Rav Singh

Religious Vows and Income Tax Obligations: Harmony to Clash 

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The Supreme Court is currently seized of a matter which, at its core, involves determining to what extent do the religious beliefs of a person exempt them from withholding tax obligations under the IT Act, 1961. In this article, I will focus on the issues involved and refer to the relevant judgments of the Madras High Court – Single Judge Bench and Division Bench, as well as the judgment of a Single Judge Bench of the Kerala High Court, currently under appeal before a Division Bench. The judgments reveal differing opinions and unravel layers of the central dilemma – should interpretation of tax law accommodate personal religious beliefs, or should tax law be indifferent to religious beliefs, irrespective of the hardship it may cause.    

Background 

The controversy involved nuns, sisters, priests, or fathers who provided their services as teachers in schools. The schools were provided grant-in-aid by the State Government under its grant-in-aid scheme. Christian religious institutions/religious congregations (‘societies’) which controlled the schools and represented the cause of the teachers before the High Court(s) contended that the teachers were bound by Canon law as they taken vows of poverty to the Christ. As a result of their vows, the teachers had suffered a civil death, were incapable of owning property and thus their salaries belonged to the society in question. The teachers were obligated to ‘make over’ their salaries to the societies and did not possess any title over them. And it was the society which accounted for the money in its tax returns and not the teachers. In view of the above, the petitioners contended that the salaries of teachers cannot be subjected to deduction of tax at source as stipulated under IT Act, 1961.  

Before I summarise the arguments adopted by the parties, it is vital to understand the successive Circulars and Instructions issued by CBDT on the issue. I’ve summarised the content of each Circular in a chronological fashion.  

Circular No.5 of 1940, issued on 02.01.1940: Medical fees, examination fees or any other kind of fees received by the missionaries are taxable in the hands of the missionaries themselves, even though they are required by terms of their contracts to make over the fees to the societies. The Circular stated that not only does the accrual happen in favor of the missionaries but there is an actual receipt by them. 

Circular No.1 of 1944, issued on 24.01.1944: Cited the principle of diversion of income and noted that the fees received by missionaries is not their income and clarified that where a missionary employee collects fees in payment of bills due to the institution, the amount collected will income of the institution and not of the employee. No income tax will be collected on fees received by missionaries for services rendered by them which as per their conditions of service they are required to make over to the society. 

Circular F. No. 200/88/75-II (AI), issued on 05.12.1977: Referred to the Circular of 1944 and reiterated that since the fees received by the missionaries is to be made over to the congregation there is an overriding title to the fees which would entitle the missionaries exemption from payment of income tax. 

CBDT Letter, F. No. 385/10/2015-IT (B), issued on 26.02.2016: Observed that the Circular of 1944, which was reiterated in 1977, was only applicable on amounts received as fees as payment of bills due to the institutions and does not cover salaries and pensions. And while Circular of 1977 mentions the word ‘salary’, the operative portion only dealt with fees. 

CBDT Letter, F. No. 385/10/2015-IT (B), issued on 07.04.2016: Reiterated the position in previous letter and noted that salary and pension earned by member of congregation in lieu of services rendered by them in their individual capacity are taxable in the hands of members even if same are made over to the congregation. No exemption from TDS is envisaged under the Circulars and Instructions of the Board. 

The shift in stance on TDS obligations, from 1944 to 2016, is evident from a summary of the above Circulars. The shift though was not caused by any substantive change in the underlying law but facts. From 2015 onwards, the teachers were to be paid salaries in their individual accounts via ECS, while previously the grant-in-aid from the State Government was credited as a lumpsum amount to the account of the societies itself. Prior to 2015, no withholding tax was deducted, primarily because that was the interpretation of the 1977 Circular. However, in 2015, before crediting the salaries to individual accounts of teachers, the Pay and Accounts Officer addressed a communication to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (Chennai) as to whether tax is to be deducted from salaries of teachers and received a reply in the affirmative, which the societies alleged was contrary to the Circulars issued until then. Nonetheless, it triggered a chain of events which culminated into CBDT Instructions of 2016 which also affirmed that tax should be deducted and thereafter societies filed writ petitions before the Madras and the Kerala High Court challenging the orders of deduction of tax. 

Diversion of Income vis-a-vis Application of Income 

The Revenue’s stance that religious beliefs do not exempt from withholding tax obligations highlighted the apolitical character of IT Act, 1961. And the Division Bench of the Madras High Court agreed with this argument and premised its interpretation of provisions relating to withholding tax partly on that assumption. (paras 29-30) In my view though, the Revenue’s case hinges on the core issue that the salary of teachers which they are bound to make over to the societies is an application of the teacher’s income and not a diversion of income. The petitioners contended otherwise: that the societies had an overriding title on the teacher’s salaries due to their vow of poverty and making over the salaries amounts to diversion of income and not application of income. 

Application of income, under direct tax law, means a person applies the income or spends it on an avenue of his choosing ‘after’ its receipt. This could mean donation of the entire income to another person, transferring a part or entirety of the income to a dependent based on a previous promise or otherwise parting with the income after receiving it. In such cases, since the income is received by the person and is accrued in their favor, it is taxable in the person’s hands. The subsequent application of income for charitable or other purposes is immaterial to chargeability of income in the hands of the person who receives the income in the first place.  

Diversion of income, fully expressed as ‘diversion of income by an overriding title at source’, implies that the person has diverted their income, by a contractual arrangement or otherwise, to another person and never receives the income. It is important that not only does the person not receive the income, but more crucially the accrual does not happen in favor of the person who diverts their income. Diversion of income can happen in various ways. If a person, as part of an employment or professional contract, dedicates a portion of his income to a charity whereby a charity has a right to receive such money every month, it can be said that the person has diverted that portion of their income and created a charge in favor of the charity. The portion of money earmarked for charity neither accrues in the person’s favor nor does it receive that income. The diversion needs to happen at the source of income to create an overriding title in favor of the other person. But, if the contractual terms are such that the entire income accrues in favor of the person and thereafter a portion of income is diverted towards charity, it will not amount to diversion of income but application of income. 

Courts in India have tried to demarcate the two concepts through various decisions. And while an articulation of the concepts is coherent, their application to various fact situations remains a challenge. Courts have, for example, observed that diversion of income happens where third person becomes entitled to receive the amount before an assessee can lay claim to receive it as its income, but no diversion of income happens when it is passed to a third person after receipt of income even if it may be passed in discharge of an obligation. These broad dictums while understandable need to be applied to situations that are rarely straightforward such as the current case involving nuns and fathers who have taken a vow of poverty.     

Have Teachers Diverted Their Income?  

Based on the above summary exposition of application and diversion of income, it is apposite to examine if the teachers who have taken a vow of poverty diverted their income or were they recipients of income which they applied in favor the societies. From a Canon law perspective since the teachers had suffered a civil death and were no longer capable of owning property, the case is that of diversion of income. And the teachers should not be taxable. And as the petitioners argued, the teachers were merely conduits, and the income was that of the societies. But such an approach tends to completely discount or at least dilutes relevance of the provisions under IT Act, 1961. 

The Division Bench of Madras High Court and the Single Judge Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court disagreed with the above line of argument and gave the IT Act, 1961 more primacy. Both the Courts in their respective judgements observed that the societies did not have a legal right to receive the salaries as they accrued to individual teachers. While the precepts of canon law might require the teachers to part with their salaries, it was held that the said obligation was in the realm of personal law and did not entitle the societies to receive salaries from the State Government. It can be said that from the State Government and Revenue’s standpoint, only teachers were entitled to receive the salaries, but from the standpoint of societies teachers were mere conduits to receive the money and the right to receive the money was of societies. The latter view, of course, is based primarily if not entirely on personal law.  

The single judge bench of the Madras High Court – against which a writ appeal was decided by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court – however, said the above conclusion did not give ‘due regard to personal law’ and the Revenue Department cannot ignore the personal law of the teachers. And by applying the test of distinction between diversion and application of income enunciated by Courts in previous decisions, Single Judge of the Madras High Court held that the correct conclusion is that the teachers only receive the salary on behalf of their societies as they do not partake in any part of their income. And no tax should be deducted at the time of disbursal of their salaries.      

The question then is to what extent, if at all, should income tax accommodate the religious beliefs of the teachers? If the religious belief is to be accommodated, the teachers would have to be considered as fictitious persons – and also in accordance with the long-standing practice of the Income Tax Department as per its pre-2016 Circulars – and only societies would be considered recipients of income via a deeming fiction. This would save the teachers – who do not receive any benefits of portion of their income in reality – from income tax obligations of filing returns and claiming refunds, etc. If the societies are accounting in their income tax returns, it should not be a problem as it has not been since 1944. 

What is the case for not accommodating the religious beliefs? One, there is no express provision in IT Act, 1961 that exempts people from withholding tax obligations on the ground of their religious beliefs. At the same time, I would suggest that accrual, which is one crucial basis to determine chargeability of income, may be a more pertinent lens to view this issue. For example, if the salary accrues to the teachers – due to their services provided on basis of their qualifications, as argued by the Income Tax Department – then it can be said that IT Act, 1961 and its withholding tax obligations applies to them, and the teachers are merely applying their income by making it over to the societies under their personal vows. In the alternative, if the accrual happens in favor of societies, then it is a clear case of diversion of income. But can personal religious vows transfer titles in property? Doubtful. Though if the societies can argue – and I’m not sure they have – that the teachers are bound to transfer salaries to them not just because of their personal vows but also under their contractual obligations with the school/societies, there may be room to suggest that diversion of income happens under contractual terms as well, creating an escape from withholding tax obligations. 

Story of CBDT Circulars 

Apart from the above, a sister issue is that of the validity, content, and scope of Circulars. The Income Tax Department has contended before the Courts that the Circulars that were issued under the IT Act, 1922 and do not represent the legal position under IT Act, 1961. Further, it has been argued the Circulars issued before 2016, only clarify the legal position as regards the fees received by teachers in a fiduciary capacity and not the salaries and pensions. For example, while the Circular of 1977 mentions salaries, the operative part of the Circular only refers to fees. The Division Bench of Madras High Court has opined that the Circulars suffer from vagueness, do not refer to the contemporary position such as the requirement of crediting salaries of teachers in their individual bank accounts such via ECS. Further, the Madras High Court in the same judgment has held that the Circulars can only act as a guide to interpretation and are not binding on Courts. And more importantly, the CBDT does not have the power to grant exemptions when the statutory provisions do not permit such exemptions.  

The Single Judge Bench of the Madras High Court opined that the Principal Commissioner of Chennai could not have issued directions to deduct tax by ignoring the previous valid Circulars. But, the Revenue has a persuasive argument in stating that pre-2016 Circulars only refer to fees and not salaries and pensions. The Single Judge of the Madras High Court questioned the validity of 2016 Instructions on the ground it covered the same subject matter as the previous Circulars. While the Division Bench held that the pre-2016 Circulars did not apply to salaries, but only fees. This, again, is a matter of interpretation. A perusal of the Circulars does suggest that the pre-2016 Circulars clarify tax obligations on fee and refer to salaries incidentally. Even if fee is interpreted to encompass salaries, the more crucial fact in my view is that the manner of crediting salaries has changed. Post-2015, teachers are supposed to be paid salaries via ECS in their individual accounts undeniably making them recipients of the income. This fact was not considered in pre-2015 Circulars necessitating issuance of new directions in 2016. Change in facts can change the interpretation of law. I doubt there is much grouse in that argument.  

Conclusion

I think the ‘correct’ answer in this case depends on various parameters and what is accorded due importance. The Single Judge of the Madras High Court invoked Fundamental Rights relating to religion under Article 25 and 26 to support his conclusion in favor of the teachers, while the Division Bench dismissed their relevance to the issue. Similarly, as highlighted above, if personal law is given primary consideration, then the conclusion favors the teachers, while if a strict interpretation of the withholding tax provisions is followed then as the Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed, there is no exemption based on personal religious beliefs. In my view, a deeper look into accrual and by extension diversion and application of income may provide us an insight as to how to satisfactorily resolve this issue. The Single Judge of Kerala High Court, for example, based its conclusion by reasoning that the salary accrued to the teachers who provided service in their individual capacity and not to the societies. The right to receive income is that of the teachers who entrust their salaries to the societies under a personal vow. (para 16) And, this is a fair conclusion and understanding of the arrangement. In fact, this is what the first Circular of 1940 also infers, but in the context of fees. Last, it is worthwhile to underline that the validity of Circulars and Instructions and the interpretation placed on them may ultimately prove to be crucial in determining the fate of this case.       

Not Providing Opportunity of Being Heard Vitiates Order Imposing Penalty: Raj HC

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In a recent decision, the Rajasthan High Court held that the petitioner’s representation – filed under Section 270AA, IT Act, 1961 – for waiving the penalty imposed under Section 270A, IT Act, 1961 was wrongly rejected without providing an opportunity of being heard. And since the impugned orders did not specifically state which sub-clause of Section 270A(9) of IT Act, 1961 are attracted in the case, the orders are quashed and set aside. It is pertinent to briefly mention the provisions in question here: under Section 270A an assessee may have to pay penalty for misreporting or under-reporting an income, but under Section 270AA, the assessee can file an application for waiver of or immunity from penalty. However, as per Proviso to Section 270AA(4) an order rejecting the application of immunity cannot be passed without providing the assessee an opportunity of being heard.  

Facts 

For the Assessment Year 2018-19, the petitioner filed its original return of income on 30.11.2018 and the revised return on 29.03.2019. The petitioner’s case was listed for scrutiny and an exhaustive list of issues were communicated by various notices to which the petitioner replied. During the scrutiny proceedings, the petitioner realized that it had made a provision for ‘doubtful GST ITC’ of Rs 16,30,91,496/- and had mistakenly claimed it as an expense. The said amount was suo motu surrendered by the petitioner and was added to the total income. The said amount was added to the petitioner’s total income via an assessment order but the said order also imposed a penalty on the petitioner under Section 270A for misreporting income. 

The petitioner’s application under Section 270AA against the penalty order was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner. The petitioner’s revision application under Section 264 challenging the rejection was also rejected. The petitioner’s case was that no opportunity of being heard was provided to it which was in non-compliance of Section 270AA and neither did the order specify as to how it misreported the income. 

Against the said rejections, the petitioner approached the Rajasthan High Court via a writ petition. 

Arguments 

The petitioner argued that it had filed an application against imposition of penalty under Section 270AA and the Proviso to Section 270AA(4) clearly states that an order rejecting the petitioner’s application cannot be passed without providing it an opportunity of being heard. The petitioner further assailed the Deputy Commissioner’s order on the ground that it was a one-line non-speaking order. And also that the order of revisional authority instead of correcting the flaws in the Deputy Commissioner’s order stated that the petitioner’s order fell within the ambit of Section 270A(9) clause (a) or (c). While clause (a) mentions misrepresentation of facts, clause (c) mentions claims of expenditure not substantiated by evidence. The petitioner argued that it was never specified in either of the orders how its case was covered by either of the two clauses since it voluntarily offered the amount for taxation by revising its income. 

The Income Tax Department argued that the case was a clear case of misrepresentation and suppression of income since the petitioner had merged doubtful ITC for GST with its expense account. And that the revisional authority had correctly and specifically pointed that the petitioner’s case was covered by clause (a) and (c) of Section 270(9) of the IT Act, 1961. Thus, there was no need or ground for Court’s interference with the orders of the Deputy Commissioner and the revisional authority. 

Decision Favors Assessee 

The Rajasthan High Court accepted the petitioner’s arguments and decided that the orders of the income tax authorities should be quashed and were liable to be set aside. The High Court’s conclusion was based on three major reasons: 

First, the High Court observed that it was undisputed that the amount in question had been offered by the petitioner for taxation voluntarily and was not discovered by the Income Tax Department during the scrutiny proceedings. 

Second, the High Court noted that under Section 270AA(3) an assessing authority can grant an assessee immunity from penalty sought to be imposed under Section 270A, but the Proviso to Section 270AA(4) makes it clear that an order rejecting the assessee’s application for immunity cannot be passed without providing an opportunity of being heard. And while in the impugned case the petitioner had sought personal hearing, no opportunity of being heard was provided. 

Third, the High Court noted that the order of the Deputy Commissioner was a non-speaking order, it had mechanically reiterated the provision of Section 270AA(3), and neither had it specifically stated under which sub-clause of Section 270AA(9) was the case covered. The High Court was particularly harsh about the order of the revisional authority and noted that: 

The revisional authority apparently did not consider the fact that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity of hearing in violation of provisions of proviso to Section 270AA (4) and that the order impugned before it was wholly non-speaking and attempted to justify imposition of penalty under Section 270A (9) (a) and (c). The very fact that the indications were made that the matter fall within (a) and (c), necessarily means that even the revisional authority was not sure whether it was a case of misrepresentation or suppression of facts or claim of expense, not substantiated by any evidence. (para 20) 

Since the orders were in violation of the provisions in question, were vague and the income tax authorities did not provide an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner, they were set aside and quashed by the High Court with the directions that the petitioner be provided immunity under Section 270AA. 

Conclusion 

The Rajasthan High Court’s decision duly appreciated the facts in question and interpreted the relevant provisions prudently. The degree of specificity expected from the income tax authorities was also clearly articulated. While the Income Tax Department argued that identification of two sub-clauses, either of which could cover the case was a specific identification of the provision in question, the High Court rightly interpreted the same to be vague.    

Whose Money is it? Madras HC Says Deposit of Cash Amounts to Payment of GST

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The Madras High Court, in a recent decision, observed that the money in Electronic Cash Ledger (‘ECL’) of the taxpayer belongs to the exchequer since the money was deposited in the name of the exchequer in the form of GST. The High Court held that it cannot be said that the Government can only utilize the money in the ECL only when the taxpayer files the monthly return, i.e., GSTR-3B. The High Court reasoned that the taxpayer cannot keep the money in ECL forever and deprive the exchequer the right to utilize the amount deposited in the Government’s account on the pretext of non-filing of GSTR-3B. The High Court’s decision is at variance with the Jharkhand High Court’s decision where it was held that mere deposit of amount in the ECL does not amount to payment of tax to the exchequer and a taxpayer discharges tax liability only on filing of GSTR-3B. 

Facts 

On the date of introduction of GST, i.e., 01.07.2017, the petitioner had Rs 33 crores (rounded off) in balance as CENVAT credit which could not be transitioned to GST regime due to technical difficulties faced by the petitioner in filing TRAN-1. Since the credit was not transitioned and reflected as ITC, the petitioner could not file GSTR-3B for July 2017 within the due date. The inability to file GSTR-3B for July 2017 disentitled the petitioner from filing GSTR-3B for August to December 2017 due to the bar under Section 39(10). Accordingly, the petitioner discharged the GST liability for the period of July 2017 to December 2017 by depositing amounts in the Electronic Cash Ledger and Electronic Credit Ledger under appropriate heads of CGST, SGST, IGST into the government account. Once the petitioner was able to file TRAN-1, the GST portal allowed it to file GSTR-3B for July 2017 to December 2017 which it did on 24.01.2018. 

The petitioner was served with a recovery notice on 16.05.2023 demanding payment of interest of Rs 24 crores (rounded off) for belated filing of returns for the period of July 2017 to December 2017. The petitioner’s representation against the recovery was rejected by the Department and the validity of recovery proceedings formed the subject of the writ petition before the Madras High Court. 

The issue, simply put, was whether the petitioner was liable to pay interest on the amount it regularly – and before due date – deposited in the ECL, but in respect of which GSTR-3B was filed belatedly. 

Arguments 

The petitioner’s argument was that the deposit of cash in ECL is tantamount to deposit of money with the Government since that deposit is made into the Government’s treasury account maintained with the RBI. The petitioner relied on Section 49(1) and Explanation (a) to Section 49 of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 49(1) states that: 

Every deposit made towards tax, interest, penalty, fee or any other amount by a person by internet banking or by using credit or debit cards or National Electronic Fund Transfer or Real Time Gross Settlement or by such other mode and subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed, shall be credited to the electronic cash ledger of such person to be maintained in such manner as may be prescribed. 

And Explanation (a) to Section 49 states that ‘the date of credit to the account of the Government in the authorized bank shall be deemed to be the date of deposit in the electronic cash ledger.’ 

Based on the above two provisions, the petitioner argued that once money is deposited in ECL, it cannot be withdrawn by the taxpayer at their sweet will since it is money deposited in the Government account maintained with RBI. And a refund from ECL can only happen under Section 54 and, at the same time, if the Department wishes to recover any amount from a taxpayer they can do it via a journal entry for appropriation of amount against the pending tax demand. The petitioner added that merely because debit of ECL is a mere journal entry does not take away from the fact that tax is paid to the Government at the time of remittance under Section 49(1). And since they had deposited amount in ECL on time which amounts to payment of tax, there was no case to levy an interest on them under Section 50, CGST Act, 2017. 

The Department, on the other hand, argued that ‘cash’ which is paid vide a challan is a deposit into the petitioner’s own ECL and is not tax paid to the Government unless the said amount is debited by filing GSTR-3B returns. The Department relied on Section 49(3) which states that the amount available in ECL can be used towards making any payment towards tax, fee or interest and that tax under different heads, i.e., CGST, SGST, IGST is paid only on filing GSTR-3B and debiting the amount from ECL. It is only when GSTR-3B is filed that the tax liability is discharged. 

As is evident, the fulcrum of arguments was whether deposit of cash in the Govt’s account and subsequent credit in ECL amounts to payment of tax or whether debit from ECL at the time of filing of GSTR-3B amounts to payment of tax.  

Madras High Court Favored the Petitioner 

The Madras High Court favored the petitioner by interpreting Section 39, Section 49, and Explanation (a) to Section 49 and to support its interpretation the High Court also relied on the challan used to deposit cash and the format of GSTR-3B. 

Section 39(1) states that:

Every registered person, other than an Input Service Distributor or a non-resident taxable person or a person paying tax under the provisions of section 10 or section 51 or section 52 shall, for every calendar month or part thereof, furnish, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, a return, electronically, of inward and outward supplies of goods or services or both, input tax credit availed, tax payable, tax paid and such other particulars, in such form and manner, and within such time, as may be prescribed, on or before the twentieth day of the month succeeding such calendar month or part thereof. 

The Madras High Court emphasised on the phrase ‘tax paid’ and noted that Section 39 makes it clear that in GSTR-3B the detail of tax paid has to be furnished which is paid via GST PMT-06 challan. And since the challan mentions RBI as the beneficiary bank, any amount deposited vide the challan goes to RBI under the name of GST where the Government maintains an account. The High Court then examined the columns and details provided in GSTR-3B which contain a column of tax paid in cash. And thereby concluded that it was necessary that tax should have been paid via GST PMT-06 ‘prior’ to filing of GSTR-3B since there is a column in GSTR-3B which requires furnishing the details of tax paid in cash. 

The Madras High Court then cited Section 39(7) which states as follows:

Every registered person, who is required to furnish a return under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) or sub-section (5), shall pay to the Government the tax due as per such return not later than the last date on which he is required to furnish such return.” 

The Madras High Court’s interpretation was novel and vital to the case. As per the High Court, Section 39(7) requires that the tax be paid before the due date of filing monthly return – GSTR-3B – and that filing of the monthly return is not important, but that tax should be paid before the due date of filing of monthly return. (paras 24-26) The High Court thus decoupled the payment of tax with filing of GSTR-3B and derived this conclusion from the manner in which Section 39(7) is phrased. 

The Madras High Court subsequently interpreted Section 49(1) and Explanation (a) to mean that the date on which account of the Government is credited is deemed to be the date of deposit in the ECL. The High Court noted that this implies that at the first step the Government’s account is credited and then the taxpayers’ ECL. And that latter was merely a journal entry or an accounting entry.   

The Madras High Court’s combined reading of Section 39(1), 39(7), 49(1) and Explanation (a) led it to the conclusion that the payment of tax must be made before the filing of GSTR-3B and the payment is made in the Government’s authorized account maintained with RBI. This inevitably led the High Court to the conclusion that GST is paid when money is deposited in the Government’s account and not when GSTR-3B is filed. The High Court further reinforced its interpretation by reasoning that if one were to hold that the Government cannot utilize GST collection until the taxpayer files GSTR-3B then the taxpayer can retain the amount in ECL forever by delaying filing of returns. Thus, the High Court reasoned that the moment money is deposited by generating the challan GST PMT-06, it is the money of the exchequer. The amount deposited is GST collected by a taxpayer on behalf of the Government and the Government’s right to utilize it cannot be postponed until the taxpayer files GSTR-3B. (paras 35-41)     

Jharkhand High Court Favored the Department 

On a similar issue, the Jharkhand High Court in M/s RSB Transmissions case, referred to the same provisions, but interpreted them differently to conclude that tax is paid at the time of filing of GSTR-3B and not when cash is deposited in ECL. The Jharkhand High Court referred to the deposit of money vide a challan, Explanation (a) to Section 49 and noted that the deposit of cash was a deposit in the ECL of the taxpayer and did not amount to discharge of tax liability. While, as per the Madras High Court, the money deposited vide a challan is deposited into the Government’s account maintained in RBI and thereafter shown in ECL via a journal entry. 

The Jharkhand High Court also differed in its interpretation of Section 39(7) by observing that no tax can be paid before filing of GSTR-3B. The Jharkhand High Court noted that it is only on filing of GSTR-3B that the ECL is debited towards payment of tax, interest or penalty. The High Court emphasised on the term ‘deposit’ used in Section 49(1) and 49(3) which states that the amount available in ECL ‘may be’ used for payment towards any tax, interest, interest, penalty or fees. The Jharkhand High Court viewed the ECL as an ‘e-wallet’ where the taxpayer can deposit cash anytime by generating the requisite challans. And refund of the said cash can be obtained under the procedure prescribed under the Act. (para 15)   

Importance of Proviso to Section 50 

Section 50(1) and the Proviso also received differing interpretations from the Madras High Court and the Jharkhand High Court primarily because the way the former interpreted Section 39(7). 

Section 50(1) states that: 

Every person who is liable to pay tax in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, but fails to pay the tax or any part thereof to the Government within the period prescribed, shall for the period for which the tax or any part thereof remains unpaid, pay, on his own, interest at such rate, not exceeding eighteen per cent., as may be notified by the Government on the recommendations of the Council. (emphasis added)  

The Madras High Court interpreted the term prescribed period in reference to Section 39(7) cited above and held that Section 39(7) provides that tax should be paid before due date of filing monthly return, i.e., GSTR-3B. And, the said tax, as the Madras High Court had noted is deposited vide a challan. This fact becomes crucial in interpreting the Proviso to Section 50(1) which states: 

Provided that the interest on tax payable in respect of supplies made during a tax period and declared in the return for the said period furnished after the due date in accordance with the provisions of section 39, except where such return is furnished after commencement of any proceedings under section 73 or section 74 in respect of the said period, shall be levied on that portion of the tax that is paid by debiting the electronic cash ledger.  (emphasis added)

The Jharkhand High Court had relied on the latter part of Proviso to conclude that tax is actually paid when the ECL is debited. The Jharkhand High Court had observed: 

This again goes to show that only on filing of GSTR-3B return, the debit of the tax dues is made from Electronic Cash Ledger and any amount lying in deposit in the Electronic Cash Ledger prior to that date does not amount to discharge of tax liability. A combined reading of Section 39 (7), 49 (1) and Section 50(1) read with its proviso and Rule 61(2) also confirms this position. (para 15)

The Madras High Court expressed its disagreement with the above interpretation and noted that Section 50(1) read with Section 39(7) provides for payment of tax via cash and its Proviso cannot be interpreted to mean that tax is paid only on debit of ECL. The Madras High Court noted that the Jharkhand High Court’s interpretation of the Proviso is contrary to Section 50(1) which is not permissible since a Proviso does not travel beyond the main provision, only carves out an exception to it. (paras 55 and 58)

The Jharkhand High Court’s interpretation of Proviso to Section 50 flowed from its interpretation of Section 39(7) and since the Madras High Court interpreted Section 39(7) differently, its interpretation of Proviso to Section 50 differed accordingly. Though, the latter seems more aligned with the bare text of the provisions. 

Conclusion

The Madras High Court’s conclusion was premised on its understanding that deposit of cash vide challan is a deposit in the Government’s account which it can utilize immediately. The Madras High Court viewed GSTR-3B as the ‘ultimate proof’ for discharge of tax liability of the taxpayer, a return that quantifies and formalizes the tax payment made earlier. (para 38) The Jharkhand High Court viewed the deposit vide challan as a deposit in the e-wallet of the taxpayer. (para 15) The Jharkhand High Court did not pay attention to the first few words of Explanation (a) to Section 49(1) which state ‘the date of credit to the account of the Government …’. The import of these words, in my view, is that the cash is deposited in the account of the Government and by the deeming fiction the date of deposit is treated to be the date of deposit in ECL of the taxpayer. The cash deposit happens in the Government’s account which is merely reflected in the ECL later. And via a journal entry caused by GSTR-3B, the remainder amount, if any, is shown in ECL which can be refunded to the taxpayer. The Jharkhand High Court was also remiss in not paying adequate attention to the phrase ‘tax paid’ used in Section 39(1) and which the Madras High Court corrected, to some extent.   What then is the purpose of GSTR-3B? In my view, the Madras High Court is correct in observing that tax liability is quantified on filing of GSTR-3B even though the tax is deposited before the filing of GSTR-3B. This is because, as the petitioners argued before the Madras High Court, a taxpayer cannot simply withdraw money from ECL unless the prescribed procedure is followed. And a proper officer would not ordinarily allow withdrawal from ECL if there is outstanding tax liability. The cash so deposited, is de facto in the Government’s control. To conclude, it suffices to say that the Jharkhand High Court erred in stating that tax cannot be paid before filing of GSTR-3B while the Madras High Court has accorded less than deserved importance to GSTR-3B, though it does not detract from the fact that the latter’s view reflects a more accurate reading of the law. 

Delhi HC Disallows Disclosure of PM Cares Fund Documents Under RTI Act, 2005

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The Delhi High Court in a recent judgment allowed the Income Tax Department’s appeal against the Central Information Commission’s (‘CIC’) order directing the respondent be provided copies of all documents submitted by PM Cares Fund to obtain exemption under Section 80G of the IT Act, 1961. The Delhi High Court’s main reason was that the IT Act, 1961 was a special legislation vis-à-vis the RTI Act, 2005 and provisions of former would prevail in matters relating to disclosure of information of an assessee. The High Court concluded that information relating to an assessee can only be disclosed by the authorities prescribed under Section 138 of IT Act, 1961 and CIC does not have jurisdiction to direct furnishing of information of an assessee. 

Brief Facts 

PM Cares Fund is a charitable fund which was established to provide relief to the public during COVID-19 and other similar emergencies. The Income Tax Department had granted exemption to PM Cares Fund under Section 80G of the IT Act, 1961 on 27.03.2020. The respondent wanted to know the exact procedure followed by the Income Tax Department in granting a swift approval to the PM Cares Fund and whether any rules or procedure were bypassed by the Income Tax Department in granting the approval. On 27.04.2022, the CIC via its order had directed that the respondent be provided copies of all the documents submitted by PM Cares Fund in its exemption application and copies of file notings approving the application. The Income Tax Department approached the Delhi High Court challenging the CIC’s order. 

The Income Tax Department’s primary contentions were that information of an assessee relating to income tax can only be sought under Section 138, IT Act, 1961 and not RTI Act, 2005. And that information sought by the respondent is exempt under Section 8(1)(j) of RTI Act, 2005, i.e., it is personal information, and further that CIC could not have directed disclosure of information without providing an opportunity of hearing to PM Cares Fund. (para 2-5)

The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the non-obstante clause in Section 22, RTI Act, 2005 ensures that it will have an over-riding effect over other statutes for the time being in force. Further that if there are two methods for obtaining information, there was no bar in seeking information under either of the methods. The respondent also argued that the bar of Section 8(1)(j) would not apply as the information sought is not personal information but there is an overriding public interest in disclosing the information. (para 6)    

Reasoning and Decision     

The Delhi High Court’s primary reasoning related to the ‘inconsistency’ between the IT Act, 1961 and RTI Act, 2005 due to non-obstante clauses contained in both the statutes. It is apposite to cite Section 138 in entirety to analyse the the Delhi High Court’s reasoning.

138. (1)(a) The Board or any other income-tax authority specified by it by a general or special order in this behalf may furnish or cause to be furnished to—

  (i) any officer, authority or body performing any functions under any law relating to the imposition of any tax, duty or cess, or to dealings in foreign exchange as defined in clause (n) of section 2 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999); or

 (ii) such officer, authority or body performing functions under any other law as the Central Government may, if in its opinion it is necessary so to do in the public interest, specify by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf,

any such information received or obtained by any income-tax authority in the performance of his functions under this Act, as may, in the opinion of the Board or other income-tax authority, be necessary for the purpose of enabling the officer, authority or body to perform his or its functions under that law.

(b) Where a person makes an application to the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner in the prescribed form48 for any information relating to any assessee received or obtained by any income-tax authority in the performance of his functions under this Act, the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do, furnish or cause to be furnished the information asked for and his decision in this behalf shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or any other law for the time being in force, the Central Government may, having regard to the practices and usages customary or any other relevant factors, by order notified in the Official Gazette, direct that no information or document shall be furnished or produced by a public servant in respect of such matters relating to such class of assessees or except to such authorities as may be specified in the order. (emphasis added)

The non-obstante clause of RTI Act, 2005, contained in Section 22, states as follows: 

The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), and any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. (emphasis added)

In my view, the Delhi High Court’s framing of the issue – non-obstante clauses in IT Act, 1961 and RTI Act, 2005 are inconsistent and seemingly in conflict with each other – is erroneous. The non-obstante clause of Section 138(2), IT Act, 1961 overrides only Section 138(1) while Section 22, RTI Act, 2005 overrides every other law for the time being in force. Section 138(2) empowers the Central Government, by an order notified in the Official Gazette, to circumscribe or prevent powers of officers to disclose information under Section 138(1). Section 138(2) cannot be read so say that IT Act, 1961 will override all other laws in matters relating to disclosure of information relating to an assessee. In fact, it is Section 22 of RTI Act, 2005 which states that it will override all other statutes. While both provisions use non-obstante clauses, their scope and effect is different and there is no direct conflict of the manner suggested by the High Court.   

By framing the issue as that of ‘conflict’ of two non-obstante clauses, the Delhi High Court then had to necessarily answer as to which Act would prevail. The High Court was of the opinion that IT Act, 1961 is a special legislation governing all provisions and laws relating to income tax and super tax in the country. While RTI Act, 2005 is a general legislation to enable citizens to exercise and enable their right to information. The High Court did not give too much importance to the dictum that latter legislation prevails over the earlier legislation. The High Court opined that the date on which statutes come into force cannot be the sole deciding factor in determining the application and overriding effect of a legislation, and that in its opinion it is more important that the special legislation, i.e., IT Act, 1961 should prevail over the general legislation, i.e., RTI Act, 2005. Which factors need to be accorded more importance is of course is the discretion of the judges. In this case, the High Court was of the view that the dictum of special legislation should prevail general legislation is of primary importance; the question though arises is: is it a straightforward answer that IT Act, 1961 is a special legislation and RTI Act, 2005 a general legislation? 

The Delhi High Court cited some precedents to this effect which have held that whether a statute is a general or special statute depends on the principal subject-matter and particular perspective. And a legislation can be a general legislation for one subject matter and a special legislation for others. For example – and as cited by the High Court in its judgment – in LIC v DJ Bahadur case, Supreme Court had observed that in matters of nationalisation of LIC the LIC Act is the principal legislation while in matters of employer-employee dispute, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1948 is the principal legislation. Applying this dictum, the High Court made a defensible conclusion that in matters relating to disclosure of information of assessees relating to income tax, IT Act, 1961 is the principal legislation while RTI Act, 2005 is the general legislation.

Finally, the Delhi High Court made another observation that, in my view, is not an accurate reading of Section 138. After noting that Section 138, IT Act, 1961 provides a special procedure for disclosure of information, the High Court observed: 

Applying the said analogy to the facts of the present case, Section 138(1)(b) of the IT Act which specifically states that information relating to an assessee can only be supplied subject to the satisfaction of Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, as the case may be, would prevail over Section 22 of the RTI Act. (emphasis added) (para 18) 

The inaccuracy of the Delhi High Court’s observation is in supplying the word ‘only’ to Section 138. It is trite that in tax jurisprudence, that provisions of a tax statute are to be construed strictly. And strict interpretation of provisions of a tax statute requires that a provision be read as is, without adding or subtracting any words from it. The Delhi High Court in adding the word ‘only’ to Section 138 (1)(b) departed from the doctrine of strict interpretation of tax statutes and for no good reason. The observation that a special legislation – IT Act, 1961 –  prevails over the general legislation – RTI Act, 2005 – cannot form basis of the conclusion that information can ‘only’ be provided under the special statute. A bare reading of Section 138 does not support the High Court’s interpretation.  

Conclusion 

The Delhi High Court’s observations in the impugned case are on shaky grounds. The only defensible part of the judgment is that a special statute prevails over a general statute, but as I argue that issue only arises because the High Court erred in framing the headline issue as that of conflict of non-obstante clauses, when the non-obstante clauses in question have differing scopes and do not necessarily clash. The result is that PM Cares Fund continues to enjoy a certain level of opaqueness that is, in my view, not in public interest. And for the meanwhile, Delhi High Court’s deficient reasoning has provided the opaqueness a convenient legal cover.

Tax Residency Certificate and Stakes in the Blackstone Case – II

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In the first part of this Article, I detailed Delhi High Court’s decision in the Blackstone case. This part focuses on the immediate and larger issues that are likely to be considered by the Supreme Court in its decision on the appeal against the Delhi High Court’s decision. The central issue in the appeal is likely to be the eligibility for tax benefits under a DTAA, and as one witnessed in the Azadi Bachao case, any legal opinion on the issue will navigate both domestic and international tax law.     

Interpretation of DTAAs

To begin with, DTAAs, a legislative instrument agreed to and signed by two contracting states, needs to be interpreted to decipher the agreement between the two sovereign states. The Delhi High Court had to contend with two issues relating to DTAA: whether Article 13 incorporated the concept of beneficial ownership and the conditions imposed by the LOB clause. With regards to the former, the High Court compared Article 13, as it stood at the relevant time, with other provisions of the DTAA, i.e., Articles 10, 11, and 12 which provide for taxation of dividends, interest, and royalties respectively. The High Court correctly pointed out that in India-Singapore DTAA the concept of beneficial ownership attracted taxation only qua Articles 10,11, and 12 which expressly provided for it and beneficial ownership cannot be read into Article 13 in the absence of any mention of the same in the latter. (para 61)    

The Delhi High Court was also unequivocal in its conclusion that the LOB clause included in Article 24A of the India-Singapore DTAA provides for an objective and not a subjective test. As per the LOB clause, only companies that are not shell companies can claim benefits of the India-Singapore DTAA and to establish if a company is not a shell company there is an expenditure test. The High Court observed that the audited financial statement of Blackstone Singapore and independent chartered accountant certificate established that the expenditure of the company is above the prescribed limit. The High Court rejected the Income Tax Department’s view that Blackstone Singapore was a shell company by observing that all expenditure incurred by it in Singapore, direct and indirect, will be considered an operational expense. The Income Tax Department’s attempt to bifurcate expenses into operational and other expenses was rejected. (para 70) 

In interpreting both Article 13 and LOB clause in Article 24A of the India-Singapore DTAA, the Delhi High Court adopted a good faith interpretation of the treaty. One could also suggest that a strict interpretation was adopted. Either way, it is the acceptable and welcome interpretive approach as it avoids reading into the DTAA phrases and expressions that are not expressly included in its text. Particularly, notable are the Delhi High Court’s observations that LOB clause incorporates an objective test. If the expenditure threshold is met and the expenses are verified, the Income Tax Department cannot form a subjective opinion that the expenses are not operational expenses.   

The interpretation of both the above provisions is likely to be tested before the Supreme Court. Though the Delhi High Court’s opinion stands on firm footing, it is difficult to ascertain how the Supreme Court will approach the same issues. 

Validity of TRCs and Relevance of Azadi Bachao Ratio 

From a domestic tax law perspective, an issue that needs determination is the mandate and requirements of Sections 90(4) and 90(5). As I’ve mentioned in the first part of this article, Section 90(4) states than an assessee, who is not a resident of India, is not entitled to claim any tax relief under DTAA unless it obtains a TRC from the country of residence. And Section 90(5) states that an assessee referred to in sub-section (4) shall provide such other documents and information, as may be prescribed. Both the sub-sections, in no manner, state that TRC is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to claim DTAA benefits. This interpretation is not only borne out by the bare text of the provisions, but also their legislative history. The Delhi High Court, like the Punjab and Haryana High Court, arrived at a correct conclusion that the legislative history of these provisions does not support the Income Tax Department’s argument that it can go behind the TRC issued by a contracting state.   

Further, the appeal will necessarily involve engagement with the Supreme Court’s ratio in Azadi Bachao case. The Azadi Bachao case settled various issues, the relevant portion of the ratio for the purpose of our discussion here are: under Section 119, IT Act, 1961, CBDT possesses the power to issue a Circular stating that TRC issued by Mauritius would be a sufficient evidence of the assessee’s residence status. While the Circular was issued in the context of India-Mauritius DTAA, there is no legal reason why a similar approach would be invalid in the context of India-Singapore DTAA. Especially, as the Delhi High Court noted, the Press Release of the Ministry of Finance issued in 2013 also adopted a similar position. And the Press Release described the general legal position and not in context of India-Mauritius DTAA.   

Nonetheless, the arguments about the scope and mandate of CBDT have reared their head often and will perhaps do so in the future. And the impugned appeal provides an opportunity to raise the issue about CBDT’s powers again. But we do need an understanding beyond the simple dictum that CBDT’s Circulars are binding on the Income Tax Department. If and to what extent do the assessing officers possesses the mandate to scrutinize returns and question the TRC still does not have a straightforward answer. Does CBDT Circular and Azadi Bachao case foreclose any possibility of an assessing officer questioning the TRC? The Supreme Court, in Azadi Bachao case, was categorical in its conclusion that the Circular No. 789 issued by CBDT – mandating acceptance of TRC issued by Mauritius – in reference to India-Mauritius DTAA was within the parameters of CBDT’s powers under Section 119, IT Act, 1961. And the said Circular did not crib, cabin or confine the powers of the assessing officers but only formulated ‘broad guidelines’ to be applied in assessment of assessees covered under the India-Mauritius DTAA.    

Both the above aspects in respect of domestic tax law, specifically IT Act, 1961 will likely be argued and examined in the impugned appeal. The nature and extent of their influence will only be known in due time. 

Way Forward 

Prima facie, there is little to suggest that the Delhi High Court’s view deviates from the accepted interpretation of the Azadi Bachao case and the guiding principles of tax treaty interpretation. Neither is the Delhi High Court’s understanding of legislative history of Section 90(4) and 90(5) incorrect. The Supreme Court can and may have other views. Irrespective of the outcome, the arguments advanced by both parties, the reasoning and approach of the Supreme Court and the outcome of the case will impact Indian tax jurisprudence in multiple ways.  

Tax Residency Certificate and Stakes in Blackstone Case – I

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In BlackStone case framed the following as the main issue for consideration: whether the Income Tax Department can go behind the tax residency certificate (‘TRC’) issued by another jurisdiction and issue a re-assessment notice under Section 147, IT Act, 1961 to determine the residence status, treaty eligibility and legal ownership. In this article, I will focus only on the issue of TRC. In the first part of this article, I provide a detailed explanation of the case and in the second part I highlight the stakes involved in the case given that the Supreme Court has decided to hear an appeal against the Delhi High Court’s judgment.  

Facts 

Blackstone Capital Partners (Singapore) VI FDI Three Pte. Ltd (‘Blackstone Singapore’) acquired equity shares of Agile Electric Sub Assembly Private Limited, a company incorporated in India in two tranches on 16.08.2013 and 31.10.2013. In the Assessment Year 2016-17, Blackstone Singapore sold all the equity shares. In its return of the income, Blackstone Singapore claimed that the capital gains earned by it on sale of shares were not taxable in India as per Article 13(4) of the India-Singapore DTAA.  The import of Article 13(4) was that capital gains earned by a resident of India or Singapore were taxable only in its resident state. Since Blackstone Singapore possessed a TRC issued by Singapore, it claimed tax exemption in India on its capital gains under the India-Singapore DTAA. On 08.10.2016, Blackstone Singapore’s return was processed with no demand by the Indian Income Tax Department. 

On 31.03.2021 a notice was issued to Blackstone Singapore under Section 148, IT Act, 1961 (reassessment notice). On 28.04.2021 Blackstone Singapore filed its return and requested reasons for re-opening the assessment. Eight months later, on 02.12.2021 Blackstone Singapore was provided reasons for re-opening the case. The primary reason, as per the Income Tax Department, was that Blackstone Singapore was part of US-based management group and it appeared that the source of funds and management of affairs of Blackstone Singapore was from US. And there was an apprehension that Blackstone Singapore was not the beneficial owner of the transaction. The Income Tax Department was claiming that beneficial owner of the shares was Blackstone US, with Blackstone Singapore being a conduit/shell company incorporated to avail tax benefits under the India-Singapore DTAA.  

Blackstone Claims Tax Exemption 

Blackstone Singapore’s case for tax exemption of capital gains was predicated on the following: 

First, Blackstone claimed that it was entitled to claim tax exemption under Article 13(4) of the India-Singapore DTAA. Article 13(4) of the India-Singapore DTAA originally stated that the gains derived by resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of any property other than those mentioned in paragraphs 1,2 and 3 of this Article shall be taxable only in that State. In simple terms it meant that capital gains of a resident of Singapore or India were taxable only in its resident state. Since Blackstone possessed a valid TRC from Singapore, it was as per Article 13(4), not liable to pay tax in India, but in the country of its residence. 

Second, Blackstone relied on the chequered history of the India-Mauritius DTAA. In reference to the India-Mauritius DTAA, CBDT had issued a Circular No. 789 on 13.04.2000 stating if a TRC was issued by the Mauritian authorities, it would constitute sufficient evidence for accepting the status of residence as well as beneficial ownership for applying the DTAA accordingly. And the validity of the said Circular was upheld by the Supreme Court in the Azadi Bachao case and its ratio subsequently approved in the Vodafone case. Analogously, Blackstone Singapore claimed that TRC issued by Singapore should be sufficient to qualify for tax benefits under the India-Singapore DTAA.  

Third, Blackstone cited a Press Release issued by the Ministry of Finance on 01.03.2013 regarding TRC. The Press Release categorically stated that the TRC produced by a resident of a contracting state will be accepted by the Indian Income Tax Department for the purpose that he is a resident of that contracting state and that the income tax authorities in India will not go behind that certificate to question the resident status. The income tax authorities had no option but to accept the validity of TRC issued by Singapore.         

Fourth, Blackstone, to rebut allegations that it was not the beneficial owner or was a shell company in Singapore, argued that it fulfilled the requirements incorporated in the India-Singapore DTAA. Article 3 of the Third Protocol of India-Singapore DTAA added Article 24A in the DTAA w.e.f 01.04.2017. Article 24A contains a detailed LOB clause and as per one of its conditions the resident of one of the Contracting States is prevented from claiming the benefits of DTAA if its annual expenditure on operations in that State was less than Rs 50,00,000 in the immediately preceding period of 24 months from the date the gains arise. In the expenditure was below the prescribed, it was presumed that the company was shell/conduit company. Blackstone Singapore argued that since its expenditure for running the Singapore company was above the prescribed threshold it cannot be considered a shell company and denied treaty benefits. 

Income Tax Department Defends its Interpretation of the Treaty  

First, the Income Tax Department claimed that the management and funding of Blackstone Singapore was in US and not Singapore. And that the ultimate holding company was in US, and Blackstone Singapore entity was used as a conduit since the India-US DTAA did not provide capital gains exemption. The filings of Blackstone Group before SEC, US were used to underline the control of Blackstone, US over Blackstone, Singapore. Further, the Income Tax Department argued that Blackstone, Singapore had a paid-up capital of US $1 and it was hard to believe that it had independently decided to acquire assets worth US $53 million and in two years made profits of US $55 million. 

Second, the Income Tax Department argued that Blackstone Singapore does not meet the LOB test since the expenditure mentioned in the LOB clause is ‘operations expenditure’ and not just an ‘accounting entry’. The Income Tax Department argued that a major part of Blackstone’s expenses were merely management expenses paid to a group company which were nothing more than an accounting entry and did not constitute real expenses.  

Third, the Income Tax Department argued that as per Section 90(4) of the IT Act, 1961, TRC was a ‘necessary’ but not a ‘sufficient’ condition to claim DTAA benefits. And that a TRC is only binding when a court or authority makes an inquiry into it and makes an independent decision. Though a plain reading of Section 90(4) does not support this interpretation.  

Fourth, an extension of the third argument, it was argued that the Press Release of 2013, Supreme Court’s decision in Azadi Bachao case and the CBDT Circulars that were considered in Azadi Bachao case were issued in the context of India-Mauritius DTAA and were not applicable to India-Singapore DTAA. Further, it was contended that Azadi Bachao case did not circumscribe the jurisdiction of an assessing officer in individual cases. And that CBDT Circulars only provide ‘general’ instructions and cannot interfere with quasi-judicial powers of the assessing officers.        

Delhi High Court Favors Blackstone 

On the issue of TRC, the findings of the Delhi High Court were categorically in favor of Blackstone Singapore. The High Court observed that: 

… the entire attempt of the respondent in seeking to question the TRC is wholly contrary to the Government of India’s repeated assurances to foreign investors by way of CBDT Circulars as well as press releases and legislative amendments and decisions of the Courts … (para 71)

The Delhi High Court noted that the actions of the Income Tax Department in questioning the TRCs were contrary to Azadi Bachao, Vodafone cases and other cases. 

On the issue of whether Section 90(4) provides that TRC is a necessary or a sufficient condition to claim DTAA benefits, the Delhi High Court relied on legislative history of Section 90(5) instead of the bare text of Section 90(5). To begin with, Section 90(4) is worded in negative terms and does not use either the word ‘sufficient’ or ‘necessary’. Section 90(4) states that:

            An assessee, not being a resident, to whom an agreement referred to in sub-section (1) applies, shall not be entitled to claim any relief under such agreement unless a certificate of his being a resident in any country outside India or specified territory outside India, as the case may be, is obtained by him from the Government of that country or specified territory. 

Clearly, mere reliance on the bare text of Section 90(4) does not throw sufficient light on whether the TRC constitutes a sufficient evidence of residence in a contracting state. The Delhi High Court referred to Finance Bill, 2013 which proposed to introduce Section 90(5). The proposed draft text of Section 90(5) as contained in Finance Bill, 2013 was: 

The certificate of being a resident in a country outside India or specified territory outside India, as the case may be, referred to in sub-section (4), shall be necessary but not a sufficient condition for claiming any relief under the agreement referred to therein.” 

However, immediately after introduction of the Finance Bill, 2013, the Ministry of Finance issued a clarification via a Press Release clearly stating that a TRC issued by a contracting state would constitute as sufficient evidence of its residence, and the Delhi High Court clarified that the clarification was not Mauritius specific. Since the proposed Section 90(5) was not implemented by the Finance Act, 2013, the Delhi High Court refused to accept the Income Tax Department’s argument that TRC is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to claim DTAA benefits. The High Court also relied on similar reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the Serco Bpo Pvt Ltd case.  

Accordingly, the Delhi High Court concluded that:

Consequently, the TRC is statutorily the only evidence required to be eligible for the benefit under the DTAA and the respondent’s attempt to question and go behind the TRC is wholly contrary to the Government of India’s consistent policy and repeated assurances to Foreign Investors. In fact, the IRAS has granted the petitioner the TRC after a detailed analysis of the documents, and the Indian Revenue authorities cannot disregard the same as doing the same would be contrary to international law. (para 91) 

Aftermath

The Income Tax Department, unsurprisingly appealed against the Delhi High Court’s decision and the Supreme Court, also unsurprisingly, has stayed the decision. The Supreme Court will, in all likelihood, have a final say on the matter; though in India, the Revenue Department wishes to be final authority on all tax matters. Nonetheless, there are important legal and policy questions that are stake in this case. Based on my understanding, I detail and highlight the stakes involved in the second part of this article. 

Leg History of Sec 90(4) & 90(5), IT Act, 1961

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The infographic below is a snapshot of the legislative history of Section 90(4) and 90(5) of IT Act, 1961. It provides a summary view of the Income Tax Department’s attempt to include a stringent condition for a non-resident assessee to claim DTAA benefits. The condition, simply stated, was that a TRC issued by a contracting state is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to claim DTAA benefits. It was supposed to allow the Indian income tax authorities to go behind the TRC issued by another state.

The importance and relevance of the legislative history of the aforesaid provisions can be better understood by reading this and this in the wake of Delhi High Court’s decision involving tax benefits under the India-Singapore DTAA. An appeal against the decision is pending before the Supreme Court at the time of publishing this infographic.

Fee Attributable to Transmission of Non-Live Feed Not Royalty: Delhi HC

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The Delhi High Court in a recent decision[1] held that the fee attributable to ‘non-live’ feed cannot be categorized as royalty under Section 9(1)(vi) of the IT Act, 1961. The High Court relied on the observations in Delhi Race Club case to support its conclusions. 

Facts 

The assessee entered into a tripartite agreement – titled as the ‘Novation Agreement’ – with ESS Singapore and Star India Private Limited by way of which various existing agreements regulating distribution of channels, ads, etc. came to be novated. For the Assessment Year 2015-16, the assessee offered an amount of Rs 65,44,67,199/- as royalty income subject to tax under Section 9(1)(vi) of the IT Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer questioned the assessee as to why out of total income of Rs 1181.63 crores only Rs 65,44,67,199/- was offered for taxation as royalty. The assessee replied that only the income attributable to ‘non-live’ feed was taxable as royalty while the income attributable to ‘live’ feed would not fall within the ambit of royalty as contemplated under Section 9(1)(vi). 

The ITAT noted that in the agreement, under the head of ‘consideration’ the parties acknowledge and agree that 95% of the commercial fee is attributable to live feed and 5% to the non-live feed. The ITAT concluded that the fee from non-live feed would not be covered within the ambit of royalty. The ITAT’s view was assailed by the Revenue before the Delhi High Court. 

Arguments and Decision 

The arguments were straightforward with the Revenue contending that the fee from ‘non-live feed’ was covered within the scope of royalty under Explanation 2 of Section 9(1)(vi) of the IT Act, 1961.  The assessee contended otherwise, primarily relying on, Delhi Race Club case ratio. 

The Delhi High Court cited the ratio of Delhi Race Club case where it was held that live telecast/broadcast is not a work under Section 2(y) of the Copyright Act and thus a live telecast/broadcast would have no copyright. The Delhi High Court in the Delhi Race Club case held that copyright and broadcast reproduction rights are two separate rights and the two rights though akin are nevertheless separate and distinct. Expressing its concurrence with the ratio of Delhi Race Club case, the Delhi High Court in the impugned case observed that: 

In light of the unequivocal conclusions as expressed by the Division Bench in Delhi Race Club and with which we concur, we find that once the Court came to the conclusion that a live telecast would not fall within the ambit of the expression „work‟, it would be wholly erroneous to hold that the income derived by the assessee in respect of „live feed‟ would fall within clause (v) of Explanation 2 to S.9(1)(vi) of the Act. (para 10)

The Delhi High Court in the impugned case was correct and prudently followed the well-reasoned ratio of Delhi Race Club case. The Revenue in an attempt to bring fee from ‘live’ feed within the ambit of royatly, in the impugned case, also sought to place assessee’s income under Explanation 6 to Section 9(1)(vi) which states as follows: 

            … the expression “process” includes and shall be deemed to have always included transmission by satellite (including uplinking, amplification, conversion or down-linking of any signal), cable, optic fibre or by any other similar technology, whether or not such process is secret;

The Delhi High Court correctly rejected the Revenue’s argument noting that Explanation hinges on transmission being via satellite while in the impugned case the transmission happened via SIPL. 

Conclusion 

The Delhi High Court made additional observations on the relationship of international tax law and domestic law and how the former overrides the later. (paras 15-17) From the judgment and the arguments reproduced in the judgment, the context and relevance of international tax law is not entirely clear. Most likely, the High Court was trying to underline that the definition of royalty under the IT Act, 1961 can be amended by the legislature, but if the definition of royalty in the applicable Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement is more beneficial to the assessee it would apply. Or that the definition in an international agreement cannot be negated via domestic actions alone. Nonetheless, the relevance of the High Court’s observations on international tax law are not immediately apparent.   

[1] The Commissioner of Income Tax, International Taxation v Fox Network Group Singapore PTE Ltd TS-28-HC-2024DEL

Section 16, CGST Act is Constitutional: Kerala HC

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The Kerala High Court recently[1] dismissed a taxpayer’s challenge that Section 16(2)(c) and Rule 36(4) of CGST Rules, 2017 were violative of Article 14 and unconstitutional. The High Court ruled that the taxpayer’s challenge was vague, and the impugned provisions did not suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness and were not unconstitutional.   

Facts 

The brief facts of the case are: taxpayer was denied ITC under the CGST and SGST Acts on the ground of difference in GSTR 2A and GSTR 3B returns. The Assessing authority levied interest, penalty, and initiated recovery proceedings against the taxpayer. The taxpayer challenged the assessment order and the constitutional validity of Section 16(2)(c) and Rule 36(4).

Section 16(2)(c) states that no registered person shall be entitled to ITC in respect of any supply of goods or services unless the tax charged in respect of such supply has been actually paid to the Government either in cash or through utilization of ITC admissible in respect of such supply. Rule 36(4) states that ITC to be availed by a registered person in respect of invoices or debit notes the details of which have not been furnished by suppliers in GSTR-1 shall not exceed 5% of eligible ITC available in respect of invoices or debit notes the details of which have been furnished by the suppliers. 

Since the judgment didn’t mention in detail the arguments of the parties, it is difficult to decipher the exact ground on which the constitutional challenge was made by the taxpayer. One can only glean the arguments from the Kerala High Court’s reasoning and its conclusion.  

Decision 

The Kerala High Court articulated four reasons to dismiss the taxpayer’s challenge. 

First, the High Court noted that ‘it is settled’ that ITC is a benefit/concession and not a right extended to a dealer. And that ITC can only be claimed by a taxpayer as per the conditions prescribed in the statute. (para 5) And that the State in exercise of its rule making powers can provide additional conditions for availing the concession. This view aligns with recent decisions wherein ITC has been labelled as a concession thereby providing the State ample, if not infinite space, to impose conditions on taxpayers before they can successfully claim ITC.  

Second, the High Court relied on the doctrine of deference to tax statutes, encoded in Indian tax jurisprudence and is dutifully invoked by Courts without scrutinizing the merits of the doctrine. In the impugned case, the High Court noted there was need for judicial restraint before interfering with tax statutes unless the statute was manifestly unjust or glaringly unconstitutional. (para 10)

Third, the High Court rejected the taxpayer’s claims that Section 16(2)(c) and Rule 36(4) of CGST Rules, 2017 were violative of Article 14 on the ground that the argument was vague. The High Court further noted that neither did the provisions discriminate between the purchaser and seller nor were they manifestly arbitrary and were not contrary to Article 14. 

Fourth, the High Court relied on the facts to observe that the taxpayer did not produce tax invoice as required by Section 16 despite various opportunities, nor did it appear for personal hearing and equally did not discharge the burden on a dealer as per Section 155, CGST Act, 2017. Section 155 states that where any person claims that he is eligible for ITC, the burden of proving such claim shall lie on such person. Since the taxpayer did not meet the prescribed conditions under Section 16 and did not provide the documents, the High Court was correct in holding that the taxpayer did not discharge the burden under Section 155. 

Conclusion 

The Kerala High Court’s decision is defensible and cogent when it invokes Section 155 and non-fulfilment of the conditions of Section 16. However, the High Court is on tricky ground when it claims that ‘it is settled’ ITC is a concession. Undoubtedly, some of recent decisions have taken a similar view, but it is ordinarily incumbent on a Court to acknowledge the divergent interpretations and that ITC has not always been interpreted to be a concession. Similarly, the invocation of doctrine of deference to tax statutes, while well-established, needs to be scrutinized as to its relevance if not its merits in constitutional challenges to tax statutes. Surely, there is room to suggest that the doctrine is not holy grail in all constitutional challenges to tax statutes. The High Court was remiss in not paying adequate attention to the aforementioned facets of the reasoning.               

[1] Nahasshukoor v Asst Commr, Second Circle, SGST, Colletorate 2023:KER:69725. 

Jharkhand HC Allows State Authorities to Continue Proceedings, Rejects DGGI’S Arguments on Nationwide Fake ITC Fraud

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The Jharkhand High Court recently adjudicated a writ petition where the petitioner had argued that only the authority which had initiated the entire process of investigation can complete the modalities and any subsequent actions by other authorities need to be quashed. The High Court interpreted Section 6, CGST Act, 2017 and the relevant notifications to adjudicate in favor of the petitioner. 

Facts 

The petitioner was the proprietor of M/s Manish Trading, Ranchi carrying on the business of iron, steel and cement. An inspection was carried out by the Intelligence Branch of the Jharkkhand State GST Dept and subsequently the petitioner was made to make certain deposits. Therafter, the Preventive Branch of CGST, Ranchi issued a notice to the petitioner directing reversal of ITC due to purchases made from certain non-existent entities. It was followed by a search carried out by DGGI, Central Tax which seized certain items from the petitioner and prepared a Panchnama to that effect. The petitioner was sent various summons. 

The petitioner approached the Jharkhand High Court with the prayer that it had been issued summons by 3 different authorities and that only the authority which had initiated the proceeding prior in point in time shall be authorized to carry out the proceedings. The petitioner relied on the Notification and subsequent clarificationissued by CBIC, wherein the latter stated that: 

            It is accordingly clarified that the officers of both Central tax and State tax authorized to initiate intelligence based enforcement action on the entire taxpayer’s base irrespective of the administrative assignment of the taxpayer to any authority. The authority which initiates such action is empowered to complete the entire process of investigation, issuance of SCN, adjudication, recovery, filing of appeal etc. arising out of such action. (para 3)

The petitioner elaborated that the said Notification had been issued under Section 6(2)(b), CGST Act, 2017 and that it was amply clear that the investigation had been initiated by inspecting team of State GST and only it should be authorized to carry forward the proceedings. 

The respondents including DGGI argued that the investigation were initiated by them as part of the investigations against the fake invoice gangs based in Noida. The respondents argued that the investigations had revealed various fake entities that were involved in claiming fraudulent ITC and the petitioner was part of a large scale fraud spread across various States. And that DGGI was better suited to conduct the investigation since it had an all India jurisdiction and normally State GST transfers such cases to DGGI. 

DGGI’s argument was thus two-fold: not only did it initiate the investigation but also it was more competent to handle the investigation since the case had inter-State ramifications. 

Decision 

The Jharkhand High Court noted that Section 6(2)(b) and the clarification issued under it made it amply clear that the chain of a particular event and the investigation carried out at behest of the Department are interrelated. The High Court observed that even if it accepted that the DGGI initiated an independent investigation based on information received in Noida:

… in that event also, we are at loss to say that the DGGI is raising a question about credibility and competence of the State GST Authorities, in carrying out the investigation concerning wrong/inadmissible availment of Input Tax Credit, inasmuch as, the officers of the DGGI does not enjoy any special power or privilege in comparison with the officers of the State GST Authorities. (para 14) 

Based on the above, the Jharkhand High Court concluded that since the investigation by State authorities were prior in time, including the search and seizure operation and since all proceedings are inter-related, the State authorities shall continue with the proceedings. 

Conclusion 

The impugned decision reveals the administrative complexity of a nationwide dual levy. Empowering officials both the Central and State level to administer a single tax in India is unprecedented and some administrative tensions are bound to arise. And this isn’t the first nor the last instance of jurisdictional tussles. The Jharkhand High Court did well to rely only on the relevant statutory provisions and notifications/clarifications to arrive at its decision. Whether it is the best decision from an administrative standpoint is not easy to tell. At least not yet.  

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