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Lessons from NAA: Parameters of a Fair Dispute Resolution Body

February 13, 2024February 12, 2024 by Rav Singh

The experience of transitioning from retail sales tax to VAT laws in 2002-03 provided a learning that a similar transition to GST may be used as a pretext by suppliers to artificially increase the prices of goods and services and profiteer at the expense of retail consumers. To protect consumer interest, an anti-profiteering provision was included in Section 171 of the CGST Act, 2017 which mandates that any reduction in tax rate or the benefit of ITC shall be passed on to the consumer by way of commensurate reduction in prices. And under the same provision the Central Government was empowered to either notify an existing authority or create a new authority to implement the mandate. And a new body in the form of National Anti-Profiteering Authority (‘NAA’) was duly constituted to implement the mandate of Section 171.

NAA’s constitution via delegated legislation, opaqueness about its methodology to determine profiteering, absence of an appellate remedy, and the rhetoric filled nature of its orders created fertile grounds for arguments that it was an unconstitutional body. Recently, the Delhi High Court upheld the constitutionality of NAA though it provided the petitioners the liberty to challenge the individual orders of NAA on merits. I’ve previously examined the limitations and flaws in the judgment. In this article, I rely on NAA’s working and the Delhi High Court’s judgment to extrapolate some parameters which should be the touchstone to examine the efficacy and fairness of a tax dispute resolution body.

Providing Appropriate Policy Guidance

A crucial issue that characterises the administration of tax laws in India is the nature and extent of delegated legislation. Statutory provisions are consistently interpreted, re-interpreted by the executive via Circulars, Notifications, and Press Releases which are also constantly issuing instructions that require attention and compliance by taxpayers. The content of several such secondary legislative instruments is not only far removed from the parent statute, but the policy is also rarely encoded in the statute. The issue of delegated legislation, and its legal scope, becomes even more acute when the statute does not provide adequate policy guidance to the decision-making body creating a danger of the body interpreting its mandate beyond the confines of the parent statute. And more crucially, leaving the stakeholders clueless about the scope of jurisdiction of the decision-making body and the nature of disputes that it can adjudicate.

The fact that NAA did not contain adequate policy guidance was one of the petitioner’s main contentions before the Delhi High Court and rightly so. While Section 171 does state the broad compliance that suppliers need to adhere, it provides no insight into the nature and scope of of the body that is empowered to implement the mandate. NAA’s and the Delhi High Court’s opinion was that Section 171 is a ‘self-contained code’; but, interpreting the broad mandate of Section 171 as an adequate policy direction is not ideal. Certainly not from the perspective of taxpayers. The jurisdiction and mandate of the decision-making body needs to be prescribed more precisely and preferably by the legislature or executive. The body in question should not have the authority to determine its own jurisdiction and procedure which it can interpret in a self-serving manner.

Creating an Accountability Mechanism

Creating accountability mechanisms for judicial or quasi-judicial bodies has been a tough road in India. For example, we are yet to determine the appropriate method and manner of determining the accountability of judges of High Courts and the Supreme Court. One way the accountability invariably gets attached to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies is through the process of appeals against their orders. It allows the petitioner an opportunity to make additional or better arguments, at the same time another body can scrutinize the order on the touchstone of fairness, interpretive coherence, and other similar parameters. In the absence of a statutory right to appeal for the parties, the risk of perverse orders and opaque functioning increases dramatically. For example, in NAA’s case the parties were not provided a statutory right to appeal against its orders and could only approach the High Court via writ petitions which is accompanied with its own limitations. NAA could only be supervised by the GST Council, which if the minutes of its meetings as anything to go by, treated its job of supervising NAA superficially.

One consistent and oft-repeated theme in NAA’s orders was the taxpayers demanding that NAA makes its methodology for calculating profiteering public and NAA replying that it had issued a document – which actually did not state the methodology – and regardless, calculating amount of benefits that needs to be passed to customers wasn’t a tough or complex task and taxpayers could do it themselves. And yet when taxpayers challenged NAA’s constitutionality on the ground that it lacked a judicial member, etc., NAA replied that it was an ‘expert body’ involved in complex work of determining profiteering and need not be compared to quasi-judicial or judicial bodies. Opaqueness and inconsistencies in NAA’s orders were abound but there was no superior or appellate authority that could scrutinize its decisions and present and alternate or a modified view of the facts and dispute in question. It is one thing to say that the constitutionality of a body cannot be challenged on the ground that there is no right to appeal against its orders, but the implications of the absence of such a right extend beyond the constitutionality argument and tax administration needs to be mindful of them.

Defined Identity as an Adjudicatory Body or a Regulator

Taxation law primarily concerns itself with the relationship of State with its residents with the former exercising its coercive power to extract financial resources for its sustenance. The disputes about the scope of the State’s powers are typically adjudicated by classical dispute resolution bodies, mostly successfully. In mediating the relationship of the State and its residents qua their tax obligations, the need for a regulator rarely presents itself. Thus, while sectoral regulators in other spheres such as banking law, securities law, etc. is relatively common, we do not witness similar bodies in tax law universe. Irrespective, when novel or ‘atypical’ bodies are created for administration of tax laws, it is incumbent on the legislature to be precise in stating the rationale and need for the body. Else, not only are the stakeholders confused, but the ‘atypical’ body itself suffers from an identity crisis and looks to fulfil the mandate of both a traditional dispute resolution body and a sectoral regulator and is frequently unable to do justice to neither.

In the case of NAA, it is still unclear if it was intended to be a dispute resolution body or a regulator. But one thing we do know that NAA fancied itself as an expert body and a sectoral regulator and frequently drew analogy of its mandate with SEBI. The analogy was always flawed because SEBI is creation of a dedicated statute, has a Board, and separate dispute resolution bodies while NAA, created via delegated legislation, was a coalesced body consisting of a few technical members which adjudicated on disputes and complaints relating to profiteering. The investigate arm of NAA, DGAP, was answerable and bound by all directions of NAA removing all and any pretence of checks and balances in its operation. There was no clear identification of its role beyond the general mandate contained in Section 171 and NAA itself did not satisfactorily fulfil the role of either a regulator or a dispute resolution body.

De Minimis Requirement of Reasoned Orders

In respect of taxation law, the absence of well-reasoned orders is a widespread symptom that affects advance ruling authorities, tribunals and to some extent even High Courts and the Supreme Court. While speaking orders are a minimum requirement or at least an expectation from any judicial or quasi-judicial or for that matter any administrative body, there is a need to ensure that the orders satisfy the minimum standards of a reasoned order. This can be done through careful selection of personnel and/or ensuring accountability mechanisms in form of an appellate body as suggested above.

While people like me and more skilled than me examine and critique the various such orders, there was something fundamental amiss in the NAA’s orders: skill of writing a judgment. The Delhi High Court in its recent judgment has incorrectly noted that NAA was only a fact-finding body and did not adjudicate on rights and liabilities. NAA not only heard arguments of the taxpayers who were defending their conduct, but also of complainants, and adjudicated on their rights and obligations. But in most of its orders, one found a lack of engagement with the various arguments that the parties raised and instead a generous dose of rhetoric, stonewalling, and sidestepping with substantive arguments. NAA interpreted the relevant statutory provisions were interpreted pedantically and did not even acknowledge important arguments when arriving at its conclusions, violating basic tenets of judgment writing. It is important that vital tax law matters are not decided in a whimsical fashion with disregard to taxpayer rights and a well reasoned judgment is provided by the authorities in question.

Conclusion

The above are by no means exhaustive or even necessary conditions to design a fair and transparent tax dispute resolution body. I’ve only picked cues from the working of NAA and the arguments presented by petitioners before the Delhi High Court to make a tentative case for designing dispute resolution bodies under the tax law umbrella. I’ve highlighted some of the above parameters based on my own previous assessment and observation of the NAA’s working and how, in my view, there was a wide bridge between the laudable objectives of setting up an anti-profiteering regime under GST and the NAA implementing the said mandate in an opaque manner via questionable orders that barely met the minimum requirements of respecting taxpayer rights and administering tax justice.

NAA is Constitutional, Individual Orders Can be Challenged on Merits: Delhi HC

February 7, 2024February 5, 2024 by Rav Singh

Introduction

This post focuses on the Delhi High Court’s recent judgment upholding the constitutionality of NAA, a statutory body established under Section 171, CGST Act, 2017. I’ve examined the working of NAA in detail here and here, where I’ve highlighted the problematic aspects of NAA’s various orders. In this post, I will summarize the petitioner’s arguments and the State’s response. At the outset, it is important to highlight that NAA’s functions and powers have been transferred to Competition Commission of India w.e.f. 01.12.2022. While the petitions challenging the constitutionality of NAA have been pending before the Delhi High Court for a while now, a decision on the constitutionality of NAA after it has passed hundreds of orders and has practically ceased to function is also an instance of how tax justice for taxpayers is elusive and littered with delays, even under a ‘transformative’ and ‘game changing’ legislation such as GST.

The Delhi High Court, in upholding the constitutionality of NAA, has not broken any new ground. In fact, it has blunted various persuasive arguments of the petitioner’s by choosing to adopt a pedantic and literal interpretive approach that saves the face of NAA and paves path for almost unfettered delegated legislation in tax legislations. The High Court has used similar vocabulary as NAA deployed in its orders to defend its constitutionality. The High Court has floundered in engaging with the true import and scope of petitioner’s arguments and instead has provided them the concession of challenging the NAA’s individual orders on merits which is at best a half-baked solution to a constitutional challenge.

The centrepiece of the petitioner’s case was that Section 171, CGST Act, 2017 and Rules 122, 124, 126, 127, 129, 133, 134 of CGST Rules, 2017. The notices and orders of NAA imposing penalties on taxpayers were also challenged, but the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions was the main subject of the impugned decision. And the constitutionality of the provisions and the related arguments also are the focus of this post.

Section 171(1), CGST Act, 2017 states that any reduction in rate of tax on any supply of goods or services or the benefit of input tax credit shall be passed on to the recipient by way of commensurate reduction in prices. Section 171(2) empowers the Central Government, on recommendations of the GST Council, to constitute an authority or empower an existing authority to examine if the mandate of sub-section (1) is being followed by the registered taxpayers. It was in exercise of its powers under Section 171(2) that the Central Government constituted NAA.

The relevant Rules under challenge inter alia provided that NAA shall consist of one Chairperson and four technical members, it shall have the power to determine the procedure and methodology to determine if the mandate of Section 171(1) is being adhered to, amongst other relevant details about initiation and conduct of proceedings by NAA.

Arguments

The petitioner’s arguments traversed a wide array of issues. The challenge to Section 171 involved arguments that Section 171 prescribed a financial extraction akin to a tax which cannot be levied via subordinate legislation; Section 171 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation as it delegates essential legislative functions to the Government and contains no legislative or policy guidance as to how NAA is to exercise its powers; and further while Section 171 delegates to the Government the power to determine the powers of NAA, the Government via Rule 126 has further delegated to the NAA the power to determine the methodology and procedure to adjudicate on violation of Section 171. The petitioners also contended that the term ‘commensurate’ has not been defined under Section 171 and meaning of profiteering hinges on the phrase ‘commensurate reduction in prices’ resulting in a circular reasoning in the provision. Section 171 was accordingly challenged as being violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(g).

The other leg of challenges involved the opaque and uncertain methodology adopted by NAA in determining the violation of Section 171. And that in the absence of any legislative guidance, NAA acted arbitrarily demanding taxpayers reduce prices without disclosing specifics of its methodology. The petitioner highlighted the methodology adopted by NAA in profiteering complaints involving real estate companies to underline the arbitrariness in NAA’s approach. The petitioner also compared India’s anti-profiteering mechanism with that of Malaysia and Australia to underline their argument that the anti-profiteering mechanism in India was a price control mechanism interfering with their right to determine prices of goods and services.

Petitioners further highlighted that there was no time prescribed for taxpayers to reduce prices, there was no judicial member in NAA even though it performed a quasi-judicial function, taxpayers did not have a statutory right to appeal against NAA’s orders. And that NAA did not allow any other method to pass on benefits of reduced taxes except via reduction in prices. For example, altering the sizes of products to pass on benefits of reduced taxes to customers had been rejected by NAA except in one case.

The State justified the legal framework of NAA as constitutional. The arguments were, to a large extent, comparable to the rhetoric that NAA deployed in its orders in justifying its constitutionality. Some of the arguments that the State adopted were: Section 171 was enacted in pursuance of the Directive Principles of State Policy under Articles 38, 38(b), and 38(c) which inter alia mention economic justice and prevention of concentration of resources in a few hands. Section 171 was within the legislative competence of the Union under Article 246A of the Constitution. The State interpreted Section 171(1) differently from that of the petitioners and argued that it provided amply policy direction. It was argued that Section 171(1) clearly states that ‘any reduction’ in tax rates must be passed to recipients by ‘commensurate reduction in prices.’ And that only minutiae had been left for delegated legislation. The State defended NAA’s powers to determine the procedure and methodology stating that it clearly flows from Section 171 and this not a case of excessive delegation.

The State also challenged petitioner’s argument that only reduction of prices cannot be the sole method via which the taxpayers can adhere to the mandate of Section 171. The State argued that taxpayers should be allowed to ‘only’ reduce price in compliance of Section 171 and NAA is justified in interpreting the provision which is least prone to tax avoidance as allowing other methods may involve manipulation by taxpayers.

The State argued that Section 171 did not provide for a price control mechanism as argued by petitioners and it only influenced the indirect price component and did not restrict the freedom of suppliers to determine the price. And that NAA was only indulging in fact finding exercise and absence of a judicial member was not fatal to its orders. Neither can absence of a time for which taxpayers are to maintain reduced prices can be the basis of challenging the constitutionality of NAA.

I’ve tried to summarise the important arguments raised by both sides; but, in my view, the core challenge was of excessive delegation. Section 171 does not provide legislative and policy guidance to NAA and Rule 126 questionably allows NAA to determine its own procedure and methodology, a methodology which the State argued it ‘may’ determine but was not obligated to determine. The issues of excessive delegation and opaqueness/arbitrariness in the NAA’s functioning were the overarching themes in the arguments. And State defended the constitutionality of Section 171 by interpreting it in a manner as if it was the most precise and comprehensive statutory provision.

Delhi High Court Upholds NAA’s Constitutionality

The Delhi High Court gave multiple reasons for upholding the constitutionality of NAA. The High Court dutifully cited the principles that presumption of constitutionality guides adjudication of constitutionality of a provision and that in matters of economic laws the legislature has a wide latitude, both principles duly entrenched in Indian jurisprudence via a long line of judicial precedents. Further, the High Court observed that GST heralded a new indirect tax regime in India to reduce the cascading effect of multiple indirect taxes. On these broad and abstract principles there is little to find fault with the High Court’s approach. It is the specifics that make this judgment deficient in reasoning. I highlight some of the deficiencies below.

To begin with, one of petitioner’s argument was that the key phrases used in Section 171 ‘commensurate’ and ‘profiteering’ are defined in reference to each other, a case of circular reasoning. The High Court invoked the State’s reference to Directive Principles of State Policy, the objective of GST to reduce cascading effect of taxes, and the dictionary meaning of ‘commensurate’ to conclude:

Section 171 of the Act, 2017 mandates that whatever is saved in tax must be reduced in price. Section 171 of the Act, 2017 incorporates the principle of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, it has a flavor of consumer welfare regulatory measure, as it seeks to achieve the primary objective behind the Goods and Services Tax regime i.e. to overcome the cascading effect of indirect taxes and to reduce the tax burden on the final consumer. (para 100)

Again, what the Delhi High Court says here is correct, but it does not address the petitioner’s simple argument that in absence of precise phrases or clear definitions the provision suffers from arbitrariness as it allows NAA complete discretion to interpret and implement the provision. Also, the constitutionality of a provision cannot be defended by reference to its intended objectives. The fact that Section 171 was enacted in reference to Directive Principles of State Policy or for consumer protection is irrelevant to the argument that it suffers from arbitrariness. The High Court places undue emphasis on the intent of the provision to adjudicate its constitutionality and sidestepped the core issue of the provision lacking sufficient policy guidance.

The second questionable aspect of the judgment was in the Delhi High Court’s conclusion that Section 171 contains a clear legislative policy and does not delegate essential legislative functions. And the High Court added that not only does Section 171 prescribe a clear legislative policy it also contains all the navigational tools, checks and balances to guide the authority tasked with its workability. Section 171 creates a substantive obligation on taxpayers to not profiteer, but the authority to implement the mandate, NAA, has under the relevant rules been given the power to determine its own procedure, determine the scope of complaints and investigation, determine the methodology to determine profiteering – without being under an obligation to determine it or disclose it – which cannot be reasonably traced to the statutory provision. And a statutory right to appeal against NAA’s order is absent. In such a scenario, the High Court’s interpretation that Section 171 contains sufficient policy guidance, imbibes Section 171 with more substance than it contains.

Further, Section 171(3) states that the authority, i.e., NAA shall exercise such powers and discharge such functions as may be prescribed. And under Rule 126, the Central Government empowers NAA to determine the methodology and procedure for determining if the taxpayers are passing on benefits of reduced taxes to consumers. It is indeed difficult to not see that the delegated legislation function assigned to the Central Government was further passed to NAA leading to a situation where NAA framed Rules to determine its own powers and determine the methodology to determine profiteering. In my view, this is a clear case of impermissible delegated legislation where an authority has been entrusted to self-determine scope of its own powers circumscribed by a thinly worded statutory provision. Also, it is worth pointing out that the Methodology that NAA prescribed in exercise of its powers was not a methodology that reliably informed the taxpayers of how the reduced prices are to be calculated and unreasonably suggested that increased costs of compliance for taxpayers are immaterial to determine compliance with Section 171. The Delhi High Court’s observations on this issue are:

Moreover, as per Rule 126 NAA ‘may determine’ the methodology and not ‘prescribe’ it. The substantive provision i.e. Section 171 of the Act, 2017 itself provides sufficient guidance to NAA to determine the methodology on a case by case basis depending upon peculiar facts of each case and the nature of the industry and its peculiarities. Consequently, so long as the methodology determined by NAA is fair and reasonable, the petitioners cannot raise the objection that the specifics of the methodology adopted are not prescribed. (para 126)

What is the difference between ‘determining’ and ‘prescribing’? NAA, in its orders has observed that it is not obligated to prescribe a methodology since different fact situations require different approaches. And it is only supposed to determine the methodology as per the facts, an approach which the Delhi High Court endorses in the above paragraph. But, is it justifiable to rely on the said interpretation to conclude that the methodology need not be revealed to the taxpayers?

The above observations of the Delhi High Court where it almost completely agreed with the State’s arguments and in fact NAA’s own defence of its own constitutionality, pretty much sealed the case for the petitioners. The High Court though concluded that all other arguments of the petitioners’ also did not have a persuasive value. For example, the High Court observed NAA’s investigations could be validly extended beyond the scope of original complaint (para 159), time limit to complete investigations were only directory and not mandatory despite use of the word ‘shall’, (para 158 )and that NAA was a fact-finding body and absence of judicial members was not fatal to its constitutionality. (para 146) The last finding collapses on an examination of NAA’s function and High Court’s own interpretation of Section 171 as a provision that creates a substantive obligation on taxpayers. (para 100) Clearly, in implementing Section 171, NAA is adjudicating on rights and obligations of consumers and taxpayers and yet NAA’s functions were interpreted to be confined to mere fact-finding exercise. While the actual fact-finding was undertaken by the investigative arm of the NAA, i.e., DGAP. And if a body like NAA has powers to impose penalties and cancel registrations, do they not impact taxpayer obligations? How is it defensible to accord it a status of mere fact-finding body performing functions of expert determination?

Finally, while the State and the Delhi High Court were correct in stating that absence of a right of appeal is not fatal to the constitutionality of a body, it needs to be stated that the absence of such a right should have made the High Court more cautious that there are enough checks and balances to protect taxpayer rights at the NAA level. Instead, by upholding the arguments that investigation by DGAP can traverse beyond the subject matter of complaint, the time limit to complete investigation is directory in nature and otherwise misreading the mandate and nature of NAA, the Delhi High Court has granted a wide leeway to the State in matters of anti-profiteering in particular and generally in drafting tax legislations with unfettered delegated legislative powers to the executive.

Conclusion

I’ve argued previously that NAA adopted self-serving interpretation of Section 171, relied on opaque and arbitrary methodology to adjudicate complaints of profiteering and that its manner of creation was tinged with unconstitutionality. The Delhi High Court has concluded otherwise, though as I’ve highlighted above, its reasoning and interpretive approaches are not beyond reproach. The concession that the petitioners have received from the Delhi High Court is that NAA adopted a flawed methodology in adjudicating complaints of profiteering in real estate projects. The High Court observed that NAA relied on the difference between ratio of ITC and turnover in pre and post-GST periods, but there is no direct co-relation between ITC and turnover. And that varying expenses and nature of construction activity should have been considered by NAA. But, the impact of these observations will only be revealed when specific orders of NAA are challenged on merits. (para 129) Since a bulk of NAA’s orders related to the real estate sector, this is not insignificant, but still does not detract from the High Court’s flawed approach in engaging with the arguments on constitutionality of NAA.