IT Act 1961

Taxation of ESOP-Related Compensation: Reviewing the Flipkart Cases

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Introduction 

In April 2023, the Board of Flipkart Private Limited (‘FPS’), Singapore decided to pay a one-time voluntary compensation – 43.67 US dollars per stock option – to all the option grantees of its Employee Stock Options (‘ESOPs’). FPS paid the compensation because the value of its ESOPs had reduced after divestment of its stake in PhonePe, a digital payments company. Under the Flipkart Stock Option Scheme of 2012, FPS was under no obligation to compensate option grantees for loss in the value of its ESOPs. Nor did the option grantees have a right to compensation for FPS’s failure to protect the value of its ESOPs. However, FPS exercised its discretion and decided to compensate all the option grantees on a pro rata basis. 

The question from a tax standpoint was: whether the option grantees are liable to pay tax on the one-time voluntary compensation paid by FPS? In the absence of a clear charging provision under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961) vis-à-vis such a compensation, three High Courts have arrived at two different answers. The Delhi High Court in Sanjay Baweja v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, TDS Circle, 77(1), Delhi & Anrand the Karnataka High Court in Manjeet Singh Chawla v Deputy Commissioner of TDS Ward-(1)(2), Bangalore have answered in favor of the option grantees, while the Madras High Court in Nishithkumar Mukeshkumar Mehta v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, TDS Circle 2(1), has held in favor of the Income Tax Department. In all three cases, the options had vested in favor of the option grantees, but they had not exercised the options on the date of receiving the compensation. A fact which is crucial to understand all three decisions.    

There were two possible ways the Income Tax Department tried to shoehorn the compensation as income under the IT Act, 1961: first, by classifying the compensation as a perquisite under Section 17(2)(vi) of the IT Act, 1961; second, by categorizing the compensation as capital gains under Section 45 of the IT Act, 1961. This article suggests that – contrary to the Income Tax Department’s claims – the compensation paid by FPS is not taxable either as a perquisite or as capital gains under existing provisions of the IT Act, 1961. 

The two arguments against levy of income tax on the compensation are: 

first, Section 17(2)(vi) of the IT Act, 1961 only envisages the difference in exercise price and fair market value of the options as a taxable perquisite. A one-time voluntary compensation paid to compensate for loss in value of ESOPs is not within the purview of Section 17(2)(vi). 

second, while the one-time compensation paid by FPS is appropriately categorized as a capital receipt, in the absence of transfer of the underlying capital asset – stocks- it cannot be considered as capital gains under the IT Act, 1961. And even if one assumes that the compensation is capital gains, in the absence of a corresponding computation provision for such payments, the attempt to levy tax on such a compensation should fail.   

Scope of Perquisite under Section 17(2)(vi) 

Section 17(2)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’) defines ‘perquisite’ to include the value of any specified security or sweat equity shares allotted or transferred, directly or indirectly, by the employer, or former employer, free of cost or at a concessional rate to the assessee. Explanation (c) to the above sub-clause adds that: 

the value of any specified security or sweat equity shares shall be the fair market value of the specified security or sweat equity shares, as the case may be, on the date on which the option is exercised by the assessee as reduced by the amount actually paid by, or recovered from, the assessee in respect of such security or shares;

Section 17(2)(vi) read with Explanation (c) makes ESOPs taxable in the hands of an assessee as a perquisite. And difference in the fair market value of ESOPs and the cost paid by the assessee for ESOPs is treated as a perquisite on which income tax is payable. But the difference between two prices is only relevant if the option grantee exercises the option because the difference is calculated in reference to the ‘date on which the option is exercised by the assessee.’ One can then plausibly argue that it is the exercise of stock options that triggers an option grantee’s income tax liability under Section 17(2)(vi). 

The Madras High Court though held that the compensation received by an option grantee from FPS was taxable under Section 17(2)(vi) since the former ‘continues to retain all the ESOPs even after the receipt of compensation’. This conclusion has no basis in Section 17(2)(vi) since retention or otherwise of vested ESOPs is irrelevant to their taxability. It is the exercise of options that is material in determining the tax liability. The Madras High Court added another problematic observation to its above conclusion, i.e., computation of tax payable on the compensation. Section 17(2)(vi) does not provide for a computation mechanism for a voluntary compensation paid in respect of ESOPs. In this respect, the Madras High Court created its own computation mechanism by observing that:

If payments had been made by the petitioner in relation to the ESOPs, it would have been necessary to deduct the value thereof to arrive at the value of the perquisite. Since the petitioner did not make any payment towards the ESOPs and continues to retain all the ESOPs even after the receipt of compensation, the entire receipt qualifies as the perquisite and becomes liable to be taxed under the head “salaries”. 

Again, there is nothing in Section 17(2)(vi) that supports the above observation. Section 17(2)(vi) does envisage an option grantee receiving ESOPs free of cost. And in that case, the import of Explanation(c) would be that since ‘the amount actually paid’ by the option grantee is nil, the fair market value of ESOP would be computed as the taxable perquisite, without any deduction of cost. The foundational condition of exercise of options though must still be satisfied. But the Madras High Court overlooked the condition of exercise of options. Overall, the Madras High Court’s observations on taxability and computation of tax on the compensation, via a liberal reading of Section 17(2)(vi), are suspect.

On the other hand, by adopting a comparatively more strict and reasonable interpretation of Section 17(2)(vi), the Delhi High Court noted that ‘a literal understanding’ of the provision would reveal that the value of specified securities or sweat equity shares is dependent on exercise of options. And that for an income to be included as a ‘perquisite’ under Section 17(2)(vi), it is essential that the option grantee exercises the options. In the absence of exercise of options, the benefits derived in the form of a one-time voluntary compensation were not taxable as a perquisite under Section 17(2)(vi). The Karnataka High Court in a similar vein added since the assessee had not exercised the stock options the voluntary compensation paid by FPS was not taxable under Section 17(2)(vi) a perquisite. The Karnataka High Court stated that in the impugned scenario ‘a computational impossibility’ arises since taxability under Section 17(2)(vi) only arises when the option grantee exercises the option.  

Charge and Computation of Capital Gains 

Section 45 of the IT Act, 1961 states that any profits or gains arising from transfer of a capital asset shall be chargeable to income tax under the head “capital gains”. To levy a charge of tax under this provision, there must be transfer of a capital asset from which a profit or gain is made by the asssesse. None of the conditions specified in Section 45 were satisfied in the impugned scenario. The arguments against equating the one-time voluntary compensation to capital gains are manifold. 

To begin with, the option grantees stated that since they had not exercised their stock options at the time of receipt of compensation, there was no transfer of the underlying capital asset, i.e. the stocks. An essential ingredient of Section 45 was not fulfilled and thus the assertion that the compensation amounted to capital gains must fail. 

Another reason for not considering the compensation as capital gains was that in the absence of exercise of stock options, the option grantees had paid no cost for acquiring them. The cost of acquisition, essential to compute capital gains, could not be determined. Section 48 of the IT Act, 1961 contains details on how to compute income chargeable to tax under the head of capital gains. But, Section 48 of the IT Act, 1961 does not specify how to compute capital gains tax for a voluntary compensation received by an option grantee; specifically, when the option grantee has not exercised options at the time of receiving a voluntary compensation in relation to ESOPs. 

Even if one assumes there was transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of Section 45 of the IT Act, 1961 the lack of a corresponding computation mechanism would mean that the charge of tax must fail. The Karnataka High Court endorsed a well-established dictum of law on this issue, i.e., a charging provision and computation provision constitute an integrated code. The Karnataka High Court relied on Mathuram Aggarwal v State of Madhya Pradesh, where the Supreme Court has held that if any of the three elements: the subject of tax, the person liable to pay tax and rate of tax are ambiguous, there is no tax under the law. The Karnataka High Court’s reasoning that in the absence of a computation mechanism – for the compensation received by the option grantees – the charge of tax fails is based on a correct reading of the tax statute and aligns with the Supreme Court’s unchallenged view.

Finally, the option grantees argued that the compensation is a capital receipt, and the levy of income tax must fail. The Income Tax Department tried to argue that the compensation is a revenue receipt on the ground that FPS intended to deduct tax at source implying that the compensation is taxable under the IT Act, 1961. The Delhi High Court correctly negatived this assertion by the Income Tax Department and observed that: 

It is pertinent to note that the manner or nature of payment, as comprehensible by the deductor, would not determine the taxability of such transaction. It is the quality of payment that determines its character and not the mode of payment. Unless the charging Section of the Act elucidates any monetary receipt as chargeable to tax, the Revenue cannot proceed to charge such receipt as revenue receipt and that too on the basis of the manner or nature of payment, as comprehensible by the deductor.

The Delhi High Court added that the compensation paid by FPS to the option grantees was a one-time voluntary payment not linked to employment or business of the latter, and neither did it arise from a statutory or contractual obligation and correctly categorized it as a capital receipt. The Delhi High Court cited various precedents to emphaise on the voluntary nature of the payment to conclude that the compensation paid by FPS was a capital receipt. The Delhi High Court’s conclusion on the compensation being a capital receipt was in the context of Section 17(2)(vi). However, the Delhi High Court’s above observation was partially applicable to rebut the argument of capital gains as well. To put it succinctly, a capital receipt is subject to tax only if there is an express charging provision under the relevant income tax statute, there is a corresponding computation provision, and the capital receipt is included in the definition of income. Else, a capital receipt remains outside the purview of an income tax statute. In the impugned case, the lack of a specific computation provision for such compensation establishes that it is a capital receipt that is not charged to tax under the IT Act, 1961. The Karnataka High Court went a step ahead and pointedly held that the compensation was a capital receipt not chargeable to income tax under Section 45. And that a capital receipt which cannot be taxed under Section 45, cannot be taxed under any other head of income. And in stating so, the Karnataka High Court refused to categorize the compensation under the head of ‘salaries’, ‘capital gains’ or ‘income from other sources.’      

Conclusion  

Overall, the Delhi and Karnataka High Court’s approach to the impugned issue of taxability of a one-time compensation seems to be on much sounder footing. The latter copiously cited the former judgment and endorsed it unqualifiedly while adding its own similar interpretation. The reason that the Madras High Court’s judgment is unpersuasive is because it at odds with some of the fundamental interpretive tools used in tax law. For example, the position under tax law is clear and unimpeached: an income cannot be subjected to tax in the absence of an express charging provision. The charge of tax also fails in the absence of a corresponding computation mechanism. The former only establishes that the tax is payable, quantifying the amount payable via a computation provision is equally vital. Absence of either proves fatal to the charge. The Madras High Court by holding that the one-time voluntary compensation paid by FPS is taxable under Section 17(2)(vi), and that the entire sum received as compensation is taxable as perquisite, contradicts both the above well-accepted positions in tax law. It is not the remit of courts to interpret charging provisions liberally or prescribe computation mechanisms. The Madras High Court’s interpretive approach was an unwelcome intervention in adjudication of tax disputes. The Delhi and Karnataka High Court judgments – based on strict interpretation and defensible reasoning – hopefully will be a persuasive source for any future disputes that may arise on tax disputes of similar nature. 

The Monsoon of Tax ‘Reform’ 

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It’s raining tax ‘reform’. Income Tax Bill, 2025 (‘IT Bill, 2025’) will soon replace the six decades old Income Tax Act, 1961. Goods and Services Tax (‘GST’) will ostensibly be simplified by Diwali of 2025. And we will have a two-tier GST consisting of 5% and 12%, with a ‘special’ tax rate of 40% applicable to select goods and services. Income Tax Return forms are being simplified, money limits for filing appeals across all tax domains are being enhanced to reduce tax litigation. Cumulatively, the changes – we are informed – are part of the larger goal of ushering in ‘Next-Generation Reforms’. There is a lot of activity, but something seems amiss.

Substantive tax reform is amiss. 

IT Bill, 2025: Simple Language, Uncertain Policy 

The use of simple, comprehensible, and coherent legal language is a goal worth spending thousands of hours. But such an exercise proves to be shallow and limited if the underlying policy is unclear and operating at cross purposes. Is faceless assessment scheme now the default manner of assessment or some aspects of human interaction are to be retained permanently? Do CSR activities deserve an unqualified tax-free status? What is the appropriate manner to levy tax on trusts? If the questions seem too narrow and pointed, what about the broader ones. Do we decisively move to the new tax regime and shed the old tax regime? Do we provide revenue targets to officers, but ensure that they don’t adopt absurd positions? Can we ensure that the Revenue Department does not adopt a position that is contrary to plain language of the statute? Do we repose faith in taxpayers and make policies from that starting point or is the default position otherwise? Should every tax treaty now be necessarily notified or was it just a convenient argument adopted by the Income Tax Department to deny benefits to a handful of taxpayers? I can go on, but you get the gist. 

If core income tax policies are in a state of flux, the language to express that policy can only provide limited clarity. Ironically, most clarity emerges in only in provisions which endow powers to the Income Tax Department. This includes powers of search and seizure, powers of arrest, and now that the dust has settled a bit: powers to reopen assessments. Otherwise, use of phrases such ‘tax year’ for ‘assessment year/previous year’ or use of ‘irrespective’ instead of ‘notwithstanding’ is a choice in favor of alternate words, not necessarily clarity. The IT Bill, 2025 may be more readable compared to its predecessor. The unending provisos and explanations may have been removed, redundant provisions to some extent been deleted, and use of legalese comparatively lesser. But improved readability should not be confused with clarity.    

GST: Multiple Tax Rates are not THE Enemy

Multiple tax rates in GST only take the heat because they are an obvious and low hanging target on which we like to hang all the flaws of GST. But the truth is that the Union and States cannot express their GST governance in clear and unambiguous terms. Why are purchaser’s dependent on suppliers to file their returns to claim Input Tax Credit? Why is provisional attachment of taxpayer properties so commonplace that courts must intervene repeatedly, and caution about the draconian nature of the power of provisional attachment? What policy is guiding levy of GST on health and life insurance? Why was online gaming target of ludicrous GST claims despite the law being obviously silent on come crucial issues? Why cannot the Revenue Department not digest any loss in courts? Any major loss in courts for the Revenue Department immediately triggers an amendment to nullify the decision. If possible, a through retrospective amendment. You want examples of these amendments? I’ve enlisted some here. 

The upward trajectory of GST collections hides the many flaws of GST governance. Instead of undertaking long, painful substantive reform, and building on the many gains of GST, we have chosen to focus on tinkering with GST rates. It is an easy sell on the political front. Come Diwali, it is easy to sell reduction of GST rates on cars and claim brownie points. But does that solve the broader issues caused by multiple tax rates in GST. The classification disputes – though source of occasional amusement – are unlikely to see end of the day until GST magically adopts a single-rate structure. Is revenue neutral rate now completely irrelevant to determine GST tax rates? If GST Compensation Cess is phased out, will the new policy be of no more cesses on GST? Because if the Union and States are simply going to levy ad hoc cesses on narrowed down tax slabs to compensate for revenue loss, we may as well stick with the current tax rates. And, while we at it, can someone tell me: why do gold and precious stones that they deserve a tax rate of their own?    

Tax Administration IS Tax Policy

There is a credible viewpoint in tax law scholarship: tax administration IS tax policy. You can understand this pithy quote in any number of ways. First, that tax administration can elevate or bury the most prudent tax policy. Delay in processing bona fide tax refunds can defeat a well-intentioned policy of reducing tax burdens of certain taxpayers. Cancelling GST registrations for sham reasons can defeat the policy of providing registrations within three working days of filing an application of registration. The above viewpoint can also be understood to mean that tax administration is an integral part of tax policy. Or if not integral, tax policy is certainly not distanced from tax administration. And that any tax reform or change in tax policy that does not bring a simultaneous change in tax administration is a flawed, if not a doomed tax reform. 

We cannot expect a rewrite of a law or a change in the tax rates to simply reduce unnecessary litigation, improve compliance, or otherwise improve tax governance. We need accompanying changes in attitudes of tax officers which in turn may require a broader systemic change in the administration of our Revenue Departments. Forsaking pedantic interpretation of law, aspiring for tax coherence, letting go of smaller tax demands in the short run for long term gains of simplicity and coherence can be some of the changes. But, as I write and advocate for these changes, I’m already convinced that they will take a long time to be realized. If at all.   

Conclusion – Buzzwords Abound  

The landscape of tax law and policy is increasingly being populated by buzzwords of no consequence. ‘One Nation, One Tax’ was a slogan that hid the reality that some indirect taxes will survive the implementation of GST. Now the ‘Diwali gift’ of GST tax rates restructuring is being thrown around as if sane tax policy is a largesse of the state and not a basic expectation of taxpayers. Income tax law has a ‘new look’ while it retains its old soul. And, while one cannot grouse political priorities because buzzwords sell, it is vital to understand the substance or the lack of it that hides behinds these quasi-marketing slogans. India’s tax landscape needs reform – deep, wide, and substantive. Anything else is activity, not meaningful change.    

Shelf Drilling Judgment: A Case of Interpretive Disagreements

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The Supreme Court in a split judgment left unresolved the long standing issue of interplay between Section 144C-Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’). The absence of a clear resolution while not ideal, provides an insight into different interpretive attitudes towards procedural issues in tax. In this article, I make a few broad points on the interpretive approaches both the judges adopted when faced with a question that did not have a clear answer, but at the same time, a question seems to have acquired more complexity than  warranted. 

Issue 

The panoramic question was: whether timelines for ‘specific assessments’ in Section 144C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’) are independent of or subsumed in the general timelines for assessments provided in Section 153 of the IT Act, 1961? 

Section 144C provides the procedure and timelines for a specific kind of assessments which typically involve foreign companies. If the assessing officer makes any change in the assessment which is prejudicial to the assessee, then Section 144C prescribes a procedure which includes forwarding a draft assessment order to the assessee. If the assessee has any objections after receiving the draft assessment order, it may approach the Dispute Resolution Panel (‘DRP’). Section 144C, in turn, empowers DRP to issue binding directions to the assessing officer. And the latter has to complete the assessment as per the said directions. Section 153, in comparison, is a general provision which prescribes timelines for completion of assessments and reassessments. The assessing officer ordinarily has 12 months, after the end of a financial year, to complete any assessment.  

Opinions that do not ‘Converse’ 

In the impugned case, both judges framed the issue identically but answered it in diametrically opposite fashion. The divergent conclusions were a result of the different interpretive approaches adopted by both judges and their differing opinions as to what each of them considered relevant factors to adjudicate the case. The jarring part is that there seems to be no single point of consensus between the two judges. At the same time, while Justice Nagarathna does mention some points of disagreement with Justice SC Sharma’s opinion, the latter does not even mention or even superficially engage with her opinion. And consequently, Justice SC Sharma fails to tell us as to why he disagrees with Justice Nagarathna. It is left for us to arrive at our deductions and conclusions. I indulge in a preliminary attempt at this exercise and identify how both judges approached the issue and interpreted the relevant provisions and their respective reasonings.          

Modes Of Interpretation 

It is trite that tax statutes need to be interpreted strictly. Justice Nagarathna in her opinion went into significant detail about the appropriate interpretive approach in tax law disputes and cited various judicial precedents to lend support to her view of the necessity of strict interpretation. One offshoot of the doctrine of strict interpretation is that if the provision(s) is clear, plain, and unambiguous and inviting only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. It is this interpretive approach that guided her opinion that the issue of interplay between Section 144C-Section 153 was simply of statutory interpretation. She added that courts should not opine about the adequacy of the timelines available to the assessing officer or to the assessee as it would undermine the cardinal principles of tax law interpretation. So, if a strict interpretation of the provisions meant that an assessing officer would have limited time to complete assessments, so be it. It is for the Parliament to look into the adequacy of time available to the officers and assessees, not courts.      

Justice SC Sharma had no qualms – superficial or otherwise – about the need to follow strict interpretation. His approach was of a ‘balancing act’, literally. He clearly says that the Court must be alive to the ‘fine balance’ that needs to be maintained between tax officers having sufficient time to scrutinise income tax returns to prevent tax evasion and the right of assessees to not have their returns scrutinised after a certain amount of time. And in doing so, he stresses on the need for harmonious interpretation, the need to make various provisions of the IT Act, 1961 work. As is wont, a balancing act tends to lead to a half-baked solution. And Justice SC Sharma’s conclusion is one such solution where he concludes that the timelines prescribed in Section 153 are not completely irrelevant to Section 144C. The assessing officer is bound to complete the draft assessment order within the timelines mentioned in Section 153, and not the final assessment order. So he binds the assessing officer to complete half a job within the timeline prescribed by Section 153, but not the complete job. As per him, the final assessment order can be passed even after the limit set of Section 153. This is certainly not a strict interpretation of tax law provisions, but a judge’s subjective view of what is a ‘reasonable time’ for an assessing officer to complete an assessment.  

Relevance of Administrative Inconvenience 

Justice SC Sharma’s opinion is littered with his concern for tax officers of this country and their inability to complete assessments in a short time if the time period under Section 144C is interpreted to be subsumed in the time period provided in Section 153. He stated that in such a scenario, the tax officer will have to work ‘backwards’ and allow for a period of nine months to the DRP. As per Section 144C, if an assessee objects to the draft assessment order and refers it to a DRP, the latter has nine months to issue directions to the officer for completion of assessment and its directions are binding on the assessing officer. So, the assessing officer has to complete the draft assessment order by anticipating that objections may be raised before DRP, else the final assessment may not be completed within the timeline prescribed in Section 153. Justice Sharma was of the opinion that the Parliament ‘could not have conceived’ such a procedure to be followed by an assessing officer. The root cause of his concern was that the time window to complete the final assessment would be ‘negligible’ since ordinarily an assessment is to be completed within 12 months from end of the financial year in which the remand order is received from the tribunal. And this narrow time window, in his view, would ‘result in a complete catastrophe for recovering lost tax.’

Justice Nagarathana, however, dismissed the concern of unworkability of timelines. She said that failure of the assessing officer to meet the statutory timeline cannot be the basis of assuming any absurdity. The Revenue argued that if an assessing officer has to work backwards, the timelines may not be met, leading to an absurdity. I do agree with Justice Nagarathana that if for a specific set of assesses the assessing officers have to work backwards to respect the timelines, it does not make the provisions unworkable or absurd. How is working backwards to accommodate statutory prescribed timelines an absurd position? An assessing officer has to essentially accommodate nine months of time accorded to DRP in Section 144C and issue a draft assessment order accounting for that time. The actual absurdity is in the Revenue’s argument that an assessing officer accounting for the time that DRP may consume is a ground for extending statutory prescribed timelines. 

Also, Justice Nagarathana made it clear that merely because the assessee may opt for raising objections against the draft assessment order and approach the DRP cannot be a factor for increasing the timeline. The assessee cannot be prejudiced for exercising a right prescribed in the statute. Justice SC Sharma’s opinion though suggests that the exact opposite and implies that the assessee exercising the right to file objections and approach DRP is a good reason to extend timelines. And in implying so, he adopts a tenuous position. 

Impact of Non Obstante Clause(s) 

Our tax statutes contain non-obstante clauses galore, but their import and impact is understood differently based on the context. In the impugned case, Justice Nagarathana noted that the context and legislative intent of a non-obstante clause is vital to understand its import. Applying the above dictum, she held that the non-obstante clause in Section 144C(1) was only regarding the special procedure prescribed in the provision and not for the timelines enlisted in Section 153. She elaborated that Section 144C is only applicable to ‘eligible assessees’ and the provision mandates the assessing officer to forward a draft assessment order, while in all other cases a final assessment order is issued directly. Since Section 144C prescribes a special procedure for the eligible assessees, it overrides only those provisions of the IT Act, 1961 which prescribe a different procedure. Section 144C does not override all the provisions of the IT Act, 1961.  

Based on the above reasoning, Justice Nagarathana concluded that  the effect of non-obstante clause of Section 144C(1) is not to override Section 153. But why? This is because as per Justice Nagarathana, the latter was not contrary to the former. She added that if Section 144C is construed to extend the limitation period prescribed under Section 153, it would lead to an ‘absurd result’ as the scope and ambit of two provisions is distinct. She was clear that Section 153 prescribes timelines for assessments and reassessments while Section 144C prescribes procedure for a specific set of eligible assessees. In other words, Section 153 controls the timelines for all assessments while Section 144C controls procedure for specific assessments that may encompass only a limited set of assessees. Thus, both provisions had different scope and were not at odds with each other.  

One can also understand the above interpretive dilemma as an occasion where a judge faced with the relation between a general and specific provision, held that the former should serve the object and aims of the latter. Section 153 is certainly a general provision, and the timelines prescribed in it must be respected by a narrower and more specific provision such as Section 144C. Latter cannot operate at odds with the former and defeat the larger objective of completing assessments within prescribed time periods.  

Justice SC Sharma’s emphasis was on the non-obstante clauses in Section 144C(4) and Section 144C(13) which specifically override Section 153. Both these sub-sections mention the assessing officer’s obligation to pass a final assessment order. Both these sub-sections obligate an assessing officer to pass a final assessment order within one month (approximately) of receiving the assessee’s acceptance and DRP’s directions respectively. Justice Sharma somehow reads into the non-obstante clauses in these two sub-sections the idea that their effect was to only extend the timeline for passing a final assessment order and not the draft assessment order. He concluded that an assessing officer will have to complete the draft assessment order within the limitations stated in Section 153. 

Justice Sharma insisted that the non-obstante clauses must be construed to ‘not defeat’ the working of the IT Act, 1961 and ensure a harmonious construction of both the provisions. However, the real reason was his belief that if timelines of cases in Section 144C were subsumed in Section 153, it would be ‘practically impossible’ to complete the assessments. As discussed above, Justice Nagarathana was clear – and rightly so – that such a belief should have no role in interpretation of tax statutes. Also, Justice Sharma added that the assessing officer only acts in an executing capacity once the draft assessment order is passed, since the no new fresh issues can be raised thereafter. The implication being that the draft assessment order issued under Section 144C is effectively a final assessment order. This is convoluted phrasing and also an inaccurate understanding of assessment orders.      

Use of ‘Internal’ and ‘External’ Aids for Interpretation 

In the context of this discussion, let me say that an internal aid for interpretation can be understood be other provisions of the IT Act, 1961. While an external aid can include the Parliamentary discussions, committee reports, etc. Both the judges referred to external aids in the impugned case and tried to understand the rationale of impugned provisions, especially Section 144C, by citing memorandums and explanatory notes of the relevant finance acts. Justice Nagarathna cited them in significant detail and one can see that her conclusion was influenced by these external aids. The Finance Minister, when introducing the amendment via which Section 144C was inserted in the IT Act, 1961 had mentioned the need to improve climate for tax disputes, expedite the dispute resolution process, and provide an alternate dispute resolution process. Since the assessees that would benefit from Section 144C would primarily be foreign companies, the aim was to signal a more receptive tax environment for foreign investment. If expediting dispute resolution process was one of the aims of Section 144C, one could argue it was a reasonable deduction that timelines of Section 144C were subsumed in timelines of Section 153. Holding otherwise would delay the process instead of expediting it. And Justice Nagarathna was partially influenced by the purpose of introducing Section 144C before arriving at her conclusion.      

Justice SC Sharma’s reliance on external aid was comparatively much more limited. He cited the relevant extracts that explained the need for Section 144C, but his focus was more on the need to harmoniously interpret Section 144C and Section 153. He tried to reason that his conclusions were aimed at making sure the IT Act, 1961 remained workable and absurdities were avoided. He primarily relied on internal aids, i.e., other provisions of the IT Act, 1961 to defend his conclusions that he said were aimed to ensure harmony amongst the various statutory provisions.    

While We Await Another Judicial Opinion  

Until a three-judge bench weighs in with their opinion, the interplay of Section 144C-Section 153 obviously remains without a clear answer. On balance, the reasoning adopted by Justice Nagarathna is more aligned to classical principles of tax law interpretation. But, the Indian Supreme Court has an uneven record in tax law matters and predicting what may happen next is as good as rolling the dice. In recent times, the Supreme Court’s uneven history on tax matters includes but is not limited to providing remedy to the Revenue Department without them even making a request for it. Or adopting gymnast worthy legal fictions and altering the concept of time to ostensibly balance the rights of the Revenue and the assessees. Thus, there is no predicting the outcome of this dispute, though I can go out on a limb and say that the relevant provision(s) maybe amended, and retrospectively so, if the Income Tax Department does not agree with the final verdict. Such amendments are certainly not unheard of!     

When A Princess Worried About Tax on Alimony

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All things in life have a tax angle, including alimony payments. In this article I elaborate on tax treatment of alimony payments under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’). Upfront, these are the three takeaways from this article: 

first, a lump sum payment of alimony amount is not taxable in the hands of recipient, since it is a capital receipt.

second, the monthly payment of alimony amount is taxable in the hands of recipient, since it is an income from a particular source. 

third, the payer receives no tax deductions for alimony payments, even if the payments are made under a decree of court. 

The law on all three above aspects was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Princess Maheshwari of Pratapgarh v Commissioner of Income Tax. This case is the focus of my article below. 

Decree of Nullity Sprouts Tax Questions  

(i) Decree of Nullity of Marriage 

In September 1963, Princess Maheshwari Devi of Pratapgarh obtained a decree of nullity of her marriage with Maharaja of Kotah. The Bombay City Civil Court (‘civil court’) pronounced the decree of nullity under Section 25, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. As part of the proceedings, the Princess had claimed monthly alimony and a gross sum as permanent alimony from the Maharaja. The Civil Court ordered the Maharaja to pay the Princess an amount of Rs 25,000 as permanent lump sum alimony and a sum of Rs 750 per month as monthly alimony. The Maharaja was obligated to pay the latter until her remarriage, if and when, it took place.    

(ii) Two Tax Questions 

I will spare you details of assessment years and focus on the broader issue: the Princess claimed tax exemption on the lump sum alimony amount as well as the monthly alimony amounts. Her claims were rejected by the Income Tax Office and Appellate Tribunal, and against the said decisions she appealed to the Bombay High Court.

The High Court had to answer two questions: 

First, whether the monthly alimony of Rs 750 was income in hands of the Princess and liable to tax? 

Second, whether the lump sum alimony of Rs 25,000 was income in hands of the Princess and liable to tax? 

The framing of questions is crucial, from an income tax viewpoint. A receipt of money is only taxable if it constitutes ‘income’ as defined under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’). Else the receipt falls outside the ambit of IT Act, 1961 though given the current and expansive definition of income, rarely if ever is a receipt of money not subjected to income tax. 

Monthly Alimony is Taxable in Hands of Princess  

The Bombay High Court answered the first question in favor of the Income Tax Department and held that the monthly alimony payment to the Princess constituted her income and was taxable in her hands. The arguments from both sides were as follows.  

(i) Arguments 

The advocate for the Princess rested her case for tax exemption of the monthly alimony on various grounds. Some of them were: 

First, alimony is merely an extension of husband’s obligation to maintain his wife and Section 25, Hindu Marriage Act merely enlarges that obligation. The advocate was implying that the husband is obligated to maintain his wife, whether they continue to remain married or not.  

Second, the alimony payment to the Princess did not emerge from a definite or particular source and in fact, the payment would cease on her remarriage. 

Third, monthly alimony is a personal payment from her ex-husband and not a consideration for any services performed – past or future. 

The counsel for the State though argued that the decree of Civil Court had created a legal right in favor of the Princess. The right to receive a monthly alimony amount had a definite source, i.e., the decree of court, and should be taxed as income in hands of the Princess.   

(ii) High Court Applies the Law

The Bombay High Court scanned through the previous cases to state judicial understanding o the term ‘income’. For example, one notable case, the Privy Council had observed that income is something that is ‘coming in’ with some sort of regularity from a definite source. The High Court after scanning various other precedents, succinctly stated the judicial definition of income as: 

a periodical return for labour/skill that a person receives with some regularity, and from a definite source. But an income excludes a ‘windfall’ gain. 

The above definition would squarely cover a monthly alimony payment. The only point then in the Princess’s favor was her claim that the monthly alimony was not a result of application of any labour or skill on her part. But the High Court rejected this point and held that even voluntary payments can constitute income in hands of recipient if they come with regularity from a definite source. The High Court though further pointed out that the monthly alimony was paid to the Princess because of the civil court decree which was obtained by her by expending effort and labour. And the civil court decree is the source of her right to claim monthly alimony as minus the decree she would have no right to alimony. The High Court concluded: 

Although it is true that it could never be said that the assessee entered into the marriage with any view to get alimony, on the other hand, it cannot be deneid that the assessee consciously obtained the decree and obtaining the decree did involve some effort on the part of the assessee. The monthly alimony being a regular and periodical return from a definite source, being the decree, must be held to be “income” within the meaning of the said term in the said Act.

The monthly alimony amount was something the Princess would receive regularly because of the decree, because of her efforts to obtain to same from the civil court and thus it would constitute her income under IT Act, 1961 and be subjected to income tax. 

Lump Sum Amount Received as Alimony: Exempt from Tax  

As regards the taxability of lump sum amount of Rs 25,000 received as alimony, the Bombay High Court decided that it amounted to a capital receipt and was not taxable as income in the hands of the Princess. The High Court observed: 

It is not as if the payment of Rs. 25,000 can be looked upon as a commutation of any future monthly or annual payments because there was no pre-existing right in the assessee to obtain any monthly payment at all. Nor is there anything in the decree to indicate that Rs. 25,000 were paid in commutation of any right to any periodic payment. In these circumstances, in our view, the receipt of that amount must be looked upon as a capital receipt.

Capital receipt, in income tax law, is only taxable if there is an express charging provision in income tax law to that effect. Else, not. Only revenue receipt is charged to income tax by default. Thus, the above distinction of revenue and capital receipts was in favor of the Princess. Also, because the High Court took the view that the lump sum payment did not ‘commute’ any monthly or periodical payments that the Princess would have received since she had no pre-existing right to receive the monthly alimony payment. To be clear, the lump sum alimony amount could be taxable if it ‘commutes a part of the future alimony’. However, the High Court said there was nothing in the civil court decree that indicated that the lump sum amount commuted her monthly payments. At the same time, the High Court did acknowledge that ‘beyond doubt that had the amount of Rs. 25,000 not been awarded in a lump sum under the decree to the assessee, a larger monthly sum would have been awarded to her on account of alimony.’ Thus, leaving a window ajar to tax lumpsum alimony amounts in future cases.     

No Tax Deductions for Alimony Payments

The unfairness of IT Act, 1961 is that it does not allow deduction for alimony payments. Typically, husbands pay alimonies to their ex-wives. Presuming that the alimony payment is from a portion of husband’s already taxed income, such payment should ideally qualify for a deduction. It can be viewed as an expense. If not the entire amount, a deduction with an upper cap can be provided. And for monthly alimony payments anyways the wife is liable to pay income tax, so providing the husband income tax deduction on such payments may not be too harmful from a revenue perspective. Currently, the husband pays income tax on his income, pays a portion of such income as monthly alimony to his ex-wife, and the ex-wife is liable to income tax for the monthly alimony as it constitutes her income. A bountiful for the revenue, unless the spouses are smart and rich enough to agree only to a one-time alimony amount, circumventing the uneven tax consequences of IT Act, 1961.   

In fact, the Bombay High Court described the above position of law as ‘unfortunate’. It heeded the legislature to pay attention to this aspect and noted: 

It is clearly desirable that a suitable amendment should be considered to see that in cases where the payments of alimony are made by a husband from his income and are such that they cannot be claimed as deductions from the income of the husband, in the assessment of his income, they should not be taxed in the hands of the wife. That, however, is not for the courts but for the Legislature to consider.

The Bombay High Court made the above observations in 1982. Since the IT Act, 1961 has been amended several times to include various capital receipts within the realm of taxability. But not lump sum alimony payments categorized as capital receipts have not been made taxable. Neither have deductions on alimony payments been included. Our lawmakers seem busy ‘simplifying’ the income tax law, rather than introducing substantive and meaningful policy changes that acknowledge new social realities. 

Conclusion 

Neither the Income Tax Act, 1961 and unfortunately nor does the Income Tax Bill, 2025 provide a clear answer about taxability of alimony payments. Tax lawyers typically advice their clients based on above discussed judgment of the Bombay High Court. Any legislative clarity on this front seems a bit distant for now.    

Regardless, I would like to conclude with a normative question: 

Who SHOULD pay the tax on alimony payments? 

Depending on your gender biases, views on divorce, necessity of alimony payments, your perception of divorce settlements as fair or otherwise, your answers would vary. Typically, women receive alimony payments from their ex-husbands. And people who have strong and inflexible opinions that women use family laws as ‘get rich quick’ route are likely to argue that women should foot the tax bill on both kinds of alimony payments: made via lump sum amounts and/or on monthly basis. 

A tax law view would be to ask who benefits from the alimony payment? And who bears the burden? The latter should receive a deduction on the payment and the former should shoulder the tax liability. Irrespective of gender. I’m willing to go a step further and suggest that even if the alimony payment is not made because of a court order, but voluntarily as part of a valid contract, the above principles should apply. Taxability of alimony payments should not depend on whether court ordered it, or parties themselves agreed to it. IT Act, 1961 provides deductions to all kinds of voluntary contributions including to political parties, it is imperative that same principles apply to personal relationships if it ends with mutual consent – actual or perceived. We should stop hiding behind the argument that alimony payment is a personal obligation and thus does not qualify for deduction. Unless one entertains the far-fetched belief that providing such a deduction may further catalyze divorces.         

Finally, and just as a matter of abundant caution I would like to add that transfer of various assets – jewelry, house, etc. – between two spouses can and do happen when they are still legally married and sometimes after the marriage has legally ended. The transfers of such assets attract different tax liabilities and warrant a separate discussion.  

Tax Privacy: To Begin a Conversation … 

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Income tax law is based on disclosing information to the State. Personal financial information. Bank account statements, investments, salary receipts, rent paid or received, medical expenses, money transferred to spouse, expenses of children, insurance premiums, political donations, charitable contributions to name a few. Each piece of information is necessary to ascertain the exact tax liability of a taxpayer. And it is statutory duty of a taxpayer to make accurate and timely disclosures.  

If income tax administration is based on State compulsorily seeking detailed financial information from taxpayers, is it even possible to expect tax privacy? Yes. In fact, one could argue it is necessary to demand tax privacy. But what would tax privacy look like? What safeguards can be reasonably demanded and expected? There are no concrete answers and if I may dare suggest, no tentative answers either. Because the conversation around tax privacy in India has not even begun. 

To Begin a Conversation … 

Conduct an unscientific and random survey: ask your colleagues and friends if they are comfortable sharing their income tax returns with everyone? The dominant response will be no. Tax privacy in India starts and ends with a strong disagreement to make income tax returns public. Tax privacy in India hasn’t progressed beyond the notion of income tax returns. And even in this example, privacy exists in a rudimentary shape. The disinclination to share one’s income tax return with public at large isn’t entirely rooted in privacy, but a desire to avoid unnecessary scrutiny by social media and other ‘experts’, who may find numerous inconsistencies or point at insufficient income disclosures. And there lies the risk of reassessment notices, a trigger with which the Income Tax Department isn’t unfamiliar. And if you are even mildly popular, your income tax returns will be the fodder of endless gossip. Though you may not be object if your advance tax payments are conveniently disclosed to underline your success. 

The broad expectation of an Indian taxpayer seems to be that the State can access all relevant financial information, but the details contained in income tax returns should not be disclosed to the public at large without previous consent of the taxpayer, if at all. But we seem to have accepted or at least resigned to the fact that there is no concrete limit on the State’s power to secure personal financial information. How else will the State assess your income tax liability is the retort? 

An accurate response is that the State does not need unfettered access to your personal financial information to ascertain your income tax liability. State needs access to your ‘relevant’ personal financial information. Ordinarily, a taxpayer makes self-assessment – with help of a tax lawyer or an accountant – and discloses the relevant financial information. The State may, at times, demand additional information on the ground of ‘insufficient disclosure’ or to verify certain expenses. And it is at the juncture of disclosure and additional disclosure where privacy needs to be a shield for taxpayer, but it is conspicuous by its absence. The concept of tax privacy as a legal concept isn’t sufficiently articulated in India, especially to mediate the exchange of information and additional information between the State and taxpayers.          

Disclosing Financial Information 

Privacy is in the context of tax law, especially income tax law requires specific articulation. If I disclose to the State that I received a gift of immovable property from my parents, it is to ensure that an appropriate amount of tax is paid on the gift received. Hiding the transaction may allow me to escape the tax liability, in the short term or even forever, but it would be contravention of income tax law. But what if the State secures access to the transaction between me and my parents? If I did not disclose it voluntarily, maybe I boasted about acquiring a new immovable property on social media, and the State monitoring my virtual activity suddenly swung into action.

One pertinent question here is: can the State monitor my virtual activities in the hope of finding my ‘hidden’ sources of income or does it need prior permission before monitoring my activities? Privacy centric answer would lean in favor of the latter. The answer would suggest that the State needs to have a priori justification to monitor a taxpayer’s online activity. And such surveillance can only take place for a limited time and for specific activities. For example, tracking phone calls or movement without listening to the content of phone conversations. Our income tax laws are designed to grant the State power to intrude into taxpayer’s lives and the threshold to intrude into taxpayer’s life isn’t high. 

For example, let me look at some provisions that have lately generated some concern. Currently, search and seizure operations are permitted under Sec 132, IT Act, 1961 if some designated officers such as the Principal Commissioner, Chief Commissioner or Principal Chief Commissioner have ‘reason to believe’ that certain documents, articles, gold, etc. that are relevant to proceedings under the IT Act, 1961 have not produced by the taxpayer. The search and seizure operations empower officers to enter any building, vessel, aircraft, etc. and search persons, seize book, articles, etc. Section 132(9B) also empowers the officers to provisionally attach property of the taxpayer. These are extensive powers that are at times used to browbeat political opponents or journalists that the State doesn’t particularly like. Does the Income Tax Bill, 2025 go a step forward and provide additional powers to the State? Yes. 

Clause 247, Income Tax Bill, 2025 largely mirrors Section 132, IT Act, 1961, except the latter also provides the officers powers to override access codes to virtual digital space and any computer system where the codes are not available. It is the digital equivalent of powers to break lock to enter a locked building where the keys to the lock are unavailable. The threshold under Income Tax Bill, 2025 remains the same as under the IT Act, 1961. The authorized officer must have a ‘reason to believe’ that some document or information contained in an electronic media is not being disclosed by the taxpayer in relation to an income or property. 

Reason to believe is the subjective opinion of the officer in question and as per courts, should be based on credible material. But there must be proximate relation between the material on which opinion is formed and the final opinion. However, the courts have repeatedly stated that it is a subjective standard, and they cannot substitute the officer’s view with their view. The threshold of ‘reason to believe’ thus doesn’t provide ample safeguards against intrusion of privacy by tax officers: physical and virtual.   

The broad scope of search and seizure powers under the IT Act, 1961 and now Income Tax Bill, 2025 are rightly criticized for being overbroad. But the pushback is never rooted in protection of privacy. Or if it is, privacy is only in unarticulated subtext. Once officers are authorized to conduct a search and seizure operation under Section 132, they have the power to break locks, almirahs, seize documents, and search persons thereby impinging on business freedoms, bodily autonomy, and basic right to be ‘left alone’. While the State can justify that taxation is a sovereign right and search and seizure powers are ancillary to tax administration. But the articulation of privacy rights is missing in this argument and counter argument. To what extent can the State intrude into a person’s life to secure tax collection? When can the State violate physical autonomy of a taxpayer? On what grounds? We don’t know. Not yet.    

Disclosing Additional Information 

Privacy in the context of income tax law further suffers due to powers of the State to demand additional information under certain circumstances. Search and seizure operation is ideally conducted if the officer believes that the taxpayer has not voluntarily disclosed the information demanded by the State. But sometimes the additional information that is demanded from the taxpayer may put privacy in jeopardy. The additional information is usually sought when the income tax return of a taxpayer is selected for scrutiny or audit. In such cases, the officers demand additional information. For example, if I claim that I paid an ‘X’ amount as medical expenses for myself, then the State can question the validity of the claim. Or the amount. Disclosing additional information may risk disclosing my private medical information to the State. While the State may claim that not disclosing the entirety of medical expenses and the exact disease may jeopardize taxpayer’s claim for medical expenses and tax deduction. Where should we draw the line? Not sure, but the question is worth asking for now. 

Carrying the Conversation Forward  

There are three distinct strands of tax privacy that I wish to articulate in this preliminary article on tax privacy. I hope to delve deeper into each of these strands in the future, but the summation on each of these aspects of tax privacy is as follows. 

To begin with, if a taxpayer consents to sharing personal financial information with the State, then it is not unreasonable to expect tax privacy. To begin with, State should only seek relevant information that is proximate to the purpose of ascertaining tax liability. It is unreasonable to assume that the State has a carte blanche to demand any financial information. 

Equally, it is a valid expectation that the State shall only use the said information for purpose of computing and assessing tax liability. The ‘purpose limitation’ test as data protection law informs us. Privacy in this context is breached if the State uses the information for a purpose other than tax.  

Finally, I wish to underline the once the State has secured certain information, keeping the information secure is also State obligation. However, this is only one aspect of privacy, and in fact, more an element of confidentiality and less of privacy. And yet we tend to focus unduly on the State not disclosing our income tax returns to the public, instead of questioning scope of its power to demand and collect information in the first place. 

Long Wait for GSTATs: July 2017 … and Counting. 

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GSTATs have been envisaged as the first appellate forum under GST laws. And yet, 7.5 years since implementation of GST, not a single GSTAT is functioning. Reason? Many. Some are easy to identify, others are tough to understand. Nonetheless, here is a small story of the ill-fated GSTATs since the implementation of GST laws in July 2017. 

Provision is Declared Unconstitutional 

CGST Act, 2017, as originally enacted, provided that the no. of technical members in GSTATs would exceed the no. of judicial members. Both the Union and States wanted to ensure their representation on GSTATs via technical members which led to each GSTAT accommodating at least 2 technical members, i.e., technical member (Centre) and technical member (State). But CGST Act, 2017 provided for only one judicial member on the Bench of GSTAT. The Madras High Court ruled that the strength of technical members in tribunals cannot exceed that of judicial members, as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The relevant provision – Section 109(9) as originally enacted – was struck down as unconstitutional. There was a simultaneous challenge on the ground of Article 14 wherein the petitioners argued that under CGST Act, 2017 advocates were not eligible to become members of GSTATs and it violated their fundamental right to equality. The High Court refused to accept this plea and requested the Union to reconsider the ineligibility of advocates. Making advocates ineligible to become members of GSTAT is rather strange since a similar disqualification does not exist for ITATs under the IT Act, 1961.     

No Appeal Against the Decision  

The Union didn’t appeal against the Madras High Court’s decision. Surprising, since the Union likes to defend all its decisions including its interpretation of tax statutes until the last possible forum. Or perhaps in this instance the Union decided it was prudent to agree with the High Court’s decision. Or it wanted to use the High Court’s decision as a shield to defend the delay in operationalizing GSTATs. Irrespective, the Union’s decision to not file an appeal against the High Court’s decision meant it had to explore options to operationalize the GSTATs. During 2019-2021, the GST Council did discuss the options and feasibility of GSTATs in various States and the required no. of Benches, but the discussions didn’t prove to be immediately fruitful. One possible option of breaking the logjam was by amending the respective provision of CGST Act, 2017. 

Provisions are Amended 

The Finance Act, 2023 amended the provisions relating to composition of GSTATs. Below are the relevant provisions before amendment and post-amendment respectively: 

Pre-Amendment

Section 109(3):

The National Bench of the Appellate Tribunal shall be situated at New Delhi which shall be presided over by the President and shall consist of one Technical Member (Centre) and one Technical Member (State). 

Section 109(9): 

Each State Bench and Area Benches of the Appellate Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial Member, one Technical Member (Centre) and one Technical Member (State) and the State Government may designate the seniormost Judicial Member in a State as the State President. 

Post-Amendment 

Section 109(3): 

The Government shall, by notification, constitute a Principal Bench of the Appellate Tribunal at New Delhi which shall consist of the President, a Judicial Member, a Technical Member (Centre) and a Technical Member (State). 

Section 109(4): 

On request of the State, the Government may, by notification, constitute such number of State Benches at such places and with such jurisdiction, as may be recommended by the Council, which shall consist of two Judicial Members, a Technical Member (Centre) and a Technical Member (State). 

In summary, the amendments via the Finance Act, 2023 have ensured that the no. of judicial members are equal to technical members, if not more. This is because the President of GSTAT is usually the senior most judicial member. The balance of judicial and technical members needed to be met on two fronts: ensuring balance of representation between the Union and States inter-se needs and the balance between judicial and technical side to avoid executive domination. Now that the initial hurdle to constitute GSTATs was officially removed via Finance Act, 2023, one would have expected speedy and decisive steps towards constitution of GSTATs. But that wasn’t the case.  

Benches, Chairperson, Website … and Other Puny Steps 

Since the provisions relating to GSTATs have been amended, the Union has taken multiple – but tiny – steps towards operationalizing the GSTATs. With each step, the tax community has raised its hopes for quick operationalization of GSTATs. But each step seems a step too far. 

In May 2024, the Minister of Finance administered oath to the first President of GSTAT, New Delhi. Since GSTATs are not yet operational and do not hear cases, I’m not sure what the President of GSTAT does to earn his salary.  

In July 2024, in another step forward, the Ministry of Finance notified various Benches of GSTATs, with the Principal Bench in New Delhi. 

Recently, the tax community was rejoicing at GSTATs having a dedicated website. It is hard for me to understand the joy of having a functional website for an institution that itself isn’t functional. And the purpose of having a website is difficult to comprehend due to a recent report in January 2025, mentioning that GSTATs will take another 6 months to begin their functioning. When the formalities for appointing personnel have not completed, IT infrastructure is yet uncertain, and real estate for GSTATs has not been finalized, even 6 months seem like an ambitious target. Especially due to the track record of the Union and States on this aspect of GST.  

Constitutional Courts are Impatient  

Since GSTATs, ideally the first appellate forum for GST-related disputes, are not functioning, the burden has shifted to constitutional courts. High Courts and the Supreme Court end up hearing matters that typically should not have received attention beyond GSTATs. Supreme Court has recognized the effect of not having GSTATs and has recently raised the following query in one of its orders:

We would like to first know at the earliest why the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal has not been made functional till this date.  

The Union is supposed to reply to the above query in three weeks, but do not expect any fireworks and new revelations. 

Supreme Court’s question was prompted after it noted that the petitioner had the remedy to file an appeal under CGST Act, 2017 but had to approach the High Court via writ petition due to GSTATs not functioning. Many such cases that did not deserve or should not have been heard by High Courts and Supreme Court are currently in limbo because these constitutional courts do not have the advantage of GSTATs judgments and fact finding.   

Previously, the Allahabad High Court also tried to make the Union act quickly. But, despite the High Court’s eagerness to constitute GSTATs in the State of UP, there wasn’t much headway. 

Additionally, GSTATs are necessary to ensure harmony in interpretation and coherence in jurisprudence which has, for a long time, been at the mercy of AARs and AAARs. Both are intended to be interpretive bodies, not dispute resolution bodies but their several sub-par interpretations have caused tremendous confusion on various matters.

To conclude, I cannot say for sure when GSTATs will start functioning, but it is imperative that they do. And they function efficiently. A reform such as GST cannot be truly called a bold or a transformative reform until the accompanying rule of law infrastructure is operational. And GSTATs are a vital cog of that infrastructure. Until then, GST has certainly transformed the landscape of indirect tax in India. But, the promise of fair and speedy resolution of disputes remains a distant and unfulfilled promise.  

Income Tax Bill, 2025: In Search of a Big Idea

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The Department of Revenue claims that Income Tax Bill, 2025 – tabled in the Parliament on 13 February 2025 – marks a significant step towards simplifying the language and structure of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Does it? Yes. Was it needed? Yes. Is it a major reform? No, and herein lies the rub.  

The Press Release accompanying the IT Bill, 2025 makes it clear that the ‘simplification exercise’ did not implement any major tax policy changes to ensure continuity and certainty for taxpayers. This statement presumes two things: first, that there isn’t much uncertainty in the current IT Act, 1961 or certainly not worth immediate attention; second, that simplification and policy changes are easily separable. Both contain an element of truth without being completely true. 

In more than six decades of its existence, the IT Act, 1961 has ensured some stability and continuity in the direct tax domain, despite repeated amendments. But that does not mean that any major policy change in direct taxes should be frowned upon and sacrificed at the altar of certainty. There is enough ambiguity on various issues in income tax that could do with more clarity and better policy direction. Capital gains tax is one example. 

Equally, if the underlying policy is muddled, then the legislative language can only be that ‘simple’. Merely because the Provisos have been rearranged into sub-sections, Schedules have been appended, or ‘notwithstanding’ has been replaced with ‘irrespective’ will not be enough to reduce income tax litigation and disputes. Straightforward policy decisions usually lead to simpler statutes. Ad hoc policy changes cause frequent amendments and an eventual bloating of the statute. As it happened with IT Act, 1961. To aim for simplification of language without ensuring adequate clarity in policy is a limited exercise.   

In this post, I intend to highlight three major things: one achievement of IT Bill, 2025; one major flaw, and the way forward. 

IT Bill, 2025: Improves Readability, Not Comprehension  

IT Bill, 2025 has achieved one thing: it has improved reading flow of the proposed statute, the provisions are easier to locate without unnecessary alphanumeric numbers and caveats obstructing one’s view. The multiple Explanations, Provisos, non-obstante clauses, some with prospective, others with retrospective effect have been realigned into sub-sections to make the provisions easier to follow. Schedules are more informative, some redundancies have been eliminated, and overall, it is much easier to navigate the law as compared to the IT Act, 1961. But the ease of readability, and improved navigation is only for tax professionals. 

I don’t intend to speak for an ‘average’ taxpayer, but I’m going out on a limb to say that any claim that IT Bill, 2025 will be easier to comprehend for an average taxpayer is a bit of a stretch. The proposed law does not in any way remove the legalese to such an extent that the average taxpayer can fully understand the tax implications of their transactions. It is self-serving for tax administration to sell hope on the back of this simplification exercise, but let us draw a line and stop them from selling a fantasy. Let me illustrate: 

Section 9(1), IT Bill, 2025 states that income deemed to accrue or arise in India shall be the incomes mentioned in sub-sections (2) to (10). Section 9(2) then states that any income accruing or arising, directly or indirectly, through or from the transfer of capital asset situated in India shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. Section 9(9) refers back to Section 9(2) and elaborates the latter via seven clauses with almost each clause containing various sub-clauses. We expect an average taxpayer to not only read this legal language, but also understand it, make a reasonable prediction as to how the tax officers and courts will interpret it? It should not even be an expectation. It is pure fantasy.

And if anyone still doubts my assertion, let us show an average taxpayer the Revenue Department’s explanation of what is a ‘tax year’ and the need for its introduction. The clueless expression that a taxpayer may respond with will give us some answers about the simplicity of language and lucidity of the IT Bill, 2025. Don’t get me wrong, tax year as a concept is welcome and can be easily understood by tax professionals. Not by a layman. And the claim that somehow by rearranging the provisions and improving flow of the statute may make it easier for an average taxpayer to comprehend it is something that I’m unable to accept.

In fact, improved readability is all the simplification exercise offers to tax professionals. For all intents and purposes, the changes in the IT Bill, 2025 will not make it easier to understand and interpret. IT Bill, 2025 remains as complicated and dense a statute as its predecessor and is likely to attract similar volume of litigation and same nature of interpretive disputes.      

Simplistic Understanding of Simplification  

Is simplifying the language of statute a ‘significant step’? Rarely. 

Simplification of legal language is a desirable step. It is not necessarily a significant one. 

Tax law, like every other law, is a constant site of interpretation. Judiciary performs the prime role in statutory interpretation. One can then argue that simplifying the language of statutory provisions may make it easy for the judiciary to understand ‘legislative intent’. It is a phrase that is often-invoked by the Revenue Department. However, the expectations should be muted on this front. A simple language in a statute does not guarantee that the judiciary will always agree with the Revenue’s interpretation. An outcome that the latter terribly desires, but rarely achieves. 

IT Bill, 2025 contains provisions of charge, exemptions, deductions, corporate taxation, tax evasion, assessments, clubbing of income, powers of tax officers, to name just a few. Each of these provisions require constant interpretation and re-interpretation depending on the transactions and facts that emerge. It is the dynamic nature of personal and commercial transactions, their shape shifting nature that provides scope and opportunity for tax officers to interpret the law and determining tax liabilities of taxpayers. And depending on the fate of disputes, the law changes frequently to address the emerging circumstances. If the Revenue Department disagrees with a particular interpretation, changes to income tax law happen soon thereafter. Why? Because protecting revenue’s interest is primary, policy direction is easily divorced. Simplification, is thus, rarely about drafting provisions in easy-to-understand language. Simplification emerges from clear policy.    

Simplification of provisions of IT Act, 1961 currently seems like a desire that legislative language will be easier to decipher during adjudication of tax disputes. The desire will only become a fact once the judiciary starts interpreting the ‘simple’ statutory provisions. And if one goes by the track record of Department of Revenue, each time the judiciary disagrees with it, the statute is amended to reflect its position and interpretation via an Explanation, a Proviso, an insertion or deletion of a clause. Will that not happen in the future? We don’t know because there have been no such commitments. Also, because we don’t know what tax policies are driving the simplification of provisions, apart from generic statements such as ‘improving ease of business’, ‘rationalisation of tax law’, ‘improving compliance’, etc.  

In Search of a Big Idea 

There is no big idea that underscores the IT Bill, 2025. Admittedly, if the official Press Release itself admits no major policy change has been introduced, then highlighting lack of substantive changes is an obvious comment. But it doesn’t and shouldn’t distract us from the fact that India’s direct tax policy is not ideal. The claim that direct tax policy shouldn’t be disrupted to prevent ‘instability’ is shallow and insincere. To be sure, India’s income tax has witnessed some changes in recent times, the primary one being the introduction of new tax regime. And, of course, the recent introduction of income tax exemption on income upto 12 lakhs per annum. What else? Nothing. Political parties continue to enjoy a durable income tax exemption, there is no movement to tax agricultural income, charitable organisations keep facing undue scrutiny and onerous compliance requirements, tax officers continue to enjoy unbridled powers of search, seizure, and survey without any meaningful scrutiny. Faceless assessments and attempts to limit powers of reassessments were well intentioned reforms, but both are embroiled in tangles that seem to have limited their administrative reform potential. 

We had the opportunity to create a trailblazing direct tax policy for cryptocurrencies, instead we opted for and continue with a punitive regime that all but discourages all kinds of cryptocurrency transactions in India. Digital taxation continues to hang in balance, with India participating in the OECD’s attempts to overhaul the corporate and international tax landscape without being able to fully retain its autonomy and wriggle space for autonomous domestic policies. How about capital gains tax? No major idea on the anvil. Tax evasion? GAAR, introduced as a reaction to Vodafone case, alongside the Principal Purpose Test in tax treaties require constant reassurance to calm investors. But no major clarity has emerged on applicability and scope of either. Certainly not until the Revenue’s clarifications are tested in actual cases. Presence of wide-ranging anti-tax evasion provisions while conferring extensive and intrusive powers to tax officers are not typical hallmarks of a tax law attempting to inspire confidence in taxpayers. And, certainly do not boost taxpayer morale. 

Finally, burgeoning bots, robots, and deployment of artificial intelligence seem to have not made a dent in India’s substantive direct tax policy. We are still waiting for someone else to show us the path and then incorporate derived version of AI-related tax policy in India. AI is the biggest idea in today’s tech obsessed world and needs a tax response. How about promoting environment friendly activities? Better and more encompassing tax policies for electric vehicles? Environment taxes on polluting corporates? We refuse to engage with such ideas and instead and are focusing on renumbering our statute instead of unveiling new tax ideas.        

Conclusion 

India’s direct tax policy needs big ideas. Simplification of statute is not one. It is a reform, but we do ourselves a disservice by calling it a major milestone or a significant step. We need better ideas as to how to rethink source rules in a digital world, and how to guard our revenue interests while engaging with OECD, evolving a suitable anti-tax avoidance approach – domestically and in our tax treaties – as well as ensuring that our residence principles do not remain stuck in the past while the contemporary world increasingly inhabits digital nomads. And, not the least, ensure tax administration reforms are not just about ‘using’ AI, data processing, big data but also sowing seeds of substantive tax policies towards these technologies. We also need a first principles approach towards powers of tax officers to ensure that they have sufficient powers, but are not unaccountable for their actions. The only solace is that the simplification of language of IT Act, 1961 may prove to be the launchpad of such major reforms of income tax law. Time will tell if there is appetite for such reforms.  

Skeletal Timeline of Income Tax Reform in India

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1860-1886: 

Income tax was introduced in India for the first time in 1860 to overcome the financial difficulties due to First War of Independence of 1857. The period of 1860-1886 saw the Govt alternating between income tax and license tax as a source of revenue. Income tax became the preferred option when the first systematic form of income tax law was passed in 1886. 

1860: Income Tax Act, 1860 enacted in India

  • First income tax law of India 
  • Income was divided into four schedules to be taxed separately 
  • Four schedules were: income from landed property, income from professions and trades, income from securities, and income from salaries and pensions

1863: Income Tax Act, 1860 ‘expired’ 

1869: Income tax was reintroduced due to financial difficulties faced by the British Govt 

1873: Income Tax Act, 1869 ‘expired’  

1878: Income tax was replaced by license tax to raise money for famine insurance

1886: Income Tax Act, 1886 enacted with important changes 

  • Income was divided into four classes
  • Four classes were: salaries, pensions or gratuities, net profits of companies, interest on securities of Govt of India, and income from other sources 
  • Agricultural income was exempt from income tax and so were properties devoted to charitable and religious purposes  

1918-1961: 

The foundation for modern Indian income tax law – as we know it today – was laid with enactment of 1918. Income tax reforms were initiated after the First World War and eventually led to a broad review of income tax collections leading to enactment of Income Tax Act, 1922, foundational legislation for the current Income Tax Act, 1961. The foundation for tax administration was also laid during this period.   

1918: Income Tax Act, 1918 replaced the Income Tax Act, 1886 

  • Broad shape of contemporary income tax law started emerging  
  • Act of 1918 replaced ‘schedular income tax’ with ‘total income tax’ 

1922: Predecessor to the Income Tax Act, 1961 enacted 

  • Income Tax Act, 1922 was enacted based on recommendations of All India Committee
  • Income tax rates were determined annually via ‘Finance Acts’ (Annual Budget) and were not encoded in the Income Tax Act itself 

1939: Special Enquiry Committee comprised of experts from India and England 

1941: Income Tax Appellate Tribunals were established 

  • First specialist tribunals constituted in India 

1956: Union of India stresses on reform of IT Act, 1922

  • It was acknowledged that IT Act, 1922 had grown in an unplanned manner 
  • It was decided to re-examine the IT Act, 1922 to simplify it and make it more intelligible and referred the task to Law Commission of India  

1958: Law Commission of India submits it report 

  • 12th Report of the LCI made extensive suggestions for rearrangement of provisions
  • LCI stated that income tax law was in a state of ‘hopeless confusion’ due to constant tinkering with the IT Act, 1922 via short sighted amendments 

1959: Tyagi Committee submitted its report 

  • The Committee was formally called ‘Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry Committee’ 
  • The Committee acknowledged that simplification of tax laws was not an easy task. It recommended that provisions of IT Act, 1961 should be rearranged more logically and expressed in clearer language to remove ambiguities in the law

1961: Income Tax Act, 1961 was enacted 

Promise of IT Act, 1961

Promise of Income Tax Act, 1961: 

Morarji Desai promised the following when introducing the income tax law in 1961: 

Simplification has been sought to be obtained by replacing obscure and ambiguous expressions with clear ones and by re-arranging the provisions of the Act so as to make them more easy of comprehension than they are at present. 

1961-Present: 

Over years, Income Tax Act, 1961 grew complex, longer, and difficult to decipher due to various reasons. The Union of India’s propensity to amend the law every year, frequently with retrospective effect, emergence of novel forms of business transactions, incomes, tax evasion techniques, and divergence between the Revenue Department’s understanding of income tax law provisions and judicial interpretation of such provisions contributed to the complexity. Not least was the use of extensive ‘Provisos’, ‘Explanations’ in the statute which made the law difficult to understand and administer.   

1963: Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963 passed 

  • Repealed the Central Board of Revenue Act, 1924 
  • Central Board of Revenue was replaced by two entities: Central Board of Direct Taxes and Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs. Former is the ape administrative body for income taxes in India  

1991-92: Raja Chelliah Committee examined India’s entire tax landscape 

  • Formally called the ‘Tax Reforms Committee’, it recommended a series of tax reforms for direct and indirect taxation 
  • The Committee though did not suggest enacting a new income tax law, only suggested various changes including but not limited to corporate taxes, interest taxation, agricultural income, and gift tax  

2009: First notable attempt to replace the IT Act, 1961 

2010: Revised version, Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 presented in the Parliament 

  • Revised version incorporated some comments received on the 2009 version
  • Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 referred to the Standing Committee on Finance

2012: Standing Committee on Finance submitted its Report on Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 

2014: Revised version of Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 was again put up for comments 

  • Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 lapsed with dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha 
  • No clear commitment by the new BJP Govt to take the process forward 

2017: Task Force on Direct Tax Code setup 

  • Initially the Task Force was led by Mr. Arbind Modi and later by Mr. Akhilesh Ranjan 

2019: Task Force submitted its Report 

  • Report was never released to the public 

2024: Ms Nirmala Sitharaman announces a review of IT Act, 1961

  • CBDT forms an ‘Internal Committee’ to substantively review IT Act, 1961 
  • It was announced that the review will be completed within 6 months 

2025: Ms Nirmala Sitharaman announces that new income tax bill will be introduced 

  • Promises that new income tax law will be based on ‘trust first, scrutinize later’ principle 
  • New law will be substantively shorter and simpler as compared to IT Act, 1961
  • Also indicates that the income tax bill will be referred to the Standing Committee 

Promise of Income Tax Bill, 2025: 

Nirmala Sitharaman promised the following in her Budget Speech of 2025 

New IT bill will carry forward the spirit of  ‘nyaya based on the concept of trust first, scrutinise later’ and ‘the new bill will be clear and direct in text with close to half of the present law, in terms of both chapters and words. Also ‘It will be simple to understand for taxpayers and tax administration, leading to tax certainty and reduced litigation.’ [Not verbatim]

Shimla HC Decodes Scope of Sec 43-B, IT Act, 1961

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In a recent judgment, the Shimla High Court had to adjudicate on the conditions prescribed in Section 43-B, IT Act, 1961 for an assessee to claim deductions. The issue related to Section 43-B(f) which envisages deductions to an employer for payments made to employees on encashment of cash leaves.

Facts 

For the Assessment Year 2002-03, the assessee inter alia claimed expenses of Rs 45,00,000/-, a sum it paid to LIC on contribution to Credit Leave Encashment Trust. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of such expense and added it to the income of the assessee. The assessee was unsuccessful in appeal before the ITAT. The dates are relevant to understand the issue at hand: 

The fund was established on 29.10.2002 and contribution of Rs 45,00,000/- to LIC was made on the same date.

Provision for contribution of Rs 45,00,000/- was not made by the assessee after closure of financial year 2001-02, i.e. on 31.03.2002. 

The assessee was not following the mercantile system of accounting during the financial year 2001-02. 

The liability of payment of Rs 45,00,000/- did not accrue nor was it paid during the financial year 2001-02.    

Summary of arguments adopted by the assessee and the Revenue is as follows: the assessee argued that the payment of Rs 45,00,000/- was part of the entire past liability of Rs 1.80 crores assessed by the insurer. The liability was not a contingent liability. And since the liability was met before due date of submission of returns, i.e., 31.10.2002, it was a permissible deduction under Proviso to Section 43-B(f), IT Act, 1961. Revenue, on the other hand, contended that the amount was not deductible under the IT Act, 1961 and even if it was, since it was not ascertained during the relevant financial year could not be a permissible deduction under Proviso to Section 43-B, IT Act, 1961. 

Section 43-B, IT Act, 1961 

Section 43-B, IT Act, 1961 allows for certain deductions to an assessee only on actual payment. Section 43-B(f) states ‘any sum payable by the assessee as an employer in lieu of any leave at the credit of his employee;’ and the Proviso states: 

Provided that nothing contained in this section [[except the provisions of clause(h)]] shall apply in relation to any sum which is actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date applicable in his case for furnishing the return of income under sub-section (1) of section 139 in respect of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred as aforesaid and the evidence of such payment is furnished by the assessee along with such return.

Shimla HC Answers Two Questions 

The first question that the Shimla High Court decided to answer was whether the contribution made by a corporate employer to a fund for payment of leave encashment to its employees was entitled to deduction. The High Court disagreed with the ITAT and held that it is not accurate to state that such a fund has not been statutorily recognized. The inclusion of Section 43-B(f), as per the High Court, proved otherwise. The High Court cited Exide Industries case to rightly conclude that amount of contribution made by an assessee towards a fund for payment of leave encashment to its employees was a deductible expense. 

The second question then was: did the assessee meet requirements of Section 43-B and its Proviso? The High Court answered in the negative. The High Court noted that Proviso allows only allows an assessee to claim a deduction if the sum payable as an employer in lieu of any leave was incurred by the assessee according to the regular method of accounting employed by him and the sum was actually paid in the previous accounting year. The second condition is not a correct interpretation of the Proviso, as it clearly states the payment can be made after the accounting year but before due date of filing returns. 

Nonetheless, the Shimla High Court denied the assessee’s claim for deduction on the ground that the liability of Rs 45,00,000/- had already been incurred as a past liability. The assessee’s assertion that the amount was part of a past liability of Rs 1.80 crores determined by the insurer, the High Court noted had not been substantiated. And since the finding of fact is not controverted the High Court denied assessee’s claim for deduction. 

Conclusion 

The insight this case offers us is that the payment towards a fund for encashment of leave is a permissible deduction under Section 43-B, IT Act, 1961. The payment can be made after the end of accounting year but before the due date to successfully claim deduction. But, the payment must be for satisfaction of a past liability incurred during the previous accounting year and the accounting method adopted by an assessee must reflect the liability. The observation that Section 43-B alongwith Proviso also requires payment before the end of accounting year does not align with a plain reading of the provision and does not hold on scrutiny.     

Issuance of Shares under Amalgamation Scheme is Not Transfer of Property: ITAT

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The Rajkot Bench of ITAT recently ruled that issuance of shares under a scheme of amalgamation does not amount to transfer of capital assets under IT Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer had applied Sec 56(2)(vii)(c)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961 to assert that a skewed swap ratio was applied for transfer and valuation of shares, but the ITAT held in favor of the assessee. 

Facts 

The assessee was a public limited company. It filed its revised returns on 07.05.2015 declaring total income of Rs 4,74,48,046/- and book profit of Rs 5,20,68,396/- and it was selected for scrutiny. The Assessing Officer noted that the assessee company had amalgamated with three private limited companies with itself. The latter were owned by relatives of promoters of the assessee company.  During amalgamation, the assessee issued shares to shareholders of all three companies as per the scheme of amalgamation. 

The Assessing Officer took the view that a skewed swap ratio was chosen in the process of amalgamation and the assessee company transferred its shares to the beneficiaries at a discount. And the transfer of capital to such beneficiaries attracted Sec 56(2)(vii)(c)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961. Thus, the Assessing Officer held that the excess value of Rs 18,74,73,500/- transferred to the beneficiary, related parties should be added to the income of assessee. 

CIT(Appeals) on appeal filed by the assessee deleted the addition made by the Assessing Officer. And it was against the order of CIT (Appeals) that the Revenue approached the ITAT.  

Revenue’s Stand 

Revenue made two arguments and the latter appears rather strange. The first argument was that the share of assessee company was valued at Rs 1.82 per share while the amalgamated companies had a share price of Rs 10.65 per share. The Revenue argued that the difference of Rs 8.83 between two prices was passed over or given to the individual shareholder by adopting a colourable device and defeating the purpose of Sec 56(2)(vii)(c)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961. 

Revenue in its second argument conceded that the issuance or allotment of shares under a scheme of amalgamation does not amount to transfer of capital asset under Sec 47 of the IT Act, 1961. And no capital gains would be taxable in the hands of assessee. However, ‘the real income should be taxable in the hands of the assessee company.’ (para 11) 

What is real income in this case? And how did the Revenue suppose it was taxable if the transaction was not a taxable as per the applicable charging provisions of the IT Act, 1961? Even if one concedes that some benefit had occurred, in the absence of an express charging provision to tax such a benefit the entire case collapses. And yet the Revenue thought it was a fit case to file an appeal despite the CIT (Appeals) making an order that the no income had accrued under IT Act, 1961.    

Decision 

ITAT relied on multiple precedents to underline its three reasons for holding in favor of the assessee: 

First, ITAT held that the assessee company receives shares of the amalgamated company upon a statutorily valid and approved procedure of amalgamation under Companies Act, 1956. And once the share is issued at the court approved price, ‘then no one has the right to raise questions regarding one received more or less in value of shares.’ (para 14) ITAT added: 

… the new share is allotted as per the Amalgamation scheme under the supervision of the High Court after hearing of all stakeholders including the Government. The Scheme of amalgamation under which an exchanger ratio of shares is approved by the high court, and it is conclusive. So, question of skewed swap ratio or issuing shares at discounted rate does not arise.’ (para 20) 

Second, ITAT held that under Section 2(1B) read with Section 47 of the IT Act, 1961 transfer of shares during an amalgamation or even a fresh allotment of shares does not amount to transfer of a capital asset. And once there is no transfer of property, on merely receiving shares in lieu of shares previously held, Sec 56(2)(vii)(c)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961 cannot be applied. 

Finally, ITAT noted that Sec 56(2)(vii)(c)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961 does not apply to public limited companies but only to individuals and HUFs. 

ITAT’s decision in the impugned case is well-reasoned and decides the issue appropriately even if the decision in this case was straightforward. The case though is another instance of what I can term as unnecessary litigation by the Revenue Department. The ITAT’s decision correctly aligned with the CIT (Appeals) decision and the Revenue needn’t have appealed against the latter order pretending that the assessee had adopted a colorable device. The law and facts were straightforward to not require dedication of such extensive resources to this case.     

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