack of nexus with India and he concluded that: 

            … section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act not only falls foul of the overall scheme of the CGST Act and the IGST Act but also offends Articles 245, 246A, 269A and 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. The extra-territorial effect given by way of section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act has no real connection or nexus with the taxing regime in India introduced by the GST system. (para 56)   

While Justice Bhuyan’s opinion was correct in identifying the lack of nexus and that the provision undermined GST’s fundamental principle of destination-based consumption tax, he failed to clearly articulate as to ‘how’ Section13(8)(b), IGST Act, 2017 contravened Art 286 of Constitution. Art 286(1) prevents the State from levying GST on a supply that takes place outside the State or a supply that takes place in the course of import of goods or services into India’s territory or their export out of India’s territory. While Art 286(2) empowers the Parliament to determine principles for determining when a supply of goods or services takes place in any of the two ways mentioned in Art 286(1). It is unclear in Justice Bhuyan’s opinion as to which aspect of Art 286 does Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act, 2017 specifically contravene and what is the constitutional embargo that the legislature is trying to circumvent. 

At the same time, Justice Bhuyan’s opinion was notable for understanding that while the source of legislative power regarding the inter-State supply of goods or services could be traced to Art 246A and Art 269A of the Constitution, there were constitutional restraints on such power, such as Art 286 of Constitution, and the impugned provision needed to be examined on those touchstones. More importantly, unlike the Gujarat High Court, he did not accept the argument that the existence of a similar provision under the service tax regime precluded a challenge to Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act, 2017. He instead stated that the validity of Section 13 (8)(b) read with Section 8 of the IGST Act, 2017 had to be examined on the touchstone of relevant constitutional provisions and not by relying on previous legal provisions. Though he fell short of clearly specifying the nature and extent of constitutional transgression.  

Justice Abhay Ahuja in his separate opinion upheld the constitutionality of Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act, 2017. He gave a ringing endorsement to the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Material Recycling Association of Indiacase, though he added his reasons, which were equally if not less convincing. I will only briefly mention his reasons since his engagement with the petitioner’s argument is almost cavalier. 

Justice Abhay Ahuja pithily observed that Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act, 2017 was not contrary to the destination-based principle of GST. He observed that since under GST taxation is on supply by intermediaries and the same was characterized as an inter-State supply, there was no conflict thereby completely missing the thrust of the petitioner’s argument. He also incorrectly stated that the definition of export of services being a general provision would be inapplicable since there was a specific provision defining intermediary. Again, not realizing that the two provisions operated independently and performed different functions. 

Justice Ahuja’s examination of the constitutional dimension is worth discussing in more detail. He began by interpreting the scope of Parliament’s power under Art 269A and Art 286 of the Constitution too widely. He noted that while imports had been deemed to be inter-State trade or commerce under IGST Act, 2017, Art 269A of the Constitution did not take away the power of the Parliament to stipulate ‘any other supply’ to be a supply in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. (para 103) Art 269A(5) specifically provides that:

            Parliament may, by law, formulate the principles for determining the place of supply, and when a supply of goods or of services, or both takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.   

Clearly, Art 269A (5) of the Constitution empowers the Parliament to determine the situs/place of supply for inter-State trade or commerce. Thus, when Justice Ahuja says that Art 269A does not take away power to include any supply as inter-State trade or commerce, it should have been preceded by an examination if the Parliament by exercising its power under Art 269A(5) – to enact Section13(8)(b), IGST Act, 2017 – has acted within the scope of its power and has adhered to the limitations imposed by Art 286 of Constitution. Instead, he held that the ‘whole purpose’ of Art 286(2) of the Constitution was to empower Parliament to determine the situs of supply and since Section13(8)(b), IGST Act, 2017 specifically does that it could not be said to contravene Art 286 of Constitution. His understanding of the nature and purpose of Art 286(2) is partly wrong. And his conclusion about the constitutionality of Section 13 (8)(b), IGST Act, 2017 lacks any examination of the Parliament’s powers under Art 269A read with Art 286 of the Constitution. 

The reasoning adopted by both the Gujarat and the Bombay High Court only contributes to greater uncertainty on GST’s applicability to intermediaries. Further, we have no clarity on the role of Art 286 in the GST regime, no clear articulation on the interplay of Art 246A and Art 269A and a lack of appreciation as to whether and to what extent GST’s identity as a destination-based tax is supposed to constrain Parliament’s legislative power. Are no deviations allowed from the destination-based principle? If they are, on what grounds and to what extent?

Finally, both the Gujarat High Court and Justice Abhay Ahuja of the Bombay High Court endorsed the deeming fiction contained in Section13(8)(b), IGST Act, 2017 by stating that it was essential to bring such intermediary services within the scope of GST to raise revenue. Adopting a revenue-maximising approach is the prerogative of the legislature; but, from the standpoint of Courts, it is crucial that the provision in question is constitutional. The fact that the legislature is better placed to frame a tax policy cannot be cited as a reason to enact provisions that are unconstitutional. We need a more robust examination of the tax dimensions of the Constitution and not a judicial approach that uncritically endorses the view that the legislature deserves a wide leeway in enacting tax laws. Such an approach has a little analytical basis, presumes that the legislature is adequately examining each law minutely and certainly does not warrant giving short shrift to arguments based on constitutional law. 

[1] Material Recycling Association of India v Union of India & Others 2020-VIL-341-GUJ. 

[2] Dharmendra M. Jani v Union of India 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 839. 

Refunds for Zero-Rated Exports Viewed as Fundamental to GST Regime

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In a judgment pronounced on 16 February 2023, a Single Judge Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Tonbo Imaging India case[1] held that Rule 89(4)(C), CGST Rules, 2017 ‘is illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational, unfair, unjust and ultra vires Section 16 of the IGST Act and Section 54 of the CGST Act …’. (para 17) The writ petition filed by the petitioners challenged that the amendment to Rule 89(4)(C) – via Notification 16/2020-CT dated 23.03.2020 – was unconstitutional and the High Court upheld the same. I explore the arguments and the High Court’s reasoning in this post.  

Background to the Writ Petition  

The petitioners were engaged in designing, developing, and deploying various types of advanced imaging and sensor systems to control and understand complex environments. The petitioners exported the aforementioned products from May 2018 to March 2019. Accordingly, the petitioners claimed refunds of its zero-rated exports under Section 16, IGST Act, 2017 read with Section 54(3)(i), CGST Act, 2017 and Rule 89, CGST Rules, 2017. The petitioners claim was rejected by the Revenue Department for not filing proof as required under the amended Rule 89(4)(C) despite the petitioner contending that their case related to the period before the amendment and should be governed by the pre-amended rule. The petitioner argued that its case should be governed by the pre-amended version of Rule 89(4)(C) which stated as follows:

Turnover of zero-rated supply of goods means the value of zero-rated supply of goods made during the relevant period without payment of tax under bond or letter of undertaking as declared by the supplier, whichever is less, other than the turnover of supplies in respect of which refund is claimed under sub-rules (4A) or (4B) or both.

While the Revenue Department’s case was that the petitioner must show proof as required under the amended version of Rule 89(4)(C), which states as follows: 

Turnover of zero-rated supply of goods means the value of zero-rated supply of goods made during the relevant period without payment of tax under bond or letter of undertaking or the value which is 1.5 times the value of like goods domestically supplied by the same or, similarly placed supplier, as declared by the supplier, whichever is less, other than the turnover of supplies in respect of which refund is claimed under sub-rules (4A) or (4B) or both. (emphasis added)

The amended rule introduced the concept of comparing the value of exports of the supplier with its domestic supplies, and introducing an upper cap to the refunds based on the comparison. This would mean that if an exporter has paid a certain amount by way of GST on its purchases, then the Revenue Department may not refund the entire tax amount but only 1.5 times the value of like goods supplied domestically. 

Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner assailed the amendment to Rule 89(4)(C) on various grounds. First, that while Section 16(3) allowed refund of taxes made in the course of making a zero-rated supply, the Rule in whittling the refund is ultra vires the parent statute. Second, the petitioners claimed that the amendment to Rule 89(4)(C) creates a hostile discrimination between exporters who export without payment of duty under a Bond/Letter of Undertaking and those who pay duty. And only exporters who made exports without payment of duty were subjected to the restriction under Rule 89(4)(C). Extending the Article 14 argument, the petitioners argued that the impugned Rule was arbitrary and unreasonable because it had no rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved by Section 16, IGST Act, 2017, i.e., zero-rating of exports. Third, the petitioners argued that amendment to the impugned Rule was violative of Article 19(1)(g) since it will affect availability of funds and hamper the rotation of their funds. Finally, the petitioners assailed the impugned Rule on the ground that it suffered from the vice of vagueness, did not define key terms nor did it prescribe the consequences if a similarly placed supplier was not found or the supplier did not supply similar goods domestically.       

High Court Accepts Petitioner’s Arguments 

The Karnataka High Court accepted almost all the petitioner’s arguments. It traced a brief legislative history of GST to conclude that zero-rating of exports was a core feature of GST in Section 16, IGST Act, 2017 and Section 54, CGST Act, 2017 with Rule 89 as a machinery provision to implement the policy of zero-rating. Based on this understanding, the High Court almost repeated all of the petitioner’s arguments approvingly. 

The High Court held that the amended Rule 89(4)(C) overrides the parent legislation since it restricts refunds while the parent provisions, i.e., Section 16, IGST Act, 2017 and Section 54, CGST Act, 2017, allow for full refunds for zero-rated supplies such as exports. It accepted the argument that the impugned Rule created hostile discrimination between two kinds of exporters, i.e., those who export without payment of duty and those who pay duty violating Article 14; especially since there was no rational nexus with the objective contained in Section 16, IGST Act, 2017. The High Court also opined that the impugned Rule was unreasonable since it affected the availability of funds and caused hardship to exporters. Further, it held the impugned Rule to be vague as phrases such as ‘like goods’ and ‘similarly placed supplier’ were not defined in the statute or relevant Rules. It concluded that:  

The object of zero rating would be lost if exports are made to suffer GST as the exporter would either pass it on to the foreign supplier or would absorb it himself; firstly it would mean that taxes are exported which is against the policy of zero rating supra and secondly, it would make exports uncompetitive being against the stated policy of the Government. The amending words therefore, do not sub serve the objectives set out in Section 16 of the IGST Act, 2017 nor Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017 and are contrary to the clarifications given above. (Para 17(h))

The High Court viewed the impugned Rule at odds with the GST’s objective of making exports zero-rated and not subjecting them to the burden of tax. Zero-rating of goods is also in consonance with GST’s identity as a destination-based tax. The State had to discharge a heavy burden in arguing the reason for the departure from the core characteristics and policy of GST. However, no persuasive reason was argued by the State.  

Conclusion

The judgment is a closely reasoned judgment and supports its conclusions adequately. The entire premise of the judgment is that zero-rating of exports is a core feature of GST encoded in the legislation, and deviation from its via secondary legislation without a persuasive reason is impermissible. However, the judgment offers no perspective from the State and/or the Revenue Department. The Karnataka High Court never elaborated on the State’s arguments because considered them to be ‘neither relevant nor germane’ for adjudication of the petition. (para 27) Only argument of the State, i.e., the impugned Rule was amended to prevent misuse was referred to dismissed summarily. The High Court rightly held that in the absence of defining data the reason of misuse has no reasonable basis in law and neither can amendments to law be made on the premise of distrust without actually ascertaining the misuse. (para 22) Apart from the above, no detailed reference is made to the State’s arguments. Consequently, we never really get an insight as to why the amendment to Rule 89(4)(C) was made and the objective sought to be achieved by restricting refunds of exporters. And, at the time of writing, there seems to be no move to challenge this judgment either.    

[1] M/s Tonbo Imaging India Pvt Ltd v Union of India 2023 LiveLaw (Kar) 134. 

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