GST
In Applause of a Repeal: Place of Supply for Intermediary Services
The Goods and Services Tax Council (‘GST Council’) in its 56th meeting took multiple decisions and made a series of recommendations. The headline, of course, was dominated by the change in tax rates of various goods. An equal, or to my mind, a more substantive reform was the recommendation for omission of Section 13(8)(b) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act of 2017 (‘IGST Act of 2017’).
Section 13 of the IGST Act of 2017 prescribes place of supply rules where location of supplier or location of recipient is outside India. Section 13(2) lays down the general rule and states that the place of supply for the above-mentioned services shall be location of recipient of services. Section 13(8)(b) incorporates a deeming fiction – at variance with the general rule – and states that the place of supply for intermediary services shall be the location of supplier of services. Section 13(8)(b) proved be an interpretive challenge producing a split judgment by the Bombay High Court and subsequently an opinion by a third judge to resolve the interpretive disagreement. And yet, no clear resolution seemed to be in sight. I’ve previously commented both judicial opinions here and here.
In this article, I briefly explain the provision, the interpretive challenge it presented, and the resulting position of law that proved to be unimplementable. I argue that interpretive approach adopted by the third judge – of the Bombay High Court – in upholding constitutional validity of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 was not incorrect. But, it resulted in a legal position that resembled a riddle wrapped inside an enigma. I conclude that the impending omission of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 is a step in the right direction. It will provide much needed clarity for GST liabilities of intermediary services. And the omission aligns with a core feature of GST – a destination-based tax. Finally, the omission reduces an unnecessary complexity in IGST Act of 2017. While one of the Revenue Department’s arguments was that Section 13(8)(b) was introduced for purpose of collecting additional revenue; removing it introduces more simplicity which may prove to be a more meaningful reform of GST in the long run.
‘Exceptional’ Nature of Section 13(8), IGST Act of 2017
Section 13(2) of the IGST Act of 2017 lays down the default rule to determine place of supply for services where location of either supplier or recipient is outside India. The location of recipient of services is the default place of supply as per Section 13(2). Section 13(8) contains exceptions to the above rule. Section 13(8)(b) states that for intermediaries, the place of supply shall be the location of supplier of services. Thus, if an intermediary with a registered office in Bombay supplies intermediary services to a recipient located outside India, the place of supply shall be Bombay. But wouldn’t a supply of intermediary services to a recipient outside India amount to export of services and thus outside the net of GST? Ideally, yes. But the deeming fiction under Section 13(8)(b) was introduced precisely to levy tax on export of intermediary services by deeming it to be a domestic service. This was just the first level of complication.
Section 8(2) of the IGST Act of 2017 states that:
.. supply of services where the location of the supplier and the place of supply of services are in the same State or same Union territory shall be treated as intra-State supply:
In the above example, the location of supplier and place of supply is Bombay, State of Maharashtra. And as per the mandate of Section 8(2) of the IGST Act of 2017, the supply shall be treated as an intra-State supply. What is the implication of the latter?
Under GST laws, an intra-State supply is subjected to Central Goods and Services Tax (‘CGST’) + State Goods and Services Tax (‘SGST’). The latter is collected by the State if the place of supply is its jurisdiction. In the above example, the SGST component would be levied and collected by the State of Maharashtra under its State-level GST law. Now, we enter the next level of complication.
Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution states that no law of a State shall impose, or authorize the imposition of, a tax on the supply of goods or of services or both, where such supply takes place in the course of the export of the goods or services or both out of the territory of India.
The embargo placed by Article 286(1)(b) in this context meant that States cannot levy SGST on intermediary services. Why? Because the intermediary services provided by a supplier from India to a recipient outside India are export of services. Section 13(8)(b) via deeming fiction, shifted the place of supply of export of services and deemed it to be a domestic transaction. But a statute cannot incorporate a deeming fiction that empowers State to levy tax beyond the constitutional boundary marked by Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution.
The deeming fiction contained in Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 was the subject of a constitutional challenge. And the resulting judicial opinions did not make the legal position any better.
A Split Judgment of the Bombay High Court
In Dharmendra M. Jani v Union of India, the Bombay High Court delivered a split judgment. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan held that Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 violated Article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution and was unconstitutional. He noted the extra-territorial effect being attempted via Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 ran counter to a fundamental principle of GST, i.e., it is a destination-based consumption tax. Justice Abhay Ahuja though disagreed and – by applying a convoluted logic – held that Section 8(2) of the IGST Act of 2017 is inapplicable to the transaction of an intermediary providing services to a recipient located abroad. He also stated that the Parliament has the power to determine place of supply for inter-State supplies under Article 246A read with Article 269A of the Constitution. And thus, upheld that vires of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 by conveniently ignoring Article 286 of the Constitution.
The obvious result of this interpretive disagreement was a stalemate.
Opinion of Justice G.S. Kulkarni: An ‘Unimplementable’ Legal Position
In view of the split judgment of the Division Bench, the proceedings of case were referred to Justice G.S. Kulkarni. And he issued a peculiar opinion in Dharmendra M. Jani v Union of India. Though to be fair to him, the peculiarity emerged largely from the deeming fiction contained in Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017. He was tasked with unravelling a knot that could have no simple or elegant result.
Justice Kulkarni accepted that an intermediary service provided by a taxpayer located in India to a recipient located in a foreign jurisdiction amounted to export of services as defined under Section 2(6) of the IGST Act of 2017. And that by virtue of Section 8(2) of the IGST Act of 2017 an export service was deemed to be an intra-State supply of service. But since an intra-State supply is subjected to tax under the CGST Act of 2017 and relevant State GST Act of 2017; Justice Kulkarni added that reading Section 13(8)(b) of the with Section 8(2) amounted to reading a provision of the IGST Act of 2017 into other GST statutes. He observed:
… that the fiction which is created by Section 13(8)(b) would be required to be confined only to the provisions of IGST Act, as there is no scope for the fiction travelling beyond the provisions of IGST Act to the CGST and the MGST Acts, as neither the Constitution would permit taxing of an export of service under the said enactments nor these legislations would accept taxing such transaction.
Justice Kulkarni was clear in one crucial respect: the domain of IGST Act of 2017 was separate – inter-State supplies. CGST Act of 2017 and State-level GST laws also operated in their own respective domains – intra-State supplies. In the absence of a specific incorporation of provision of one statute in another – ideally introduced by the legislature expressly – the provisions of the IGST Act of 2017 cannot by a process of interpretation be applied to other GST statutes.
Based on his above reasoning and understanding of the legislative landscape in GST, Justice Kulkarni concluded that operation of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 was to be confined only to the IGST Act of 2017. But he refused to term the provision as unconstitutional. Justice Kulkarni, by upholding the vires of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017, resolved the stalemate caused by the split judgment. However, it presented the challenge of implementing his opinion. How to confine Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 only to the IGST Act of 2017?
If the fiction of Section 13(8)(b) was to be confined only to the IGST Act of 2017, it would mean intermediary services exported to other countries could only be subjected to IGST. But IGST is levied only on inter-State supplies. Or imports which are deemed to be inter-State supplies. So, would Justice Kulkarni’s opinion mean that the Union would now levy IGST on export of intermediary services? Such a levy would be diametrically opposite to the underlying policy of levying IGST only on inter-State supplies or imports. Also, wouldn’t levying IGST defeat the fiction contained in Section 8(2) of the IGST Act of 2017? As per Section 8(2) if place of supply and location of supplier are in the same State, the supply is an intra-State supply. But States cannot levy SGST on such supplies by virtue of the opinion of Justice Kulkarni. So, would the net result be that an export of service that is treated as an intra-State supply will be subjected to IGST? If yes, it would not only challenge but practically defeat all fundamental principles that inform the design of GST. One way out of this puzzle would have been to amend the relevant provisions of CGST Act of 2017, and relevant State-level GST laws and specifically incorporate Section 8(2) and Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 in such legislations. It would address the issue highlighted by Justice Kulkarni but would perhaps risk make the provision even more complex. It is unknown if the option to amend the provisions was seriously considered by the GST Council.
Irrespective, Justice Kulkarni while did not hold Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 to be unconstitutional; his peculiar – and internally consistent logic – resulted in making the provision unimplementable. At the very least an appropriate amendment to the relevant provisions was needed to levy tax under the deeming fiction contained in Section 13(8)(b).
GST Council Recommends Repeal of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017
In the face of such a challenge, the GST Council perhaps thought that a repeal of the provision is the best option. But what we don’t know – at least for now – is the precise reason why repeal of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 was recommended by the GST Council. Was it truly because the provision has become ‘implementable’? Or is it because an alternate and ‘implementable’ provision to levy tax on cross-border intermediary services is in the works? If one vital reason for incorporation of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017 was to collect additional tax, is that reason abandoned for good? I guess we will have to wait until at least the minutes of the 56th meeting of the GST Council are made public.
Section13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017: Repeal Recommended in December 2017
We currently do not know the reasons why the GST Council recommended repeal of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017. However, we do know that a suggestion for repeal was made previously but was not adhered to by the Union and States. In December 2017, a report of the Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce was laid before the Rajya Sabha. The 139th Report titled ‘Impact of Goods and Services Tax (GST) on Exports’ made various recommendations for changes to GST from the perspective of promoting exports. One of the recommendations in the Report specifically stated:
The Government may also cause amendment to section 13(8) of the IGST Act to exclude ‘intermediary’ services and make it subject to the default section 13(2) so that the benefit of export of services would be available. (para 15.3)
The Committee reasoned that since GST was a destination-based tax, the place of supply should as per the default rule under Section 13(2), i.e., location of the recipient of services. And the amendment to Section 13(8) of the IGST Act of 2017 would ensure that the intermediary services provided from India to foreign recipients are treated as exports and receive an exemption from the levy of IGST.
The recommendation of the Committee was based on sound logic. Section 13(8)(b) militated not only against the destination-based character of GST; it also stretched the concept of a deeming fiction too far. By treating an export of intermediary service as an intra-State supply of service, the attempt to gain more revenue created a set of complications that the Revenue Department did not anticipate. Or maybe the Revenue Department was blinded by the thirst for additional revenue.
A Welcome Repeal
Overall, the GST Council’s recommendation for repeal of Section 13(8)(b) is welcome – to some extent – preserves the integrity of GST as a destination-based tax. At the same time, the repeal will reduce an unnecessary complexity from the GST laws, making compliance with and comprehension of place of supply rules easier. As for potential loss of revenue. I think reduced complexity in tax laws only tends to promote business activities. If not directly and immediately, at least in an incidental manner. And reduced complexity in tax laws is always beneficial for revenue collections in the long run. Export of intermediary services, on principle, should not be within the remit of GST since it is a destination-based tax. A deviation from the basic character of GST should be based on sound justification and sounder reasons. Collection of more revenue was a less-than-ideal reason to incorporate and continue with Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act of 2017. A more compelling reason seems to have prevailed even if we yet don’t know the precise reason that motivated the GST Council’s recommendation.
Time Restraint on Power of Provisional Attachment under GST
Introduction
The Supreme Court in Kesari Nandan Mobile v Office of Assistant Commissioner of State Tax (‘Kesari Nandan Mobile’) held that an order of provisional attachment under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 (‘CGST Act of 2017’) cannot extend beyond one year. A plain reading of Section 83(2) of the CGST Act of 2017 reveals that every provisional attachment shall cease to have effect after expiry of one year. However, Section 83(2) doesn’t expressly prohibit renewal of an attachment order after expiry of one year.
In Kesari Nandan Mobile, the Revenue Department after expiry of one year issued a new attachment order terming it as ‘renewal’ of the previous attachment order. The Gujarat High Court dismissed the assessee’s challenge to ‘renewal’ of the attachment order. The Gujarat High Court provided two major reasons:
first, prima facie the assessee was engaged in supply of bogus invoices and claiming Input Tax Credit (‘ITC’) based on those invoices. In view of the assessee’s conduct, the Gujarat High Court held that the order of provisional attachment cannot be said to cause any harassment to the assessee;
second, the Gujarat High Court added that under Section 83(2) of the CGST Act of 2017, there was no embargo to issue a new provisional attachment order after lapse of the previous attachment order. And that a provisional attachment order passed after one year was intended to safeguard the revenue’s interest and was not in breach of Section 83(2) of the CGST Act of 2017.
The Supreme Court set aside the Gujarat High Court’s decision by interpreting Section 83(2) in favor of the assessee. The Supreme Court referred to comparable legislations – Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’) as well as Customs Act, 1962 and The Central Excise Act, 1944 – and noted that the authorities can renew an order of provisional attachment only when a statute expressly provides for it. But, if the statute does not expressly confer a power for extension of provisional attachment, the executive ‘cannot overreach the statute’.
In this article, I argue that the Supreme Court in Kesari Nandan Mobile has added a welcome restraint on the Revenue Department’s power of provisional attachment by correctly interpreting Section 83(2) of the CGST Act of 2017. I further suggest that the Supreme Court in the impugned case reinforced the legal framework on provisional attachment elaborated in in M/S Radha Krishan Industries v The State of Himachal Pradesh(‘Radha Krishan Industries’). The Supreme Court in Radha Krishan Industries was categorical that the power of provisional attachment was ‘draconian in nature’ with serious consequences. And the rights of assessees against such a power were valuable safeguards that needed protection. The Supreme Court in Kesari Nandan Mobile builds on the foundation laid in Radha Krishan Industries and expressly states that provisional attachment is only a pre-emptive measure and not a recovery mechanism.
Radha Krishan Industries on Provisional Attachment
The Supreme Court in Radha Krishan Industries noted that the legislature was aware of the draconian nature of provisional attachment and serious consequences that emanate from it. And use of power of provisional attachment is predicated on specific statutory language used in Section 83 of the CGST Act of 2017. Interpreting Section 83(1) of the CGST Act of 2017, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Commissioner must only issue an order of provisional attachment if it is necessary to do so and not because it was practical or convenient. Necessity of protecting the interest of the revenue is the fountainhead reason that triggers the power of provisional attachment.
Supreme Court in Radha Krishan Industries also interpreted Section 83(1) of the CGST Act of 2017 alongside Rule 159 of the CGST Rules of 2017. The latter provided detailed procedure and rights of assessee’s vis-à-vis provisional attachment. The Supreme Court specifically interpreted Rule 159(5) of the CGST Rules and held that it provided two procedural entitlements to the person whose property was attached: first, the right to file an objection on the ground that the property was not or is not liable to be attached; second, an opportunity of being heard. The Supreme Court underlined the importance of these rights and dismissed the Revenue Department’s stance that the right to file objections was not accompanied by a right to be heard.
Finally, in Radha Krishan Industries, the Supreme Court took umbrage that a previous attachment order against the assessee was withdrawn by the Revenue Department after considering representations of the assessee; but a subsequent order of provisional attachment was passed on the same grounds. The Supreme Court observed that unless there was a change in circumstances it was not open to the Revenue Department to pass another order of provisional attachment. While this observation of the Supreme Court was not in the context of outer time limit, it laid down the law that even if a new provisional attachment order is issued within one year, the onus is on the Revenue Department to prove that there was a change in circumstances that necessitated a new order.
It is in the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s above observations in Radha Krishan Industries on provisional attachment that we need to understand the issue of time restraint addressed in Kesari Nandan Mobile.
Supreme Court Adds Time Restraint
In Kesari Nandan Mobile, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether an order of provisional attachment can be issued after expiry of one year of issuance of the previous attachment order. The Supreme Court noted that issuance of an order of provisional attachment after one year cannot be justified on the ground that it is not prohibited under a legislative or executive instrument. The Supreme Court added three more reasons to support its conclusion that provisional attachment cannot take place after expiry of one year:
First, the ‘complete absence of any executive instruction’ that is consistent with the legislative policy of allowing renewal of orders of provisional attachment after expiry of one year.
Second, the Supreme Court reasoned that Section 83(2) of the CGST Act of 2017 must be interpreted in a manner that does not reduce it to a dead letter. As per the Supreme Court, conceding to the Revenue Department’s argument of allowing renewal of provisional attachment after expiry of one year would make Section 83(2) otiose. The Supreme Court – impliedly invoked Radha Krishan Industries – and held that Section 83(1) conferred a draconian power and Section 83(2) should not be interpreted to ‘confer any additional power over and above the draconian power’ upon the lapse of one year envisaged under Section 83(2).
Third, the Supreme Court further observed that issuance of a fresh provisional attachment order on substantially the same grounds as previous one would be in disregard to the safeguard provided under Section 83(2) of the CGST Act of 2017. In Radha Krishan Industries the Supreme Court had disallowed issuance of a fresh provisional attachment order on similar grounds as the previous order. But the Supreme Court’s primary objection was that the new provisional attachment order was issued despite there being no change in facts. However, in Kesari Nandan Mobile, the Supreme Court expressed concern that issuance of new order after expiry of one year may lead to continuous issuance of provisional attachment under the garb of renewal and would be contrary to a plain reading of Section 83(2).
The Supreme Court’s observations in Kesari Nandan Mobile are an important win for taxpayer protection, a plain reading of tax statutes, and a welcome restraint on the Revenue Department’s power. The Gujarat High Court’s decision was influenced by dishonest conduct of the taxpayer. Ideally, the taxpayer’s conduct should not intervene in plain and strict reading of the tax statutes unless the context warrants otherwise. In the impugned scenario, there was little reason for the Gujarat High Court to interpret Section 83(2) in a way that provided additional powers to the Revenue Department. Especially when the powers in question are intrusive and can cause permanent damage to the assessee’s business.
Incongruity Between Section 83(2) and Rule 159(2)
The Supreme Court in Kesari Nandan Mobile also took note of the incongruity between Section 83(2) of the CGST Act of 2017 and Rule 159(2) of CGST Rules of 2017. The former provides that every order of provisional attachment shall cease to have effect after expiry of one year. Rule 159(2) in turn provides that an order provisional attachment shall cease to have effect only when the Commissioner issues written instructions. Thus, even after expiry of one year the provisional attachment continues unless written instructions are issued by the Commissioner. The Supreme Court noted that the incongruity had been brought to the notice of the GST Council and an amendment to Rule 159(2) was proposed. The amendment to Rule 159(2) will provide that a provisional attachment shall cease to have effect after one year or from the date of order of the Commissioner, whichever is earlier.
But even though the proposed amendment – though approved by the GST Council – has not been effectuated, the Supreme Court held that it is important that Section 83(2) is complied with strictly. Implying that an order of provisional attachment should not extend beyond one year.
Conclusion
The power of provisional attachment is certainly intrusive, but at the same time necessary. The necessity stems from preventing an eventual frustration of the tax demand because the assessee has disposed of their properties. At the same time, as courts have reminded the Revenue Department: the power of provisional attachment is not a recovery measure. It is temporary until the investigation is over. And failure to complete the investigation or recover tax cannot be used as a cover to extend the duration of provisional attachment beyond the statutory mandate. And each time, the Revenue Department must be mindful of the consequences that provisional attachment entails and its disruption to assessee’s business and profession.
Parallel Proceedings under GST: Supreme Court Misses an Opportunity
Introduction
Recently, the Supreme Court in M/S Armour Security (India) Ltd v Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr (Armour Security case) clarified scope of the terms ‘proceedings’ and ‘same subject matter’ used in Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 (CGST Act of 2017). The need to clarify the import of both phrases was necessary to ensure that taxpayers are not subjected to parallel proceedings by the Union and State GST officers on the same subject matter.
The judgment largely succeeds in earmarking the scope of both phrases but feels like a missed opportunity.
In this article, I suggest that Armour Security case offered the Supreme Court a chance to elucidate on the inter-relatedness of various proceedings under CGST Act of 2017. Instead, the Supreme Court focused narrowly only on Section 6(2)(b) and eschewed a broader examination of inter-dependency of various provisions of the CGST Act of 2017. I also argue that the Supreme Court’s guidelines are not a substantive contribution to the challenge of preventing parallel proceedings. GST is the first time that both the Union and States have jurisdiction over the same taxpayer base. Overlaps, frictions, and disputes in administrative actions of both entities are expected and addressing them will require time, deft adjudication, and interpretive balance. Broad guidelines for tax administration wherein courts urge respective tax authorities to ‘communicate with each other’ is a simplistic approach to a novel and complex issue.
Scope and Aim of Section 6(2)(b), CGST Act of 2017
Section 6 of the CGST Act of 2017 performs two crucial roles in GST administration:
first, Section 6(1) ensures ‘cross empowerment’ wherein officers appointed under the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act are authorized to be the proper officers for the purposes of the CGST Act of 2017 as well. This ensures that appointment and orders of proper officers have effect under both the Union and State GST laws simultaneously.
second, Section 6(2)(b) ensures a ‘single interface’ for the taxpayer by providing:
where a proper officer under the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act has initiated any proceedings on a subject matter, no proceedings shall be initiated by the proper officer under this Act on the same subject matter. (emphasis added)
Section 6(2)(b) serves a salutary purpose of ensuring that a taxpayer is not subjected to overlapping investigations by two different authorities and is accountable to only one authority, i.e., there is a ‘single interface’ for the taxpayer. But ensuring a single interface is not as straightforward. The Supreme Court in Armour Security case had to interpret the phrases ‘proceedings’ and ‘same subject matter’ to clarify the powers of officers and various actions that they are allowed or restrained from initiating against a taxpayer.
Issuance of Summons is not Initiation of Proceedings
In the impugned case, Armour Security had received a show cause notice (‘SCN’) under Section 73 of the CGST Act of 2017. The SCN raised a demand for tax, interest, and penalty for excess claim of ITC. Approximately three months later the premises of Armour Security were searched by another authority. Armour Security subsequently received summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act of 2017 requiring one of its directors to produce relevant documents. Armour Security challenged the latter on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction in view of Section 6(2)(b).
The Supreme Court in Armour Security case clarified that issuance of summons to a taxpayer under Section 70 of the CGST Act of 2017 does not amount to initiation of proceedings. The Supreme Court endorsed the view of the Allahabad High Court in GK Trading v Union of India & Ors where it was held that Section 70 of the CGST Act of 2017 empowers a proper officer to issue a summon to obtain evidence or document in any inquiry. The High Court added that the use of the word ‘inquiry’ in Section 70 had a specific connotation and was not synonymous with use of the word “proceedings” used in Section 6(2)(b) of Uttar Pradesh GST Act (pari materia with Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act of 2017).
The Supreme Court reasoned that summons do not culminate an investigation but are merely an information gathering device during an ‘inquiry’ to determine if proceedings should be initiated against the taxpayer. If and any information received consequent to summons can influence initiation of proceedings. Thus, the Supreme Court correctly held that issuance of summons does not amount to proceedings. In stating the above, the Supreme Court largely reiterated the reasoning and conclusion of the Allahabad High Court. But let’s suppose proceedings against a taxpayer are pending before the Union GST officers. During the pendency, State GST officers issue summons to the taxpayer. And the latter discover new information as part of their inquiry; information that justifies initiation of proceedings. Wouldn’t pending proceedings before the former constrain the latter from initiating proceedings against the latter? It would defeat the entire purpose of obtaining the information via summons. In such a situation, it seems the State GST officers can only transfer the information that they obtained to the Union GST officers who initiated the proceedings.
‘Proceedings’ Galore under CGST Act of 2017
In interpreting the scope of ‘proceedings’, the Supreme Court chose to focus only on Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act of 2017. The Supreme Court’s narrow lens on Section 6(2)(b) is a defensible judicial choice but has left a few issues unaddressed. I will take two examples from the CGST Act of 2017 to highlight the crucial nature of inter-relatedness of various proceedings.
First, let me cite Section 83 of the CGST Act of 2017 which states:
Where, after the initiation of any proceeding under Chapter XII, Chapter XIV or Chapter XV, the Commissioner is of the opinion that for the purpose of protecting the interest of the Government revenue it is necessary so to do, he may, by order in writing, attach provisionally, any property. Including bank account, belonging to the taxable person … (emphasis added)
Chapter XIV of the CGST Act of 2017 contains Section 70 which empowers a proper officer to summon any person. Chapter XII also contains Section 67 empowering a proper officer to conduct inspection, search and seizure. So, it is not unreasonable to deduce that as per Section 83(1) cited above, issuance of summons and conduct of inspection, search and seizure amounts to proceedings. Initiation of either of the two will satisfy the pre-condition of exercising the power of provisional attachment under Section 83(1).
So, after Armour Security case, this is the position: issuance of summon under Section 70 of the CGST Act of 2017 does not amount to initiation of ‘proceedings’ under Section 6(2)(b); but as per Section 83(1), issuance of summons continues to be a ‘proceeding’. Not only is the taxpayer liable to respond to the summons, but the taxpayer becomes susceptible to provisional attachment immediately after issuance of summons. The current position of law is unlikely to be a respite for the taxpayer.
Second, Section 66 of the CGST Act of 2017 empowers an officer not below an Assistant Commissioner to direct a special audit ‘at any stage of scrutiny, inquiry, investigation or any other proceedings before him’. Does issuance of a summon satisfy the pre-condition for a special audit under Section 66 too? Section 66 is under Chapter XIII of the CGST Act of 2017, so we can argue that proceedings under this provision does not have the same meaning as ascribed to it under Section 6(2)(b) or Section 83(1). And that the Armor Security case needs to be read narrowly. But there is no clear or definitive answer yet.
The term ‘proceedings’ has been used in several places in different contexts throughout the CGST Act of 2017. One can argue that the context of the provision may alter the meaning of the term ‘proceeding’ and the Supreme Court’s observations in Armour Security case must be understood solely in the context of Section 6. It is a fair argument but does not set aside the possible interpretive disagreements that may arise. Not the least because of the inter-related nature of various proceedings under the CGST Act of 2017 – an issue that the Supreme Court chose to not address.
Scope of ‘Same Subject Matter’
The bar against parallel proceedings under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act of 2017 is only regarding ‘the same subject matter.’ The meaning of same subject matter thus acquiring a crucial role in preventing parallel proceedings. The Supreme Court in the impugned case was clear that proceedings are initiated only on issuance of SCN. And it is only in a SCN that various grounds and challenges alleged against an assessee are penned down for the first time. Based on its above observations about SCN, the Supreme Court concluded that:
The expression “subject matter” contemplates proceedings directed towards determining the taxpayer’s liability or contravention, encompassing the alleged offence or non-compliance together with the relief or demand sought by the Revenue, as articulated in the show cause notice through its charges, grounds, and quantification of demand. Accordingly, the bar on the “same subject matter” is attracted only where both proceedings seek to assess or recover an identical liability, or even where there is the slightest overlap in the tax liability or obligation. (para 86)
Thus, same subject matter is determined on the basis that an authority has already proceeded on an identical tax or offence and the demand or relief sought subsequently is identical.
The Supreme Court’s delineation of what constitutes the same subject matter flows logically from its identification of issuance of SCN as the initiation of proceedings against an assessee. And it is the demand mentioned in a SCN that will be the reference point to determine if the latter set of proceedings are on the same subject matter.
There is little to dispute about the Supreme Court’s interpretation of scope and meaning of the ‘same subject matter’. But whether the above understanding will be applied appropriately – by GST officers and courts – to various fact situations will only be known in future.
Supreme Court’s Guidelines
The Supreme Court did not stop at interpreting the term proceedings and same subject matter. Though the interpretation would have sufficed given the issue involved in the impugned case. The Supreme Court went ahead and issued guidelines in its over eagerness to ensure that parallel proceedings against a taxpayer are avoided. The Supreme Court’s guidelines are perhaps the weakest part of Armour Security case. Mostly, because they were not needed. Additionally, the guidelines are a simplistic take on an issue that requires frequent administrative decisions and co-ordination. A task that the judiciary is not best suited to accomplish. The Supreme Court as part of its guidelines urges the tax authorities to decide inter se who should have jurisdiction over the proceedings against the taxpayer if it comes to their notice that a taxpayer is subjected to parallel proceedings. And enjoins an assessee to bring parallel proceedings to the notice of tax authorities by writing a complaint to have that effect. Equally, the Supreme Court clarified that both authorities have a right to pursue a matter until it is established that it concerns the same liability and demand. In other words, both authorities are allowed to pursue their actions until they can ascertain if they relate to the same subject matter.
Maybe – by way of abundant caution – the Supreme Court felt the need to communicate certain obvious issues to the Revenue Department. But, on balance, it seems that the guidelines are superfluous and could have been easily avoided. The Revenue Department – if it feels necessary – is better positioned to issue suitable guidelines on how to address the issue of parallel proceedings, prevent duplication of efforts, and ensure that the taxpayer is not subject to repeated and unnecessary queries on the same subject matter. There are likely to be finer nuances of dual tax administration that the Revenue Department can appreciate as opposed to a judicial forum. And some of the issues may need time and experience to be ironed out adequately.
Conclusion
The Armor Security case is a welcome addition to the jurisprudence on parallel proceedings. It clarifies some crucial elements regarding proceedings and subject matter. And, at the same time, provides additional guidance to the taxpayers and tax authorities on how to ensure better communication when caught in the crosshairs of multiple proceedings. While the guidelines seem superfluous, the Supreme Court’s narrow focus on Section 6(2)(b) may create a bigger uncertainty. The meaning of ‘proceedings’ used in other provisions of the CGST Act of 2017 can either be aligned with or be at variance with the Armor Security case. Either way, there is no clear answer for now.
The Monsoon of Tax ‘Reform’
It’s raining tax ‘reform’. Income Tax Bill, 2025 (‘IT Bill, 2025’) will soon replace the six decades old Income Tax Act, 1961. Goods and Services Tax (‘GST’) will ostensibly be simplified by Diwali of 2025. And we will have a two-tier GST consisting of 5% and 12%, with a ‘special’ tax rate of 40% applicable to select goods and services. Income Tax Return forms are being simplified, money limits for filing appeals across all tax domains are being enhanced to reduce tax litigation. Cumulatively, the changes – we are informed – are part of the larger goal of ushering in ‘Next-Generation Reforms’. There is a lot of activity, but something seems amiss.
Substantive tax reform is amiss.
IT Bill, 2025: Simple Language, Uncertain Policy
The use of simple, comprehensible, and coherent legal language is a goal worth spending thousands of hours. But such an exercise proves to be shallow and limited if the underlying policy is unclear and operating at cross purposes. Is faceless assessment scheme now the default manner of assessment or some aspects of human interaction are to be retained permanently? Do CSR activities deserve an unqualified tax-free status? What is the appropriate manner to levy tax on trusts? If the questions seem too narrow and pointed, what about the broader ones. Do we decisively move to the new tax regime and shed the old tax regime? Do we provide revenue targets to officers, but ensure that they don’t adopt absurd positions? Can we ensure that the Revenue Department does not adopt a position that is contrary to plain language of the statute? Do we repose faith in taxpayers and make policies from that starting point or is the default position otherwise? Should every tax treaty now be necessarily notified or was it just a convenient argument adopted by the Income Tax Department to deny benefits to a handful of taxpayers? I can go on, but you get the gist.
If core income tax policies are in a state of flux, the language to express that policy can only provide limited clarity. Ironically, most clarity emerges in only in provisions which endow powers to the Income Tax Department. This includes powers of search and seizure, powers of arrest, and now that the dust has settled a bit: powers to reopen assessments. Otherwise, use of phrases such ‘tax year’ for ‘assessment year/previous year’ or use of ‘irrespective’ instead of ‘notwithstanding’ is a choice in favor of alternate words, not necessarily clarity. The IT Bill, 2025 may be more readable compared to its predecessor. The unending provisos and explanations may have been removed, redundant provisions to some extent been deleted, and use of legalese comparatively lesser. But improved readability should not be confused with clarity.
GST: Multiple Tax Rates are not THE Enemy
Multiple tax rates in GST only take the heat because they are an obvious and low hanging target on which we like to hang all the flaws of GST. But the truth is that the Union and States cannot express their GST governance in clear and unambiguous terms. Why are purchaser’s dependent on suppliers to file their returns to claim Input Tax Credit? Why is provisional attachment of taxpayer properties so commonplace that courts must intervene repeatedly, and caution about the draconian nature of the power of provisional attachment? What policy is guiding levy of GST on health and life insurance? Why was online gaming target of ludicrous GST claims despite the law being obviously silent on come crucial issues? Why cannot the Revenue Department not digest any loss in courts? Any major loss in courts for the Revenue Department immediately triggers an amendment to nullify the decision. If possible, a through retrospective amendment. You want examples of these amendments? I’ve enlisted some here.
The upward trajectory of GST collections hides the many flaws of GST governance. Instead of undertaking long, painful substantive reform, and building on the many gains of GST, we have chosen to focus on tinkering with GST rates. It is an easy sell on the political front. Come Diwali, it is easy to sell reduction of GST rates on cars and claim brownie points. But does that solve the broader issues caused by multiple tax rates in GST. The classification disputes – though source of occasional amusement – are unlikely to see end of the day until GST magically adopts a single-rate structure. Is revenue neutral rate now completely irrelevant to determine GST tax rates? If GST Compensation Cess is phased out, will the new policy be of no more cesses on GST? Because if the Union and States are simply going to levy ad hoc cesses on narrowed down tax slabs to compensate for revenue loss, we may as well stick with the current tax rates. And, while we at it, can someone tell me: why do gold and precious stones that they deserve a tax rate of their own?
Tax Administration IS Tax Policy
There is a credible viewpoint in tax law scholarship: tax administration IS tax policy. You can understand this pithy quote in any number of ways. First, that tax administration can elevate or bury the most prudent tax policy. Delay in processing bona fide tax refunds can defeat a well-intentioned policy of reducing tax burdens of certain taxpayers. Cancelling GST registrations for sham reasons can defeat the policy of providing registrations within three working days of filing an application of registration. The above viewpoint can also be understood to mean that tax administration is an integral part of tax policy. Or if not integral, tax policy is certainly not distanced from tax administration. And that any tax reform or change in tax policy that does not bring a simultaneous change in tax administration is a flawed, if not a doomed tax reform.
We cannot expect a rewrite of a law or a change in the tax rates to simply reduce unnecessary litigation, improve compliance, or otherwise improve tax governance. We need accompanying changes in attitudes of tax officers which in turn may require a broader systemic change in the administration of our Revenue Departments. Forsaking pedantic interpretation of law, aspiring for tax coherence, letting go of smaller tax demands in the short run for long term gains of simplicity and coherence can be some of the changes. But, as I write and advocate for these changes, I’m already convinced that they will take a long time to be realized. If at all.
Conclusion – Buzzwords Abound
The landscape of tax law and policy is increasingly being populated by buzzwords of no consequence. ‘One Nation, One Tax’ was a slogan that hid the reality that some indirect taxes will survive the implementation of GST. Now the ‘Diwali gift’ of GST tax rates restructuring is being thrown around as if sane tax policy is a largesse of the state and not a basic expectation of taxpayers. Income tax law has a ‘new look’ while it retains its old soul. And, while one cannot grouse political priorities because buzzwords sell, it is vital to understand the substance or the lack of it that hides behinds these quasi-marketing slogans. India’s tax landscape needs reform – deep, wide, and substantive. Anything else is activity, not meaningful change.
Competition Law and the IBC: An Alternate Perspective on the Supreme Court’s Balancing Act
Introduction
Recently, the Supreme Court (‘Court’) in Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd v Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors resolved an interpretive uncertainty involving the interface of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) with the Competition Act, 2002. The narrow question before the Court was whether the approval of a resolution plan by the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) must mandatorily precede the approval of the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’) under the proviso to Section 31(4), IBC. The proviso states that:
Provided that where the resolution plan contains a provision for combination as referred to in section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003), the resolution applicant shall obtain the approval of the Competition Commission of India under that Act prior to the approval of such resolution plan by the committee of creditors.
The majority opinion, relying on a plain and literal interpretation, held that prior approval by the CCI was mandatory and not directory. The interpretive disagreement did not arise due to any ambiguity in the provision per se, but due to anxiety about delays in the resolution process. It was argued that mandating the prior approval of the CCI for all resolution applicants, instead of only the successful resolution applicant, would delay the completion of the resolution process under the IBC, and time is of the essence in a resolution process to protect and maximise the value of the corporate debtor’s assets. The issue – before, and even after the Court’s judgment – has been largely looked at from the prism of efficacy of the resolution process under the IBC and the need to respect timelines. Even the resolution professional in the impugned case seems to have interpreted the requirement of prior approval as directory to preserve time.
I suggest that there are alternative ways to examine the issue. First, the prior approval of the CCI ensures respect for the commercial wisdom of the CoC as it prevents an ex-post alteration of the latter’s decision. The above sequence will help preserve the design of the IBC, which entrusts the CoC with the final say on commercial decisions in the resolution process. Second, I propose that insistence on prior approval of the CCI should be viewed as an eligibility requirement for resolution applicants instead of a procedural hurdle. The requirement of the prior approval of the CCI may dissuade insincere resolution applicants, and prevent submission of resolution plans that may crumble at the implementation stage. Cumulatively, both arguments cohere with the framework of the IBC and provide us a better understanding of its aims and procedures.
Respect For Commercial Wisdom Of The CoC
In most cases where petitioners have challenged the CoC’s approval of a resolution plan, courts have invoked the supremacy of the commercial wisdom of the CoC. The policy design of the IBC confers powers on the CoC to take commercial decisions, and courts can only intervene in limited and specific instances. The narrow window for judicial interference with decisions of the CoC has been rightly justified by courts by invoking limited grounds for appeal under the IBC. Courts have, thus, termed decisions of the CoC as being of paramount importance. How does the CoC’s supremacy translate into, and become relevant, in the context of the interface of the IBC and the Competition Act, 2002?
The Court in the impugned case relied on the commercial wisdom of the CoC to observe that the lack of prior approval will dilute the aforesaid design of the IBC. For example, if the CoC approves a resolution plan before it receives approval by the CCI, it would leave open the possibility of the latter suggesting modifications to the resolution plan. Permitting ex-post changes by the CCI would also strike at the finality of the CoC’s decision, and, more pertinently, alter the CoC’s position as the final arbiter of corporate debtors’ destiny. The Court underlined the paramount importance of the commercial wisdom of the CoC and reasoned that it can only be exercised assiduously if the CCI’s approval precedes the CoC’s approval. Otherwise, the CoC would be forced to exercise its commercial wisdom without complete information.
Providing the CoC with the final say on commercial aspects of the resolution plan has remained a core idea since the initial stages of discussion on the IBC. The Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (‘BLRC’) had noted that one of the flaws of the pre-IBC regime was to have entrusted business and financial decisions to judicial forums. The BLRC opined that it was not ideal to let adjudicatory bodies take commercial decisions as they may not possess the relevant expertise. To overcome the flaws of the pre-IBC regime, the IBC was designed to empower only the CoC to take business decisions, as it comprises of financial creditors who may bear the loss in the resolution process. The bifurcation of roles was clear, the legislature and courts were to control and supervise the resolution process, however, all business decisions were the remit of the CoC, though it would arrive at the decision after consultation and negotiations with the corporate debtor. In a similar vein, the Court in Swiss Ribbons v Union of India noted that the financial creditors, comprising mainly of banks and financial institutions, are from the beginning involved in assessing the viability of the corporate debtor, and are best positioned to take decisions on restructuring the loan and reorganisation of the corporate debtor’s business when there is financial stress.
The resolution applicant also suggested that the CCI’s approval could be sought by the successful applicant after the CoC’s approval but before the NCLT’s approval. First, the suggestion contravenes the plain language of the proviso. Second, the suggestion, if accepted, would still leave open the window of the CCI suggesting amendments to the CoC-approved resolution plan and strike at the IBC’s aim to give the CoC the final say on commercial aspects of the resolution plan.
In fact, the CoC approving a resolution plan which has not received the CCI’s approval would also be in contravention of other provisions of the IBC. The Court specifically mentioned that a resolution plan which contains a provision for combination is incapable of being enforced if it has not secured prior approval of the CCI. Such a plan cannot be approved by the Court as it would violate Sections 30(2)(e), 30(3), and 34(4)(a) of the IBC on grounds of being in contravention of the laws in force. Apart from the above provisions, it may be worth mentioning Section 30(4), which obligates the CoC to approve a resolution plan after considering its feasibility and viability. Clearly, evaluation of the feasibility and viability of a resolution plan must precede the CoC’s approval. The CoC should not be put in a position where it approves a resolution plan and only subsequently considers its feasibility and viability based on the CCI’s opinion, as that would disregard the IBC’s mandate.
Proviso To Section 31(4) As An ‘Eligibility Requirement’
I suggest that the proviso to Section 31(4) should be viewed as an eligibility requirement for the resolution applicant. My suggestion is predicated on an analogy with Section 29A(c). Briefly put, Section 29A(c) declares that a person is ineligible to submit a resolution plan if such person or any other person acting jointly, or in concert with, it has an account classified as a non-performing asset for one year. The proviso removes the ineligibility if the person makes payment of all overdue amounts before the submission of the resolution plan. One of the resolution applicants in Arcelor Mittal India Pvt Ltd v Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors had argued that insistence on the prior payment of overdue amounts would reduce the pool of resolution applicants as their plan may not be eventually approved by the CoC, and that the proviso should be interpreted in a ‘commercially sensible’ manner wherein overdue amounts should be allowed to be paid as part of the resolution plan and not before the submission of the resolution plan.
Justice S.V.M Bhatti, in his dissenting opinion in the impugned case, has attempted to interpret proviso to Section 31(4) in a similar fashion. He has observed that insistence on prior approval by the CCI would limit the number of eligible resolution applicants. Further, he noted that the requirement of prior approval by the CCI raises a question of prudence since the resolution applicant would seek approval of its plan, which may eventually not be acceptable to the CoC.
In Arcelor Mittal, the Court dismissed the above line of arguments and held that the plain language of the proviso to Section 29A(c) makes it clear that the ineligibility is removed if overdue payments are made before the submission of the resolution plan. Making the overdue payments may be worth the while of the applicant as the dues may be insignificant compared to the possibility of gaining control of the corporate debtor. The Court added that it would not disregard the plain language of the proviso to avoid hardship to the resolution applicant. The above reasoning squarely applies to the proviso to Section 31(4) and is more persuasive than the dissenting opinion in the impugned case.
In fact, one could further engage with the argument about the proviso limiting the number of eligible resolution applicants by stating that the mandate of prior approval of the CCI may act as a filtering mechanism and attract only sincere applicants with concrete resolution plans. The receipt of the CCI approval may diminish the possibility of the resolution plan crumbling at the implementation stage due to the inability or disinclination of the resolution applicants to comply with the subsequent conditions that the CCI may impose. Knowledge of the CCI’s stance prior to the approval of the resolution plan will help in setting realistic timelines and conditions for the successful resolution applicant.
Section 31(4) permits the successful resolution applicant to obtain the necessary approvals required under any law for the time being in force, within one year from the date of approval by the adjudicating authority. The proviso to Section 31(4) carves out one exception and states that if the resolution plan contains a provision for combination, the resolution applicant shall obtain the approval of the CCI prior to the approval of such resolution plan by the CoC. The language of the proviso is clear, unambiguous, and the legislative intent is unmistakable. As the Court noted in its majority opinion, courts must respect the ordinary and plain meaning of the language instead of wandering into the realm of speculation. An exception has been made in the proviso wherein resolution applicants need the prior approval of the CCI. To interpret ‘prior’ to mean ‘after’ would amount to the judicial reconstruction of a statutory provision. There is also no room to interpret the requirement of prior approval as being directory and not mandatory. Analogous to the proviso to Section 29A(c), obtaining the prior approval of the CCI may be ‘worth the while’ of the resolution applicants and this would be a minor hardship compared to the possibility of controlling the corporate debtor.
Prior approval by the CCI should be viewed as an eligibility requirement for resolution applicants instead of a procedural burden. Typically, resolution professionals prescribe requirements of net worth, expertise, etc. for resolution applicants. If compliance with such conditions is not viewed as a hurdle, why view a regulatory approval only through the lens of time, as a procedural hurdle? Instead, it is better viewed as a safeguard to prevent future legal hurdles, smoothen the implementation of approved resolution plan, and to preserve the IBC’s design.
Understanding The Anxiety About Delay
The Court, in the impugned case, has cited statistics to blunt the argument on delay. The statistics about the speed of decision-making by the CCI reveal that delays may not be significant. The Court cited the Annual General Report of the CCI for 2022-23, as per which, the average time taken by the CCI to dispose of combination applications was 21 days, and there was no recorded instance of the CCI taking more than 120 days to approve a combination application. The track record of the CCI partly convinced the Court that arguments about delays were exaggerated.
While there is merit in arguing that the insistence on prior approval by the CCI may delay the resolution process, it is important to add two caveats: first, even in cases not requiring the approval of the CCI, timelines of the IBC are not frequently respected for various reasons. This is not to suggest that additional delays would do no harm, but that delays are par for the course even when the CCI’s approval is not required. So, it is not accurate to ascribe the possible delay only to the requirement of the CCI’s prior approval. Second, prior approval by the CCI will be needed in relatively few instances, and thus there is good reason to adopt a relaxed view of timelines in such cases to avoid competition law issues after the CoC has approved the resolution plan. The additional time consumed in seeking the CCI’s approval will be for a valid reason, i.e., to address the interface of the IBC with competition law. The IBC cannot be implemented in a sealed bubble. where no extraneous factor ever influences the speed and progress of the resolution process.
Conclusion
I have tried to establish that once we take a step back from the time-centric arguments, we can cast a different lens on the issue of the interface of competition law and the IBC. We can understand that the decision-making of the CoC, and other procedural requirements also need to be respected to maintain the integrity of the resolution process. Time, despite being vital, cannot solely dictate the entire resolution process. When the resolution process implicates other areas of law, such as competition law, adopting a relatively relaxed approach to the time limits of the IBC may ensure smooth approval and implementation of the resolution plan. In fact, the prior approval of the CCI aligns with the key design of the IBC, which strives to reserve final decisions on the resolution process to the CoC, subject to minimal judicial supervision. If the CCI unpacks and modifies the CoC-approved resolution plans ex-post, it will in fact, undermine the sanctity of the resolution process.
[This post was first published at NLSIR Online in May 2025.]
Service Charge, its Similarity with Tax, and a ‘Double Whammy’ for Consumers: Some Thoughts
Introduction
The Delhi High Court (‘High Court’) recently ruled that levy of mandatory service charge by restaurants violates customer rights. The High Court’s reasoning, anchored in consumer protection laws, termed a mandatory service charge as deceptive and misleading for consumers. The High Court also made a few casual references to tax laws. For example, the High Court took umbrage at the nomenclature of ‘service charge’ and its potential to confuse customers with a tax levied by the Government. There is merit to the High Court’s observation, but service charge and tax have a deeper connection that is only superficially referred to in the judgment. In this article, I try to scratch the surface a bit deeper.
I elaborate on two potential misgivings about service charge that the High Court’s judgment may entrench:
First, the High Court noted that addition of service charge below the cost of food followed by levy of GST in the bill, created a ‘double whammy’ for the customers. I argue that restaurants by adding service charge before calculating GST were adhering to the mandate under CGST Act, 2017. In complying with GST laws, restaurants seem to have tripped over the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Unless there is a change in any of the two laws, restaurants are now faced with the challenge of squaring a circle.
Second, the High Court’s view that service charge can be confused for a tax prompted it to recommend that a change in nomenclature may be worth exploring. The High Court recommended that the Central Consumer Protection Authority (‘CCPA’) can permit restaurants to levy ‘tip’, ‘gratuity’, or ‘fund’ on a voluntary basis. The nomenclature issue was two-fold: first, service charge per being mistaken for a tax by customers; second, use of abbreviations by restaurants – such as ‘charge’, ‘VSC’, ‘SER’ – which further misled the customers if the levy was a mandatory levy by the State or restaurants. I query whether ‘confusion’ is the touchstone to determine if a levy by private entity should be disallowed or is its perceived mandatory nature?
GST on Food Cost + Service Charge
The High Court noted in its judgment that:
Moreover, when the bills of establishments are generated, it is noticed that the service charge is added right below the total amount of the cost of the food, followed by GST and taxes. For any consumer who does not examine the bill thoroughly, the impression given is that the service charge is a component of tax; (para 122)
The High Court’s above observation hints at two things:
one, the restaurants are trying to inflate the cost of food bill by calculating GST on the cumulative of food bill and service charge;
second, the mention of service charge just before GST creates a confusion that the former is a tax.
Let me examine the first implication in this section.
Section 15(2)(c), CGST Act, 2017 states that the value of supply of goods or services or both shall include:
incidental expenses, including commission and packing, charged by the supplier to the recipient of a supply and any amount charged for anything done by the supplier in respect of the supply of goods or services or both at the time of, or before delivery of goods or supply of services; (emphasis added)
Thus, if a restaurant was adding service charge to the food bill before computing GST, it was adhering to the mandate of GST law and not trying to ‘inflate’ the bill on its own accord. Once a restaurant decides to levy any additional charge including packing charges, etc., then as per Section 15(2)(c) it needs to be added to the total cost in a bill before computing GST. Adding all the ancillary costs ensures that the base value for calculating GST is as high as possible. Enhancing underlying value of the supply is a statutory policy aimed to enhance revenue collections, and leaves business entities such as restaurants no option to exclude charges such as service charge from the cost. One could question the statutory policy, but I doubt restaurants at fault for adding service charge to the food cost before computing GST.
In adding the service charge to food cost, as per the mandate of CGST Act, 2017, restaurants though seem to have tripped over the consumer protection law. How to ensure compliance with both? The High Court has offered a suggestion that service charge could be renamed to something that cannot be confused with a tax, though its payment should remain voluntary.
Service Charge Can be Confused With Tax
The High Court, as noted above, was concerned about mention of service charge just above GST in the restaurant bill and its potential to confuse customers former with a tax. The High Court also noted that:
In some cases, service charge is being confused with service tax or a mandatory tax imposed by the government. In fact, for the consumers, the collection of service charge is proving to be a double whammy i.e., they are forced to pay service tax and GST on the service charge as well. This position cannot be ignored by the Court. (para 123)
Latter part of the High Court’s judgment, of course, is a bit inaccurate. Service tax has been subsumed by GST since July 2017. Also, payment of GST on service charge is not a ‘double whammy’ as the High Court observes. It is, as noted above, payment of GST as per statutory mandate. It is simply, a ‘whammy’ as inclusion of service charge in value of supply though prejudices the taxpayer, is not qualitatively dissimilar from inclusion of any charges that suppliers compulsorily collect from their recipients.
The first part of the observation points out that service charge can be confused with a tax by consumers who may think they have no option but to pay it, may be misled into paying a private compulsory levy. The misleading part is on two counts, as per the High Court.
First, the mention of service charge just above GST. This can be corrected by tinkering billing software and doesn’t seem like a substantive issue that it beyond correction. One could perhaps mandate restaurants to specifically mention in the bill itself that service charge is discretionary and not a levy by the State.
Second, is the phrase ‘service charge’ itself, which gives consumers the impression that it is a tax. But will a service charge by any other name taste just as bitter? Perhaps.
Even if the CCPA permits restaurants to rename service charge to let us say a ‘tip’, it would have to be on a voluntary basis. Technically, as per CCPA guidelines, service charge was discretionary even before the Delhi High Court’s judgment. And if CCPA permits levy of ‘tip’, we would enter similar issues of restaurants arguing that the ‘tips’ are voluntary and customers can request it to be waived off while customers claiming that the voluntary nature is only a ruse. Restaurants effectively collect ‘tip’ as if it’s a mandatory charge. Equally, GST will have to levied on food cost and ‘tip’, if paid. Thus, the ‘double whammy’ may persist.
Can consumers confuse a ‘tip’ with a ‘tax’? Well, ideally, they should not confuse a service charge with a tax either. Not after July 2017, since the terms service charge and GST are not eerily similar. However, one should not take the view of a tax professional but deploy the standard of an average reasonable consumer. It is difficult to predict with mathematical certitude, but a ‘tip’ or ‘gratuity’ seems like a relatively less confusing option. If CCPA can mandate that no restaurants cannot use abbreviations or alternate names which can lead to confusion as in the case of service charge. There should be one voluntary levy and its name uniform across all restaurants.
Finally, I’m prompted to ask a question: do we mistake any other levy by private entity as a tax? Is there any comparable example?
There have been instances of conmen masquerading as tax officers, and fooling people into paying money, but I cannot think of a comparable levy where an average person has been confused that the money is not being collected by the State, but a private entity. Perhaps some people were confused if the maintenance fee paid to their resident associations was a State levy, but the confusion doesn’t seem as widespread as for service charge. The confusion seems a rather peculiar and unique problem to service charge. And one that may require an innovative solution. Though, equally possibly, restaurants may eschew the path of levying or collecting any ‘tip’ and may simply raise prices of food to compensate. Wait and watch, I guess.
Fraudulent Sale is Supply Under GST: Three Errors of the Advance Ruling
A recent advance ruling by Gujarat AAR is a frustrating read. AAR held that sale by a seller constitutes as supply under GST laws even if the seller was defrauded and did not receive any consideration for such goods. In this article, I argue that there are three obvious errors in the advance ruling, which encompass flaw in applicant’s arguments and AAR’s approach. The three errors are:
First, the applicant’s framing of question.
Second, AAR’s reasoning and identification of relevant provision.
Third, applicant’s argument on why a fraudulent sale should not constitute a supply.
The facts involved a peculiar and may I daresay a novel question that should have led to an interesting analysis of the relevant legal provisions and hopefully a defensible answer. Instead, what we receive via the advance ruling is a superficial analysis and a facile answer.
The basic facts in application were: the applicant supplied submersible pumps for two months and generated several invoices for the said sales only to discover that it had been defrauded. The applicant did not receive any consideration for the supply of goods as the order documents were forged by a fraudulent purchaser by using the name of a reputable purchaser. Applicant approached AAR seeking an answer whether GST can be levied on the above transaction.
First Error
The question before AAR should have been whether such a fraudulent sale of goods constitutes a supply under GST laws, even in the absence of a consideration? Instead, applicant framed the question as:
Whether the goods supplied by us [becoming victim of fraud without receiving consideration] could be considered as supply of goods under the provisions of section 21 under the IGST Act?
Grammatical errors in the question aside, the legal question would be why did the applicant invoke Section 21, IGST Act, 2017? The impugned provision states that import of services made on or after the appointed day shall be liable to tax regardless, whether the transactions for import of such services had been initiated before the appointed day. However, the applicant’s transaction in question was an inter-State supply and nothing to do with import of services. Clearly, the applicant approached AAR with a question that referred to the wrong provision. And AAR also noted the applicant’s reference to the above provision and observed:
How this will be applicable to supply of goods made by the applicant to the recipient in the State of Assam is not understood. We find that the question, at best is vaguely framed. (para 9)
The applicant’s query could not have been answered by referring to the wrong provision and thus another approach was necessary.
Second Error
In adopting the alternate approach, the AAR made an error by referring to Section 12, CGST Act, 2017 which states the time of supply of goods. Time of supply goods is a concept under GST which helps us determine at what point in time did the supply in question took place. To delineate and cohere various situations, the provision lays down certain rules including deeming fictions. AAR referred to Section 12 and noted that time of supply of goods is either the date of issue of invoice by the supplier or date on which the supplier receives payment with respect to the supply, whichever is earlier. Applying the above rules to the facts, AAR noted that the supplier had issued invoices in June 2023 and July 2023, thus the point of taxation in respect of supply of goods will be the date of issue of invoice. AAR thereby concluded that the applicant had supplied goods under relevant provisions of GST laws.
The error in the above analysis by AAR is that it did not consider if supply had been made. Time of supply as the phrase indicates is only relevant for a supply. The more relevant question for AAR was if a supply had been made and not the time of supply. Latter was contingent on the former. AAR, instead, assumed that the supply had been made and relied on time of supply and invoices to state that a supply had been made.
Third Error
This leads us to the third error: applicant’s argument that no supply had taken place. The applicant relied on Sales of Goods Act, 1930 to argue that a valid sale had not taken place since all the essential ingredients of a sale were not satisfied in absence of a consideration. AAR declined to accept applicant’s above argument and referred to Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 which defines supply. However, instead of analysing if the ingredients of supply were satisfied in the impugned case, AAR took a short route and simply noted that ‘it is not disputed that a supply has been done by the applicant’. (para 14) AAR concluded that while a fraud may vitiate the contract of sale, the applicant has not explained how a fraudulent sale moves outside the ambit of supply.
The error here is actually two-fold: first, the applicant invoking Sales of Goods Act, 1930 instead of categorically stating that the ingredients of supply are not satisfied in the impugned case; second, AAR only reproducing the definition of supply in its ruling rather than examining if a supply can take place under Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 even if the purchaser pays no consideration. To be fair though, AAR would not undertake the latter exercise if the applicant doesn’t argue for it. And it seems the four people representing the applicant before AAR didn’t make the argument and instead surprisingly relied on Sales of Goods Act, 1930 to argue that a sale had not taken place.
Conclusion
The first instinct is to club Gujarat AAR’s impugned ruling with the wide swathe of sub-par advance rulings under GST. While AAR is not completely faultless in this ruling and did commit its own error, the applicant approached AAR with a wrongly framed question and made some misjudged arguments. There is only so much that AAR can do when the applicant adopts such a flawed approach. AAR to some extent did salvage the situation. But just about. Irrespective, I doubt we have heard the last word on this issue.
Legislative Intent or Error: Puzzle of Indian Tax Policy
Introductory Questions
Let me start with a question: how does one discover legislative intent in a provision of tax statute? Through a plain reading of the provision or through a subsequent statement by the State’s legal counsel stating its intent? Positivist thinking would point us to the former, and rightly so. A statement, even a sworn statement in a court shouldn’t override what is contained in the statute. Deference to the legislature cannot extend to a point where despite what the statute contains, court interprets the provision based on legislature’s statement explaining its intent.
The question in your mind may be: why am I asking this question? Well, for those who follow tax developments, you may already know. For others, I’m asking the question in the context of Safari Retreats case and the latest amendment to CGST Act, 2017 via the Finance Act, 2025.
One key question that the Supreme Court had to answer in Safari Retreats case was: Did the legislature intentionally use the conjunction ‘or’ instead of ‘and’? Or did the legislature commit a mistake? A simple question that acquires tremendous urgency if a taxpayer needs the answer to assess its tax liability which in this was a few crores.
During the hearing, the State’s counsel argued that use of the conjunction ‘or’ was a legislative error and further pressed that ‘or’ should be read as ‘and’. What should have been the ideal response of the Supreme Court? One view – subscribed by the State – is that Supreme Court should have declared ‘or’ means ‘and’ and interpreted the provision accordingly even if it meant throwing all grammar and interpretive rules out of the court complex. Or was there more justification in the Supreme Court responding the way it did: legislative intent can only be revealed by the legislative text and not by the State counsel’s statement about the text. And in doing so, restrict the amount of deference that courts accord to the legislature in tax laws.
And equally importantly, how should we respond? Resign to yet another retrospective amendment to a tax statute and raise our hands in exasperation while letting out a huge sigh. Or do we try to understand this entire episode like a puzzle and use it as an example of how Indian State approaches tax policy. I prefer to do the latter, and hence this article.
‘Or’ Means ‘And’
I’ve commented on the case in detail here and here. In this article, I intend to provide a limited overview of the controversy with an aim to highlight Indian State’s tax policy choices.
In 2019, the Orissa High Court allowed taxpayer to claim Input Tax Credit (‘ITC’) on construction of a shopping mall. In 2024-25, one of State’s arguments before the Supreme Court was that use of ‘or’ instead of ‘and’ was a legislative error. The reason for the argument, from a revenue perspective, was straightforward: it would ostensibly allow the State to block the taxpayer’s ITC claim. But the State was aware of the ‘legislative error’ since 2019, why not correct the error via a legislative amendment and bury the issue instead of making elaborate arguments before the Supreme Court? Commenting on the same the Supreme Court in its judgment observed the following:
The writ petition in which the impugned decision was rendered is a six-year-old writ petition. If it was a drafting mistake, as suggested by learned ASG, the legislature could have stepped in to correct it. However, that was not done. In such circumstances, it must be inferred that the legislature has intentionally used the expression “plant or machinery” in clause (d) as distinguished from the expression “plant and machinery”, which has been used in several places. (emphasis added) (para 43)
As is evident, the Supreme Court rejected the State’s claim of an error. If use of ‘or’ was indeed an error, there was ample time for the State to step in and rectify it. And its failure to do so, in my books, counts as lack of bona fide. For the Supreme Court it was sufficient to dismiss the entire argument and proceed solely on the basis of what was written in the statute.
What did the State achieve by not amending the law and correcting what it claimed was a ‘legislative error’? For one, if the Supreme Court had actually ruled that ‘or’ should be read as ‘and’, it would have armed the State with a decision that could have been conveniently used by it to block ITC in the future as well.
Second, if the Supreme Court refused to interpret ‘or’ to mean ‘and’, the State could have claimed that the decision did not reflect ‘legislative intent’. Both things did happen. The latter is no longer a surprise. Each time the State loses a major tax case, its response is that the judicial decision does not reflect legislative intent. And subsequently, it leads to an amendment of the provision in question. And even more often, the amendment is given retrospective effect.
Legislative Intent – Legislative Error
The Supreme Court in its above cited paragraph makes it sufficiently apparent that legislative intent must be reflected through the statute itself. If the State claims that a legislative error crept into the statute, it should have rectified it in the intervening 6 years it had to act on it.
Legislative intent thus cannot be superimposed on a statute by the State on discovering its error or mistake. That would upset the balance of power in State’s favor and would violate a cardinal rule of tax law interpretation, i.e., strict interpretation of tax statutes is necessary to determine the taxpayer’s liability.
But does that mean that legislative error can never be acknowledged by courts? Apparently so.
One, there is no telling if an error is truly an error. In Safari Retreats case, the petitioners pointed out that:
In the model GST law, which the GST Council Secretariat circulated in November 2016 for inviting suggestions and comments, the expression “plant and machinery” was used both in clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5). However, while enacting the law, the legislature has advisedly used the expression “plant and machinery” in clause (c) and “plant or machinery” in clause (d) of Section 17(5). Therefore, the intention of the legislature cannot be brushed aside by contending that the use of the word “or” in Section 17(5)(d) is a mistake of the legislature. (para 9)
In such circumstances, who is to know if the legislature intentionally replaced ‘and’ with ‘or’ when finalising the text of the bill or an error crept in while editing the Model law. Presumably only the State can reveal the mystery through detailed document history and accompanying notes on the provisions. But do we want to go down that rabbit hole. Forget us, I doubt the State would like that like that level of transparency in law making.
Second, it would defeat a core tenet of not just tax law but also law in general. Tax liability is as per the law that exists and not what the law was intended to be. A taxpayer has no way of knowing what the legislature ‘intended’ to enact except by interpreting the provisions as they exist. And if one argues that the legislative debates, and other pre-legislative reports would provide a clue, it is a heavy burden to impose on the taxpayer. Then not only must the taxpayer know the law but also whether the law contains an error or not. Hardly just or fair. And one would argue such a stance is also devoid of common sense.
Puzzle of Indian Tax Policy
Hidden in the steps of Safari Retreats case and its aftermath is the puzzle of Indian tax policy decisions.
One, why wait for the Supreme Court’s decision and then amend the provision retrospectively? Because beyond the immediate urgency of losing or wining a case, was a question of policy. Do we allow taxpayers to claim ITC on construction of shopping malls when they further rent it for business? While a timely amendment of ‘or’ to ‘and’ may not have answered the question with certainty, it would have provided a clear signal of proactive policy making including correcting errors. Instead, the post-decision amendment reveals a policy of amending laws as per convenience.
Two, where were the States? Since the entire dispute centred around CGST Act, 2017 we expect response from the Union, but GST is a federal levy. Why didn’t any State openly and persuasively argue for an amendment and perhaps end a long winding litigation? It was only after the Supreme Court’s judgment, that States were visible. But just about. States were on board for the GST Council’s recommendation for amendment. Or at least no State objected to the amendment. So, my impression is that either ALL States were either clueless about the litigation or all of them unanimously approve retrospective amendments to GST laws instead of proactive amendments to thwart resource consuming litigation. Maybe, this is the kind of uniformity that was aimed through GST.
Third, why file a review after deciding to introduce the amendment? Again, it seems the Court’s stamp of approval or its views on the amendment will prevent sprouting of similar issues from the provision. In this case, though the litigation may not end because even the amendment may not prove enough as courts will still need to interpret the phrase ‘plant and machinery’. But a review seems like a circuitous way of making tax policy when there can be direct and straightforward ways. Only we prefer to be clever by half and like to prevent transparency on fundamental tax policy issues. Else, the State may be held to its word and that is not something it will enjoy.
Way Forward
The promise of no retrospective amendments to GST laws was buried long ago. And now it is dead. We can only hope for a more sane approach to tax disputes and a saner reaction to court decisions that are not in the State’s favor. Else, the familiar cycle of dispute, decision, amendment will continue till perpetuity until one fine day we feel the need to ‘simplify’ GST by removing all the Provisos and Explanations which were added via numerous reactive amendments.
Powers of Arrest under CGST Act, 2017 and Customs Act, 1962: Constitutionality and their Scope
The Supreme Court in a recent judgment upheld the constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in Customs Act, 1962 and CGST Act, 2017. The Court also elaborated on the scope of arrest powers under CGST Act, 2017 and safeguards applicable to an arrestee. The judgment reiterates some well-established principles and clarifies the law on a few uncertain issues. In this article, I examine the judgment in 3 parts: first, the import of Om Prakash judgment and Court’s opinion on arrest powers under Customs Act ,1962; second, the issue of constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in CGST Act, 2017, and third, the scope and contours of arrest-related powers under GST laws along with a comment on Justice Bela Trivedi’s concurring opinion and its possible implication.
Part I: Om Prakash Judgment and Customs Act, 1962
Om Prakash Judgment
In Om Prakash judgment, the Supreme Court heard two matters relating to Customs Act, 1962 and Central Excise Act, 1944. The issue in both matters was that all offences under both the statutes are non-cognizable, but are they bailable? The Court held that while the offences were non-cognizable, they were bailable. The Court referred to relevant provisions of the CrPC, 1973 and statutes in question to support its conclusion. For example, the Court referred to Section 9A, Central Excise Act, 1944 and held that the legislative intent is recovery of dues and not punish individuals who contravene the statutory provisions. And the scheme of CrPC also suggests that even non-cognizable offences are bailable, unless specifically provided.
The Supreme Court in Om Prakash judgment also clarified that even though customs and excise officers had been conferred with powers of arrest, their powers were not beyond that of a police officer. And for non-cognizable offences, the officers under both statutes had to seek warrant from the Magistrate under Sec 41, CrPC, 1973.
Amendments to Customs Act, 1962
Section 104, Customs Act, 1962 was amended in 2012, 2013, and 2019 to modify and to some extent circumvent the application of Om Prakash judgment. Supreme Court’s insistence on tax officers seeking Magistrate’s permission before making an arrest was sought both – acknowledged and modified via amendments to the Customs Act, 1962. To begin with, Customs Act, 1962 bifurcated offences into two clear categories: cognizable and non-cognizable and the amended provisions clearly specified which offences were bailable or non-bailable. These amendments which were the subject of challenge in the impugned case.
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and held that petitioner’s reliance on Om Prakash judgment was incorrect. But were the pre-conditions for arrest in Customs Act, 1962 sufficient to safeguard liberty? Were there sufficient safeguards against arbitrary arrest to protect the constitutional guaranteed liberties?
The Supreme Court clarified that the safeguards contained in Sections 41-A, 41-D, 50A, and 55A of CrPC shall be applicable to arrests made by customs officers under the Customs Act, 1962. The arrestee would have to informed about grounds of arrest, the arresting officer should be clearly identifiable through a badge being some of the protections available to an arrestee. Court added that mandating that said safeguards of CrPC shall apply to arrests by customs officers ‘do not in any way fall foul of or repudiate the provisions of the Customs Act. They complement the provisions of the Customs Act and in a way ensure better regulation, ensuring due compliance with the statutory conditions of making an arrest.’ (para 29)
The Supreme Court further added that safeguards provided in Customs Act, 1962 were in itself also adequate to protect life and liberty of the persons who could be arrested under the statute. The Supreme Court noted that the threshold of ‘reason to believe’ was higher than the ‘mere suspicion’ threshold provided under Section 41, CrPC. And that the categorisation of offences under the Customs Act, 1962 wherein clear monetary thresholds were prescribed for non-cognizable and non-bailable offences enjoined the arresting officers to specifically state that the statutory thresholds for arrest have been satisfied.
Finally, the Supreme Court read into Section 104, Customs Act, 1962 the requirement of informing the accused of grounds of arrest as it was in consonance with the mandate of Article 22 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court exhorted the officers to follow the mandate and guidelines laid down in Arvind Kejriwal casewhere it had specified parameters of a legal arrest in the context of Sec 19, PMLA, 2002.
While dismissing the challenge to constitutionality of arrest-related provisions of Customs Act, 1962 the Supreme Court cautioned and underlined the need to prevent frustration of statutory and constitutional rights of the arrestee.
Overall, the Supreme Court was of the view that pre-conditions for arrest specified in Customs Act, 1962 were not constitutional and safeguarded the liberties of an arrestee while obligating the custom officers to clearly specify that the conditions for arrest were satisfied. The Court also clarified that various safeguards prescribed in CrPC, 1973 were available to an arrestee during arrests made under Customs Act, 1962.
Part II: Constitutionality of Arrest-Related Provisions in CGST Act, 2017
Article 246A Has a Broad Scope
The constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in CGST Act, 2017 was previously upheld by the Delhi High Court in Dhruv Krishan Maggu case, as I mentioned elsewhere. The Supreme Court in impugned case also upheld the constitutionality of provisions. The arguments against constitutionality of arrest-related provisions in CGST Act, 2017 were similar in the impugned case as they were before the Delhi High Court. The petitioner’s challenge was two-fold: first, Parliament can enact arrest related provisions only for subject matters contained in List I; second, powers relating to arrest, summon, etc. are not incidental to power to levy GST and thus arrest-related provisions cannot be enacted under Article 246A of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court’s rejection of petitioner’s argument on constitutionality was in the following words:
The Parliament, under Article 246-A of the Constitution, has the power to make laws regarding GST and, as a necessary corollary, enact provisions against tax evasion. Article 246-A of the Constitution is a comprehensive provision and the doctrine of pith and substance applies. The impugned provisions lay down the power to summon and arrest, powers necessary for the effective levy and collection of GST. (para 75)
Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of liberal interpretation of legislative entries, wherein courts have noted that the entries need to be interpreted liberally to include legislative powers on matters that are incidental and ancillary to the subject contained in legislative entry. Relying on above, the Supreme Court concluded that:
Thus, a penalty or prosecution mechanism for the levy and collection of GST, and for checking its evasion, is a permissible exercise of legislative power. The GST Acts, in pith and substance, pertain to Article 246-A of the Constitution and the powers to summon, arrest and prosecute are ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect goods and services tax. In view of the aforesaid, the vires challenge to Sections 69 and 70 of the GST Acts must fail and is accordingly rejected. (para 75)
The Supreme Court has correctly interpreted Article 246A in the impugned case. The Court liberally interpreted the scope of Article 246A in a previous case as well. The Court’s observations in the impugned case align with its previous interpretation wherein the Court has been clear that Article 246A needs to be interpreted liberally – akin to legislative entries – and include in its sweep legislative powers not merely to levy GST but ancillary powers relating to administration and ensuring compliance with GST laws.
The nature of Article 246A is such that it needs to be interpreted akin to a legislative entry since there is no specific GST-related legislative entry in the Constitution. The power to enact GST laws and bifurcation of powers in relation to GST are both contained in Article 246A itself investing the provision with the unique character of a legislative entry as well as source of legislative power in relation to GST.
Part III: Scope and Contours of Arrest Powers under CGST Act, 2017
Reason to Believe and Judicial Review
The Supreme Court referred to the relevant provisions of GST laws to note that there is clear distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable offences under the GST laws. And bailable and non-bailable offences have also been bifurcated indicating the legislature’s cognizance of Om Prakash’s judgment. Further, the nature of offence is linked to the quantum of tax evaded. While the threshold to trigger arrest under CGST Act, 2017 is the Commissioner’s ‘reason to believe’ that an offence has been committed. In this respect, the Court emphasized that the Commissioner should refer to the material forming the basis of his finding regarding commission of the offence. And that an arrest cannot be made to investigate if an offence has been committed. The Supreme Court also pronounced a general caution about the need to exercise arrest powers judiciously.
Another riddle of arrest that the Supreme Court tried to resolve was: whether a taxpayer can be arrested prior to completion of assessment? An assessment order quantifies the tax evasion or input tax credit wrongly availed. And since under CGST Act, 2017 the classification of whether an offence is cognizable or otherwise is typically dependent on the quantum of tax evaded, this is a crucial question. And there is merit in stating that the assessment order should precede an arrest since only then can the nature of offence by truly established. In MakeMyTrip case – decided under Finance Act, 1994, the Delhi High Court had mentioned that an arrest without an assessment order is akin to putting the horse before a cart. And in my view, in the absence of an assessment order, the Revenue’s allegation about the quantum of tax evaded is merely that: an allegation. And there is a tendency to inflate the amount of tax evaded in the absence of an assessment order. And an inflated amount tends to discourage courts from granting bail immediately and can even change the nature of an offence.
However, the Supreme Court in the impugned case noted that it cannot lay down a ‘general and broad proposition’ that arrest powers cannot be exercised before issuance of assessment orders. (para 59) There may be cases, the Supreme Court noted where the Commissioner can state with a certain degree of certainty that an offence has been committed and in such cases arrest can be effectuated without completion of an assessment order.
Here again, the Supreme Court stated that the CBIC’s guidelines on arrest will act as a safeguard alongwith its previous observations on arrest by custom officers, which will also apply to arrest under GST laws.
The issue is that CBIC issued the guidelines on arrest in 2022, and yet the Supreme Court noted that there have been instances of officers forcing tax payments and arresting taxpayers. And though the arrests led to recovery of revenue, the element of coercion in tax payments cannot be overlooked. If the coercive element during arrest was present even despite the guidelines, then perhaps an even stronger pushback is needed against arbitrary and excessive use of arrest powers. While the Supreme Court has done well in stating that various safeguards will apply to arrests such as those enlisted in various provisions of CrPC and requirements of warrants from Magistrates in non-cognizable offences, even the numerous safeguards, at times, don’t seem enough to protect taxpayers.
Justice Bela M. Trivedi’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Bela M. Trivedi’s concurring opinion prima facie dilutes safeguards provided to taxpayers. The Revenue is likely to use her words to argue against any judicial interference and deny bail to accused. Justice Trivedi clearly noted that when legality of arrests under legislations such as GST are challenged, the courts must be extremely loath in exercising their power of judicial review. The courts must confine themselves to examine if the constitutional and statutory safeguards were met and not examine the adequacy of material on which the Commissioner formed a ‘reason to believe’ nor examine accuracy of facts.
Justice Trivedi was emphatic that adequacy of material will not be subject to judicial review since an arrest may ordinarily happen at initial stages of an investigation. The phrase ‘reason to believe’, she observed, implies that the Commissioner has formed a prima facie opinion that the offence has been committed. Sufficiency or adequacy of material leading to formation of such belief will not be subject to judicial review at nascent stage of inquiry. The reason, as per Justice Trivedi was that ‘casual and frequent’ interference by courts could embolden the accused and frustrate the objects of special legislations such as GST laws. Limited judicial review powers for powers exercised on ‘reason to believe’ is a recurring theme in the jurisprudence on this standard. Reason to believe is a standard prescribed under IT Act, 1961 as well and courts have clear about not scrutinizing the material which forms the basis of the officer’s belief.
However, some of Justice Trivedi’s observations seem at odds with the lead opinion which requires written statements about Commissioner’s belief, reference to material on basis of which the Commissioner forms the ‘reason to believe’ that lead to arrest. The majority opinion is also clear about power of judicial review in case of payment of tax under threat of arrest, power of courts to provide bail even if no FIR is filed, among other safeguards. Though in the leading opinion there is no clear opinion about scope of judicial review at preliminary or later stages of investigation.
One possible manner to reconcile Justice Trivedi’s concurring opinion with the lead opinion is that her observations about narrow judicial review are only for preliminary stages of investigation. And that courts can exercise wider powers of judicial review at later stages of investigation. And that her view is only limited to ensuring that once the statutory safeguards have been met, courts should not stand in the way of officers to complete their inquiries and investigations else aims of the special laws such as GST may not be met. But her views are likely to be interpreted in multiple manners and the Revenue will certainly prefer her stance in matters relating to bail, not just at the initial stage of investigation but during the entire investigative process.
Conclusion
In the impugned case, the Supreme Court has advanced the jurisprudence on arrests under tax laws to some extent. But the observations are not in the context of any facts but in a case involving constitutional challenge. Thus, numerous safeguards that the Court has noted will apply to arrests made by customs officers or under GST Acts will be tested in future. Courts will have to ascertain if the arrests were made after fulfilment of the various safeguards, whether taxes were paid under threats of arrests, and other likely abuse of powers. The crucial test will be how and if to grant bail including anticipatory bail in matters where FIR is not registered.
Finally, ‘reason to believe’ is admittedly a subjective standard. It is the opinion of an officer based on the material that comes to their notice. And courts while may examine the material, cannot replace their own subjective view with that of the officer. The test in such cases is if a reasonable person will arrive at the same conclusion based on the material as arrived at by the Commissioner. Thus, ‘reason to believe’ as a standard per se, limits scope of judicial review and confers immense discretion to the Commissioner to exercise powers of arrest. The jurisprudence on this issue – both under the IT Act, 1961 and GST laws – is evidently uneven due to the subjective nature of standard. And courts have not been able to form a clear and unambiguous stance on the scope of judicial review with respect to the ‘reason to believe’ standard. And this unevenness and relatively weak protection afforded to taxpayers is likely to continue in the future as well despite the Supreme Court’s lofty observations in the impugned case.
