Delhi High Court

Service Charge, its Similarity with Tax, and a ‘Double Whammy’ for Consumers: Some Thoughts

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Introduction 

The Delhi High Court (‘High Court’) recently ruled that levy of mandatory service charge by restaurants violates customer rights. The High Court’s reasoning, anchored in consumer protection laws, termed a mandatory service charge as deceptive and misleading for consumers. The High Court also made a few casual references to tax laws. For example, the High Court took umbrage at the nomenclature of ‘service charge’ and its potential to confuse customers with a tax levied by the Government. There is merit to the High Court’s observation, but service charge and tax have a deeper connection that is only superficially referred to in the judgment. In this article, I try to scratch the surface a bit deeper.  

I elaborate on two potential misgivings about service charge that the High Court’s judgment may entrench: 

First, the High Court noted that addition of service charge below the cost of food followed by levy of GST in the bill, created a ‘double whammy’ for the customers. I argue that restaurants by adding service charge before calculating GST were adhering to the mandate under CGST Act, 2017. In complying with GST laws, restaurants seem to have tripped over the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Unless there is a change in any of the two laws, restaurants are now faced with the challenge of squaring a circle.  

Second, the High Court’s view that service charge can be confused for a tax prompted it to recommend that a change in nomenclature may be worth exploring. The High Court recommended that the Central Consumer Protection Authority (‘CCPA’) can permit restaurants to levy ‘tip’, ‘gratuity’, or ‘fund’ on a voluntary basis. The nomenclature issue was two-fold: first, service charge per being mistaken for a tax by customers; second, use of abbreviations by restaurants – such as ‘charge’, ‘VSC’, ‘SER’ – which further misled the customers if the levy was a mandatory levy by the State or restaurants. I query whether ‘confusion’ is the touchstone to determine if a levy by private entity should be disallowed or is its perceived mandatory nature?  

GST on Food Cost + Service Charge 

The High Court noted in its judgment that: 

Moreover, when the bills of establishments are generated, it is noticed that the service charge is added right below the total amount of the cost of the food, followed by GST and taxes. For any consumer who does not examine the bill thoroughly, the impression given is that the service charge is a component of tax; (para 122)

The High Court’s above observation hints at two things: 

one, the restaurants are trying to inflate the cost of food bill by calculating GST on the cumulative of food bill and service charge;  

second, the mention of service charge just before GST creates a confusion that the former is a tax. 

Let me examine the first implication in this section.  

Section 15(2)(c), CGST Act, 2017 states that the value of supply of goods or services or both shall include:

incidental expenses, including commission and packing, charged by the supplier to the recipient of a supply and any amount charged for anything done by the supplier in respect of the supply of goods or services or both at the time of, or before delivery of goods or supply of services; (emphasis added)

Thus, if a restaurant was adding service charge to the food bill before computing GST, it was adhering to the mandate of GST law and not trying to ‘inflate’ the bill on its own accord. Once a restaurant decides to levy any additional charge including packing charges, etc., then as per Section 15(2)(c) it needs to be added to the total cost in a bill before computing GST. Adding all the ancillary costs ensures that the base value for calculating GST is as high as possible. Enhancing underlying value of the supply is a statutory policy aimed to enhance revenue collections, and leaves business entities such as restaurants no option to exclude charges such as service charge from the cost. One could question the statutory policy, but I doubt restaurants at fault for adding service charge to the food cost before computing GST.   

In adding the service charge to food cost, as per the mandate of CGST Act, 2017, restaurants though seem to have tripped over the consumer protection law. How to ensure compliance with both? The High Court has offered a suggestion that service charge could be renamed to something that cannot be confused with a tax, though its payment should remain voluntary.    

Service Charge Can be Confused With Tax 

The High Court, as noted above, was concerned about mention of service charge just above GST in the restaurant bill and its potential to confuse customers former with a tax. The High Court also noted that:     

In some cases, service charge is being confused with service tax or a mandatory tax imposed by the government. In fact, for the consumers, the collection of service charge is proving to be a double whammy i.e., they are forced to pay service tax and GST on the service charge as well. This position cannot be ignored by the Court. (para 123)

Latter part of the High Court’s judgment, of course, is a bit inaccurate. Service tax has been subsumed by GST since July 2017. Also, payment of GST on service charge is not a ‘double whammy’ as the High Court observes. It is, as noted above, payment of GST as per statutory mandate. It is simply, a ‘whammy’ as inclusion of service charge in value of supply though prejudices the taxpayer, is not qualitatively dissimilar from inclusion of any charges that suppliers compulsorily collect from their recipients.  

The first part of the observation points out that service charge can be confused with a tax by consumers who may think they have no option but to pay it, may be misled into paying a private compulsory levy. The misleading part is on two counts, as per the High Court. 

First, the mention of service charge just above GST. This can be corrected by tinkering billing software and doesn’t seem like a substantive issue that it beyond correction. One could perhaps mandate restaurants to specifically mention in the bill itself that service charge is discretionary and not a levy by the State.    

Second, is the phrase ‘service charge’ itself, which gives consumers the impression that it is a tax. But will a service charge by any other name taste just as bitter? Perhaps. 

Even if the CCPA permits restaurants to rename service charge to let us say a ‘tip’, it would have to be on a voluntary basis. Technically, as per CCPA guidelines, service charge was discretionary even before the Delhi High Court’s judgment. And if CCPA permits levy of ‘tip’, we would enter similar issues of restaurants arguing that the ‘tips’ are voluntary and customers can request it to be waived off while customers claiming that the voluntary nature is only a ruse. Restaurants effectively collect ‘tip’ as if it’s a mandatory charge. Equally, GST will have to levied on food cost and ‘tip’, if paid. Thus, the ‘double whammy’ may persist. 

Can consumers confuse a ‘tip’ with a ‘tax’? Well, ideally, they should not confuse a service charge with a tax either. Not after July 2017, since the terms service charge and GST are not eerily similar. However, one should not take the view of a tax professional but deploy the standard of an average reasonable consumer. It is difficult to predict with mathematical certitude, but a ‘tip’ or ‘gratuity’ seems like a relatively less confusing option. If CCPA can mandate that no restaurants cannot use abbreviations or alternate names which can lead to confusion as in the case of service charge. There should be one voluntary levy and its name uniform across all restaurants.  

Finally, I’m prompted to ask a question: do we mistake any other levy by private entity as a tax? Is there any comparable example? 

There have been instances of conmen masquerading as tax officers, and fooling people into paying money, but I cannot think of a comparable levy where an average person has been confused that the money is not being collected by the State, but a private entity. Perhaps some people were confused if the maintenance fee paid to their resident associations was a State levy, but the confusion doesn’t seem as widespread as for service charge. The confusion seems a rather peculiar and unique problem to service charge. And one that may require an innovative solution. Though, equally possibly, restaurants may eschew the path of levying or collecting any ‘tip’ and may simply raise prices of food to compensate. Wait and watch, I guess.  

Powers of Arrest under CGST Act, 2017 and Customs Act, 1962: Constitutionality and their Scope

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The Supreme Court in a recent judgment upheld the constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in Customs Act, 1962 and CGST Act, 2017. The Court also elaborated on the scope of arrest powers under CGST Act, 2017 and safeguards applicable to an arrestee. The judgment reiterates some well-established principles and clarifies the law on a few uncertain issues. In this article, I examine the judgment in 3 parts: first, the import of Om Prakash judgment and Court’s opinion on arrest powers under Customs Act ,1962; second, the issue of constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in CGST Act, 2017, and third, the scope and contours of arrest-related powers under GST laws along with a comment on Justice Bela Trivedi’s concurring opinion and its possible implication. 

Part I: Om Prakash Judgment and Customs Act, 1962 

Om Prakash Judgment 

In Om Prakash judgment, the Supreme Court heard two matters relating to Customs Act, 1962 and Central Excise Act, 1944. The issue in both matters was that all offences under both the statutes are non-cognizable, but are they bailable? The Court held that while the offences were non-cognizable, they were bailable. The Court referred to relevant provisions of the CrPC, 1973 and statutes in question to support its conclusion. For example, the Court referred to Section 9A, Central Excise Act, 1944 and held that the legislative intent is recovery of dues and not punish individuals who contravene the statutory provisions. And the scheme of CrPC also suggests that even non-cognizable offences are bailable, unless specifically provided. 

The Supreme Court in Om Prakash judgment also clarified that even though customs and excise officers had been conferred with powers of arrest, their powers were not beyond that of a police officer. And for non-cognizable offences, the officers under both statutes had to seek warrant from the Magistrate under Sec 41, CrPC, 1973.  

Amendments to Customs Act, 1962 

Section 104, Customs Act, 1962 was amended in 2012, 2013, and 2019 to modify and to some extent circumvent the application of Om Prakash judgment. Supreme Court’s insistence on tax officers seeking Magistrate’s permission before making an arrest was sought both – acknowledged and modified via amendments to the Customs Act, 1962. To begin with, Customs Act, 1962 bifurcated offences into two clear categories: cognizable and non-cognizable and the amended provisions clearly specified which offences were bailable or non-bailable. These amendments which were the subject of challenge in the impugned case. 

The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and held that petitioner’s reliance on Om Prakash judgment was incorrect. But were the pre-conditions for arrest in Customs Act, 1962 sufficient to safeguard liberty? Were there sufficient safeguards against arbitrary arrest to protect the constitutional guaranteed liberties? 

The Supreme Court clarified that the safeguards contained in Sections 41-A, 41-D, 50A, and 55A of CrPC shall be applicable to arrests made by customs officers under the Customs Act, 1962. The arrestee would have to informed about grounds of arrest, the arresting officer should be clearly identifiable through a badge being some of the protections available to an arrestee. Court added that mandating that said safeguards of CrPC shall apply to arrests by customs officers ‘do not in any way fall foul of or repudiate the provisions of the Customs Act. They complement the provisions of the Customs Act and in a way ensure better regulation, ensuring due compliance with the statutory conditions of making an arrest.’ (para 29) 

The Supreme Court further added that safeguards provided in Customs Act, 1962 were in itself also adequate to protect life and liberty of the persons who could be arrested under the statute. The Supreme Court noted that the threshold of ‘reason to believe’ was higher than the ‘mere suspicion’ threshold provided under Section 41, CrPC. And that the categorisation of offences under the Customs Act, 1962 wherein clear monetary thresholds were prescribed for non-cognizable and non-bailable offences enjoined the arresting officers to specifically state that the statutory thresholds for arrest have been satisfied. 

Finally, the Supreme Court read into Section 104, Customs Act, 1962 the requirement of informing the accused of grounds of arrest as it was in consonance with the mandate of Article 22 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court exhorted the officers to follow the mandate and guidelines laid down in Arvind Kejriwal casewhere it had specified parameters of a legal arrest in the context of Sec 19, PMLA, 2002. 

While dismissing the challenge to constitutionality of arrest-related provisions of Customs Act, 1962 the Supreme Court cautioned and underlined the need to prevent frustration of statutory and constitutional rights of the arrestee. 

Overall, the Supreme Court was of the view that pre-conditions for arrest specified in Customs Act, 1962 were not constitutional and safeguarded the liberties of an arrestee while obligating the custom officers to clearly specify that the conditions for arrest were satisfied. The Court also clarified that various safeguards prescribed in CrPC, 1973 were available to an arrestee during arrests made under Customs Act, 1962.  

Part II: Constitutionality of Arrest-Related Provisions in CGST Act, 2017

Article 246A Has a Broad Scope 

The constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in CGST Act, 2017 was previously upheld by the Delhi High Court in Dhruv Krishan Maggu case, as I mentioned elsewhere. The Supreme Court in impugned case also upheld the constitutionality of provisions.  The arguments against constitutionality of arrest-related provisions in CGST Act, 2017 were similar in the impugned case as they were before the Delhi High Court. The petitioner’s challenge was two-fold: first, Parliament can enact arrest related provisions only for subject matters contained in List I; second, powers relating to arrest, summon, etc. are not incidental to power to levy GST and thus arrest-related provisions cannot be enacted under Article 246A of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court’s rejection of petitioner’s argument on constitutionality was in the following words: 

The Parliament, under Article 246-A of the Constitution, has the power to make laws regarding GST and, as a necessary corollary, enact provisions against tax evasion. Article 246-A of the Constitution is a comprehensive provision and the doctrine of pith and substance applies. The impugned provisions lay down the power to summon and arrest, powers necessary for the effective levy and collection of GST. (para 75) 

Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of liberal interpretation of legislative entries, wherein courts have noted that the entries need to be interpreted liberally to include legislative powers on matters that are incidental and ancillary to the subject contained in legislative entry. Relying on above, the Supreme Court concluded that: 

Thus, a penalty or prosecution mechanism for the levy and collection of GST, and for checking its evasion, is a permissible exercise of legislative power. The GST Acts, in pith and substance, pertain to Article 246-A of the Constitution and the powers to summon, arrest and prosecute are ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect goods and services tax. In view of the aforesaid, the vires challenge to Sections 69 and 70 of the GST Acts must fail and is accordingly rejected. (para 75) 

The Supreme Court has correctly interpreted Article 246A in the impugned case. The Court liberally interpreted the scope of Article 246A in a previous case as well. The Court’s observations in the impugned case align with its previous interpretation wherein the Court has been clear that Article 246A needs to be interpreted liberally – akin to legislative entries – and include in its sweep legislative powers not merely to levy GST but ancillary powers relating to administration and ensuring compliance with GST laws. 

The nature of Article 246A is such that it needs to be interpreted akin to a legislative entry since there is no specific GST-related legislative entry in the Constitution. The power to enact GST laws and bifurcation of powers in relation to GST are both contained in Article 246A itself investing the provision with the unique character of a legislative entry as well as source of legislative power in relation to GST. 

Part III: Scope and Contours of Arrest Powers under CGST Act, 2017

Reason to Believe and Judicial Review  

The Supreme Court referred to the relevant provisions of GST laws to note that there is clear distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable offences under the GST laws. And bailable and non-bailable offences have also been bifurcated indicating the legislature’s cognizance of Om Prakash’s judgment. Further, the nature of offence is linked to the quantum of tax evaded. While the threshold to trigger arrest under CGST Act, 2017 is the Commissioner’s ‘reason to believe’ that an offence has been committed. In this respect, the Court emphasized that the Commissioner should refer to the material forming the basis of his finding regarding commission of the offence. And that an arrest cannot be made to investigate if an offence has been committed. The Supreme Court also pronounced a general caution about the need to exercise arrest powers judiciously. 

Another riddle of arrest that the Supreme Court tried to resolve was: whether a taxpayer can be arrested prior to completion of assessment? An assessment order quantifies the tax evasion or input tax credit wrongly availed. And since under CGST Act, 2017 the classification of whether an offence is cognizable or otherwise is typically dependent on the quantum of tax evaded, this is a crucial question. And there is merit in stating that the assessment order should precede an arrest since only then can the nature of offence by truly established. In MakeMyTrip case – decided under Finance Act, 1994, the Delhi High Court had mentioned that an arrest without an assessment order is akin to putting the horse before a cart. And in my view, in the absence of an assessment order, the Revenue’s allegation about the quantum of tax evaded is merely that: an allegation. And there is a tendency to inflate the amount of tax evaded in the absence of an assessment order. And an inflated amount tends to discourage courts from granting bail immediately and can even change the nature of an offence.  

However, the Supreme Court in the impugned case noted that it cannot lay down a ‘general and broad proposition’ that arrest powers cannot be exercised before issuance of assessment orders. (para 59) There may be cases, the Supreme Court noted where the Commissioner can state with a certain degree of certainty that an offence has been committed and in such cases arrest can be effectuated without completion of an assessment order. 

Here again, the Supreme Court stated that the CBIC’s guidelines on arrest will act as a safeguard alongwith its previous observations on arrest by custom officers, which will also apply to arrest under GST laws.      

The issue is that CBIC issued the guidelines on arrest in 2022, and yet the Supreme Court noted that there have been instances of officers forcing tax payments and arresting taxpayers. And though the arrests led to recovery of revenue, the element of coercion in tax payments cannot be overlooked. If the coercive element during arrest was present even despite the guidelines, then perhaps an even stronger pushback is needed against arbitrary and excessive use of arrest powers. While the Supreme Court has done well in stating that various safeguards will apply to arrests such as those enlisted in various provisions of CrPC and requirements of warrants from Magistrates in non-cognizable offences, even the numerous safeguards, at times, don’t seem enough to protect taxpayers.   

Justice Bela M. Trivedi’s Concurring Opinion  

Justice Bela M. Trivedi’s concurring opinion prima facie dilutes safeguards provided to taxpayers. The Revenue is likely to use her words to argue against any judicial interference and deny bail to accused. Justice Trivedi clearly noted that when legality of arrests under legislations such as GST are challenged, the courts must be extremely loath in exercising their power of judicial review. The courts must confine themselves to examine if the constitutional and statutory safeguards were met and not examine the adequacy of material on which the Commissioner formed a ‘reason to believe’ nor examine accuracy of facts. 

Justice Trivedi was emphatic that adequacy of material will not be subject to judicial review since an arrest may ordinarily happen at initial stages of an investigation. The phrase ‘reason to believe’, she observed, implies that the Commissioner has formed a prima facie opinion that the offence has been committed. Sufficiency or adequacy of material leading to formation of such belief will not be subject to judicial review at nascent stage of inquiry. The reason, as per Justice Trivedi was that ‘casual and frequent’ interference by courts could embolden the accused and frustrate the objects of special legislations such as GST laws. Limited judicial review powers for powers exercised on ‘reason to believe’ is a recurring theme in the jurisprudence on this standard. Reason to believe is a standard prescribed under IT Act, 1961 as well and courts have clear about not scrutinizing the material which forms the basis of the officer’s belief. 

However, some of Justice Trivedi’s observations seem at odds with the lead opinion which requires written statements about Commissioner’s belief, reference to material on basis of which the Commissioner forms the ‘reason to believe’ that lead to arrest. The majority opinion is also clear about power of judicial review in case of payment of tax under threat of arrest, power of courts to provide bail even if no FIR is filed, among other safeguards. Though in the leading opinion there is no clear opinion about scope of judicial review at preliminary or later stages of investigation.  

One possible manner to reconcile Justice Trivedi’s concurring opinion with the lead opinion is that her observations about narrow judicial review are only for preliminary stages of investigation. And that courts can exercise wider powers of judicial review at later stages of investigation. And that her view is only limited to ensuring that once the statutory safeguards have been met, courts should not stand in the way of officers to complete their inquiries and investigations else aims of the special laws such as GST may not be met. But her views are likely to be interpreted in multiple manners and the Revenue will certainly prefer her stance in matters relating to bail, not just at the initial stage of investigation but during the entire investigative process.   

Conclusion 

In the impugned case, the Supreme Court has advanced the jurisprudence on arrests under tax laws to some extent. But the observations are not in the context of any facts but in a case involving constitutional challenge. Thus, numerous safeguards that the Court has noted will apply to arrests made by customs officers or under GST Acts will be tested in future. Courts will have to ascertain if the arrests were made after fulfilment of the various safeguards, whether taxes were paid under threats of arrests, and other likely abuse of powers. The crucial test will be how and if to grant bail including anticipatory bail in matters where FIR is not registered. 

Finally, ‘reason to believe’ is admittedly a subjective standard. It is the opinion of an officer based on the material that comes to their notice. And courts while may examine the material, cannot replace their own subjective view with that of the officer. The test in such cases is if a reasonable person will arrive at the same conclusion based on the material as arrived at by the Commissioner. Thus, ‘reason to believe’ as a standard per se, limits scope of judicial review and confers immense discretion to the Commissioner to exercise powers of arrest. The jurisprudence on this issue – both under the IT Act, 1961 and GST laws – is evidently uneven due to the subjective nature of standard. And courts have not been able to form a clear and unambiguous stance on the scope of judicial review with respect to the ‘reason to believe’ standard. And this unevenness and relatively weak protection afforded to taxpayers is likely to continue in the future as well despite the Supreme Court’s lofty observations in the impugned case.             

            

CERC Is Exempt from GST: Delhi HC 

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The Delhi High Court in a recent judgment held that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (‘Commission’) were not liable to pay GST. The Revenue sought to levy on the fees and tariff that Commission received from the power utilities. The Revenue contended that functions performed by the Commission were ‘support services to electricity transmission and distribution services’ under a 2017 Notification issued by CBIC. The Revenue clarified that while no GST was payable on services provided via electricity transmission and distribution services, but support services rendered in the contest of electricity transmission and distribution were subject to GST. 

The Delhi High Court ruled in favor of the Commission. 

Facts and Arguments 

Commission receives various amounts under different heads such as filing fee, tariff fee, license fee, annual registration fee and miscellaneous fee. Commission took the stance that GST is not payable on such amounts since it is performing statutory functions under the Electricity Act, 2003 and is essentially not engaged in any trade or commerce. 

Revenue’s argument – derived from its Show Cause Notices (SCNs) – before the High Court was that the Commission awards licences for distribution and transmission of electricity and charges licence fees. Thus, the definition of business read with consideration under CGST Act, 2017 makes it amply clear that the Commission is supplying services. And any such amount received is taxable under GST.  

The Revenue relied on two major elements to strengthen its argument about liability of the Commission to pay GST: 

First, it relied on FAQs where the CBIC had clarified that Commission is not a Government for the purpose of GST but is appropriately classified as a regulatory agency. And any financial consideration received by the Commission for any service provided by it was liable to GST. Since the regulatory activities performed by the Commission for which it received money amounted to ‘business’, the Commission was classified as a business entity under the said FAQs.  

Second, and the Revenue reasoned this in its SCN as well: the Commission performs both regulatory and adjudicatory functions. That regulatory functions of the Commission fall outside the purview of quasi-judicial functions and while performing such functions it does not have the trappings of a full-fledged court. Further, the licence fee is received by the Commission for its regulatory functions. The Revenue argued that it is immaterial if the regulatory functions of the Commission are mandated by the statute or not, as long as consideration is received by it is for supply of, services it amounts to a supply for which GST is liable to be paid.   

The Commission questioned the Revenue’s bifurcation between its regulatory and adjudicatory functions and contended that discharge of statutory duties by it in public interest cannot be subjected to GST. 

Relevant Provisions of GST 

The High Court reproduced the relevant provisions of CGST Act, 2017 relating to supply, business, and consideration. 

Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 defines supply to include all forms of supply of goods or services or both made for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of business. 

Clause 2, Schedule III, CGST Act, 2017 states that services provided by a Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force will not be considered either as supply of goods or supply of services.  

Definitions of business and consideration under CGST Act, 2017 are as follows: 

―2. Definitions. —In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- 

      xxxx                    xxxx                    xxxx

(17) ―business‖ includes— 

(a) any trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any other similar activity, whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit; 

(b) any activity or transaction in connection with or incidental or ancillary to sub-clause (a); 

(c) any activity or transaction in the nature of sub-clause (a), whether or not there is volume, frequency, continuity or regularity of such transaction; 

(d) supply or acquisition of goods including capital goods and services in connection with commencement or closure of business; 

(e) provision by a club, association, society, or any such body (for a subscription or any other consideration) of the facilities or benefits to its members; 

(f) admission, for a consideration, of persons to any premises; 

(g) services supplied by a person as the holder of an office which has been accepted by him in the course or furtherance of his trade, profession or vocation; 

(h) activities of a race club including by way of totalisator or a license to book maker or activities of a licensed book maker in such club; and; 

(i) any activity or transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State Government or any local authority in which they are engaged as public authorities;‖ 

―2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— 

      xxxx                    xxxx                    xxxx

(31) ―consideration‖ in relation to the supply of goods or services or both includes—

(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government; 

(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government: 

Provided that a deposit given in respect of the supply of goods or services or both shall not be considered as payment made for such supply unless the supplier applies such deposit as consideration for the said supply;

The Delhi High Court examined the above two definitions in detail to reject Revenue’s contention. 

Decision 

The Delhi High Court noted that the Commission certainly acts as a tribunal, but the Revenue seeks to distinguish between the adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the Commission. The bifurcation warranted an examination of the definition of business and consideration in tandem with supply as defined under Section 7, CGST Act, 2017. 

As regards the definition of business, the Delhi High Court observed that clause (a) was the applicable clause. But the High Court observed that it cannot fathom how the power of regulation statutorily vested in the Commission can be included in any of the activities enlisted in the definition of business. Further, while clause (i) included activities undertaken by the Central or State Governments, the High Court noted that the Commission being a statutory body could not be equated with either of the two entities. 

As regards the definition of consideration, the Delhi High Court noted that it draws colour from the definition of business and it needs to be in relation or response to inducement of supply of goods or services. And here two elements need to be satisfied: first, the payment received must be outcome of an inducement of supply of goods or services; second, the supply must be in the course of or furtherance of business. 

As regards the first element, the High Court noted that: 

Suffice it to note that it was not even remotely sought to be contended by the respondents that the payments in the form of fee as received by Commissions were an outcome of an inducement to supply goods or services. (para 29) 

The above observation is not entirely accurate, since the SCN did mention that the Commission was providing support services for electricity transmission and distribution services. 

Nonetheless, even if one accepts that the money received by the Commission was in response to inducement of supply of goods or services, the said money must be in course or furtherance of business. To this end, the Delhi High Court observed that the functions performed by the Commission cannot be included in the term ‘business’ as defined under Section 2(17), CGST Act, 2017 and concluded: 

We find ourselves unable to accept, affirm or even fathom the conclusion that regulation of tariff, inter-State transmission of electricity or the issuance of license would be liable to be construed as activities undertaken or functions discharged in the furtherance of business. (para 33)

Finally, what about the bifurcation between regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the Commission? As per the Delhi High Court that the Electricity Act made no distinction between regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the Commission and that the statute had enjoined the Commission to regulate and administer electricity distribution. 

Conclusion 

The Delhi High Court’s decision stands on firm footing. And despite the CBIC and the GST Council having recommended otherwise, the High Court arrived at a clear and well-reasoned decision that the Commission was a tribunal. Even if it was accepted that the Commission received consideration in exercise of regulatory functions, it was not in course or furtherance of business. 

Finally, the Delhi High Court clarified that merely because was a heading: “Support services to electricity, gas and water distribution” which is placed under Group Heading 99863 of the CBIC Notification does not mean that the statutory exemption under Schedule III where services provided by a tribunal are excluded can be bypassed. The High Court helpfully clarified: 

What we seek to emphasise is that a notification would neither expand the scope of the parent entry nor can it be construed as taking away an exemption which stands granted under the CGST Act. There cannot possibly be even a cavil of doubt that a Schedule constitutes an integral part and component of the principal legislation. (para 36) 

Whether the Revenue will appeal against this decision will be revealed in due course, but for now, a well-reasoned decision of the Delhi High Court has clarified the GST implications of the Commission’s functions. 

Telecommunication Towers are Movable Property under GST: Delhi HC

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The Delhi High Court in a recent decision held that telecommunication towers are best characterized as movable property under Section 17(5), CGST Act, 2017 and are eligible for input tax credit (‘ITC’). 

Facts 

Indus Towers filed a writ petition impugning the showcause notice issued under Section 74, CGST Act, 2017. The notice issued a demand for tax along with interest and penalty. Indus Towers was engaged in the business of providing passive infrastructure services to telecommunication service providers. And the notices denied it ITC on inputs and input services used for setting up passive infrastructure on the ground. The Revenue’s argument was that the inputs were used in construction of telecommunication towers and fell in the ambit of Section 17(5)(d), CGST Act, 2017. The relevant portions of the provision are below to help us understand the issue better: 

17. Apportionment of credit and blocked credits. 

xxxxx

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of Section 16 and sub-section (1) of Section 18, input tax credit shall not be available in respect of the following, namely:-  

xxx

(d) goods or services or both received by a taxable person for construction of an immovable property (other than plant or machinery) on his own account including when such goods or services or both are used in the course or furtherance of business. 

Xxx

Explanation.- For the purposes of this Chapter and Chapter VI, the expression “plant and machinery” means apparatus, equipment, and machinery fixed to earth by foundation or structural support that are used for making outward supply of goods or services or both and includes such foundation and structural supports but excludes – 

  • land, building or any other civil structures; 
  • telecommunication towers; and 
  • pipelines laid outside the factory premises. 

Revenue’s reading of the above extracted provisions was: plant and machinery is not immovable property and is eligible for ITC, but clause (ii) of the Explanation expressly excludes telecommunication towers from the scope of plant and machinery. Thus, telecommunication towers should be considered as immovable property on which ITC is blocked. 

Petitioner’s Arguments 

Petitioner’s assertion was that telecommunication towers more appropriately classified as movable and not immovable property. Petitioner argued that telecommunication towers are movable items of essential equipment used in telecommunications. The towers can be dismantled at site and are capable of being moved. The concrete structure on which the towers are placed could be treated as the immovable element of the equipment, but all other parts can be easily moved and shifted to other locations. And since the underlying concrete structure is essentially for the purpose of providing stability to the towers, it would not detract from the basic characteristic of towers as being a movable property. 

Precedents and Generic Principles of Immovable Property 

The Delhi High Court cited two major precedents: Bharti Airtel and Vodafone Mobile Services cases. The Supreme Court in the former and the Delhi High Court in the latter had opined that telecom towers are intrinsically movable items and liable to be treated as inputs under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The Revenue’s contention was that both decisions should be distinguished. Under GST, the Explanation appended to Section 17, CGST Act, 2017 specifically excludes telecommunication towers from the ambit of plant and machinery, and thereby they should be treated as immovable property. The Delhi High Court relied on the above two precedents to disagree with the Revenue’s contentions.   

Additionally, the Delhi High Court cited a host of other principles enunciated in the context of TPA, 1882 where courts have tried to distinguish movable property from immovable property. Some of the principles to determine the nature of a property include: nature of annexation, object of annexation, intention of parties, functionality, permanency, and marketability test. 

The Delhi High Court cited Supreme Court’s observations in the Airtel case and how after applying the said tests, the Court had concluded that towers were not permanently annexed to the earth, but could be removed or relocated without causing any damage to them. And that the annexation of telecommunication towers to the earth was only to make them stable and wobble free. 

Expressing its complete agreement with Supreme Court’s observations, the Delhi High Court noted that the telecommunication towers were never erected with an intent of conferring permanency and their placement on concrete bases was only to help them overcome the vagaries of nature. The Revenue’s argument that telecommunication towers were immovable property, was as per the Delhi High Court, completely untenable.      

High Court Interprets Section 17(5) & the Explanation in a Curious Manner  

The Delhi High Court noted that telecommunication towers are not an immovable property in the first place and do not fall within the ambit of Section 17(5)(d). While the Explanation specifically excludes telecommunication towers from the ambit of the expression ‘plant and machinery’, the High Court observed that: 

… the specific exclusion of telecommunication towers from the scope of the phrase “plant and machinery” would not lead one to conclude that the statute contemplates or envisages telecommunication towers to be immovable property. Telecommunication towers would in any event have to quality as immovable property as a pre-condition to fall within the ambit of clause (d) of Section 17(5). Their exclusion from the expression “plant and machinery” would not result in it being concomitantly held that they constitute articles which are immoveable. (para 18) 

The High Court interpretation is a curious one. The legislative scheme under CGST Act, 2017 is: plant and machinery are not to be treated as immovable property, but telecommunication towers are specifically excluded from ambit of plant and machinery. Does mean that telecommunication towers move back into the category of immovable property since they are excluded from the exception? Prima facie, yes. But the Delhi High Court answered in negative. The High Court’s reasoning is that telecommunication towers are not an immovable property in the first place. The High Court’s opinion is not entirely convincing. Explanation to Section 17(5) excludes three specific things from the ambit of plant and machinery, i.e., 

  • land, building or any other civil structures; 
  • telecommunication towers; and 
  • pipelines laid outside the factory premises. 

Category (i) and (ii), are prima facie immovable property. Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, one can argue that telecommunication towers also fall in the same category. Even if the generic principles of the concept of immovable property suggest that telecommunication towers are a movable property that is an answer in abstract. In the context of Explanation to Section 17(5), a case can be made that telecommunication towers are treated as immovable property by a deeming fiction. Section 17(5) read with the Explanation clearly suggests that telecommunication towers are to be treated as immovable property. The Delhi High Court’s opinion that telecommunication towers are not an immovable property in the first place does not adequately examine the interplay of the Explanation with the text of Section 17(5) and that the predecents cited were in the context of CENVAT Credit Rules and not GST law. This issue of telecommunication towers and their appropriate classification under GST may need a revisit in the future.   

ESOPs-Related Compensation Present an Interesting Dilemma

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Introduction 

Employee Stock Options (ESOPs) are typically taxable under the IT Act, 1961 in the following two instances: 

first, at the time of exercise of option by the employee as a perquisite. The rationale is that the employee has received a benefit by obtaining the share at a price below the market price and thereby the difference in the option price and the market price constitutes as a perquisite is taxable under the head ‘salaries.’ 

second, when the said stocks are sold by the employees, the gains realized are taxed as capital gains. 

In above respects, the law regarding taxability of ESOPs is well-settled. Of late, two cases – one decided by the Delhi High Court and another by the Madras High Court – have opined on another issue: taxability of compensation received in relation to ESOPs. Both the High Courts arrived at different conclusions on the nature of compensation received and its taxability. In this article I examine both the decisions in detail to highlight that determining the taxability of compensation received in relation to ESOPs – before exercising the options – is not a straightforward task and presents a challenge in interpreting the relevant provision and yet one may not have a completely acceptable answer to the issue. 

Facts 

The facts of both the cases are largely similar and in interest of brevity I will mention the facts as recorded in the Madras High Court’s judgment. The petitioner was an employee of Flipkart Interest Private Limited (FIPL) incorporated in India and a wholly owned subsidiary of Flipkart Marketplace Private Limited (FMPL) incorporated in Singapore. The latter was in turn a subsidiary of Flipkart Private Limited Singapore (FPS).

FPS implemented the Flipkart Employee Stock Option Scheme, 2012 under which stock options were granted to various employees and other persons approved by the Board. In April 2023, FPS announced compensation of US $43.67 per ESOP is view of the divestment of its stake in the PhonePe business. As per FPS, the divestment of PhonePe reduced the potential of stocks in respect for which ESOPs were offered to the employees. The compensation was payable to stakeholders in respect of vested options, but only to current employees in case of unvested options. FPS clarified that the compensation was being paid to the employees despite there being no legal or contractual obligation on its part to pay the said compensation. 

The petitioner received US$258,701.08 as compensation from FPS after deduction of tax at source under Section 192, IT Act, 1961 since the said compensation was treated by FPS as part of ‘salary’. The petitioner claimed that the compensation was a capital receipt and applied for a ‘nil’ TDS certificate arguing that the compensation was not taxable under the IT Act, 1961. But the petitioner’s application was denied against which the petitioner filed a writ petition and approached the Madras High Court. 

Characterizing the Compensation – Summary of Arguments  

The petitioner’s arguments for treating the compensation as a capital receipt were manifold: 

First, that the petitioner continued to hold all the ESOPs after receipt of compensation and since there was no transfer of capital assets, no taxable capital gains can arise from the impugned transaction. 

Second, the compensation received by the petitioner was not a consideration for relinquishment of the right to sue since the compensation was discretionary in nature. The petitioner did not have a right to sue FPS if the said compensation was not awarded. 

Third, in the context of taxable capital gains: IT Act, 1961 contains machinery and computation provisions for taxation of all capital gains which are absent in the impugned case. In the absence of computation provisions relating to compensation received in relation to ESOPs and lack of identification of specific provisions under which such compensation is taxable, the petitioner argued that attempt to tax the compensation should fail.    

Fourth, the petitioner before the Delhi High Court was an ex-employee of FIPL and the petitioner relied on the same to argue that the compensation received in relation to ESOP cannot be treated as a salary or a perquisite since it was a one-time voluntary payment by FPS in relation to ESOPs. 

The State resisted petitioner’s attempt to carve the compensation out of the scope of salaries and perquisites. The primary argument seemed to be that the petitioner’s ESOPs had a higher value when FPS held stake in the PhonePe businesss, and on divestment of its stake, the value of ESOPs declined and thus petitioner had a right to sue for the decline in value of ESOPs. The compensation paid to the petitioner, the State argued was a consideration for relinquishment of the right to sue and the said relinquishment amounted to transfer of a capital asset. 

ESOPs are not a Capital Asset – Madras High Court

The Madras High Court was categorical in its conclusion that ESOPs are not a capital asset, and neither was there any transfer of capital asset in the impugned case. Section 2(14), IT Act, 1961 defines a capital asset as – 

  • property of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession;

Explanation 1 of the provision clarifies that property includes rights in or in relation to a company.  Since the petitioner did not hold any rights in relation to an Indian company, Explanation 1 was inapplicable to the impugned case. 

The Madras High Court examined the petitioner’s rights and observed that under the ESOP scheme, petitioner had a right to receive the shares subject to exercise of options as per terms of the scheme. And only in case of breach of obligation by the employer would the petitioner have a right to sue for compensation. Apart from the above, the petitioner had no right to a compensation nor was there a guarantee that value of its ESOPs would not be impaired. Accordingly, the Madras High Court correctly held that:  

In the absence of a contractual right to compensation for diminution in value, it cannot be said that a non-existent right was relinquished. As discussed earlier, the ESOP holder has the right to receive shares upon exercise of the Option in terms of the FSOP 2012 and the right to claim compensation if such right were to be breached. But, here, the compensation was not paid for relinquishment of ESOPs or of the right to receive shares as per the FSOP 2012. In fact, the admitted position is that the petitioner retains all the ESOPs and the right to receive the same number of shares of FPS subject to Vesting and Exercise. Upon considering all the above aspects holistically, I conclude that ESOPs do not fall within the ambit of the expression “property of any kind held by an assessee” in Section 2(14) and are, consequently, not capital assets. As a corollary, the receipt was not a capital receipt. (para 29)

The Madras High Court concluded since the petitioner did not exercise any option in respect of vested ESOPs, no shares of FPS were issued or allotted to it meaning there was no transfer of capital asset either. Thus, in the absence of a right to receive compensation for diminution in value of ESOPs or  transfer of capital assets it cannot be said that the petitioner was paid compensation for relinquishment of the right to sue or had received taxable capital gains. 

ESOPs are not Perquisites – Delhi High Court 

The second primary question which engaged both the Delhi and the Madras High Court was whether the compensation received by the petitioner constituted as perquisite under Section 17, IT Act, 1961. Section 17(2)(vi), IT Act, 1961 states that a perquisite includes: 

the value of any specified security or sweat equity shares allotted or transferred, directly or indirectly, by the employer, or former employer, free of cost or at concessional rate to the assessee. 

To begin with, let me elaborate on the Delhi High Court’s reasoning and conclusion. 

In trying to interpret if the compensation received by the petitioner would fall within the remit of Section 17(2)(vi), IT Act, 1961 the Delhi High Court observed that a literal interpretation of the provision reveals that the value of specified securities or sweat equity shares is dependent on the exercise of options by the petitioner. An income can only be included in the definition of perquisite if it is generated by exercise of options by an employee. The High Court added: 

Under the facts of the present case, the stock options were merely held by the petitioner and the same have not been exercised till date and thus, they do not constitute income chargeable to tax in the hands of the petitioner as none of the contingencies specified in Section 17(2)(vi) of the Act have occurred. (para 25)

The Delhi High Court further added that the compensation could not be considered as perquisite since: 

… it is elementary to highlight that the payment in question was not linked to the employment or business of the petitioner, rather it was a one-time voluntary payment to all the option holders of FSOP, pursuant to the disinvestment of PhonePe business from FPS. In the present case, even though the right to exercise an option was available to the petitioner, the amount received by him did not arise out of any transfer of stock options by the employer. Rather, it was a one- time voluntary payment not arising out of any statutory or contractual obligation. (para 27)

The Delhi High Court’s above reasoning and conclusion are defensible on the touchstone of strict interpretation of tax statutes. Unless the stocks were allotted or transferred, the conditions specified in Section 17(2)(vi) were not satisfied ensuring the compensation is outside the scope of the impugned provision. Further, the fact of petitioner being an ex-employee influenced the High Court in de-linking the compensation from employment of the petitioner.   

ESOPs are Perquisites – Madras High Court 

The Madras High Court went a step further than the Delhi High Court and also examined Explanation (a) to Section 17(2)(vi) which states that:

“specified security” means the securities as defined in clause (h) of section 2 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956) and, where employees’ stock option has been granted under any plan or scheme therefor, includes the securities offered under such plan or scheme; (emphasis added)

The Madras High Court emphasised three aspects of the Explanation: first, that the petitioner admittedly received the ESOPs under a ‘plan or scheme’, i.e., Flipkart Employee Stock Option Scheme, 2012; second, that the use of word ‘includes’ in the latter part indicates that the phrase ‘securities offered under such plan or scheme’ is not meant to be exhaustive; third, that follows from the second is that ‘specified security’ in the context of ESOPs does not include shares ‘allotted’ but also includes securities ‘offered’ to the holder of ESOPs. 

The Madras High Court further added that in order to tax the compensation received by the petitioner as a perquisite, the benefit flowing to the petitioner must be ascertained. That though was not a difficult task as the High Court noted, in its own words: 

ESOPs were clearly granted to the petitioner as an Employee under the FSOP 2012. If payments had been made by the petitioner in relation to the ESOPs, it would have been necessary to deduct the value thereof to arrive at the value of the perquisite. Since the petitioner did not make any payment towards the ESOPs and continues to retain all the ESOPs even after the receipt of compensation, the entire receipt qualifies as the perquisite and becomes liable to be taxed under the head “salaries”. (para 40)

The Madras High Court’s interpretation of the impugned provision also adheres to a strict interpretation of the statute. And one crucial reason its conclusion differs from that of the Delhi High Court is because the Madras High Court also took note of the Explanation to Section 17(2)(vi) and interpreted it strictly to include within the remit of perquisite not only share allotted or transferred but also shares securities offered under a plan or scheme. And before exercise of options by an employee, the ESOPs can be accurately understood as an offer for securities. 

One could, however, argue as to whether the legislative intent was to tax and include within the remit of perquisite a one-off compensation by the company to a person who had yet to exercise their options or was the intent to cover all kinds of securities offered and allotted to the option grantee. But, the counterargument is that legislative intent is difficult to ascertain in this particular case and the manner in which the Madras High Court interpreted Explanation(a) alongside Section 17(2)(vi) reveals adherence to strict interpretation, which in itself is reflective of manifesting legislative intent. Additionally, one could argue that the compensation is included in ‘value of securities offered’ since it was meant to compensate the option grantee for diminution in value of securities in relation to which ESOPs were offered. One could also argue that the Delhi High Court treated the ‘exercise of options’ as a taxable event under Section 17(2)(vi), which is a correct reading of the provision. And that the High Court not acknowledging Explanation(a) since the latter cannot expand the former’s scope. I do feel that there are several persuasive arguments but not one overarching clenching argument in this particular issue.   

Conclusion 

I’ve attempted a detailed analysis of both the judgments with a view to provide clarity on the interpretive approach and reasoning of both the High Courts on the issue. While both the High Courts adopted a strict interpretive approach, the Madras High Court by taking cognizance of the Explanation alongside the provision arrived at a conclusion that was at variance with the Delhi High Court.

Prima facie though, the provisions as they exist today do not seem to contemplate compensation received by an option grantee before the exercise of options. Regarding ESOPs, there are two taxable scenarios contemplated – on exercise of options and on sale of securities – and taxability of compensation, it seems can only be read into the relevant provisions – specifically Section 17(2)(vi) – by a process of interpretation. As the Madras High Court itself noted the compensation paid in the impugned case was atypical creating the conundrum of whether it was taxable under the relevant provisions. Ambiguity in a charging provision should ideally be resolved in favor of the assessee, but the Madras High Court clearly did not think there was an ambiguity and neither did the Delhi High Court for that matter. Thus, creating a scenario of multiple possibilities with more than one valid interpretive approach.

Section 71(3A), IT Act, 1961 is Constitutional: Delhi HC

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In a recent judgment, the Delhi High Court held that Section 71(3A), IT Act, 1961 was constitutional and did not violate Art 14 and/or Art 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The High Court’s primary reasoning was that the introduction of sub-section (3A) to Section 71 did not take away a vested right of the assessee but only introduced a new condition for an assessee to set off the loss. 

Section 71, IT Act, 1961

Section 71(1), IT Act, 1961 allows an assessee to set off loss under one head of income against income under another head of income, subject to certain conditions. To the said conditions, Finance Act, 2017 added another condition by introducing a new sub-section (3A) which states that: 

Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), where in respect of any assessment year, the net result of the computation under the head “Income from house property” is a loss and the assessee has income assessable under any other head of income, the assessee shall not be entitled set off such loss, to the extent the amount of the loss exceeds two lakh rupees, against income under the other head. (emphasis added)

The condition of claiming a set off of loss, not beyond two lakh rupees was challenged by the assessee before the Delhi High Court. 

Assessee’s Challenge 

The asssesee made the following main arguments in its attempt to assail the constitutional validity of Section 71(3A), IT Act, 1961: first, that that prior to the amendment assessee had an unhindered right to claim set of loss and promissory estoppel should be applied against the State since introduction of Section 71(3A) amounted to breach of a promise; second, the assessee claimed that the impugned sub-section created unreasonable restrictions on taxpayer rights and was violative of Art 14 and Art 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 

The State’s arguments, in short, were that the Section 71(3A) was not a revenue harvesting measure but an anti-abuse provision. In the absence of an upper limit, high income taxpayers were paying huge amount as interest payments and setting off the same against incomes from other heads. 

High Court’s Analysis 

The Delhi High Court noted that as per the facts: when the assessee constructed his house in 2014, he was entitled to claim deductions – without an upper limit – on interest payments made for housing loan; but, from Assessment Year 2018-19, the deductions were limited to a maximum of Rs 2 lakhs. The introduction of the upper limit was challenged by the assessee as an unreasonable restriction on taxpayer rights. 

The Delhi High Court noted that assessee’s challenge to Section 71(3A) was founded on the impugned sub-section having a retroactive effect, i.e., applicability of a law/provision to a fact situation where assessee has vested rights. And a successful challenge to retrospectivity was only possible if a vested right of the assessee was disturbed by introduction of the impugned sub-section. The High Court noted that neither the previous nor the amended provision created an indefeasible right in the petitioner’s favor to set off the losses. (para 24) 

In the absence of a crystallised right, the Delhi High Court added, the assessee’s argument that impugned sub-section violates Article 14 does not hold water. The High Court’s reasoning was that the impugned sub-section does not take away the right of assessee to set off losses in toto, but only circumscribes it and imposes conditions. And further, a new class of taxpayers has not been created by the impugned provisions but only new conditions have been imposed on an existing class of taxpayers. Further, the State has provided a clear rationale for imposing the conditions, i.e., to prevent misuse of the provision by high-income taxpayers. Thus, the High Court concluded that the criteria of reasonable classification and intelligible differentia were met by the impugned sub-section and it was not violative of Article 14. The High Court added that the provision was not manifestly arbitrary either. Finally, the High Court also rejected the assessee’s challenge vis-à-vis Article 19(1)(g) and noted that the restriction was proportional and reasonable and not in violation of the assessee’s right to do business. 

Conclusion 

The assessee’s case that a vested right has been taken away by a retroactive amendment to Section 71 did not have much traction to begin with. The legislature has the discretion to limit the tax benefits, in this case, the deductions were restricted to a certain amount to prevent certain high-income taxpayers from misusing the provision. While the introduction of said limit also affected taxpayers such as the assessee in this case, it was still not a right of the assessee to claim such a deduction. The mere fact that the assessee could claim the deduction without any limit from 2014 until 2018, was not enough for it to claim a vested right for such deductions. And the Delhi High Court correctly dismissed the claim of violation of Article 14 and Art 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.     

Can Cash be Seized During GST Inspections? 

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Section 67 of the CGST Act, 2017 deals with powers of inspection, search, and seizure of officers and Section 67(2) specifically empowers the officers carrying out an inspection to seize goods and documents. Courts have arrived at divergent interpretations as to whether the power to seize goods and documents includes the power to seize cash – unaccounted or otherwise. Relying on the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis and the objective of GST laws, some Courts have held that power to seize goods includes power to seize cash while some Courts – relying on similar factors – have concluded otherwise. 

Short Profile of Section 67

Section 67, CGST Act, 2017 states that where a proper officer not below the rank of Joint Commissioner has reasons to believe that a taxable person has suppressed any transaction in relation to supply of goods or services, or has claimed ITC more than his entitlement or has engaged in the business of transporting of goods in a manner that has caused or is likely to cause tax evasion, he may authorize any officer of central tax to inspect places of business of such taxable person. Section 67(2) along with the two Provisos states as follows: 

Where the proper officer, not below the rank of Joint Commissioner, either pursuant to an inspection carried out under sub-section (1) or otherwise, has reasons to believe that any goods liable to confiscation or any documents or books or things, which in his opinion shall be useful for or relevant to any proceedings under this Act, are secreted in any place, he may authorise in writing any other officer of central tax to search and seize or may himself search and seize such goods, documents or books or things: 

Provided that where it is not practicable to seize any such goods, the proper officer, or any officer authorised by him, may serve on the owner or the custodian of the goods an order that he shall not remove, part with, or otherwise deal with the goods except with the previous permission of such officer: 

Provided further that the documents or books or things so seized shall be retained by such officer only for so long as may be necessary for their examination and for any inquiry or proceedings under this Act. (emphasis added)

The specific question that Courts have have faced is: whether cash is a ‘thing’ and can be seized by officers while carrying out inspections under Section 67? The text of Section 67 does not provide any definitive answer as it does not mention the word ‘money’ and the only way to include money in the scope of Section 67 is through a process of interpretation. While some Courts have relied on the definition of money, as included in CGST Act, 2017, this interpretive approach has not provided a definitive answer to the scope of Section 67 and the power of officers under the said provision.  

Cash is a ‘Thing’ 

The Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to the definitions of ‘consideration’, ‘business’, ‘money’ among others to hold that the term ‘thing’ used in Section 67 includes money. The High Court’s reasoning was that definitions are the key to unlock the objective of CGST Act, 2017. The High Court though never specifically articulated as to what objective of GST laws was served by allowing officers to seize cash belonging to a taxable person. The High Court further tried to reason that a statute must be interpreted in a manner that suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy. Again, here the High Court did not clearly state the mischief and remedy in question. Is the mischief tax evasion? And if so, is it warranted to rely on inconclusive definitions to interpret a provision which provides invasive powers to tax officers?   

The Kerala High Court akin to the Madhya Pradesh High Court also opined that Section 67(2) allows for seizure of cash including things under certain circumstances. However, the Kerala High Court took a different view of the objective of GST and observed that: 

The power of any authority to seize any ‘thing’ while functioning under the provisions of a taxing statute must be guided and informed in its exercise by the object of the statute concerned. In an investigation aimed at detecting tax evasion under the GST Act, we fail to see how cash can be seized especially when it is the admitted case that the cash did not form part of the stock in trade of the appellant’s business.          

The Kerala High Court added that the intelligence officer’s argument that there was huge amount of idle cash at the petitioner’s premises and it wasn’t deposited in the bank reveals the misgivings that officers have of their powers under GST laws. The High Court added that such arguments were only valid if the officer was attached to the Income Tax Department.

The above two decisions show how two High Courts are at odds as to their understanding of the objective of GST. While the Madhya Pradesh High Court reasoned that seizure of cash would serve the object of GST, the Kerala High Court opined that seizure of cash will not serve the purpose of detecting GST evasion especially if it is not part of stock in trade of the taxable person. Both High Courts are at fault in not specifically articulating the object of GST laws. Invoking the ‘object’ of GST laws in abstract and in general terms is not the best interpretive approach and is in fact erroneous. It is not prudent to assume that GST laws have only one objective. One could perhaps argue that inspection and seizure have one overarching objective, i.e., to ensure collection of the tax due and compliance with statutory provisions. But, surely, that is not the ‘only’ object of GST. To argue or even pre-suppose that the only object of GST is to facilitate maximum tax collection is a reductive view of tax laws.  

Further, it is important to highlight that the Kerala High Court casually concluded that Section 67 allows seizure of things including cash without specifically examining the text of the provision and its scope. The principles of strict interpretation of tax statutes were given a complete bypass by the Kerala High Court in observing that cash can be seized under Section 67.  

Cash is Not a ‘Thing’ 

At the other end of spectrum are two decisions of the Delhi High Court. The first case, also discussed here, relied on three major factors to conclude that cash is not included in the term ‘thing’ used in Section 67. The Delhi High Court observed that while Section 67 uses the term ‘goods’ which was a wide term, the caveat in the provision was that they should be liable for confiscation. Goods should be the subject matter or suspected to be subject matter of evasion of tax. Similarly, documents, books or things can be confiscated if in the opinion of the officer they shall be used or are relevant to any proceedings under the Act. 

The Delhi High Court highlighted the drastic nature of the powers of search and seizure and the need to adopt purposive interpretation. The High Court observed that powers under Section 67 have only been given to aid proceedings under CGST Act, 2017 and cash cannot be seized in exercise of powers under Section 67 on the ground that it represents unaccounted wealth. And that unaccounted wealth is the subject matter of IT Act, 1961. 

In the second case, the Delhi High Court also made similar observations and held that if there is no evidence that cash represents sale proceeds of unaccounted goods it cannot be seized under Section 67 of CGST Act, 2017. And that CGST Act does not permit the coercive action of forcibly taking cash from the premises of another person. 

The Delhi High Court’s approach is founded on sounder reasoning as it not only highlights the drastic and intrusive nature of powers of inspection, but also specifically identifies the purpose of these powers. To aid investigation under CGST Act, 2017 cash can be seized but only if represents the sale of unaccounted goods or a related offence under the statute. Cash cannot be seized merely because it is unaccounted income or wealth, which is the subject matter of IT Act ,1961.  

Way Forward 

The Madhya Pradesh High Court’s reasoning to support its conclusion that ‘thing’ includes ‘money’ lacks potency especially because of the High Court’s ignorance of the dictum that tax laws need to be interpreted strictly. By relying on definitions and other provisions, the High Court interpreted the scope of Section 67 which is not ideal. And unlike the Delhi High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court did not acknowledge the drastic nature of inspection and seizure powers and how in trying to suppress the mischief of tax evasion it is empowering tax officers beyond what the law specifically states. And any reliance on purposive interpretation is only defensible if the purpose of the statute and/or provision is clearly articulated and the interpretation is to suit that purpose. Reference to abstract objective of the statute is not helpful and leaves a lot to be desired. On balance, the approach adopted by the Delhi High Court – in both its decisions on the issue – is well-reasoned, pragmatic and hopefully will form the bedrock of jurisprudence in future.  

Lessons from NAA: Parameters of a Fair Dispute Resolution Body 

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The experience of transitioning from retail sales tax to VAT laws in 2002-03 provided a learning that a similar transition to GST may be used as a pretext by suppliers to artificially increase the prices of goods and services and profiteer at the expense of retail consumers. To protect consumer interest, an anti-profiteering provision was included in Section 171 of the CGST Act, 2017 which mandates that any reduction in tax rate or the benefit of ITC shall be passed on to the consumer by way of commensurate reduction in prices. And under the same provision the Central Government was empowered to either notify an existing authority or create a new authority to implement the mandate. And a new body in the form of National Anti-Profiteering Authority (‘NAA’) was duly constituted to implement the mandate of Section 171.  

NAA’s constitution via delegated legislation, opaqueness about its methodology to determine profiteering, absence of an appellate remedy, and the rhetoric filled nature of its orders created fertile grounds for arguments that it was an unconstitutional body. Recently, the Delhi High Court upheld the constitutionality of NAA though it provided the petitioners the liberty to challenge the individual orders of NAA on merits. I’ve previously examined the limitations and flaws in the judgment. In this article, I rely on NAA’s working and the Delhi High Court’s judgment to extrapolate some parameters which should be the touchstone to examine the efficacy and fairness of a tax dispute resolution body. 

Providing Appropriate Policy Guidance  

A crucial issue that characterises the administration of tax laws in India is the nature and extent of delegated legislation. Statutory provisions are consistently interpreted, re-interpreted by the executive via Circulars, Notifications, and Press Releases which are also constantly issuing instructions that require attention and compliance by taxpayers. The content of several such secondary legislative instruments is not only far removed from the parent statute, but the policy is also rarely encoded in the statute. The issue of delegated legislation, and its legal scope, becomes even more acute when the statute does not provide adequate policy guidance to the decision-making body creating a danger of the body interpreting its mandate beyond the confines of the parent statute. And more crucially, leaving the stakeholders clueless about the scope of jurisdiction of the decision-making body and the nature of disputes that it can adjudicate. 

The fact that NAA did not contain adequate policy guidance was one of the petitioner’s main contentions before the Delhi High Court and rightly so. While Section 171 does state the broad compliance that suppliers need to adhere, it provides no insight into the nature and scope of of the body that is empowered to implement the mandate. NAA’s and the Delhi High Court’s opinion was that Section 171 is a ‘self-contained code’; but, interpreting the broad mandate of Section 171 as an adequate policy direction is not ideal. Certainly not from the perspective of taxpayers. The jurisdiction and mandate of the decision-making body needs to be prescribed more precisely and preferably by the legislature or executive. The body in question should not have the authority to determine its own jurisdiction and procedure which it can interpret in a self-serving manner. 

Creating an Accountability Mechanism

Creating accountability mechanisms for judicial or quasi-judicial bodies has been a tough road in India. For example, we are yet to determine the appropriate method and manner of determining the accountability of judges of High Courts and the Supreme Court. One way the accountability invariably gets attached to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies is through the process of appeals against their orders. It allows the petitioner an opportunity to make additional or better arguments, at the same time another body can scrutinize the order on the touchstone of fairness, interpretive coherence, and other similar parameters. In the absence of a statutory right to appeal for the parties, the risk of perverse orders and opaque functioning increases dramatically. For example, in NAA’s case the parties were not provided a statutory right to appeal against its orders and could only approach the High Court via writ petitions which is accompanied with its own limitations. NAA could only be supervised by the GST Council, which if the minutes of its meetings as anything to go by, treated its job of supervising NAA superficially.  

One consistent and oft-repeated theme in NAA’s orders was the taxpayers demanding that NAA makes its methodology for calculating profiteering public and NAA replying that it had issued a document – which actually did not state the methodology – and regardless, calculating amount of benefits that needs to be passed to customers wasn’t a tough or complex task and taxpayers could do it themselves. And yet when taxpayers challenged NAA’s constitutionality on the ground that it lacked a judicial member, etc., NAA replied that it was an ‘expert body’ involved in complex work of determining profiteering and need not be compared to quasi-judicial or judicial bodies. Opaqueness and inconsistencies in NAA’s orders were abound but there was no superior or appellate authority that could scrutinize its decisions and present and alternate or a modified view of the facts and dispute in question. It is one thing to say that the constitutionality of a body cannot be challenged on the ground that there is no right to appeal against its orders, but the implications of the absence of such a right extend beyond the constitutionality argument and tax administration needs to be mindful of them.    

Defined Identity as an Adjudicatory Body or a Regulator  

Taxation law primarily concerns itself with the relationship of State with its residents with the former exercising its coercive power to extract financial resources for its sustenance. The disputes about the scope of the State’s powers are typically adjudicated by classical dispute resolution bodies, mostly successfully. In mediating the relationship of the State and its residents qua their tax obligations, the need for a regulator rarely presents itself. Thus, while sectoral regulators in other spheres such as banking law, securities law, etc. is relatively common, we do not witness similar bodies in tax law universe. Irrespective, when novel or ‘atypical’ bodies are created for administration of tax laws, it is incumbent on the legislature to be precise in stating the rationale and need for the body. Else, not only are the stakeholders confused, but the ‘atypical’ body itself suffers from an identity crisis and looks to fulfil the mandate of both a traditional dispute resolution body and a sectoral regulator and is frequently unable to do justice to neither.

In the case of NAA, it is still unclear if it was intended to be a dispute resolution body or a regulator. But one thing we do know that NAA fancied itself as an expert body and a sectoral regulator and frequently drew analogy of its mandate with SEBI. The analogy was always flawed because SEBI is creation of a dedicated statute, has a Board, and separate dispute resolution bodies while NAA, created via delegated legislation, was a coalesced body consisting of a few technical members which adjudicated on disputes and complaints relating to profiteering. The investigate arm of NAA, DGAP, was answerable and bound by all directions of NAA removing all and any pretence of checks and balances in its operation. There was no clear identification of its role beyond the general mandate contained in Section 171 and NAA itself did not satisfactorily fulfil the role of either a regulator or a dispute resolution body.    

De Minimis Requirement of Reasoned Orders 

In respect of taxation law, the absence of well-reasoned orders is a widespread symptom that affects advance ruling authorities, tribunals and to some extent even High Courts and the Supreme Court. While speaking orders are a minimum requirement or at least an expectation from any judicial or quasi-judicial or for that matter any administrative body, there is a need to ensure that the orders satisfy the minimum standards of a reasoned order. This can be done through careful selection of personnel and/or ensuring accountability mechanisms in form of an appellate body as suggested above. 

While people like me and more skilled than me examine and critique the various such orders, there was something fundamental amiss in the NAA’s orders: skill of writing a judgment. The Delhi High Court in its recent judgment has incorrectly noted that NAA was only a fact-finding body and did not adjudicate on rights and liabilities. NAA not only heard arguments of the taxpayers who were defending their conduct, but also of complainants, and adjudicated on their rights and obligations. But in most of its orders, one found a lack of engagement with the various arguments that the parties raised and instead a generous dose of rhetoric, stonewalling, and sidestepping with substantive arguments. NAA interpreted the relevant statutory provisions were interpreted pedantically and did not even acknowledge important arguments when arriving at its conclusions, violating basic tenets of judgment writing. It is important that vital tax law matters are not decided in a whimsical fashion with disregard to taxpayer rights and a well reasoned judgment is provided by the authorities in question.  

Conclusion 

The above are by no means exhaustive or even necessary conditions to design a fair and transparent tax dispute resolution body. I’ve only picked cues from the working of NAA and the arguments presented by petitioners before the Delhi High Court to make a tentative case for designing dispute resolution bodies under the tax law umbrella. I’ve highlighted some of the above parameters based on my own previous assessment and observation of the NAA’s working and how, in my view, there was a wide bridge between the laudable objectives of setting up an anti-profiteering regime under GST and the NAA implementing the said mandate in an opaque manner via questionable orders that barely met the minimum requirements of respecting taxpayer rights and administering tax justice.  

NAA is Constitutional, Individual Orders Can be Challenged on Merits: Delhi HC

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Introduction 

This post focuses on the Delhi High Court’s recent judgment upholding the constitutionality of NAA, a statutory body established under Section 171, CGST Act, 2017. I’ve examined the working of NAA in detail here and here, where I’ve highlighted the problematic aspects of NAA’s various orders. In this post, I will summarize the petitioner’s arguments and the State’s response. At the outset, it is important to highlight that NAA’s functions and powers have been transferred to Competition Commission of India w.e.f. 01.12.2022. While the petitions challenging the constitutionality of NAA have been pending before the Delhi High Court for a while now, a decision on the constitutionality of NAA after it has passed hundreds of orders and has practically ceased to function is also an instance of how tax justice for taxpayers is elusive and littered with delays, even under a ‘transformative’ and ‘game changing’ legislation such as GST.  

The Delhi High Court, in upholding the constitutionality of NAA, has not broken any new ground. In fact, it has blunted various persuasive arguments of the petitioner’s by choosing to adopt a pedantic and literal interpretive approach that saves the face of NAA and paves path for almost unfettered delegated legislation in tax legislations. The High Court has used similar vocabulary as NAA deployed in its orders to defend its constitutionality. The High Court has floundered in engaging with the true import and scope of petitioner’s arguments and instead has provided them the concession of challenging the NAA’s individual orders on merits which is at best a half-baked solution to a constitutional challenge. 

The centrepiece of the petitioner’s case was that Section 171, CGST Act, 2017 and Rules 122, 124, 126, 127, 129, 133, 134 of CGST Rules, 2017. The notices and orders of NAA imposing penalties on taxpayers were also challenged, but the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions was the main subject of the impugned decision. And the constitutionality of the provisions and the related arguments also are the focus of this post.  

Section 171(1), CGST Act, 2017 states that any reduction in rate of tax on any supply of goods or services or the benefit of input tax credit shall be passed on to the recipient by way of commensurate reduction in prices. Section 171(2) empowers the Central Government, on recommendations of the GST Council, to constitute an authority or empower an existing authority to examine if the mandate of sub-section (1) is being followed by the registered taxpayers. It was in exercise of its powers under Section 171(2) that the Central Government constituted NAA.        

The relevant Rules under challenge inter alia provided that NAA shall consist of one Chairperson and four technical members, it shall have the power to determine the procedure and methodology to determine if the mandate of Section 171(1) is being adhered to, amongst other relevant details about initiation and conduct of proceedings by NAA. 

Arguments 

The petitioner’s arguments traversed a wide array of issues. The challenge to Section 171 involved arguments that Section 171 prescribed a financial extraction akin to a tax which cannot be levied via subordinate legislation; Section 171 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation as it delegates essential legislative functions to the Government and contains no legislative or policy guidance as to how NAA is to exercise its powers; and further while Section 171 delegates to the Government the power to determine the powers of NAA, the Government via Rule 126 has further delegated to the NAA the power to determine the methodology and procedure to adjudicate on violation of Section 171. The petitioners also contended that the term ‘commensurate’ has not been defined under Section 171 and meaning of profiteering hinges on the phrase ‘commensurate reduction in prices’ resulting in a circular reasoning in the provision. Section 171 was accordingly challenged as being violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(g). 

The other leg of challenges involved the opaque and uncertain methodology adopted by NAA in determining the violation of Section 171. And that in the absence of any legislative guidance, NAA acted arbitrarily demanding taxpayers reduce prices without disclosing specifics of its methodology. The petitioner highlighted the methodology adopted by NAA in profiteering complaints involving real estate companies to underline the arbitrariness in NAA’s approach. The petitioner also compared India’s anti-profiteering mechanism with that of Malaysia and Australia to underline their argument that the anti-profiteering mechanism in India was a price control mechanism interfering with their right to determine prices of goods and services.  

Petitioners further highlighted that there was no time prescribed for taxpayers to reduce prices, there was no judicial member in NAA even though it performed a quasi-judicial function, taxpayers did not have a statutory right to appeal against NAA’s orders. And that NAA did not allow any other method to pass on benefits of reduced taxes except via reduction in prices. For example, altering the sizes of products to pass on benefits of reduced taxes to customers had been rejected by NAA except in one case. 

The State justified the legal framework of NAA as constitutional. The arguments were, to a large extent, comparable to the rhetoric that NAA deployed in its orders in justifying its constitutionality. Some of the arguments that the State adopted were: Section 171 was enacted in pursuance of the Directive Principles of State Policy under Articles 38, 38(b), and 38(c) which inter alia mention economic justice and prevention of concentration of resources in a few hands. Section 171 was within the legislative competence of the Union under Article 246A of the Constitution. The State interpreted Section 171(1) differently from that of the petitioners and argued that it provided amply policy direction. It was argued that Section 171(1) clearly states that ‘any reduction’ in tax rates must be passed to recipients by ‘commensurate reduction in prices.’ And that only minutiae had been left for delegated legislation. The State defended NAA’s powers to determine the procedure and methodology stating that it clearly flows from Section 171 and this not a case of excessive delegation.

The State also challenged petitioner’s argument that only reduction of prices cannot be the sole method via which the taxpayers can adhere to the mandate of Section 171. The State argued that taxpayers should be allowed to ‘only’ reduce price in compliance of Section 171 and NAA is justified in interpreting the provision which is least prone to tax avoidance as allowing other methods may involve manipulation by taxpayers. 

The State argued that Section 171 did not provide for a price control mechanism as argued by petitioners and it only influenced the indirect price component and did not restrict the freedom of suppliers to determine the price. And that NAA was only indulging in fact finding exercise and absence of a judicial member was not fatal to its orders. Neither can absence of a time for which taxpayers are to maintain reduced prices can be the basis of challenging the constitutionality of NAA. 

I’ve tried to summarise the important arguments raised by both sides; but, in my view, the core challenge was of excessive delegation. Section 171 does not provide legislative and policy guidance to NAA and Rule 126 questionably allows NAA to determine its own procedure and methodology, a methodology which the State argued it ‘may’ determine but was not obligated to determine. The issues of excessive delegation and opaqueness/arbitrariness in the NAA’s functioning were the overarching themes in the arguments. And State defended the constitutionality of Section 171 by interpreting it in a manner as if it was the most precise and comprehensive statutory provision. 

Delhi High Court Upholds NAA’s Constitutionality 

The Delhi High Court gave multiple reasons for upholding the constitutionality of NAA. The High Court dutifully cited the principles that presumption of constitutionality guides adjudication of constitutionality of a provision and that in matters of economic laws the legislature has a wide latitude, both principles duly entrenched in Indian jurisprudence via a long line of judicial precedents. Further, the High Court observed that GST heralded a new indirect tax regime in India to reduce the cascading effect of multiple indirect taxes. On these broad and abstract principles there is little to find fault with the High Court’s approach. It is the specifics that make this judgment deficient in reasoning. I highlight some of the deficiencies below.  

To begin with, one of petitioner’s argument was that the key phrases used in Section 171 ‘commensurate’ and ‘profiteering’ are defined in reference to each other, a case of circular reasoning. The High Court invoked the State’s reference to Directive Principles of State Policy, the objective of GST to reduce cascading effect of taxes, and the dictionary meaning of ‘commensurate’ to conclude: 

Section 171 of the Act, 2017 mandates that whatever is saved in tax must be reduced in price. Section 171 of the Act, 2017 incorporates the principle of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, it has a flavor of consumer welfare regulatory measure, as it seeks to achieve the primary objective behind the Goods and Services Tax regime i.e. to overcome the cascading effect of indirect taxes and to reduce the tax burden on the final consumer. (para 100)

Again, what the Delhi High Court says here is correct, but it does not address the petitioner’s simple argument that in absence of precise phrases or clear definitions the provision suffers from arbitrariness as it allows NAA complete discretion to interpret and implement the provision. Also, the constitutionality of a provision cannot be defended by reference to its intended objectives. The fact that Section 171 was enacted in reference to Directive Principles of State Policy or for consumer protection is irrelevant to the argument that it suffers from arbitrariness. The High Court places undue emphasis on the intent of the provision to adjudicate its constitutionality and sidestepped the core issue of the provision lacking sufficient policy guidance.  

The second questionable aspect of the judgment was in the Delhi High Court’s conclusion that Section 171 contains a clear legislative policy and does not delegate essential legislative functions. And the High Court added that not only does Section 171 prescribe a clear legislative policy it also contains all the navigational tools, checks and balances to guide the authority tasked with its workability. Section 171 creates a substantive obligation on taxpayers to not profiteer, but the authority to implement the mandate, NAA, has under the relevant rules been given the power to determine its own procedure, determine the scope of complaints and investigation, determine the methodology to determine profiteering – without being under an obligation to determine it or disclose it – which cannot be reasonably traced to the statutory provision. And a statutory right to appeal against NAA’s order is absent. In such a scenario, the High Court’s interpretation that Section 171 contains sufficient policy guidance, imbibes Section 171 with more substance than it contains. 

Further, Section 171(3) states that the authority, i.e., NAA shall exercise such  powers and discharge such functions as may be prescribed. And under Rule 126, the Central Government empowers NAA to determine the methodology and procedure for determining if the taxpayers are passing on benefits of reduced taxes to consumers. It is indeed difficult to not see that the delegated legislation function assigned to the Central Government was further passed to NAA leading to a situation where NAA framed Rules to determine its own powers and determine the methodology to determine profiteering. In my view, this is a clear case of impermissible delegated legislation where an authority has been entrusted to self-determine scope of its own powers circumscribed by a thinly worded statutory provision. Also, it is worth pointing out that the Methodology that NAA prescribed in exercise of its powers was not a methodology that reliably informed the taxpayers of how the reduced prices are to be calculated and unreasonably suggested that increased costs of compliance for taxpayers are immaterial to determine compliance with Section 171. The Delhi High Court’s observations on this issue are: 

Moreover, as per Rule 126 NAA ‘may determine’ the methodology and not ‘prescribe’ it. The substantive provision i.e. Section 171 of the Act, 2017 itself provides sufficient guidance to NAA to determine the methodology on a case by case basis depending upon peculiar facts of each case and the nature of the industry and its peculiarities. Consequently, so long as the methodology determined by NAA is fair and reasonable, the petitioners cannot raise the objection that the specifics of the methodology adopted are not prescribed. (para 126) 

What is the difference between ‘determining’ and ‘prescribing’? NAA, in its orders has observed that it is not obligated to prescribe a methodology since different fact situations require different approaches. And it is only supposed to determine the methodology as per the facts, an approach which the Delhi High Court endorses in the above paragraph. But, is it justifiable to rely on the said interpretation to conclude that the methodology need not be revealed to the taxpayers?

The above observations of the Delhi High Court where it almost completely agreed with the State’s arguments and in fact NAA’s own defence of its own constitutionality, pretty much sealed the case for the petitioners. The High Court though concluded that all other arguments of the petitioners’ also did not have a persuasive value. For example, the High Court observed NAA’s investigations could be validly extended beyond the scope of original complaint (para 159), time limit to complete investigations were only directory and not mandatory despite use of the word ‘shall’, (para 158 )and that NAA was a fact-finding body and absence of judicial members was not fatal to its constitutionality. (para 146) The last finding collapses on an examination of NAA’s function and High Court’s own interpretation of Section 171 as a provision that creates a substantive obligation on taxpayers. (para 100) Clearly, in implementing Section 171, NAA is adjudicating on rights and obligations of consumers and taxpayers and yet NAA’s functions were interpreted to be confined to mere fact-finding exercise. While the actual fact-finding was undertaken by the investigative arm of the NAA, i.e., DGAP. And if a body like NAA has powers to impose penalties and cancel registrations, do they not impact taxpayer obligations? How is it defensible to accord it a status of mere fact-finding body performing functions of expert determination? 

Finally, while the State and the Delhi High Court were correct in stating that absence of a right of appeal is not fatal to the constitutionality of a body, it needs to be stated that the absence of such a right should have made the High Court more cautious that there are enough checks and balances to protect taxpayer rights at the NAA level. Instead, by upholding the arguments that investigation by DGAP can traverse beyond the subject matter of complaint, the time limit to complete investigation is directory in nature and otherwise misreading the mandate and nature of NAA, the Delhi High Court has granted a wide leeway to the State in matters of anti-profiteering in particular and generally in drafting tax legislations with unfettered delegated legislative powers to the executive.

Conclusion 

I’ve argued previously that NAA adopted self-serving interpretation of Section 171, relied on opaque and arbitrary methodology to adjudicate complaints of profiteering and that its manner of creation was tinged with unconstitutionality. The Delhi High Court has concluded otherwise, though as I’ve highlighted above, its reasoning and interpretive approaches are not beyond reproach. The concession that the petitioners have received from the Delhi High Court is that NAA adopted a flawed methodology in adjudicating complaints of profiteering in real estate projects. The High Court observed that NAA relied on the difference between ratio of ITC and turnover in pre and post-GST periods, but there is no direct co-relation between ITC and turnover. And that varying expenses and nature of construction activity should have been considered by NAA. But, the impact of these observations will only be revealed when specific orders of NAA are challenged on merits. (para 129) Since a bulk of NAA’s orders related to the real estate sector, this is not insignificant, but still does not detract from the High Court’s flawed approach in engaging with the arguments on constitutionality of NAA.            

Delhi HC Disallows Disclosure of PM Cares Fund Documents Under RTI Act, 2005

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The Delhi High Court in a recent judgment allowed the Income Tax Department’s appeal against the Central Information Commission’s (‘CIC’) order directing the respondent be provided copies of all documents submitted by PM Cares Fund to obtain exemption under Section 80G of the IT Act, 1961. The Delhi High Court’s main reason was that the IT Act, 1961 was a special legislation vis-à-vis the RTI Act, 2005 and provisions of former would prevail in matters relating to disclosure of information of an assessee. The High Court concluded that information relating to an assessee can only be disclosed by the authorities prescribed under Section 138 of IT Act, 1961 and CIC does not have jurisdiction to direct furnishing of information of an assessee. 

Brief Facts 

PM Cares Fund is a charitable fund which was established to provide relief to the public during COVID-19 and other similar emergencies. The Income Tax Department had granted exemption to PM Cares Fund under Section 80G of the IT Act, 1961 on 27.03.2020. The respondent wanted to know the exact procedure followed by the Income Tax Department in granting a swift approval to the PM Cares Fund and whether any rules or procedure were bypassed by the Income Tax Department in granting the approval. On 27.04.2022, the CIC via its order had directed that the respondent be provided copies of all the documents submitted by PM Cares Fund in its exemption application and copies of file notings approving the application. The Income Tax Department approached the Delhi High Court challenging the CIC’s order. 

The Income Tax Department’s primary contentions were that information of an assessee relating to income tax can only be sought under Section 138, IT Act, 1961 and not RTI Act, 2005. And that information sought by the respondent is exempt under Section 8(1)(j) of RTI Act, 2005, i.e., it is personal information, and further that CIC could not have directed disclosure of information without providing an opportunity of hearing to PM Cares Fund. (para 2-5)

The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the non-obstante clause in Section 22, RTI Act, 2005 ensures that it will have an over-riding effect over other statutes for the time being in force. Further that if there are two methods for obtaining information, there was no bar in seeking information under either of the methods. The respondent also argued that the bar of Section 8(1)(j) would not apply as the information sought is not personal information but there is an overriding public interest in disclosing the information. (para 6)    

Reasoning and Decision     

The Delhi High Court’s primary reasoning related to the ‘inconsistency’ between the IT Act, 1961 and RTI Act, 2005 due to non-obstante clauses contained in both the statutes. It is apposite to cite Section 138 in entirety to analyse the the Delhi High Court’s reasoning.

138. (1)(a) The Board or any other income-tax authority specified by it by a general or special order in this behalf may furnish or cause to be furnished to—

  (i) any officer, authority or body performing any functions under any law relating to the imposition of any tax, duty or cess, or to dealings in foreign exchange as defined in clause (n) of section 2 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999); or

 (ii) such officer, authority or body performing functions under any other law as the Central Government may, if in its opinion it is necessary so to do in the public interest, specify by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf,

any such information received or obtained by any income-tax authority in the performance of his functions under this Act, as may, in the opinion of the Board or other income-tax authority, be necessary for the purpose of enabling the officer, authority or body to perform his or its functions under that law.

(b) Where a person makes an application to the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner in the prescribed form48 for any information relating to any assessee received or obtained by any income-tax authority in the performance of his functions under this Act, the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do, furnish or cause to be furnished the information asked for and his decision in this behalf shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or any other law for the time being in force, the Central Government may, having regard to the practices and usages customary or any other relevant factors, by order notified in the Official Gazette, direct that no information or document shall be furnished or produced by a public servant in respect of such matters relating to such class of assessees or except to such authorities as may be specified in the order. (emphasis added)

The non-obstante clause of RTI Act, 2005, contained in Section 22, states as follows: 

The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), and any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. (emphasis added)

In my view, the Delhi High Court’s framing of the issue – non-obstante clauses in IT Act, 1961 and RTI Act, 2005 are inconsistent and seemingly in conflict with each other – is erroneous. The non-obstante clause of Section 138(2), IT Act, 1961 overrides only Section 138(1) while Section 22, RTI Act, 2005 overrides every other law for the time being in force. Section 138(2) empowers the Central Government, by an order notified in the Official Gazette, to circumscribe or prevent powers of officers to disclose information under Section 138(1). Section 138(2) cannot be read so say that IT Act, 1961 will override all other laws in matters relating to disclosure of information relating to an assessee. In fact, it is Section 22 of RTI Act, 2005 which states that it will override all other statutes. While both provisions use non-obstante clauses, their scope and effect is different and there is no direct conflict of the manner suggested by the High Court.   

By framing the issue as that of ‘conflict’ of two non-obstante clauses, the Delhi High Court then had to necessarily answer as to which Act would prevail. The High Court was of the opinion that IT Act, 1961 is a special legislation governing all provisions and laws relating to income tax and super tax in the country. While RTI Act, 2005 is a general legislation to enable citizens to exercise and enable their right to information. The High Court did not give too much importance to the dictum that latter legislation prevails over the earlier legislation. The High Court opined that the date on which statutes come into force cannot be the sole deciding factor in determining the application and overriding effect of a legislation, and that in its opinion it is more important that the special legislation, i.e., IT Act, 1961 should prevail over the general legislation, i.e., RTI Act, 2005. Which factors need to be accorded more importance is of course is the discretion of the judges. In this case, the High Court was of the view that the dictum of special legislation should prevail general legislation is of primary importance; the question though arises is: is it a straightforward answer that IT Act, 1961 is a special legislation and RTI Act, 2005 a general legislation? 

The Delhi High Court cited some precedents to this effect which have held that whether a statute is a general or special statute depends on the principal subject-matter and particular perspective. And a legislation can be a general legislation for one subject matter and a special legislation for others. For example – and as cited by the High Court in its judgment – in LIC v DJ Bahadur case, Supreme Court had observed that in matters of nationalisation of LIC the LIC Act is the principal legislation while in matters of employer-employee dispute, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1948 is the principal legislation. Applying this dictum, the High Court made a defensible conclusion that in matters relating to disclosure of information of assessees relating to income tax, IT Act, 1961 is the principal legislation while RTI Act, 2005 is the general legislation.

Finally, the Delhi High Court made another observation that, in my view, is not an accurate reading of Section 138. After noting that Section 138, IT Act, 1961 provides a special procedure for disclosure of information, the High Court observed: 

Applying the said analogy to the facts of the present case, Section 138(1)(b) of the IT Act which specifically states that information relating to an assessee can only be supplied subject to the satisfaction of Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, as the case may be, would prevail over Section 22 of the RTI Act. (emphasis added) (para 18) 

The inaccuracy of the Delhi High Court’s observation is in supplying the word ‘only’ to Section 138. It is trite that in tax jurisprudence, that provisions of a tax statute are to be construed strictly. And strict interpretation of provisions of a tax statute requires that a provision be read as is, without adding or subtracting any words from it. The Delhi High Court in adding the word ‘only’ to Section 138 (1)(b) departed from the doctrine of strict interpretation of tax statutes and for no good reason. The observation that a special legislation – IT Act, 1961 –  prevails over the general legislation – RTI Act, 2005 – cannot form basis of the conclusion that information can ‘only’ be provided under the special statute. A bare reading of Section 138 does not support the High Court’s interpretation.  

Conclusion 

The Delhi High Court’s observations in the impugned case are on shaky grounds. The only defensible part of the judgment is that a special statute prevails over a general statute, but as I argue that issue only arises because the High Court erred in framing the headline issue as that of conflict of non-obstante clauses, when the non-obstante clauses in question have differing scopes and do not necessarily clash. The result is that PM Cares Fund continues to enjoy a certain level of opaqueness that is, in my view, not in public interest. And for the meanwhile, Delhi High Court’s deficient reasoning has provided the opaqueness a convenient legal cover.

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