Parallel Proceedings under GST: Supreme Court Misses an Opportunity

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Introduction 

Recently, the Supreme Court in M/S Armour Security (India) Ltd v Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr (Armour Security case) clarified scope of the terms ‘proceedings’ and ‘same subject matter’ used in Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 (CGST Act of 2017). The need to clarify the import of both phrases was necessary to ensure that taxpayers are not subjected to parallel proceedings by the Union and State GST officers on the same subject matter. 

The judgment largely succeeds in earmarking the scope of both phrases but feels like a missed opportunity. 

In this article, I suggest that Armour Security case offered the Supreme Court a chance to elucidate on the inter-relatedness of various proceedings under CGST Act of 2017. Instead, the Supreme Court focused narrowly only on Section 6(2)(b) and eschewed a broader examination of inter-dependency of various provisions of the CGST Act of 2017. I also argue that the Supreme Court’s guidelines are not a substantive contribution to the challenge of preventing parallel proceedings. GST is the first time that both the Union and States have jurisdiction over the same taxpayer base. Overlaps, frictions, and disputes in administrative actions of both entities are expected and addressing them will require time, deft adjudication, and interpretive balance. Broad guidelines for tax administration wherein courts urge respective tax authorities to ‘communicate with each other’ is a simplistic approach to a novel and complex issue.   

Scope and Aim of Section 6(2)(b), CGST Act of 2017 

Section 6 of the CGST Act of 2017 performs two crucial roles in GST administration: 

first, Section 6(1) ensures ‘cross empowerment’ wherein officers appointed under the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act are authorized to be the proper officers for the purposes of the CGST Act of 2017 as well. This ensures that appointment and orders of proper officers have effect under both the Union and State GST laws simultaneously.   

second, Section 6(2)(b) ensures a ‘single interface’ for the taxpayer by providing: 

where a proper officer under the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act has initiated any proceedings on a subject matter, no proceedings shall be initiated by the proper officer under this Act on the same subject matter. (emphasis added) 

Section 6(2)(b) serves a salutary purpose of ensuring that a taxpayer is not subjected to overlapping investigations by two different authorities and is accountable to only one authority, i.e., there is a ‘single interface’ for the taxpayer. But ensuring a single interface is not as straightforward. The Supreme Court in Armour Security case had to interpret the phrases ‘proceedings’ and ‘same subject matter’ to clarify the powers of officers and various actions that they are allowed or restrained from initiating against a taxpayer.      

Issuance of Summons is not Initiation of Proceedings 

In the impugned case, Armour Security had received a show cause notice (‘SCN’) under Section 73 of the CGST Act of 2017. The SCN raised a demand for tax, interest, and penalty for excess claim of ITC. Approximately three months later the premises of Armour Security were searched by another authority. Armour Security subsequently received summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act of 2017 requiring one of its directors to produce relevant documents. Armour Security challenged the latter on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction in view of Section 6(2)(b). 

The Supreme Court in Armour Security case clarified that issuance of summons to a taxpayer under Section 70 of the CGST Act of 2017 does not amount to initiation of proceedings. The Supreme Court endorsed the view of the Allahabad High Court in GK Trading v Union of India & Ors where it was held that Section 70 of the CGST Act of 2017 empowers a proper officer to issue a summon to obtain evidence or document in any inquiry. The High Court added that the use of the word ‘inquiry’ in Section 70 had a specific connotation and was not synonymous with use of the word “proceedings” used in Section 6(2)(b) of Uttar Pradesh GST Act (pari materia with Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act of 2017).  

The Supreme Court reasoned that summons do not culminate an investigation but are merely an information gathering device during an ‘inquiry’ to determine if proceedings should be initiated against the taxpayer. If and any information received consequent to summons can influence initiation of proceedings. Thus, the Supreme Court correctly held that issuance of summons does not amount to proceedings. In stating the above, the Supreme Court largely reiterated the reasoning and conclusion of the Allahabad High Court. But let’s suppose proceedings against a taxpayer are pending before the Union GST officers. During the pendency, State GST officers issue summons to the taxpayer. And the latter discover new information as part of their inquiry; information that justifies initiation of proceedings. Wouldn’t pending proceedings before the former constrain the latter from initiating proceedings against the latter? It would defeat the entire purpose of obtaining the information via summons. In such a situation, it seems the State GST officers can only transfer the information that they obtained to the Union GST officers who initiated the proceedings.   

‘Proceedings’ Galore under CGST Act of 2017 

In interpreting the scope of ‘proceedings’, the Supreme Court chose to focus only on Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act of 2017. The Supreme Court’s narrow lens on Section 6(2)(b) is a defensible judicial choice but has left a few issues unaddressed. I will take two examples from the CGST Act of 2017 to highlight the crucial nature of inter-relatedness of various proceedings. 

First, let me cite Section 83 of the CGST Act of 2017 which states: 

Where, after the initiation of any proceeding under Chapter XII, Chapter XIV or Chapter XV, the Commissioner is of the opinion that for the purpose of protecting the interest of the Government revenue it is necessary so to do, he may, by order in writing, attach provisionally, any property. Including bank account, belonging to the taxable person … (emphasis added)

Chapter XIV of the CGST Act of 2017 contains Section 70 which empowers a proper officer to summon any person. Chapter XII also contains Section 67 empowering a proper officer to conduct inspection, search and seizure. So, it is not unreasonable to deduce that as per Section 83(1) cited above, issuance of summons and conduct of inspection, search and seizure amounts to proceedings. Initiation of either of the two will satisfy the pre-condition of exercising the power of provisional attachment under Section 83(1). 

So, after Armour Security case, this is the position: issuance of summon under Section 70 of the CGST Act of 2017 does not amount to initiation of ‘proceedings’ under Section 6(2)(b); but as per Section 83(1), issuance of summons continues to be a ‘proceeding’. Not only is the taxpayer liable to respond to the summons, but the taxpayer becomes susceptible to provisional attachment immediately after issuance of summons. The current position of law is unlikely to be a respite for the taxpayer.  

Second, Section 66 of the CGST Act of 2017 empowers an officer not below an Assistant Commissioner to direct a special audit ‘at any stage of scrutiny, inquiry, investigation or any other proceedings before him’. Does issuance of a summon satisfy the pre-condition for a special audit under Section 66 too? Section 66 is under Chapter XIII of the CGST Act of 2017, so we can argue that proceedings under this provision does not have the same meaning as ascribed to it under Section 6(2)(b) or Section 83(1). And that the Armor Security case needs to be read narrowly. But there is no clear or definitive answer yet. 

The term ‘proceedings’ has been used in several places in different contexts throughout the CGST Act of 2017. One can argue that the context of the provision may alter the meaning of the term ‘proceeding’ and the Supreme Court’s observations in Armour Security case must be understood solely in the context of Section 6. It is a fair argument but does not set aside the possible interpretive disagreements that may arise. Not the least because of the inter-related nature of various proceedings under the CGST Act of 2017 – an issue that the Supreme Court chose to not address.      

Scope of ‘Same Subject Matter’ 

The bar against parallel proceedings under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act of 2017 is only regarding ‘the same subject matter.’ The meaning of same subject matter thus acquiring a crucial role in preventing parallel proceedings. The Supreme Court in the impugned case was clear that proceedings are initiated only on issuance of SCN. And it is only in a SCN that various grounds and challenges alleged against an assessee are penned down for the first time. Based on its above observations about SCN, the Supreme Court concluded that: 

The expression “subject matter” contemplates proceedings directed towards determining the taxpayer’s liability or contravention, encompassing the alleged offence or non-compliance together with the relief or demand sought by the Revenue, as articulated in the show cause notice through its charges, grounds, and quantification of  demand. Accordingly, the bar on the “same subject matter” is attracted only where both proceedings seek to assess or recover an identical liability, or even where there is the slightest overlap in the tax liability or obligation. (para 86)

Thus, same subject matter is determined on the basis that an authority has already proceeded on an identical tax or offence and the demand or relief sought subsequently is identical. 

The Supreme Court’s delineation of what constitutes the same subject matter flows logically from its identification of issuance of SCN as the initiation of proceedings against an assessee. And it is the demand mentioned in a SCN that will be the reference point to determine if the latter set of proceedings are on the same subject matter.

There is little to dispute about the Supreme Court’s interpretation of scope and meaning of the ‘same subject matter’. But whether the above understanding will be applied appropriately – by GST officers and courts – to various fact situations will only be known in future.       

Supreme Court’s Guidelines    

The Supreme Court did not stop at interpreting the term proceedings and same subject matter. Though the interpretation would have sufficed given the issue involved in the impugned case. The Supreme Court went ahead and issued guidelines in its over eagerness to ensure that parallel proceedings against a taxpayer are avoided. The Supreme Court’s guidelines are perhaps the weakest part of Armour Security case. Mostly, because they were not needed. Additionally, the guidelines are a simplistic take on an issue that requires frequent administrative decisions and co-ordination. A task that the judiciary is not best suited to accomplish. The Supreme Court as part of its guidelines urges the tax authorities to decide inter se who should have jurisdiction over the proceedings against the taxpayer if it comes to their notice that a taxpayer is subjected to parallel proceedings. And enjoins an assessee to bring parallel proceedings to the notice of tax authorities by writing a complaint to have that effect. Equally, the Supreme Court clarified that both authorities have a right to pursue a matter until it is established that it concerns the same liability and demand. In other words, both authorities are allowed to pursue their actions until they can ascertain if they relate to the same subject matter.

Maybe – by way of abundant caution – the Supreme Court felt the need to communicate certain obvious issues to the Revenue Department. But, on balance, it seems that the guidelines are superfluous and could have been easily avoided. The Revenue Department – if it feels necessary – is better positioned to issue suitable guidelines on how to address the issue of parallel proceedings, prevent duplication of efforts, and ensure that the taxpayer is not subject to repeated and unnecessary queries on the same subject matter.  There are likely to be finer nuances of dual tax administration that the Revenue Department can appreciate as opposed to a judicial forum. And some of the issues may need time and experience to be ironed out adequately.     

Conclusion

The Armor Security case is a welcome addition to the jurisprudence on parallel proceedings. It clarifies some crucial elements regarding proceedings and subject matter. And, at the same time, provides additional guidance to the taxpayers and tax authorities on how to ensure better communication when caught in the crosshairs of multiple proceedings. While the guidelines seem superfluous, the Supreme Court’s narrow focus on Section 6(2)(b) may create a bigger uncertainty. The meaning of ‘proceedings’ used in other provisions of the CGST Act of 2017 can either be aligned with or be at variance with the Armor Security case. Either way, there is no clear answer for now.  

Taxation of ESOP-Related Compensation: Reviewing the Flipkart Cases

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Introduction 

In April 2023, the Board of Flipkart Private Limited (‘FPS’), Singapore decided to pay a one-time voluntary compensation – 43.67 US dollars per stock option – to all the option grantees of its Employee Stock Options (‘ESOPs’). FPS paid the compensation because the value of its ESOPs had reduced after divestment of its stake in PhonePe, a digital payments company. Under the Flipkart Stock Option Scheme of 2012, FPS was under no obligation to compensate option grantees for loss in the value of its ESOPs. Nor did the option grantees have a right to compensation for FPS’s failure to protect the value of its ESOPs. However, FPS exercised its discretion and decided to compensate all the option grantees on a pro rata basis. 

The question from a tax standpoint was: whether the option grantees are liable to pay tax on the one-time voluntary compensation paid by FPS? In the absence of a clear charging provision under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961) vis-à-vis such a compensation, three High Courts have arrived at two different answers. The Delhi High Court in Sanjay Baweja v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, TDS Circle, 77(1), Delhi & Anrand the Karnataka High Court in Manjeet Singh Chawla v Deputy Commissioner of TDS Ward-(1)(2), Bangalore have answered in favor of the option grantees, while the Madras High Court in Nishithkumar Mukeshkumar Mehta v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, TDS Circle 2(1), has held in favor of the Income Tax Department. In all three cases, the options had vested in favor of the option grantees, but they had not exercised the options on the date of receiving the compensation. A fact which is crucial to understand all three decisions.    

There were two possible ways the Income Tax Department tried to shoehorn the compensation as income under the IT Act, 1961: first, by classifying the compensation as a perquisite under Section 17(2)(vi) of the IT Act, 1961; second, by categorizing the compensation as capital gains under Section 45 of the IT Act, 1961. This article suggests that – contrary to the Income Tax Department’s claims – the compensation paid by FPS is not taxable either as a perquisite or as capital gains under existing provisions of the IT Act, 1961. 

The two arguments against levy of income tax on the compensation are: 

first, Section 17(2)(vi) of the IT Act, 1961 only envisages the difference in exercise price and fair market value of the options as a taxable perquisite. A one-time voluntary compensation paid to compensate for loss in value of ESOPs is not within the purview of Section 17(2)(vi). 

second, while the one-time compensation paid by FPS is appropriately categorized as a capital receipt, in the absence of transfer of the underlying capital asset – stocks- it cannot be considered as capital gains under the IT Act, 1961. And even if one assumes that the compensation is capital gains, in the absence of a corresponding computation provision for such payments, the attempt to levy tax on such a compensation should fail.   

Scope of Perquisite under Section 17(2)(vi) 

Section 17(2)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’) defines ‘perquisite’ to include the value of any specified security or sweat equity shares allotted or transferred, directly or indirectly, by the employer, or former employer, free of cost or at a concessional rate to the assessee. Explanation (c) to the above sub-clause adds that: 

the value of any specified security or sweat equity shares shall be the fair market value of the specified security or sweat equity shares, as the case may be, on the date on which the option is exercised by the assessee as reduced by the amount actually paid by, or recovered from, the assessee in respect of such security or shares;

Section 17(2)(vi) read with Explanation (c) makes ESOPs taxable in the hands of an assessee as a perquisite. And difference in the fair market value of ESOPs and the cost paid by the assessee for ESOPs is treated as a perquisite on which income tax is payable. But the difference between two prices is only relevant if the option grantee exercises the option because the difference is calculated in reference to the ‘date on which the option is exercised by the assessee.’ One can then plausibly argue that it is the exercise of stock options that triggers an option grantee’s income tax liability under Section 17(2)(vi). 

The Madras High Court though held that the compensation received by an option grantee from FPS was taxable under Section 17(2)(vi) since the former ‘continues to retain all the ESOPs even after the receipt of compensation’. This conclusion has no basis in Section 17(2)(vi) since retention or otherwise of vested ESOPs is irrelevant to their taxability. It is the exercise of options that is material in determining the tax liability. The Madras High Court added another problematic observation to its above conclusion, i.e., computation of tax payable on the compensation. Section 17(2)(vi) does not provide for a computation mechanism for a voluntary compensation paid in respect of ESOPs. In this respect, the Madras High Court created its own computation mechanism by observing that:

If payments had been made by the petitioner in relation to the ESOPs, it would have been necessary to deduct the value thereof to arrive at the value of the perquisite. Since the petitioner did not make any payment towards the ESOPs and continues to retain all the ESOPs even after the receipt of compensation, the entire receipt qualifies as the perquisite and becomes liable to be taxed under the head “salaries”. 

Again, there is nothing in Section 17(2)(vi) that supports the above observation. Section 17(2)(vi) does envisage an option grantee receiving ESOPs free of cost. And in that case, the import of Explanation(c) would be that since ‘the amount actually paid’ by the option grantee is nil, the fair market value of ESOP would be computed as the taxable perquisite, without any deduction of cost. The foundational condition of exercise of options though must still be satisfied. But the Madras High Court overlooked the condition of exercise of options. Overall, the Madras High Court’s observations on taxability and computation of tax on the compensation, via a liberal reading of Section 17(2)(vi), are suspect.

On the other hand, by adopting a comparatively more strict and reasonable interpretation of Section 17(2)(vi), the Delhi High Court noted that ‘a literal understanding’ of the provision would reveal that the value of specified securities or sweat equity shares is dependent on exercise of options. And that for an income to be included as a ‘perquisite’ under Section 17(2)(vi), it is essential that the option grantee exercises the options. In the absence of exercise of options, the benefits derived in the form of a one-time voluntary compensation were not taxable as a perquisite under Section 17(2)(vi). The Karnataka High Court in a similar vein added since the assessee had not exercised the stock options the voluntary compensation paid by FPS was not taxable under Section 17(2)(vi) a perquisite. The Karnataka High Court stated that in the impugned scenario ‘a computational impossibility’ arises since taxability under Section 17(2)(vi) only arises when the option grantee exercises the option.  

Charge and Computation of Capital Gains 

Section 45 of the IT Act, 1961 states that any profits or gains arising from transfer of a capital asset shall be chargeable to income tax under the head “capital gains”. To levy a charge of tax under this provision, there must be transfer of a capital asset from which a profit or gain is made by the asssesse. None of the conditions specified in Section 45 were satisfied in the impugned scenario. The arguments against equating the one-time voluntary compensation to capital gains are manifold. 

To begin with, the option grantees stated that since they had not exercised their stock options at the time of receipt of compensation, there was no transfer of the underlying capital asset, i.e. the stocks. An essential ingredient of Section 45 was not fulfilled and thus the assertion that the compensation amounted to capital gains must fail. 

Another reason for not considering the compensation as capital gains was that in the absence of exercise of stock options, the option grantees had paid no cost for acquiring them. The cost of acquisition, essential to compute capital gains, could not be determined. Section 48 of the IT Act, 1961 contains details on how to compute income chargeable to tax under the head of capital gains. But, Section 48 of the IT Act, 1961 does not specify how to compute capital gains tax for a voluntary compensation received by an option grantee; specifically, when the option grantee has not exercised options at the time of receiving a voluntary compensation in relation to ESOPs. 

Even if one assumes there was transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of Section 45 of the IT Act, 1961 the lack of a corresponding computation mechanism would mean that the charge of tax must fail. The Karnataka High Court endorsed a well-established dictum of law on this issue, i.e., a charging provision and computation provision constitute an integrated code. The Karnataka High Court relied on Mathuram Aggarwal v State of Madhya Pradesh, where the Supreme Court has held that if any of the three elements: the subject of tax, the person liable to pay tax and rate of tax are ambiguous, there is no tax under the law. The Karnataka High Court’s reasoning that in the absence of a computation mechanism – for the compensation received by the option grantees – the charge of tax fails is based on a correct reading of the tax statute and aligns with the Supreme Court’s unchallenged view.

Finally, the option grantees argued that the compensation is a capital receipt, and the levy of income tax must fail. The Income Tax Department tried to argue that the compensation is a revenue receipt on the ground that FPS intended to deduct tax at source implying that the compensation is taxable under the IT Act, 1961. The Delhi High Court correctly negatived this assertion by the Income Tax Department and observed that: 

It is pertinent to note that the manner or nature of payment, as comprehensible by the deductor, would not determine the taxability of such transaction. It is the quality of payment that determines its character and not the mode of payment. Unless the charging Section of the Act elucidates any monetary receipt as chargeable to tax, the Revenue cannot proceed to charge such receipt as revenue receipt and that too on the basis of the manner or nature of payment, as comprehensible by the deductor.

The Delhi High Court added that the compensation paid by FPS to the option grantees was a one-time voluntary payment not linked to employment or business of the latter, and neither did it arise from a statutory or contractual obligation and correctly categorized it as a capital receipt. The Delhi High Court cited various precedents to emphaise on the voluntary nature of the payment to conclude that the compensation paid by FPS was a capital receipt. The Delhi High Court’s conclusion on the compensation being a capital receipt was in the context of Section 17(2)(vi). However, the Delhi High Court’s above observation was partially applicable to rebut the argument of capital gains as well. To put it succinctly, a capital receipt is subject to tax only if there is an express charging provision under the relevant income tax statute, there is a corresponding computation provision, and the capital receipt is included in the definition of income. Else, a capital receipt remains outside the purview of an income tax statute. In the impugned case, the lack of a specific computation provision for such compensation establishes that it is a capital receipt that is not charged to tax under the IT Act, 1961. The Karnataka High Court went a step ahead and pointedly held that the compensation was a capital receipt not chargeable to income tax under Section 45. And that a capital receipt which cannot be taxed under Section 45, cannot be taxed under any other head of income. And in stating so, the Karnataka High Court refused to categorize the compensation under the head of ‘salaries’, ‘capital gains’ or ‘income from other sources.’      

Conclusion  

Overall, the Delhi and Karnataka High Court’s approach to the impugned issue of taxability of a one-time compensation seems to be on much sounder footing. The latter copiously cited the former judgment and endorsed it unqualifiedly while adding its own similar interpretation. The reason that the Madras High Court’s judgment is unpersuasive is because it at odds with some of the fundamental interpretive tools used in tax law. For example, the position under tax law is clear and unimpeached: an income cannot be subjected to tax in the absence of an express charging provision. The charge of tax also fails in the absence of a corresponding computation mechanism. The former only establishes that the tax is payable, quantifying the amount payable via a computation provision is equally vital. Absence of either proves fatal to the charge. The Madras High Court by holding that the one-time voluntary compensation paid by FPS is taxable under Section 17(2)(vi), and that the entire sum received as compensation is taxable as perquisite, contradicts both the above well-accepted positions in tax law. It is not the remit of courts to interpret charging provisions liberally or prescribe computation mechanisms. The Madras High Court’s interpretive approach was an unwelcome intervention in adjudication of tax disputes. The Delhi and Karnataka High Court judgments – based on strict interpretation and defensible reasoning – hopefully will be a persuasive source for any future disputes that may arise on tax disputes of similar nature. 

The Monsoon of Tax ‘Reform’ 

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It’s raining tax ‘reform’. Income Tax Bill, 2025 (‘IT Bill, 2025’) will soon replace the six decades old Income Tax Act, 1961. Goods and Services Tax (‘GST’) will ostensibly be simplified by Diwali of 2025. And we will have a two-tier GST consisting of 5% and 12%, with a ‘special’ tax rate of 40% applicable to select goods and services. Income Tax Return forms are being simplified, money limits for filing appeals across all tax domains are being enhanced to reduce tax litigation. Cumulatively, the changes – we are informed – are part of the larger goal of ushering in ‘Next-Generation Reforms’. There is a lot of activity, but something seems amiss.

Substantive tax reform is amiss. 

IT Bill, 2025: Simple Language, Uncertain Policy 

The use of simple, comprehensible, and coherent legal language is a goal worth spending thousands of hours. But such an exercise proves to be shallow and limited if the underlying policy is unclear and operating at cross purposes. Is faceless assessment scheme now the default manner of assessment or some aspects of human interaction are to be retained permanently? Do CSR activities deserve an unqualified tax-free status? What is the appropriate manner to levy tax on trusts? If the questions seem too narrow and pointed, what about the broader ones. Do we decisively move to the new tax regime and shed the old tax regime? Do we provide revenue targets to officers, but ensure that they don’t adopt absurd positions? Can we ensure that the Revenue Department does not adopt a position that is contrary to plain language of the statute? Do we repose faith in taxpayers and make policies from that starting point or is the default position otherwise? Should every tax treaty now be necessarily notified or was it just a convenient argument adopted by the Income Tax Department to deny benefits to a handful of taxpayers? I can go on, but you get the gist. 

If core income tax policies are in a state of flux, the language to express that policy can only provide limited clarity. Ironically, most clarity emerges in only in provisions which endow powers to the Income Tax Department. This includes powers of search and seizure, powers of arrest, and now that the dust has settled a bit: powers to reopen assessments. Otherwise, use of phrases such ‘tax year’ for ‘assessment year/previous year’ or use of ‘irrespective’ instead of ‘notwithstanding’ is a choice in favor of alternate words, not necessarily clarity. The IT Bill, 2025 may be more readable compared to its predecessor. The unending provisos and explanations may have been removed, redundant provisions to some extent been deleted, and use of legalese comparatively lesser. But improved readability should not be confused with clarity.    

GST: Multiple Tax Rates are not THE Enemy

Multiple tax rates in GST only take the heat because they are an obvious and low hanging target on which we like to hang all the flaws of GST. But the truth is that the Union and States cannot express their GST governance in clear and unambiguous terms. Why are purchaser’s dependent on suppliers to file their returns to claim Input Tax Credit? Why is provisional attachment of taxpayer properties so commonplace that courts must intervene repeatedly, and caution about the draconian nature of the power of provisional attachment? What policy is guiding levy of GST on health and life insurance? Why was online gaming target of ludicrous GST claims despite the law being obviously silent on come crucial issues? Why cannot the Revenue Department not digest any loss in courts? Any major loss in courts for the Revenue Department immediately triggers an amendment to nullify the decision. If possible, a through retrospective amendment. You want examples of these amendments? I’ve enlisted some here. 

The upward trajectory of GST collections hides the many flaws of GST governance. Instead of undertaking long, painful substantive reform, and building on the many gains of GST, we have chosen to focus on tinkering with GST rates. It is an easy sell on the political front. Come Diwali, it is easy to sell reduction of GST rates on cars and claim brownie points. But does that solve the broader issues caused by multiple tax rates in GST. The classification disputes – though source of occasional amusement – are unlikely to see end of the day until GST magically adopts a single-rate structure. Is revenue neutral rate now completely irrelevant to determine GST tax rates? If GST Compensation Cess is phased out, will the new policy be of no more cesses on GST? Because if the Union and States are simply going to levy ad hoc cesses on narrowed down tax slabs to compensate for revenue loss, we may as well stick with the current tax rates. And, while we at it, can someone tell me: why do gold and precious stones that they deserve a tax rate of their own?    

Tax Administration IS Tax Policy

There is a credible viewpoint in tax law scholarship: tax administration IS tax policy. You can understand this pithy quote in any number of ways. First, that tax administration can elevate or bury the most prudent tax policy. Delay in processing bona fide tax refunds can defeat a well-intentioned policy of reducing tax burdens of certain taxpayers. Cancelling GST registrations for sham reasons can defeat the policy of providing registrations within three working days of filing an application of registration. The above viewpoint can also be understood to mean that tax administration is an integral part of tax policy. Or if not integral, tax policy is certainly not distanced from tax administration. And that any tax reform or change in tax policy that does not bring a simultaneous change in tax administration is a flawed, if not a doomed tax reform. 

We cannot expect a rewrite of a law or a change in the tax rates to simply reduce unnecessary litigation, improve compliance, or otherwise improve tax governance. We need accompanying changes in attitudes of tax officers which in turn may require a broader systemic change in the administration of our Revenue Departments. Forsaking pedantic interpretation of law, aspiring for tax coherence, letting go of smaller tax demands in the short run for long term gains of simplicity and coherence can be some of the changes. But, as I write and advocate for these changes, I’m already convinced that they will take a long time to be realized. If at all.   

Conclusion – Buzzwords Abound  

The landscape of tax law and policy is increasingly being populated by buzzwords of no consequence. ‘One Nation, One Tax’ was a slogan that hid the reality that some indirect taxes will survive the implementation of GST. Now the ‘Diwali gift’ of GST tax rates restructuring is being thrown around as if sane tax policy is a largesse of the state and not a basic expectation of taxpayers. Income tax law has a ‘new look’ while it retains its old soul. And, while one cannot grouse political priorities because buzzwords sell, it is vital to understand the substance or the lack of it that hides behinds these quasi-marketing slogans. India’s tax landscape needs reform – deep, wide, and substantive. Anything else is activity, not meaningful change.    

Shelf Drilling Judgment: A Case of Interpretive Disagreements

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The Supreme Court in a split judgment left unresolved the long standing issue of interplay between Section 144C-Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’). The absence of a clear resolution while not ideal, provides an insight into different interpretive attitudes towards procedural issues in tax. In this article, I make a few broad points on the interpretive approaches both the judges adopted when faced with a question that did not have a clear answer, but at the same time, a question seems to have acquired more complexity than  warranted. 

Issue 

The panoramic question was: whether timelines for ‘specific assessments’ in Section 144C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’) are independent of or subsumed in the general timelines for assessments provided in Section 153 of the IT Act, 1961? 

Section 144C provides the procedure and timelines for a specific kind of assessments which typically involve foreign companies. If the assessing officer makes any change in the assessment which is prejudicial to the assessee, then Section 144C prescribes a procedure which includes forwarding a draft assessment order to the assessee. If the assessee has any objections after receiving the draft assessment order, it may approach the Dispute Resolution Panel (‘DRP’). Section 144C, in turn, empowers DRP to issue binding directions to the assessing officer. And the latter has to complete the assessment as per the said directions. Section 153, in comparison, is a general provision which prescribes timelines for completion of assessments and reassessments. The assessing officer ordinarily has 12 months, after the end of a financial year, to complete any assessment.  

Opinions that do not ‘Converse’ 

In the impugned case, both judges framed the issue identically but answered it in diametrically opposite fashion. The divergent conclusions were a result of the different interpretive approaches adopted by both judges and their differing opinions as to what each of them considered relevant factors to adjudicate the case. The jarring part is that there seems to be no single point of consensus between the two judges. At the same time, while Justice Nagarathna does mention some points of disagreement with Justice SC Sharma’s opinion, the latter does not even mention or even superficially engage with her opinion. And consequently, Justice SC Sharma fails to tell us as to why he disagrees with Justice Nagarathna. It is left for us to arrive at our deductions and conclusions. I indulge in a preliminary attempt at this exercise and identify how both judges approached the issue and interpreted the relevant provisions and their respective reasonings.          

Modes Of Interpretation 

It is trite that tax statutes need to be interpreted strictly. Justice Nagarathna in her opinion went into significant detail about the appropriate interpretive approach in tax law disputes and cited various judicial precedents to lend support to her view of the necessity of strict interpretation. One offshoot of the doctrine of strict interpretation is that if the provision(s) is clear, plain, and unambiguous and inviting only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. It is this interpretive approach that guided her opinion that the issue of interplay between Section 144C-Section 153 was simply of statutory interpretation. She added that courts should not opine about the adequacy of the timelines available to the assessing officer or to the assessee as it would undermine the cardinal principles of tax law interpretation. So, if a strict interpretation of the provisions meant that an assessing officer would have limited time to complete assessments, so be it. It is for the Parliament to look into the adequacy of time available to the officers and assessees, not courts.      

Justice SC Sharma had no qualms – superficial or otherwise – about the need to follow strict interpretation. His approach was of a ‘balancing act’, literally. He clearly says that the Court must be alive to the ‘fine balance’ that needs to be maintained between tax officers having sufficient time to scrutinise income tax returns to prevent tax evasion and the right of assessees to not have their returns scrutinised after a certain amount of time. And in doing so, he stresses on the need for harmonious interpretation, the need to make various provisions of the IT Act, 1961 work. As is wont, a balancing act tends to lead to a half-baked solution. And Justice SC Sharma’s conclusion is one such solution where he concludes that the timelines prescribed in Section 153 are not completely irrelevant to Section 144C. The assessing officer is bound to complete the draft assessment order within the timelines mentioned in Section 153, and not the final assessment order. So he binds the assessing officer to complete half a job within the timeline prescribed by Section 153, but not the complete job. As per him, the final assessment order can be passed even after the limit set of Section 153. This is certainly not a strict interpretation of tax law provisions, but a judge’s subjective view of what is a ‘reasonable time’ for an assessing officer to complete an assessment.  

Relevance of Administrative Inconvenience 

Justice SC Sharma’s opinion is littered with his concern for tax officers of this country and their inability to complete assessments in a short time if the time period under Section 144C is interpreted to be subsumed in the time period provided in Section 153. He stated that in such a scenario, the tax officer will have to work ‘backwards’ and allow for a period of nine months to the DRP. As per Section 144C, if an assessee objects to the draft assessment order and refers it to a DRP, the latter has nine months to issue directions to the officer for completion of assessment and its directions are binding on the assessing officer. So, the assessing officer has to complete the draft assessment order by anticipating that objections may be raised before DRP, else the final assessment may not be completed within the timeline prescribed in Section 153. Justice Sharma was of the opinion that the Parliament ‘could not have conceived’ such a procedure to be followed by an assessing officer. The root cause of his concern was that the time window to complete the final assessment would be ‘negligible’ since ordinarily an assessment is to be completed within 12 months from end of the financial year in which the remand order is received from the tribunal. And this narrow time window, in his view, would ‘result in a complete catastrophe for recovering lost tax.’

Justice Nagarathana, however, dismissed the concern of unworkability of timelines. She said that failure of the assessing officer to meet the statutory timeline cannot be the basis of assuming any absurdity. The Revenue argued that if an assessing officer has to work backwards, the timelines may not be met, leading to an absurdity. I do agree with Justice Nagarathana that if for a specific set of assesses the assessing officers have to work backwards to respect the timelines, it does not make the provisions unworkable or absurd. How is working backwards to accommodate statutory prescribed timelines an absurd position? An assessing officer has to essentially accommodate nine months of time accorded to DRP in Section 144C and issue a draft assessment order accounting for that time. The actual absurdity is in the Revenue’s argument that an assessing officer accounting for the time that DRP may consume is a ground for extending statutory prescribed timelines. 

Also, Justice Nagarathana made it clear that merely because the assessee may opt for raising objections against the draft assessment order and approach the DRP cannot be a factor for increasing the timeline. The assessee cannot be prejudiced for exercising a right prescribed in the statute. Justice SC Sharma’s opinion though suggests that the exact opposite and implies that the assessee exercising the right to file objections and approach DRP is a good reason to extend timelines. And in implying so, he adopts a tenuous position. 

Impact of Non Obstante Clause(s) 

Our tax statutes contain non-obstante clauses galore, but their import and impact is understood differently based on the context. In the impugned case, Justice Nagarathana noted that the context and legislative intent of a non-obstante clause is vital to understand its import. Applying the above dictum, she held that the non-obstante clause in Section 144C(1) was only regarding the special procedure prescribed in the provision and not for the timelines enlisted in Section 153. She elaborated that Section 144C is only applicable to ‘eligible assessees’ and the provision mandates the assessing officer to forward a draft assessment order, while in all other cases a final assessment order is issued directly. Since Section 144C prescribes a special procedure for the eligible assessees, it overrides only those provisions of the IT Act, 1961 which prescribe a different procedure. Section 144C does not override all the provisions of the IT Act, 1961.  

Based on the above reasoning, Justice Nagarathana concluded that  the effect of non-obstante clause of Section 144C(1) is not to override Section 153. But why? This is because as per Justice Nagarathana, the latter was not contrary to the former. She added that if Section 144C is construed to extend the limitation period prescribed under Section 153, it would lead to an ‘absurd result’ as the scope and ambit of two provisions is distinct. She was clear that Section 153 prescribes timelines for assessments and reassessments while Section 144C prescribes procedure for a specific set of eligible assessees. In other words, Section 153 controls the timelines for all assessments while Section 144C controls procedure for specific assessments that may encompass only a limited set of assessees. Thus, both provisions had different scope and were not at odds with each other.  

One can also understand the above interpretive dilemma as an occasion where a judge faced with the relation between a general and specific provision, held that the former should serve the object and aims of the latter. Section 153 is certainly a general provision, and the timelines prescribed in it must be respected by a narrower and more specific provision such as Section 144C. Latter cannot operate at odds with the former and defeat the larger objective of completing assessments within prescribed time periods.  

Justice SC Sharma’s emphasis was on the non-obstante clauses in Section 144C(4) and Section 144C(13) which specifically override Section 153. Both these sub-sections mention the assessing officer’s obligation to pass a final assessment order. Both these sub-sections obligate an assessing officer to pass a final assessment order within one month (approximately) of receiving the assessee’s acceptance and DRP’s directions respectively. Justice Sharma somehow reads into the non-obstante clauses in these two sub-sections the idea that their effect was to only extend the timeline for passing a final assessment order and not the draft assessment order. He concluded that an assessing officer will have to complete the draft assessment order within the limitations stated in Section 153. 

Justice Sharma insisted that the non-obstante clauses must be construed to ‘not defeat’ the working of the IT Act, 1961 and ensure a harmonious construction of both the provisions. However, the real reason was his belief that if timelines of cases in Section 144C were subsumed in Section 153, it would be ‘practically impossible’ to complete the assessments. As discussed above, Justice Nagarathana was clear – and rightly so – that such a belief should have no role in interpretation of tax statutes. Also, Justice Sharma added that the assessing officer only acts in an executing capacity once the draft assessment order is passed, since the no new fresh issues can be raised thereafter. The implication being that the draft assessment order issued under Section 144C is effectively a final assessment order. This is convoluted phrasing and also an inaccurate understanding of assessment orders.      

Use of ‘Internal’ and ‘External’ Aids for Interpretation 

In the context of this discussion, let me say that an internal aid for interpretation can be understood be other provisions of the IT Act, 1961. While an external aid can include the Parliamentary discussions, committee reports, etc. Both the judges referred to external aids in the impugned case and tried to understand the rationale of impugned provisions, especially Section 144C, by citing memorandums and explanatory notes of the relevant finance acts. Justice Nagarathna cited them in significant detail and one can see that her conclusion was influenced by these external aids. The Finance Minister, when introducing the amendment via which Section 144C was inserted in the IT Act, 1961 had mentioned the need to improve climate for tax disputes, expedite the dispute resolution process, and provide an alternate dispute resolution process. Since the assessees that would benefit from Section 144C would primarily be foreign companies, the aim was to signal a more receptive tax environment for foreign investment. If expediting dispute resolution process was one of the aims of Section 144C, one could argue it was a reasonable deduction that timelines of Section 144C were subsumed in timelines of Section 153. Holding otherwise would delay the process instead of expediting it. And Justice Nagarathna was partially influenced by the purpose of introducing Section 144C before arriving at her conclusion.      

Justice SC Sharma’s reliance on external aid was comparatively much more limited. He cited the relevant extracts that explained the need for Section 144C, but his focus was more on the need to harmoniously interpret Section 144C and Section 153. He tried to reason that his conclusions were aimed at making sure the IT Act, 1961 remained workable and absurdities were avoided. He primarily relied on internal aids, i.e., other provisions of the IT Act, 1961 to defend his conclusions that he said were aimed to ensure harmony amongst the various statutory provisions.    

While We Await Another Judicial Opinion  

Until a three-judge bench weighs in with their opinion, the interplay of Section 144C-Section 153 obviously remains without a clear answer. On balance, the reasoning adopted by Justice Nagarathna is more aligned to classical principles of tax law interpretation. But, the Indian Supreme Court has an uneven record in tax law matters and predicting what may happen next is as good as rolling the dice. In recent times, the Supreme Court’s uneven history on tax matters includes but is not limited to providing remedy to the Revenue Department without them even making a request for it. Or adopting gymnast worthy legal fictions and altering the concept of time to ostensibly balance the rights of the Revenue and the assessees. Thus, there is no predicting the outcome of this dispute, though I can go out on a limb and say that the relevant provision(s) maybe amended, and retrospectively so, if the Income Tax Department does not agree with the final verdict. Such amendments are certainly not unheard of!     

GST @8: A Journey Via Eight Amendments

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Introduction 

Goods and Services Tax (‘GST’) came into force eight years ago on 1 July 2017. Eight long, eventful years that have been full of sound and fury. But, do they signify something? Yes and No. Yes, because GST, at times, operates like a tinkered version of State-VAT laws and not a transformative reform of India’s indirect tax regime. At other times, GST reveals glimpses of its potential as a transformative reform, only to be bogged down by unexplained and reactive changes introduced by a heavy handed tax administration. On average, GST continues to meander between these two versions. As I argued elsewhere before, it is a reform that is continuously deformed.     

In this article, let me take you through GST’s journey of eight years via the prism of eight statutory amendments. And, like most amendments to Indian tax laws, a majority of the amendments to Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 (‘CGST Act of 2017’) are tied to the hip with judgements that didn’t align with the Revenue Department’s view. In this article, I focus only on eight amendments to underline the nature of some of the changes made to GST. In no particular order, here is the list:  

Journey in Eight Amendments 

1. Actionable Claims become Specified Actionable Claims   

Originally, only three actionable claims were subject to GST: betting, lotteries, and gambling. GST was hit with the curveball of online gaming, which wasn’t expressly included or excluded from GST’s scope. Courts classified a species of online gaming, i.e., fantasy games, as games of skill which immediately put them out of the purview of three actionable claims and beyond GST’s scope. The Revenue Department took the stance that all online gaming amounted to gambling and was subject to GST, and the value of supply was the entire amount staked by players and not just the platform fee collected by the online intermediary. The Revenue Department accordingly issued show cause notices to online gaming companies alleging obscene amounts of tax evasion. Eventually, the Karnataka High Court pronounced the Gameskraft judgment dismantling the Revenue Department’s entire (mis)understanding and deliberate misinterpretation of gambling law jurisprudence. But, CGST Act of 2017 was amended almost immediately thereafter in 2023 to include online gaming and casinos in the amended definition of ‘specified actionable claims’. Whether the amendment will have retrospective effect is an open question, though the Revenue Department would certainly prefer going back in time to collect taxes by claiming that the amendment is only clarificatory in nature. Which it is certainly not. The Supreme Court, currently seized of the appeal against the Karnataka High Court’s judgment, may provide some clarity, though the amendment of 2023 has ensured that all kinds of online gaming – games of skill or games of chance – are now expressly within the purview of GST. Irrespective, the amendment of 2023 may now pave way for the Revenue Department to actually recover the huge tax amounts it claimed has been evaded by online gaming companies. The Revenue Department’s claims of amount of tax evaded may prove to be a fantasy or a bountiful reality. Time will tell.        

2. Doctrine of Mutuality is Buried, But Alive   

The simple concept underlying doctrine of mutuality is that a person cannot transact with themselves and such transactions cannot be subjected to sales tax or service tax. Indian courts applied the above doctrine to keep transactions between a club and its members outside the tax net by reasoning that there was complete identity between the two constituents. To bring transactions between clubs and its members within the tax net, the 46th Constitutional Amendment introduced a legal fiction via Article 366(29-A)(e) in the Constitution and seemingly buried the doctrine of mutuality. Decades later in 2019, the Supreme Court in Calcutta Club Ltd case held that the Parliament only intended to include unincorporated clubs in Article 366(29-A)(e) and not incorporated clubs. The Supreme Court concluded that doctrine of mutuality continued to be applicable to incorporated and unincorporated member’s clubs even after the 46thConstitutional Amendment. To contain the spillover effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in GST, the Revenue Department immediately amended Section 7 of CGST Act of 2017 which defines supply. The amendment implemented with retrospective effect, introduced clause (aa) to Section 7 of CGST Act of 2017 and was intended to undo the effect of the Calcutta Club judgment as it incorporated a legal fiction that a constituent and its members were distinct persons. And transactions between them constituted supply. After the amendment, all was seemingly well and doctrine of mutuality was inapplicable to GST, until the Kerala High Court declared the amendment of Section 7 of CGST Act of 2017 as unconstitutional. The Kerala High Court reasoned that the legal fiction of treating a single person as two, went beyond the Constitutional understanding of the term sale which necessarily involves two members. Prima facie the Kerala High Court seems to have correctly found a gap in the Constitutional prescription and statutory definition. Presumably, the Supreme Court will have the final word on this issue. 

3. ITC Conditions Become Increasingly Onerous  

Section 16 of the CGST Act, 2017 prescribes conditions to claim Input Tax Credit (‘ITC’) for taxpayers. The conditions for ITC have changed in the past eight years including phasing out provisional ITC. The most significant change in claiming ITC was Section 16(2)(aa) which was introduced in 2021. Section 16(2)(aa) restricts ITC of a taxpayer until the details of the invoice or debit note have not been furnished by the supplier in their monthly output statement and the same have been communicated to the recipient. In simpler terms, a purchaser cannot claim ITC for the GST paid on their inputs/purchases until their supplier accurately and timely uploads the relevant invoices in their monthly returns. For it is only when the supplier completes and files their monthly returns with invoice details would the purchase be reflected in the purchaser’s relevant return and provide basis of their ITC claim. The introduction of Section 16(2)(aa) effectively made the purchaser dependent on the supplier for claiming ITC. Making a purchaser dependent on the supplier for ITC was an exception or an outlier in pre-GST regimes, and reserved only for cases where there was prima facie or established collusion between a purchaser and a supplier. Under GST, it has now become the default policy. The mere fact that the purchaser possesses the invoice or debit/credit note reflecting the purchase and payment of GST is not enough evidence of a genuine supply. The amendment with introduction of clause (aa) is good as the Revenue Department outsourcing to the purchaser the obligation of verifying the bona fide and tax habits of its supplier(s). Equally, the purchaser shares the burden of making sure the supplier remits the GST to the State, else the purchaser may not be able to claim ITC despite having paid GST to the supplier.         

4. Scope of Provisional Attachment Expands 

Section 83 of the CGST Act, 2017 originally empowered the Commissioner to issue an order for provisional attachment during the pendency of proceedings. And, if in the opinion of the Commissioner, it was necessary to attach the property to protect the interest of the Revenue an order for provisional attachment could be issued against a property owned by the taxpayer. After a few judgments, the Revenue Department discovered that the safeguard of ‘pendency of proceedings’ was a hurdle to its desire of arrogating to itself unfettered powers. Equally, the courts clarified that power of provisional attachment only extended to the property owned by the taxpayer. For example, the Bombay High Court clarified that powers of provisional attachment only extended to taxpayers against whom proceedings were initiated against the relevant provisions of the CGST Act, 2017. And that the Revenue Department could not automatically attach properties of other taxpayers.  

In 2021, Section 83 of the CGST Act, 2017 was amended to provide the Commissioner power to provisionally attach property any time after initiation of proceedings. Also, the Commissioner could provisionally attach property of any person mentioned in Section 122 implying the property attached need not necessarily belong to the person against whom proceedings were initiated. The expansion of scope of powers of provisional attachment is at odds to its repeated characterisation as a draconian power with far reaching effects. Ideally, the power of provisional attachment should be kept narrow and circumscribed unless there is a compelling reason to expand it. The amendment of Section 83 seemed achieved the opposite effect to the detriment of taxpayer rights. The Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs in recognition of debilitating effect of the amendment has issued guidelines for officers to exercise restraint in exercise of such powers. However, the amendment expanded the scope of power of provisional attachment diluting the safeguards in the guidelines. While the power of provisional attachment is necessary in some cases, the expansion of its scope power that has titled the scales of intrusion and intervention heavily in favour of the Revenue Department.         

5. Confiscating Goods, and Removing a Non-Obstante Clause 

Originally, Section 129 and Section 130 of the CGST Act of 2017 began with a non-obstante clause giving birth to an interpretive question: which provision will supersede the other? Equally, while both provisions provided for procedure of detention and confiscation respectively, there was also an inter-linkage between the provisions. Detention of goods under Section 129, on non-payment of penalty, could lead to confiscation of goods under Section 130. This gave rise to the second question, i.e., whether confiscation is linked to detention? Courts tried to interpret the provisions harmoniously multiple times clarified that both provisions were independent of each other. In 2021, the non-obstante clause from Section 130 was removed to ‘delink’ both the provisions and bring more clarity. However, an equally pertinent issue of the Revenue Department mechanically and routinely confiscating goods remains addressed. Courts had repeatedly cautioned the Revenue Department to not invoke Section 130 unless the taxpayer had an intention to evade tax. However, we haven’t seen the practice of directly confiscating goods abate even after the amendment. Absence of a single document or a patent misdescription of goods, misclassification of goods or any similar ground can lead to confiscation of goods. The threshold remains low leading to unnecessary adversity for taxpayers.  

6. Amendment to ‘Operationalise’ GSTATs

In 2019, the Madras High Court declared the provisions for composition of GSTATs as unconstitutional. The judgment proved to be a spoke in the wheel preventing immediate operationalisation of GSTATs, but what followed was an exemplary display of snail-paced policy making that continues its slow march. Neither did the Revenue Department appeal against the Madras High Court’s judgment, nor were the relevant provisions amended with a sense of urgency that the issue demanded. Eventually, after 4 years, via the Finance Act, 2023 provisions relating to composition of GSTATs were amended to provide an immediate spring for operationalisation of GSTATs. However, vis-à-vis GSTATs, only piecemeal changes have been made since 2023. A semi-operational website, regular recruitment advertisements, appointment of some personnel for ceremonial purposes have been completed, but GSTATs continue to be in limbo. I’ve previously argued that the GST’s rule of law foundation is proving to be weak and effective given that GSTATs are not operating. GSTATs form a crucial role in dispute resolution as they are designed as the first appellate forum and a fact finding authority. But, despite the amendment of 2023, little progress have been made to provide a sounder footing for fair dispute resolution under GST. Instead, the burden is being borne by advance authorities, whose rulings are typically poorly authored and binding only on the parties to the petition. Equally, the High Courts continue to shoulder the disproportionate burden of adjudication via writ petitions where they have to undertake the fact finding exercise and lay down the law in detail of a relatively novel law. A less than ideal, in fact dismal state of affairs for GST – a law that has been repeatedly touted as a transformative reform of indirect tax regime.      

7. ‘Or’ Becomes ‘And’ to Nullify Safari Retreats Judgment 

‘And’ does not mean ‘Or’, was Supreme Court’s strict interpretation in Safari Retreats case. The Supreme Court opined that if use of ‘Or’ was a legislative mistake, then it could have been corrected in the interim period between the High Court’s judgment and hearing before the Supreme Court. The Revenue Dept, after the Supreme Court’s decision said yes, it was an error. And we will correct it now, via a retrospective amendment. No explanation given as to why the legislative ‘error’ was not corrected after the High Court’s judgment and why the Revenue Department chose to fight a prolonged litigation if the ‘error’ was apparent and well-known. And why the Revenue Department file a review petition despite deciding – after recommendations of the GST Council – to amend the CGST Act of 2017 retrospectively. The broader issue that the amendment brings into focus is lack of hesitation in introducing a retrospective amendment. While the CGST Act of 2017 has been amended retrospectively previously – for example, when amending the definition of supply under Section 7 to nullify the Calcutta Club case ratio – this amendment after Supreme Court’s judgment revealed that not much has changed under GST regime. The Revenue Department fought a case and advocated a particular interpretation. When the Supreme Court did not agree with the Revenue Department’s view, the law was amended swiftly. The Revenue Department continues to assert that the Supreme Court did not interpret ‘legislative intent’, a standard excuse when any judgment doesn’t align with the Revenue Department’s interpretation.    

8. Anti-Profiteering Regime Ends

While not a statutory amendment, this policy change was one of the most welcome changes brought to the GST regime. National Anti-Profiteering Authority (‘NAA’) was established to protect consumer interests due to implementation of GST. NAA, however, never satisfied the parameters of a fair dispute resolution body. Its biggest contribution to GST was in November 2022, when its mandate was brought to an end and its remit was officially transferred to the Competition Commission of India. NAA, during its existence, pronounced a large volume of orders which were essentially a replica of each other. The orders were full rhetoric, obfuscation, devoid of basic legal reasoning, and imposed multiple and heavy penalties on taxpayers for seemingly violating the anti-profiteering mandate contained in Section 171 of the CGST Act, 2017. Thus, a formal end to the NAA’s regime was a net positive contribution to GST. While the Delhi High Court, in a sub-par judgment has upheld the constitutionality of NAA, it doesn’t whitewash the rhetoric-filled and nuanced deprived NAA orders. And the Delhi High Court has allowed the taxpayers to challenge the individual orders of NAA on the ground of arbitrariness, among others. While the entire superstructure of NAA could have been easily held to be unconstitutional, we may see some redemption for taxpayers if some of the individual orders of NAA are struck down in the future. The biggest solace remains that NAA will not be issuing any new orders. That may remain the biggest win for taxpayers.       

Conclusion 

Amendments in any law, are par for the course. For tax law even more so. The frequency or no. of amendments sometimes do not tell the real story. Sometimes, a large no. of amendments indicate an instability in the law and tax policy. But often amendments do not reveal if the law was drafted properly in the first place necessitating frequent amendments. However, GST laws were drafted after marathon deliberations and discussions. Though the Parliamentary debates were woefully short and unproductive, the draft and model laws that were released to the public were continuously modified after feedback and comments. 

In my view, the GST laws have not been frequently amended due to sub-par drafting but to incrementally align the statutory provisions with the Revenue Department’s view. The expansion of the scope of power of provisional attachment, inclusion of all online games including games of skill within the scope of GST, nullifying the Supreme Court’s view in Safari Retreats case, expanding scope of supply to nullify doctrine of mutuality – all point towards an obstinate Revenue Department insisting on paving its GST way as per its own desire. And the fact that some of the amendments have a retrospective effect does not augur well for tax certainty and predictability. The promise of no retrospective amendments in GST laws stands buried for now. Hopefully, it will resurrect soon and cure the imbalance in GST administration that currently is in favour of the Revenue Department, at the expense of taxpayer rights and convenience.           

Liquidation After Approval of Resolution Plan: The IBC Faces Tough Challenges

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The Supreme Court within a span of few months delivered two judgments – State Bank of India & Ors v The Consortium of Mr. Murari Lal Jalan and Mr. Florian Fritsch & Anr (Jet Airways) and Kalyani Transco v M/S Bhushan Steel Power and Steel Ltd & Ors (Bhushan Steel) – where it ordered liquidation of the corporate debtors in question. The common theme of both the judgments was that the Committee of Creditors (CoC) and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) had approved a resolution plan, but its implementation failed. The successful resolution applicants in both cases used delay tactics by repeatedly seeking extensions of time limits provided in the resolution plan, interpreted the conditions relating to payments in a self-serving manner, and overall displayed a lack of credibility to salvage the corporate debtor resulting in the Supreme Court – invoking its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution – ordering liquidation of the corporate debtors. Section 33(3), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC) does envisage liquidation after approval of the resolution plan, but the impugned judgments reveal novel challenges facing the IBC and raise questions that may not have easy answers. 

In this article, I identify two major challenges revealed by the impugned judgments: lack of a statutory time limit to implement resolution plans and imprecise role of monitoring committees in ensuring implementation of resolution plans. I argue while under the IBC time is of the essence for the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), the lack of a statutory time limit to implement a resolution plan works like a double-edged sword: it provides the freedom to customize resolution plans but also offers scope for the successful resolution applicant to seek extensions of timelines agreed upon in the plan. Additionally, after the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Jet Airways case, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) has proposed to make constitution of monitoring committees mandatory to oversee implementation of the resolution plan. But their composition and lack of precise powers is not an adequate response to the challenge of ensuring timely and full implementation of resolution plans. 

No Statutory Timeline for Resolution Plans  

In the Jet Airways case, the Supreme Court correctly stated that excessive statutory control regarding implementation phase of the resolution plan may prove to be counterproductive to the corporate debtor. Silence of the IBC as to the ideal timeline for implementation of a resolution plan is prudent because each resolution plan will be different as per the needs of the corporate debtor. And the timelines for different stages of compliance may vary in each resolution plan. This is where paradox of the IBC emerges: it is vital to prescribe an outer time limit for the CIRP to maximize value of the corporate debtor’s assets but a statutory time limit for implementation of a resolution plan may amount to over legislation.

While an approved resolution plan typically contains various time-related and stagewise obligations for the resolution applicant, seeking extensions is par for the course. And the NCLT frequently agrees to the requests delaying the implementation of the resolution plan. If not time-related, resolution applicants can seek other modifications that can cause delays. For example, in the Jet Airways case the successful resolution applicant prayed for adjustment of performance bank guarantee against the first tranche of payment it was required to make under the resolution plan. The request was agreed upon by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) until the Supreme Court held otherwise. But the issue was not resolved as the resolution applicant did not adhere to the Supreme Courts’ directions resulting in the next round of litigation which culminated with the Supreme Court finally ordering liquidation. 

The absence of a statutory time limit implies that judicial forums must evaluate factual matrix to permit or deny extensions or modifications of the resolution plan while ensuring that excessive leeway is not given to the resolution applicant. Preservation of this judicial discretion is preferable than a statutorily prescribed straitjacket time limit that may limit options to revive the corporate debtor. In fact, a focus on ensuring that the CIRP is completed in a timebound manner may partially address the downside of delays or failure to implement a resolution plan. Too often the outer time limit to complete the CIRP is breached. For example, in the Bhushan Steel case it took one and a half years for the CoC to approve a resolution plan breaching the IBC’s prescribed deadline of 270 days (as applicable then). The CoC approved a resolution plan in February 2019 which was followed by delays and more negotiations. Eventually, the Supreme Court in May 2025 ordered liquidation of the corporate debtor. In the Jet Airways case, the resolution plan became ‘incapable of being implemented’ due to delays and other factors. Delays in the CIRP create a double whammy if liquidation is caused by failure to implement the resolution plan. As evidenced in both the impugned judgments, orders of liquidation in such circumstances not only defeat the primary aim to salvage the corporate debtor but also prevent timely liquidation that may maximize asset value.

Imprecise Role of Monitoring Committees

The Supreme Court in the Jet Airways case recommended that there should be a statutory provision for constitution of a monitoring committee to ensure smooth implementation of the resolution plan. At that time, Regulation 38(4), IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 (CIRP Regulations) provided that the CoC may consider appointment of a monitoring committee for implementation of the resolution plan. The IBBI has since amended Regulation 38(4) which now states that the CoC ‘shall’ consider appointment of a monitoring committee making its constitution mandatory. Monitoring committees may be comprised of the resolution professional, representatives of the CoC, and representatives of resolution applicant. The mandatory constitution of monitoring committees is a step in the right direction, but will it prove to be a meaningful step?

In the Bhushan Steel case, the Supreme Court noted that the resolution professional and CoC both acted in contravention of the statutory provisions of the IBC and the CIRP Regulations. In such situations, where two entities key for success of the CIRP act in blatant disregard of the law, their conduct is unlikely to be any different as part of the monitoring committee. One can argue that the Bhushan Steel case is an outlier, and the entities involved will not always take decisions that contravene the law. Perhaps. But even previously the monitoring committees created under the resolution plan were trying to achieve similar objectives. Albeit they will now perform their role under the aegis and as part of a more formal body.

The Supreme Court in the Jet Airways case observed that the monitoring committee should monitor and supervise the resolution plan, ensure statutory compliances are obtained timely and report the progress of implementation to adjudicating authorities and creditors on a quarterly basis. The aim, as suggested by the Supreme Court is to ensure that a formal body oversees the implementation, and that the implementation happens in a collaborative manner. The Supreme Court clarified that the duty to implement the resolution plan is not solely of the successful resolution applicant, but it is shared with the creditors. And the latter should not be obstructive but facilitative in the process of implementation of the resolution plan. The emphasis on collaboration and shared responsibility of implementation of the resolution plan is welcome, but monitoring committee is also supposed to consist of representatives of financial creditors: how will they effectively prevent or address any misconduct by the creditors themselves?     

Monitoring committee may not be able to alter the status quo significantly if the resolution applicant doesn’t intend to implement the resolution plan in its true form. Even in the Jet Airways case there was a monitoring committee headed by the resolution professional as part of the terms of resolution plan. Did it prevent any delays or the resolution plan going off the rails? A statute backed monitoring committee maybe be able to make timely recommendation of liquidation of the corporate debtor or bring disagreements to the notice of the NCLT/NCLAT. But it is unlikely that a monitoring committee can contribute and make a more substantial change to the current situation. Agreed that the monitoring committee will have a narrow focus and a legal mandate, but the latter cannot provide insurance against irresponsible conduct of either the creditors or the successful resolution applicant. Neither can a monitoring committee prevent any extensions that the NCLT/NCLAT may grant, correctly or otherwise.   

Way Forward: Re-Emphasize Existing Elements of the IBC  

There should be a meaningful attempt to emphasize some of the existing elements in the IBC to address the issue of implementation of a successful resolution plan. The IBC repeatedly enjoins the need to consider the feasibility of a resolution plan before its approval. Regulation 38(3), CIRP Regulations enlists the mandatory contents of a resolution plan and requires that a resolution plan must demonstrate that it is feasible and viable and has provisions for its effective implementation. Section 30(2)(d), IBC enjoins the resolution professional to examine that each resolution plan provides for its implementation and supervision. Section 30(4), IBC mandates that the CoC to approve a resolution plan after considering its feasibility and viability. Section 31, IBC in turn requires the NCLT to satisfy itself that the resolution plan approved by the CoC under Section 30(4) satisfies the requirements referred in Section 30(2). If that is not sufficient, the proviso to Section 31 states that: 

Provided that the Adjudicating Authority shall, before passing an order for approval of resolution plan under this sub-section, satisfy that the resolution plan has provisions for its effective implementation. 

If all the three entities – resolution professional, CoC, and the NCLT – re-emphasize on the feasibility, viability, and provisions for implementation of the resolution plan, it is likely that the situations that arose in the impugned judgments can be avoided. If not avoid altogether, possibly address similar situations in a time and manner that does not set at naught the CIRP. 

[A version of this post was first published on irccl.in, in July 2025. ]

Competition Law and the IBC: An Alternate Perspective on the Supreme Court’s Balancing Act

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Introduction

Recently, the Supreme Court (‘Court’) in Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd v Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors resolved an interpretive uncertainty involving the interface of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) with the Competition Act, 2002. The narrow question before the Court was whether the approval of a resolution plan by the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) must mandatorily precede the approval of the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’) under the proviso to Section 31(4), IBC. The proviso states that:

 Provided that where the resolution plan contains a provision for combination as referred to in section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003), the resolution applicant shall obtain the approval of the Competition Commission of India under that Act prior to the approval of such resolution plan by the committee of creditors.

The majority opinion, relying on a plain and literal interpretation, held that prior approval by the CCI was mandatory and not directory. The interpretive disagreement did not arise due to any ambiguity in the provision per se, but due to anxiety about delays in the resolution process. It was argued that mandating the prior approval of the CCI for all resolution applicants, instead of only the successful resolution applicant, would delay the completion of the resolution process under the IBC, and time is of the essence in a resolution process to protect and maximise the value of the corporate debtor’s assets. The issue – before, and even after the Court’s judgment – has been largely looked at from the prism of efficacy of the resolution process under the IBC and the need to respect timelines. Even the resolution professional in the impugned case seems to have interpreted the requirement of prior approval as directory to preserve time.  

I suggest that there are alternative ways to examine the issue. First, the prior approval of the CCI ensures respect for the commercial wisdom of the CoC as it prevents an ex-post alteration of the latter’s decision. The above sequence will help preserve the design of the IBC, which entrusts the CoC with the final say on commercial decisions in the resolution process. Second, I propose that insistence on prior approval of the CCI should be viewed as an eligibility requirement for resolution applicants instead of a procedural hurdle. The requirement of the prior approval of the CCI may dissuade insincere resolution applicants, and prevent submission of resolution plans that may crumble at the implementation stage. Cumulatively, both arguments cohere with the framework of the IBC and provide us a better understanding of its aims and procedures.  

Respect For Commercial Wisdom Of The CoC 

In most cases where petitioners have challenged the CoC’s approval of a resolution plan, courts have invoked the supremacy of the commercial wisdom of the CoC. The policy design of the IBC confers powers on the CoC to take commercial decisions, and courts can only intervene in limited and specific instances. The narrow window for judicial interference with decisions of the CoC has been rightly justified by courts by invoking limited grounds for appeal under the IBC. Courts have, thus, termed decisions of the CoC as being of paramount importance. How does the CoC’s supremacy translate into, and become relevant, in the context of the interface of the IBC and the Competition Act, 2002?

The Court in the impugned case relied on the commercial wisdom of the CoC to observe that the lack of prior approval will dilute the aforesaid design of the IBC. For example, if the CoC approves a resolution plan before it receives approval by the CCI, it would leave open the possibility of the latter suggesting modifications to the resolution plan. Permitting ex-post changes by the CCI would also strike at the finality of the CoC’s decision, and, more pertinently, alter the CoC’s position as the final arbiter of corporate debtors’ destiny. The Court underlined the paramount importance of the commercial wisdom of the CoC and reasoned that it can only be exercised assiduously if the CCI’s approval precedes the CoC’s approval. Otherwise, the CoC would be forced to exercise its commercial wisdom without complete information.   

Providing the CoC with the final say on commercial aspects of the resolution plan has remained a core idea since the initial stages of discussion on the IBC. The Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (‘BLRC’) had noted that one of the flaws of the pre-IBC regime was to have entrusted business and financial decisions to judicial forums. The BLRC opined that it was not ideal to let adjudicatory bodies take commercial decisions as they may not possess the relevant expertise. To overcome the flaws of the pre-IBC regime, the IBC was designed to empower only the CoC to take business decisions, as it comprises of financial creditors who may bear the loss in the resolution process. The bifurcation of roles was clear, the legislature and courts were to control and supervise the resolution process, however, all business decisions were the remit of the CoC, though it would arrive at the decision after consultation and negotiations with the corporate debtor. In a similar vein, the Court in Swiss Ribbons v Union of India noted that the financial creditors, comprising mainly of banks and financial institutions, are from the beginning involved in assessing the viability of the corporate debtor, and are best positioned to take decisions on restructuring the loan and reorganisation of the corporate debtor’s business when there is financial stress.         

The resolution applicant also suggested that the CCI’s approval could be sought by the successful applicant after the CoC’s approval but before the NCLT’s approval. First, the suggestion contravenes the plain language of the proviso. Second, the suggestion, if accepted, would still leave open the window of the CCI suggesting amendments to the CoC-approved resolution plan and strike at the IBC’s aim to give the CoC the final say on commercial aspects of the resolution plan.

In fact, the CoC approving a resolution plan which has not received the CCI’s approval would also be in contravention of other provisions of the IBC. The Court specifically mentioned that a resolution plan which contains a provision for combination is incapable of being enforced if it has not secured prior approval of the CCI. Such a plan cannot be approved by the Court as it would violate Sections 30(2)(e), 30(3), and 34(4)(a) of the IBC on grounds of being in contravention of the laws in force. Apart from the above provisions, it may be worth mentioning Section 30(4), which obligates the CoC to approve a resolution plan after considering its feasibility and viability. Clearly, evaluation of the feasibility and viability of a resolution plan must precede the CoC’s approval. The CoC should not be put in a position where it approves a resolution plan and only subsequently considers its feasibility and viability based on the CCI’s opinion, as that would disregard the IBC’s mandate.   

 Proviso To Section 31(4) As An ‘Eligibility Requirement’

 I suggest that the proviso to Section 31(4) should be viewed as an eligibility requirement for the resolution applicant. My suggestion is predicated on an analogy with Section 29A(c). Briefly put, Section 29A(c) declares that a person is ineligible to submit a resolution plan if such person or any other person acting jointly, or in concert with, it has an account classified as a non-performing asset for one year. The proviso removes the ineligibility if the person makes payment of all overdue amounts before the submission of the resolution plan. One of the resolution applicants in Arcelor Mittal India Pvt Ltd v Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors had argued that insistence on the prior payment of overdue amounts would reduce the pool of resolution applicants as their plan may not be eventually approved by the CoC, and that the proviso should be interpreted in a ‘commercially sensible’ manner wherein overdue amounts should be allowed to be paid as part of the resolution plan and not before the submission of the resolution plan.

Justice S.V.M Bhatti, in his dissenting opinion in the impugned case, has attempted to interpret proviso to Section 31(4) in a similar fashion. He has observed that insistence on prior approval by the CCI would limit the number of eligible resolution applicants. Further, he noted that the requirement of prior approval by the CCI raises a question of prudence since the resolution applicant would seek approval of its plan, which may eventually not be acceptable to the CoC.    

 In Arcelor Mittal, the Court dismissed the above line of arguments and held that the plain language of the proviso to Section 29A(c) makes it clear that the ineligibility is removed if overdue payments are made before the submission of the resolution plan. Making the overdue payments may be worth the while of the applicant as the dues may be insignificant compared to the possibility of gaining control of the corporate debtor. The Court added that it would not disregard the plain language of the proviso to avoid hardship to the resolution applicant. The above reasoning squarely applies to the proviso to Section 31(4) and is more persuasive than the dissenting opinion in the impugned case.  

 In fact, one could further engage with the argument about the proviso limiting the number of eligible resolution applicants by stating that the mandate of prior approval of the CCI may act as a filtering mechanism and attract only sincere applicants with concrete resolution plans. The receipt of the CCI approval may diminish the possibility of the resolution plan crumbling at the implementation stage due to the inability or disinclination of the resolution applicants to comply with the subsequent conditions that the CCI may impose. Knowledge of the CCI’s stance prior to the approval of the resolution plan will help in setting realistic timelines and conditions for the successful resolution applicant. 

 Section 31(4) permits the successful resolution applicant to obtain the necessary approvals required under any law for the time being in force, within one year from the date of approval by the adjudicating authority.  The proviso to Section 31(4) carves out one exception and states that if the resolution plan contains a provision for combination, the resolution applicant shall obtain the approval of the CCI prior to the approval of such resolution plan by the CoC. The language of the proviso is clear, unambiguous, and the legislative intent is unmistakable. As the Court noted in its majority opinion, courts must respect the ordinary and plain meaning of the language instead of wandering into the realm of speculation. An exception has been made in the proviso wherein resolution applicants need the prior approval of the CCI. To interpret ‘prior’ to mean ‘after’ would amount to the judicial reconstruction of a statutory provision. There is also no room to interpret the requirement of prior approval as being directory and not mandatory. Analogous to the proviso to Section 29A(c), obtaining the prior approval of the CCI may be ‘worth the while’ of the resolution applicants and this would be a  minor hardship compared to the possibility of controlling the corporate debtor.  

 Prior approval by the CCI should be viewed as an eligibility requirement for resolution applicants instead of a procedural burden. Typically, resolution professionals prescribe requirements of net worth, expertise, etc. for resolution applicants. If compliance with such conditions is not viewed as a hurdle, why view a regulatory approval only through the lens of time, as a procedural hurdle? Instead, it is better viewed as a safeguard to prevent future legal hurdles, smoothen the implementation of approved resolution plan, and to preserve the IBC’s design.  

Understanding The Anxiety About Delay

The Court, in the impugned case, has cited statistics to blunt the argument on delay. The statistics about the speed of decision-making by the CCI reveal that delays may not be significant. The Court cited the Annual General Report of the CCI for 2022-23, as per which, the average time taken by the CCI to dispose of combination applications was 21 days, and there was no recorded instance of the CCI taking more than 120 days to approve a combination application. The track record of the CCI partly convinced the Court that arguments about delays were exaggerated.

While there is merit in arguing that the insistence on prior approval by the CCI may delay the resolution process, it is important to add two caveats: first, even in cases not requiring the approval of the CCI, timelines of the IBC are not frequently respected for various reasons. This is not to suggest that additional delays would do no harm, but that delays are par for the course even when the CCI’s approval is not required. So, it is not accurate to ascribe the possible delay only to the requirement of the CCI’s prior approval. Second, prior approval by the CCI will be needed in relatively few instances, and thus there is good reason to adopt a relaxed view of timelines in such cases to avoid competition law issues after the CoC has approved the resolution plan. The additional time consumed in seeking the CCI’s approval will be for a valid reason, i.e., to address the interface of the IBC with competition law. The IBC cannot be implemented in a sealed bubble. where no extraneous factor  ever influences the speed and progress of the resolution process.  

Conclusion

I have tried to establish that once we take a step back from the time-centric arguments, we can cast a different lens on the issue of the interface of competition law and the IBC.  We can understand that the decision-making of the CoC, and other procedural requirements also need to be respected to maintain the integrity of the resolution process. Time, despite being vital, cannot solely dictate the entire resolution process. When the resolution process implicates other areas of law, such as competition law, adopting a relatively relaxed approach to the time limits of the IBC may ensure smooth approval and implementation of the resolution plan. In fact, the prior approval of the CCI aligns with the key design of the IBC, which strives to reserve final decisions on the resolution process to the CoC, subject to minimal judicial supervision. If the CCI unpacks and modifies the CoC-approved resolution plans ex-post, it will in fact, undermine the sanctity of the resolution process.

[This post was first published at NLSIR Online in May 2025.]

Service Charge, its Similarity with Tax, and a ‘Double Whammy’ for Consumers: Some Thoughts

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Introduction 

The Delhi High Court (‘High Court’) recently ruled that levy of mandatory service charge by restaurants violates customer rights. The High Court’s reasoning, anchored in consumer protection laws, termed a mandatory service charge as deceptive and misleading for consumers. The High Court also made a few casual references to tax laws. For example, the High Court took umbrage at the nomenclature of ‘service charge’ and its potential to confuse customers with a tax levied by the Government. There is merit to the High Court’s observation, but service charge and tax have a deeper connection that is only superficially referred to in the judgment. In this article, I try to scratch the surface a bit deeper.  

I elaborate on two potential misgivings about service charge that the High Court’s judgment may entrench: 

First, the High Court noted that addition of service charge below the cost of food followed by levy of GST in the bill, created a ‘double whammy’ for the customers. I argue that restaurants by adding service charge before calculating GST were adhering to the mandate under CGST Act, 2017. In complying with GST laws, restaurants seem to have tripped over the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Unless there is a change in any of the two laws, restaurants are now faced with the challenge of squaring a circle.  

Second, the High Court’s view that service charge can be confused for a tax prompted it to recommend that a change in nomenclature may be worth exploring. The High Court recommended that the Central Consumer Protection Authority (‘CCPA’) can permit restaurants to levy ‘tip’, ‘gratuity’, or ‘fund’ on a voluntary basis. The nomenclature issue was two-fold: first, service charge per being mistaken for a tax by customers; second, use of abbreviations by restaurants – such as ‘charge’, ‘VSC’, ‘SER’ – which further misled the customers if the levy was a mandatory levy by the State or restaurants. I query whether ‘confusion’ is the touchstone to determine if a levy by private entity should be disallowed or is its perceived mandatory nature?  

GST on Food Cost + Service Charge 

The High Court noted in its judgment that: 

Moreover, when the bills of establishments are generated, it is noticed that the service charge is added right below the total amount of the cost of the food, followed by GST and taxes. For any consumer who does not examine the bill thoroughly, the impression given is that the service charge is a component of tax; (para 122)

The High Court’s above observation hints at two things: 

one, the restaurants are trying to inflate the cost of food bill by calculating GST on the cumulative of food bill and service charge;  

second, the mention of service charge just before GST creates a confusion that the former is a tax. 

Let me examine the first implication in this section.  

Section 15(2)(c), CGST Act, 2017 states that the value of supply of goods or services or both shall include:

incidental expenses, including commission and packing, charged by the supplier to the recipient of a supply and any amount charged for anything done by the supplier in respect of the supply of goods or services or both at the time of, or before delivery of goods or supply of services; (emphasis added)

Thus, if a restaurant was adding service charge to the food bill before computing GST, it was adhering to the mandate of GST law and not trying to ‘inflate’ the bill on its own accord. Once a restaurant decides to levy any additional charge including packing charges, etc., then as per Section 15(2)(c) it needs to be added to the total cost in a bill before computing GST. Adding all the ancillary costs ensures that the base value for calculating GST is as high as possible. Enhancing underlying value of the supply is a statutory policy aimed to enhance revenue collections, and leaves business entities such as restaurants no option to exclude charges such as service charge from the cost. One could question the statutory policy, but I doubt restaurants at fault for adding service charge to the food cost before computing GST.   

In adding the service charge to food cost, as per the mandate of CGST Act, 2017, restaurants though seem to have tripped over the consumer protection law. How to ensure compliance with both? The High Court has offered a suggestion that service charge could be renamed to something that cannot be confused with a tax, though its payment should remain voluntary.    

Service Charge Can be Confused With Tax 

The High Court, as noted above, was concerned about mention of service charge just above GST in the restaurant bill and its potential to confuse customers former with a tax. The High Court also noted that:     

In some cases, service charge is being confused with service tax or a mandatory tax imposed by the government. In fact, for the consumers, the collection of service charge is proving to be a double whammy i.e., they are forced to pay service tax and GST on the service charge as well. This position cannot be ignored by the Court. (para 123)

Latter part of the High Court’s judgment, of course, is a bit inaccurate. Service tax has been subsumed by GST since July 2017. Also, payment of GST on service charge is not a ‘double whammy’ as the High Court observes. It is, as noted above, payment of GST as per statutory mandate. It is simply, a ‘whammy’ as inclusion of service charge in value of supply though prejudices the taxpayer, is not qualitatively dissimilar from inclusion of any charges that suppliers compulsorily collect from their recipients.  

The first part of the observation points out that service charge can be confused with a tax by consumers who may think they have no option but to pay it, may be misled into paying a private compulsory levy. The misleading part is on two counts, as per the High Court. 

First, the mention of service charge just above GST. This can be corrected by tinkering billing software and doesn’t seem like a substantive issue that it beyond correction. One could perhaps mandate restaurants to specifically mention in the bill itself that service charge is discretionary and not a levy by the State.    

Second, is the phrase ‘service charge’ itself, which gives consumers the impression that it is a tax. But will a service charge by any other name taste just as bitter? Perhaps. 

Even if the CCPA permits restaurants to rename service charge to let us say a ‘tip’, it would have to be on a voluntary basis. Technically, as per CCPA guidelines, service charge was discretionary even before the Delhi High Court’s judgment. And if CCPA permits levy of ‘tip’, we would enter similar issues of restaurants arguing that the ‘tips’ are voluntary and customers can request it to be waived off while customers claiming that the voluntary nature is only a ruse. Restaurants effectively collect ‘tip’ as if it’s a mandatory charge. Equally, GST will have to levied on food cost and ‘tip’, if paid. Thus, the ‘double whammy’ may persist. 

Can consumers confuse a ‘tip’ with a ‘tax’? Well, ideally, they should not confuse a service charge with a tax either. Not after July 2017, since the terms service charge and GST are not eerily similar. However, one should not take the view of a tax professional but deploy the standard of an average reasonable consumer. It is difficult to predict with mathematical certitude, but a ‘tip’ or ‘gratuity’ seems like a relatively less confusing option. If CCPA can mandate that no restaurants cannot use abbreviations or alternate names which can lead to confusion as in the case of service charge. There should be one voluntary levy and its name uniform across all restaurants.  

Finally, I’m prompted to ask a question: do we mistake any other levy by private entity as a tax? Is there any comparable example? 

There have been instances of conmen masquerading as tax officers, and fooling people into paying money, but I cannot think of a comparable levy where an average person has been confused that the money is not being collected by the State, but a private entity. Perhaps some people were confused if the maintenance fee paid to their resident associations was a State levy, but the confusion doesn’t seem as widespread as for service charge. The confusion seems a rather peculiar and unique problem to service charge. And one that may require an innovative solution. Though, equally possibly, restaurants may eschew the path of levying or collecting any ‘tip’ and may simply raise prices of food to compensate. Wait and watch, I guess.  

Fraudulent Sale is Supply Under GST: Three Errors of the Advance Ruling

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A recent advance ruling by Gujarat AAR is a frustrating read. AAR held that sale by a seller constitutes as supply under GST laws even if the seller was defrauded and did not receive any consideration for such goods. In this article, I argue that there are three obvious errors in the advance ruling, which encompass flaw in applicant’s arguments and AAR’s approach. The three errors are: 

First, the applicant’s framing of question. 

Second, AAR’s reasoning and identification of relevant provision. 

Third, applicant’s argument on why a fraudulent sale should not constitute a supply. 

The facts involved a peculiar and may I daresay a novel question that should have led to an interesting analysis of the relevant legal provisions and hopefully a defensible answer. Instead, what we receive via the advance ruling is a superficial analysis and a facile answer. 

The basic facts in application were: the applicant supplied submersible pumps for two months and generated several invoices for the said sales only to discover that it had been defrauded. The applicant did not receive any consideration for the supply of goods as the order documents were forged by a fraudulent purchaser by using the name of a reputable purchaser. Applicant approached AAR seeking an answer whether GST can be levied on the above transaction.  

First Error 

The question before AAR should have been whether such a fraudulent sale of goods constitutes a supply under GST laws, even in the absence of a consideration? Instead, applicant framed the question as:      

Whether the goods supplied by us [becoming victim of fraud without receiving consideration] could be considered as supply of goods under the provisions of section 21 under the IGST Act? 

Grammatical errors in the question aside, the legal question would be why did the applicant invoke Section 21, IGST Act, 2017? The impugned provision states that import of services made on or after the appointed day shall be liable to tax regardless, whether the transactions for import of such services had been initiated before the appointed day. However, the applicant’s transaction in question was an inter-State supply and nothing to do with import of services. Clearly, the applicant approached AAR with a question that referred to the wrong provision. And AAR also noted the applicant’s reference to the above provision and observed: 

How this will be applicable to supply of goods made by the applicant to the recipient in the State of Assam is not understood. We find that the question, at best is vaguely framed. (para 9)

The applicant’s query could not have been answered by referring to the wrong provision and thus another approach was necessary. 

Second Error 

In adopting the alternate approach, the AAR made an error by referring to Section 12, CGST Act, 2017 which states the time of supply of goods. Time of supply goods is a concept under GST which helps us determine at what point in time did the supply in question took place. To delineate and cohere various situations, the provision lays down certain rules including deeming fictions. AAR referred to Section 12 and noted that time of supply of goods is either the date of issue of invoice by the supplier or date on which the supplier receives payment with respect to the supply, whichever is earlier. Applying the above rules to the facts, AAR noted that the supplier had issued invoices in June 2023 and July 2023, thus the point of taxation in respect of supply of goods will be the date of issue of invoice. AAR thereby concluded that the applicant had supplied goods under relevant provisions of GST laws. 

The error in the above analysis by AAR is that it did not consider if supply had been made. Time of supply as the phrase indicates is only relevant for a supply. The more relevant question for AAR was if a supply had been made and not the time of supply. Latter was contingent on the former. AAR, instead, assumed that the supply had been made and relied on time of supply and invoices to state that a supply had been made. 

Third Error 

This leads us to the third error: applicant’s argument that no supply had taken place. The applicant relied on Sales of Goods Act, 1930 to argue that a valid sale had not taken place since all the essential ingredients of a sale were not satisfied in absence of a consideration. AAR declined to accept applicant’s above argument and referred to Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 which defines supply. However, instead of analysing if the ingredients of supply were satisfied in the impugned case, AAR took a short route and simply noted that ‘it is not disputed that a supply has been done by the applicant’. (para 14) AAR concluded that while a fraud may vitiate the contract of sale, the applicant has not explained how a fraudulent sale moves outside the ambit of supply. 

The error here is actually two-fold: first, the applicant invoking Sales of Goods Act, 1930 instead of categorically stating that the ingredients of supply are not satisfied in the impugned case; second, AAR only reproducing the definition of supply in its ruling rather than examining if a supply can take place under Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 even if the purchaser pays no consideration. To be fair though, AAR would not undertake the latter exercise if the applicant doesn’t argue for it. And it seems the four people representing the applicant before AAR didn’t make the argument and instead surprisingly relied on Sales of Goods Act, 1930 to argue that a sale had not taken place.      

Conclusion 

The first instinct is to club Gujarat AAR’s impugned ruling with the wide swathe of sub-par advance rulings under GST. While AAR is not completely faultless in this ruling and did commit its own error, the applicant approached AAR with a wrongly framed question and made some misjudged arguments. There is only so much that AAR can do when the applicant adopts such a flawed approach. AAR to some extent did salvage the situation. But just about. Irrespective, I doubt we have heard the last word on this issue. 

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