RavPratapSingh

When A Princess Worried About Tax on Alimony

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All things in life have a tax angle, including alimony payments. In this article I elaborate on tax treatment of alimony payments under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’). Upfront, these are the three takeaways from this article: 

first, a lump sum payment of alimony amount is not taxable in the hands of recipient, since it is a capital receipt.

second, the monthly payment of alimony amount is taxable in the hands of recipient, since it is an income from a particular source. 

third, the payer receives no tax deductions for alimony payments, even if the payments are made under a decree of court. 

The law on all three above aspects was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Princess Maheshwari of Pratapgarh v Commissioner of Income Tax. This case is the focus of my article below. 

Decree of Nullity Sprouts Tax Questions  

(i) Decree of Nullity of Marriage 

In September 1963, Princess Maheshwari Devi of Pratapgarh obtained a decree of nullity of her marriage with Maharaja of Kotah. The Bombay City Civil Court (‘civil court’) pronounced the decree of nullity under Section 25, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. As part of the proceedings, the Princess had claimed monthly alimony and a gross sum as permanent alimony from the Maharaja. The Civil Court ordered the Maharaja to pay the Princess an amount of Rs 25,000 as permanent lump sum alimony and a sum of Rs 750 per month as monthly alimony. The Maharaja was obligated to pay the latter until her remarriage, if and when, it took place.    

(ii) Two Tax Questions 

I will spare you details of assessment years and focus on the broader issue: the Princess claimed tax exemption on the lump sum alimony amount as well as the monthly alimony amounts. Her claims were rejected by the Income Tax Office and Appellate Tribunal, and against the said decisions she appealed to the Bombay High Court.

The High Court had to answer two questions: 

First, whether the monthly alimony of Rs 750 was income in hands of the Princess and liable to tax? 

Second, whether the lump sum alimony of Rs 25,000 was income in hands of the Princess and liable to tax? 

The framing of questions is crucial, from an income tax viewpoint. A receipt of money is only taxable if it constitutes ‘income’ as defined under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act, 1961’). Else the receipt falls outside the ambit of IT Act, 1961 though given the current and expansive definition of income, rarely if ever is a receipt of money not subjected to income tax. 

Monthly Alimony is Taxable in Hands of Princess  

The Bombay High Court answered the first question in favor of the Income Tax Department and held that the monthly alimony payment to the Princess constituted her income and was taxable in her hands. The arguments from both sides were as follows.  

(i) Arguments 

The advocate for the Princess rested her case for tax exemption of the monthly alimony on various grounds. Some of them were: 

First, alimony is merely an extension of husband’s obligation to maintain his wife and Section 25, Hindu Marriage Act merely enlarges that obligation. The advocate was implying that the husband is obligated to maintain his wife, whether they continue to remain married or not.  

Second, the alimony payment to the Princess did not emerge from a definite or particular source and in fact, the payment would cease on her remarriage. 

Third, monthly alimony is a personal payment from her ex-husband and not a consideration for any services performed – past or future. 

The counsel for the State though argued that the decree of Civil Court had created a legal right in favor of the Princess. The right to receive a monthly alimony amount had a definite source, i.e., the decree of court, and should be taxed as income in hands of the Princess.   

(ii) High Court Applies the Law

The Bombay High Court scanned through the previous cases to state judicial understanding o the term ‘income’. For example, one notable case, the Privy Council had observed that income is something that is ‘coming in’ with some sort of regularity from a definite source. The High Court after scanning various other precedents, succinctly stated the judicial definition of income as: 

a periodical return for labour/skill that a person receives with some regularity, and from a definite source. But an income excludes a ‘windfall’ gain. 

The above definition would squarely cover a monthly alimony payment. The only point then in the Princess’s favor was her claim that the monthly alimony was not a result of application of any labour or skill on her part. But the High Court rejected this point and held that even voluntary payments can constitute income in hands of recipient if they come with regularity from a definite source. The High Court though further pointed out that the monthly alimony was paid to the Princess because of the civil court decree which was obtained by her by expending effort and labour. And the civil court decree is the source of her right to claim monthly alimony as minus the decree she would have no right to alimony. The High Court concluded: 

Although it is true that it could never be said that the assessee entered into the marriage with any view to get alimony, on the other hand, it cannot be deneid that the assessee consciously obtained the decree and obtaining the decree did involve some effort on the part of the assessee. The monthly alimony being a regular and periodical return from a definite source, being the decree, must be held to be “income” within the meaning of the said term in the said Act.

The monthly alimony amount was something the Princess would receive regularly because of the decree, because of her efforts to obtain to same from the civil court and thus it would constitute her income under IT Act, 1961 and be subjected to income tax. 

Lump Sum Amount Received as Alimony: Exempt from Tax  

As regards the taxability of lump sum amount of Rs 25,000 received as alimony, the Bombay High Court decided that it amounted to a capital receipt and was not taxable as income in the hands of the Princess. The High Court observed: 

It is not as if the payment of Rs. 25,000 can be looked upon as a commutation of any future monthly or annual payments because there was no pre-existing right in the assessee to obtain any monthly payment at all. Nor is there anything in the decree to indicate that Rs. 25,000 were paid in commutation of any right to any periodic payment. In these circumstances, in our view, the receipt of that amount must be looked upon as a capital receipt.

Capital receipt, in income tax law, is only taxable if there is an express charging provision in income tax law to that effect. Else, not. Only revenue receipt is charged to income tax by default. Thus, the above distinction of revenue and capital receipts was in favor of the Princess. Also, because the High Court took the view that the lump sum payment did not ‘commute’ any monthly or periodical payments that the Princess would have received since she had no pre-existing right to receive the monthly alimony payment. To be clear, the lump sum alimony amount could be taxable if it ‘commutes a part of the future alimony’. However, the High Court said there was nothing in the civil court decree that indicated that the lump sum amount commuted her monthly payments. At the same time, the High Court did acknowledge that ‘beyond doubt that had the amount of Rs. 25,000 not been awarded in a lump sum under the decree to the assessee, a larger monthly sum would have been awarded to her on account of alimony.’ Thus, leaving a window ajar to tax lumpsum alimony amounts in future cases.     

No Tax Deductions for Alimony Payments

The unfairness of IT Act, 1961 is that it does not allow deduction for alimony payments. Typically, husbands pay alimonies to their ex-wives. Presuming that the alimony payment is from a portion of husband’s already taxed income, such payment should ideally qualify for a deduction. It can be viewed as an expense. If not the entire amount, a deduction with an upper cap can be provided. And for monthly alimony payments anyways the wife is liable to pay income tax, so providing the husband income tax deduction on such payments may not be too harmful from a revenue perspective. Currently, the husband pays income tax on his income, pays a portion of such income as monthly alimony to his ex-wife, and the ex-wife is liable to income tax for the monthly alimony as it constitutes her income. A bountiful for the revenue, unless the spouses are smart and rich enough to agree only to a one-time alimony amount, circumventing the uneven tax consequences of IT Act, 1961.   

In fact, the Bombay High Court described the above position of law as ‘unfortunate’. It heeded the legislature to pay attention to this aspect and noted: 

It is clearly desirable that a suitable amendment should be considered to see that in cases where the payments of alimony are made by a husband from his income and are such that they cannot be claimed as deductions from the income of the husband, in the assessment of his income, they should not be taxed in the hands of the wife. That, however, is not for the courts but for the Legislature to consider.

The Bombay High Court made the above observations in 1982. Since the IT Act, 1961 has been amended several times to include various capital receipts within the realm of taxability. But not lump sum alimony payments categorized as capital receipts have not been made taxable. Neither have deductions on alimony payments been included. Our lawmakers seem busy ‘simplifying’ the income tax law, rather than introducing substantive and meaningful policy changes that acknowledge new social realities. 

Conclusion 

Neither the Income Tax Act, 1961 and unfortunately nor does the Income Tax Bill, 2025 provide a clear answer about taxability of alimony payments. Tax lawyers typically advice their clients based on above discussed judgment of the Bombay High Court. Any legislative clarity on this front seems a bit distant for now.    

Regardless, I would like to conclude with a normative question: 

Who SHOULD pay the tax on alimony payments? 

Depending on your gender biases, views on divorce, necessity of alimony payments, your perception of divorce settlements as fair or otherwise, your answers would vary. Typically, women receive alimony payments from their ex-husbands. And people who have strong and inflexible opinions that women use family laws as ‘get rich quick’ route are likely to argue that women should foot the tax bill on both kinds of alimony payments: made via lump sum amounts and/or on monthly basis. 

A tax law view would be to ask who benefits from the alimony payment? And who bears the burden? The latter should receive a deduction on the payment and the former should shoulder the tax liability. Irrespective of gender. I’m willing to go a step further and suggest that even if the alimony payment is not made because of a court order, but voluntarily as part of a valid contract, the above principles should apply. Taxability of alimony payments should not depend on whether court ordered it, or parties themselves agreed to it. IT Act, 1961 provides deductions to all kinds of voluntary contributions including to political parties, it is imperative that same principles apply to personal relationships if it ends with mutual consent – actual or perceived. We should stop hiding behind the argument that alimony payment is a personal obligation and thus does not qualify for deduction. Unless one entertains the far-fetched belief that providing such a deduction may further catalyze divorces.         

Finally, and just as a matter of abundant caution I would like to add that transfer of various assets – jewelry, house, etc. – between two spouses can and do happen when they are still legally married and sometimes after the marriage has legally ended. The transfers of such assets attract different tax liabilities and warrant a separate discussion.  

Tax Privacy: To Begin a Conversation … 

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Income tax law is based on disclosing information to the State. Personal financial information. Bank account statements, investments, salary receipts, rent paid or received, medical expenses, money transferred to spouse, expenses of children, insurance premiums, political donations, charitable contributions to name a few. Each piece of information is necessary to ascertain the exact tax liability of a taxpayer. And it is statutory duty of a taxpayer to make accurate and timely disclosures.  

If income tax administration is based on State compulsorily seeking detailed financial information from taxpayers, is it even possible to expect tax privacy? Yes. In fact, one could argue it is necessary to demand tax privacy. But what would tax privacy look like? What safeguards can be reasonably demanded and expected? There are no concrete answers and if I may dare suggest, no tentative answers either. Because the conversation around tax privacy in India has not even begun. 

To Begin a Conversation … 

Conduct an unscientific and random survey: ask your colleagues and friends if they are comfortable sharing their income tax returns with everyone? The dominant response will be no. Tax privacy in India starts and ends with a strong disagreement to make income tax returns public. Tax privacy in India hasn’t progressed beyond the notion of income tax returns. And even in this example, privacy exists in a rudimentary shape. The disinclination to share one’s income tax return with public at large isn’t entirely rooted in privacy, but a desire to avoid unnecessary scrutiny by social media and other ‘experts’, who may find numerous inconsistencies or point at insufficient income disclosures. And there lies the risk of reassessment notices, a trigger with which the Income Tax Department isn’t unfamiliar. And if you are even mildly popular, your income tax returns will be the fodder of endless gossip. Though you may not be object if your advance tax payments are conveniently disclosed to underline your success. 

The broad expectation of an Indian taxpayer seems to be that the State can access all relevant financial information, but the details contained in income tax returns should not be disclosed to the public at large without previous consent of the taxpayer, if at all. But we seem to have accepted or at least resigned to the fact that there is no concrete limit on the State’s power to secure personal financial information. How else will the State assess your income tax liability is the retort? 

An accurate response is that the State does not need unfettered access to your personal financial information to ascertain your income tax liability. State needs access to your ‘relevant’ personal financial information. Ordinarily, a taxpayer makes self-assessment – with help of a tax lawyer or an accountant – and discloses the relevant financial information. The State may, at times, demand additional information on the ground of ‘insufficient disclosure’ or to verify certain expenses. And it is at the juncture of disclosure and additional disclosure where privacy needs to be a shield for taxpayer, but it is conspicuous by its absence. The concept of tax privacy as a legal concept isn’t sufficiently articulated in India, especially to mediate the exchange of information and additional information between the State and taxpayers.          

Disclosing Financial Information 

Privacy is in the context of tax law, especially income tax law requires specific articulation. If I disclose to the State that I received a gift of immovable property from my parents, it is to ensure that an appropriate amount of tax is paid on the gift received. Hiding the transaction may allow me to escape the tax liability, in the short term or even forever, but it would be contravention of income tax law. But what if the State secures access to the transaction between me and my parents? If I did not disclose it voluntarily, maybe I boasted about acquiring a new immovable property on social media, and the State monitoring my virtual activity suddenly swung into action.

One pertinent question here is: can the State monitor my virtual activities in the hope of finding my ‘hidden’ sources of income or does it need prior permission before monitoring my activities? Privacy centric answer would lean in favor of the latter. The answer would suggest that the State needs to have a priori justification to monitor a taxpayer’s online activity. And such surveillance can only take place for a limited time and for specific activities. For example, tracking phone calls or movement without listening to the content of phone conversations. Our income tax laws are designed to grant the State power to intrude into taxpayer’s lives and the threshold to intrude into taxpayer’s life isn’t high. 

For example, let me look at some provisions that have lately generated some concern. Currently, search and seizure operations are permitted under Sec 132, IT Act, 1961 if some designated officers such as the Principal Commissioner, Chief Commissioner or Principal Chief Commissioner have ‘reason to believe’ that certain documents, articles, gold, etc. that are relevant to proceedings under the IT Act, 1961 have not produced by the taxpayer. The search and seizure operations empower officers to enter any building, vessel, aircraft, etc. and search persons, seize book, articles, etc. Section 132(9B) also empowers the officers to provisionally attach property of the taxpayer. These are extensive powers that are at times used to browbeat political opponents or journalists that the State doesn’t particularly like. Does the Income Tax Bill, 2025 go a step forward and provide additional powers to the State? Yes. 

Clause 247, Income Tax Bill, 2025 largely mirrors Section 132, IT Act, 1961, except the latter also provides the officers powers to override access codes to virtual digital space and any computer system where the codes are not available. It is the digital equivalent of powers to break lock to enter a locked building where the keys to the lock are unavailable. The threshold under Income Tax Bill, 2025 remains the same as under the IT Act, 1961. The authorized officer must have a ‘reason to believe’ that some document or information contained in an electronic media is not being disclosed by the taxpayer in relation to an income or property. 

Reason to believe is the subjective opinion of the officer in question and as per courts, should be based on credible material. But there must be proximate relation between the material on which opinion is formed and the final opinion. However, the courts have repeatedly stated that it is a subjective standard, and they cannot substitute the officer’s view with their view. The threshold of ‘reason to believe’ thus doesn’t provide ample safeguards against intrusion of privacy by tax officers: physical and virtual.   

The broad scope of search and seizure powers under the IT Act, 1961 and now Income Tax Bill, 2025 are rightly criticized for being overbroad. But the pushback is never rooted in protection of privacy. Or if it is, privacy is only in unarticulated subtext. Once officers are authorized to conduct a search and seizure operation under Section 132, they have the power to break locks, almirahs, seize documents, and search persons thereby impinging on business freedoms, bodily autonomy, and basic right to be ‘left alone’. While the State can justify that taxation is a sovereign right and search and seizure powers are ancillary to tax administration. But the articulation of privacy rights is missing in this argument and counter argument. To what extent can the State intrude into a person’s life to secure tax collection? When can the State violate physical autonomy of a taxpayer? On what grounds? We don’t know. Not yet.    

Disclosing Additional Information 

Privacy in the context of income tax law further suffers due to powers of the State to demand additional information under certain circumstances. Search and seizure operation is ideally conducted if the officer believes that the taxpayer has not voluntarily disclosed the information demanded by the State. But sometimes the additional information that is demanded from the taxpayer may put privacy in jeopardy. The additional information is usually sought when the income tax return of a taxpayer is selected for scrutiny or audit. In such cases, the officers demand additional information. For example, if I claim that I paid an ‘X’ amount as medical expenses for myself, then the State can question the validity of the claim. Or the amount. Disclosing additional information may risk disclosing my private medical information to the State. While the State may claim that not disclosing the entirety of medical expenses and the exact disease may jeopardize taxpayer’s claim for medical expenses and tax deduction. Where should we draw the line? Not sure, but the question is worth asking for now. 

Carrying the Conversation Forward  

There are three distinct strands of tax privacy that I wish to articulate in this preliminary article on tax privacy. I hope to delve deeper into each of these strands in the future, but the summation on each of these aspects of tax privacy is as follows. 

To begin with, if a taxpayer consents to sharing personal financial information with the State, then it is not unreasonable to expect tax privacy. To begin with, State should only seek relevant information that is proximate to the purpose of ascertaining tax liability. It is unreasonable to assume that the State has a carte blanche to demand any financial information. 

Equally, it is a valid expectation that the State shall only use the said information for purpose of computing and assessing tax liability. The ‘purpose limitation’ test as data protection law informs us. Privacy in this context is breached if the State uses the information for a purpose other than tax.  

Finally, I wish to underline the once the State has secured certain information, keeping the information secure is also State obligation. However, this is only one aspect of privacy, and in fact, more an element of confidentiality and less of privacy. And yet we tend to focus unduly on the State not disclosing our income tax returns to the public, instead of questioning scope of its power to demand and collect information in the first place. 

Powers of Arrest under CGST Act, 2017 and Customs Act, 1962: Constitutionality and their Scope

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The Supreme Court in a recent judgment upheld the constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in Customs Act, 1962 and CGST Act, 2017. The Court also elaborated on the scope of arrest powers under CGST Act, 2017 and safeguards applicable to an arrestee. The judgment reiterates some well-established principles and clarifies the law on a few uncertain issues. In this article, I examine the judgment in 3 parts: first, the import of Om Prakash judgment and Court’s opinion on arrest powers under Customs Act ,1962; second, the issue of constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in CGST Act, 2017, and third, the scope and contours of arrest-related powers under GST laws along with a comment on Justice Bela Trivedi’s concurring opinion and its possible implication. 

Part I: Om Prakash Judgment and Customs Act, 1962 

Om Prakash Judgment 

In Om Prakash judgment, the Supreme Court heard two matters relating to Customs Act, 1962 and Central Excise Act, 1944. The issue in both matters was that all offences under both the statutes are non-cognizable, but are they bailable? The Court held that while the offences were non-cognizable, they were bailable. The Court referred to relevant provisions of the CrPC, 1973 and statutes in question to support its conclusion. For example, the Court referred to Section 9A, Central Excise Act, 1944 and held that the legislative intent is recovery of dues and not punish individuals who contravene the statutory provisions. And the scheme of CrPC also suggests that even non-cognizable offences are bailable, unless specifically provided. 

The Supreme Court in Om Prakash judgment also clarified that even though customs and excise officers had been conferred with powers of arrest, their powers were not beyond that of a police officer. And for non-cognizable offences, the officers under both statutes had to seek warrant from the Magistrate under Sec 41, CrPC, 1973.  

Amendments to Customs Act, 1962 

Section 104, Customs Act, 1962 was amended in 2012, 2013, and 2019 to modify and to some extent circumvent the application of Om Prakash judgment. Supreme Court’s insistence on tax officers seeking Magistrate’s permission before making an arrest was sought both – acknowledged and modified via amendments to the Customs Act, 1962. To begin with, Customs Act, 1962 bifurcated offences into two clear categories: cognizable and non-cognizable and the amended provisions clearly specified which offences were bailable or non-bailable. These amendments which were the subject of challenge in the impugned case. 

The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and held that petitioner’s reliance on Om Prakash judgment was incorrect. But were the pre-conditions for arrest in Customs Act, 1962 sufficient to safeguard liberty? Were there sufficient safeguards against arbitrary arrest to protect the constitutional guaranteed liberties? 

The Supreme Court clarified that the safeguards contained in Sections 41-A, 41-D, 50A, and 55A of CrPC shall be applicable to arrests made by customs officers under the Customs Act, 1962. The arrestee would have to informed about grounds of arrest, the arresting officer should be clearly identifiable through a badge being some of the protections available to an arrestee. Court added that mandating that said safeguards of CrPC shall apply to arrests by customs officers ‘do not in any way fall foul of or repudiate the provisions of the Customs Act. They complement the provisions of the Customs Act and in a way ensure better regulation, ensuring due compliance with the statutory conditions of making an arrest.’ (para 29) 

The Supreme Court further added that safeguards provided in Customs Act, 1962 were in itself also adequate to protect life and liberty of the persons who could be arrested under the statute. The Supreme Court noted that the threshold of ‘reason to believe’ was higher than the ‘mere suspicion’ threshold provided under Section 41, CrPC. And that the categorisation of offences under the Customs Act, 1962 wherein clear monetary thresholds were prescribed for non-cognizable and non-bailable offences enjoined the arresting officers to specifically state that the statutory thresholds for arrest have been satisfied. 

Finally, the Supreme Court read into Section 104, Customs Act, 1962 the requirement of informing the accused of grounds of arrest as it was in consonance with the mandate of Article 22 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court exhorted the officers to follow the mandate and guidelines laid down in Arvind Kejriwal casewhere it had specified parameters of a legal arrest in the context of Sec 19, PMLA, 2002. 

While dismissing the challenge to constitutionality of arrest-related provisions of Customs Act, 1962 the Supreme Court cautioned and underlined the need to prevent frustration of statutory and constitutional rights of the arrestee. 

Overall, the Supreme Court was of the view that pre-conditions for arrest specified in Customs Act, 1962 were not constitutional and safeguarded the liberties of an arrestee while obligating the custom officers to clearly specify that the conditions for arrest were satisfied. The Court also clarified that various safeguards prescribed in CrPC, 1973 were available to an arrestee during arrests made under Customs Act, 1962.  

Part II: Constitutionality of Arrest-Related Provisions in CGST Act, 2017

Article 246A Has a Broad Scope 

The constitutionality of arrest-related provisions contained in CGST Act, 2017 was previously upheld by the Delhi High Court in Dhruv Krishan Maggu case, as I mentioned elsewhere. The Supreme Court in impugned case also upheld the constitutionality of provisions.  The arguments against constitutionality of arrest-related provisions in CGST Act, 2017 were similar in the impugned case as they were before the Delhi High Court. The petitioner’s challenge was two-fold: first, Parliament can enact arrest related provisions only for subject matters contained in List I; second, powers relating to arrest, summon, etc. are not incidental to power to levy GST and thus arrest-related provisions cannot be enacted under Article 246A of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court’s rejection of petitioner’s argument on constitutionality was in the following words: 

The Parliament, under Article 246-A of the Constitution, has the power to make laws regarding GST and, as a necessary corollary, enact provisions against tax evasion. Article 246-A of the Constitution is a comprehensive provision and the doctrine of pith and substance applies. The impugned provisions lay down the power to summon and arrest, powers necessary for the effective levy and collection of GST. (para 75) 

Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of liberal interpretation of legislative entries, wherein courts have noted that the entries need to be interpreted liberally to include legislative powers on matters that are incidental and ancillary to the subject contained in legislative entry. Relying on above, the Supreme Court concluded that: 

Thus, a penalty or prosecution mechanism for the levy and collection of GST, and for checking its evasion, is a permissible exercise of legislative power. The GST Acts, in pith and substance, pertain to Article 246-A of the Constitution and the powers to summon, arrest and prosecute are ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect goods and services tax. In view of the aforesaid, the vires challenge to Sections 69 and 70 of the GST Acts must fail and is accordingly rejected. (para 75) 

The Supreme Court has correctly interpreted Article 246A in the impugned case. The Court liberally interpreted the scope of Article 246A in a previous case as well. The Court’s observations in the impugned case align with its previous interpretation wherein the Court has been clear that Article 246A needs to be interpreted liberally – akin to legislative entries – and include in its sweep legislative powers not merely to levy GST but ancillary powers relating to administration and ensuring compliance with GST laws. 

The nature of Article 246A is such that it needs to be interpreted akin to a legislative entry since there is no specific GST-related legislative entry in the Constitution. The power to enact GST laws and bifurcation of powers in relation to GST are both contained in Article 246A itself investing the provision with the unique character of a legislative entry as well as source of legislative power in relation to GST. 

Part III: Scope and Contours of Arrest Powers under CGST Act, 2017

Reason to Believe and Judicial Review  

The Supreme Court referred to the relevant provisions of GST laws to note that there is clear distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable offences under the GST laws. And bailable and non-bailable offences have also been bifurcated indicating the legislature’s cognizance of Om Prakash’s judgment. Further, the nature of offence is linked to the quantum of tax evaded. While the threshold to trigger arrest under CGST Act, 2017 is the Commissioner’s ‘reason to believe’ that an offence has been committed. In this respect, the Court emphasized that the Commissioner should refer to the material forming the basis of his finding regarding commission of the offence. And that an arrest cannot be made to investigate if an offence has been committed. The Supreme Court also pronounced a general caution about the need to exercise arrest powers judiciously. 

Another riddle of arrest that the Supreme Court tried to resolve was: whether a taxpayer can be arrested prior to completion of assessment? An assessment order quantifies the tax evasion or input tax credit wrongly availed. And since under CGST Act, 2017 the classification of whether an offence is cognizable or otherwise is typically dependent on the quantum of tax evaded, this is a crucial question. And there is merit in stating that the assessment order should precede an arrest since only then can the nature of offence by truly established. In MakeMyTrip case – decided under Finance Act, 1994, the Delhi High Court had mentioned that an arrest without an assessment order is akin to putting the horse before a cart. And in my view, in the absence of an assessment order, the Revenue’s allegation about the quantum of tax evaded is merely that: an allegation. And there is a tendency to inflate the amount of tax evaded in the absence of an assessment order. And an inflated amount tends to discourage courts from granting bail immediately and can even change the nature of an offence.  

However, the Supreme Court in the impugned case noted that it cannot lay down a ‘general and broad proposition’ that arrest powers cannot be exercised before issuance of assessment orders. (para 59) There may be cases, the Supreme Court noted where the Commissioner can state with a certain degree of certainty that an offence has been committed and in such cases arrest can be effectuated without completion of an assessment order. 

Here again, the Supreme Court stated that the CBIC’s guidelines on arrest will act as a safeguard alongwith its previous observations on arrest by custom officers, which will also apply to arrest under GST laws.      

The issue is that CBIC issued the guidelines on arrest in 2022, and yet the Supreme Court noted that there have been instances of officers forcing tax payments and arresting taxpayers. And though the arrests led to recovery of revenue, the element of coercion in tax payments cannot be overlooked. If the coercive element during arrest was present even despite the guidelines, then perhaps an even stronger pushback is needed against arbitrary and excessive use of arrest powers. While the Supreme Court has done well in stating that various safeguards will apply to arrests such as those enlisted in various provisions of CrPC and requirements of warrants from Magistrates in non-cognizable offences, even the numerous safeguards, at times, don’t seem enough to protect taxpayers.   

Justice Bela M. Trivedi’s Concurring Opinion  

Justice Bela M. Trivedi’s concurring opinion prima facie dilutes safeguards provided to taxpayers. The Revenue is likely to use her words to argue against any judicial interference and deny bail to accused. Justice Trivedi clearly noted that when legality of arrests under legislations such as GST are challenged, the courts must be extremely loath in exercising their power of judicial review. The courts must confine themselves to examine if the constitutional and statutory safeguards were met and not examine the adequacy of material on which the Commissioner formed a ‘reason to believe’ nor examine accuracy of facts. 

Justice Trivedi was emphatic that adequacy of material will not be subject to judicial review since an arrest may ordinarily happen at initial stages of an investigation. The phrase ‘reason to believe’, she observed, implies that the Commissioner has formed a prima facie opinion that the offence has been committed. Sufficiency or adequacy of material leading to formation of such belief will not be subject to judicial review at nascent stage of inquiry. The reason, as per Justice Trivedi was that ‘casual and frequent’ interference by courts could embolden the accused and frustrate the objects of special legislations such as GST laws. Limited judicial review powers for powers exercised on ‘reason to believe’ is a recurring theme in the jurisprudence on this standard. Reason to believe is a standard prescribed under IT Act, 1961 as well and courts have clear about not scrutinizing the material which forms the basis of the officer’s belief. 

However, some of Justice Trivedi’s observations seem at odds with the lead opinion which requires written statements about Commissioner’s belief, reference to material on basis of which the Commissioner forms the ‘reason to believe’ that lead to arrest. The majority opinion is also clear about power of judicial review in case of payment of tax under threat of arrest, power of courts to provide bail even if no FIR is filed, among other safeguards. Though in the leading opinion there is no clear opinion about scope of judicial review at preliminary or later stages of investigation.  

One possible manner to reconcile Justice Trivedi’s concurring opinion with the lead opinion is that her observations about narrow judicial review are only for preliminary stages of investigation. And that courts can exercise wider powers of judicial review at later stages of investigation. And that her view is only limited to ensuring that once the statutory safeguards have been met, courts should not stand in the way of officers to complete their inquiries and investigations else aims of the special laws such as GST may not be met. But her views are likely to be interpreted in multiple manners and the Revenue will certainly prefer her stance in matters relating to bail, not just at the initial stage of investigation but during the entire investigative process.   

Conclusion 

In the impugned case, the Supreme Court has advanced the jurisprudence on arrests under tax laws to some extent. But the observations are not in the context of any facts but in a case involving constitutional challenge. Thus, numerous safeguards that the Court has noted will apply to arrests made by customs officers or under GST Acts will be tested in future. Courts will have to ascertain if the arrests were made after fulfilment of the various safeguards, whether taxes were paid under threats of arrests, and other likely abuse of powers. The crucial test will be how and if to grant bail including anticipatory bail in matters where FIR is not registered. 

Finally, ‘reason to believe’ is admittedly a subjective standard. It is the opinion of an officer based on the material that comes to their notice. And courts while may examine the material, cannot replace their own subjective view with that of the officer. The test in such cases is if a reasonable person will arrive at the same conclusion based on the material as arrived at by the Commissioner. Thus, ‘reason to believe’ as a standard per se, limits scope of judicial review and confers immense discretion to the Commissioner to exercise powers of arrest. The jurisprudence on this issue – both under the IT Act, 1961 and GST laws – is evidently uneven due to the subjective nature of standard. And courts have not been able to form a clear and unambiguous stance on the scope of judicial review with respect to the ‘reason to believe’ standard. And this unevenness and relatively weak protection afforded to taxpayers is likely to continue in the future as well despite the Supreme Court’s lofty observations in the impugned case.             

            

Long Wait for GSTATs: July 2017 … and Counting. 

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GSTATs have been envisaged as the first appellate forum under GST laws. And yet, 7.5 years since implementation of GST, not a single GSTAT is functioning. Reason? Many. Some are easy to identify, others are tough to understand. Nonetheless, here is a small story of the ill-fated GSTATs since the implementation of GST laws in July 2017. 

Provision is Declared Unconstitutional 

CGST Act, 2017, as originally enacted, provided that the no. of technical members in GSTATs would exceed the no. of judicial members. Both the Union and States wanted to ensure their representation on GSTATs via technical members which led to each GSTAT accommodating at least 2 technical members, i.e., technical member (Centre) and technical member (State). But CGST Act, 2017 provided for only one judicial member on the Bench of GSTAT. The Madras High Court ruled that the strength of technical members in tribunals cannot exceed that of judicial members, as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The relevant provision – Section 109(9) as originally enacted – was struck down as unconstitutional. There was a simultaneous challenge on the ground of Article 14 wherein the petitioners argued that under CGST Act, 2017 advocates were not eligible to become members of GSTATs and it violated their fundamental right to equality. The High Court refused to accept this plea and requested the Union to reconsider the ineligibility of advocates. Making advocates ineligible to become members of GSTAT is rather strange since a similar disqualification does not exist for ITATs under the IT Act, 1961.     

No Appeal Against the Decision  

The Union didn’t appeal against the Madras High Court’s decision. Surprising, since the Union likes to defend all its decisions including its interpretation of tax statutes until the last possible forum. Or perhaps in this instance the Union decided it was prudent to agree with the High Court’s decision. Or it wanted to use the High Court’s decision as a shield to defend the delay in operationalizing GSTATs. Irrespective, the Union’s decision to not file an appeal against the High Court’s decision meant it had to explore options to operationalize the GSTATs. During 2019-2021, the GST Council did discuss the options and feasibility of GSTATs in various States and the required no. of Benches, but the discussions didn’t prove to be immediately fruitful. One possible option of breaking the logjam was by amending the respective provision of CGST Act, 2017. 

Provisions are Amended 

The Finance Act, 2023 amended the provisions relating to composition of GSTATs. Below are the relevant provisions before amendment and post-amendment respectively: 

Pre-Amendment

Section 109(3):

The National Bench of the Appellate Tribunal shall be situated at New Delhi which shall be presided over by the President and shall consist of one Technical Member (Centre) and one Technical Member (State). 

Section 109(9): 

Each State Bench and Area Benches of the Appellate Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial Member, one Technical Member (Centre) and one Technical Member (State) and the State Government may designate the seniormost Judicial Member in a State as the State President. 

Post-Amendment 

Section 109(3): 

The Government shall, by notification, constitute a Principal Bench of the Appellate Tribunal at New Delhi which shall consist of the President, a Judicial Member, a Technical Member (Centre) and a Technical Member (State). 

Section 109(4): 

On request of the State, the Government may, by notification, constitute such number of State Benches at such places and with such jurisdiction, as may be recommended by the Council, which shall consist of two Judicial Members, a Technical Member (Centre) and a Technical Member (State). 

In summary, the amendments via the Finance Act, 2023 have ensured that the no. of judicial members are equal to technical members, if not more. This is because the President of GSTAT is usually the senior most judicial member. The balance of judicial and technical members needed to be met on two fronts: ensuring balance of representation between the Union and States inter-se needs and the balance between judicial and technical side to avoid executive domination. Now that the initial hurdle to constitute GSTATs was officially removed via Finance Act, 2023, one would have expected speedy and decisive steps towards constitution of GSTATs. But that wasn’t the case.  

Benches, Chairperson, Website … and Other Puny Steps 

Since the provisions relating to GSTATs have been amended, the Union has taken multiple – but tiny – steps towards operationalizing the GSTATs. With each step, the tax community has raised its hopes for quick operationalization of GSTATs. But each step seems a step too far. 

In May 2024, the Minister of Finance administered oath to the first President of GSTAT, New Delhi. Since GSTATs are not yet operational and do not hear cases, I’m not sure what the President of GSTAT does to earn his salary.  

In July 2024, in another step forward, the Ministry of Finance notified various Benches of GSTATs, with the Principal Bench in New Delhi. 

Recently, the tax community was rejoicing at GSTATs having a dedicated website. It is hard for me to understand the joy of having a functional website for an institution that itself isn’t functional. And the purpose of having a website is difficult to comprehend due to a recent report in January 2025, mentioning that GSTATs will take another 6 months to begin their functioning. When the formalities for appointing personnel have not completed, IT infrastructure is yet uncertain, and real estate for GSTATs has not been finalized, even 6 months seem like an ambitious target. Especially due to the track record of the Union and States on this aspect of GST.  

Constitutional Courts are Impatient  

Since GSTATs, ideally the first appellate forum for GST-related disputes, are not functioning, the burden has shifted to constitutional courts. High Courts and the Supreme Court end up hearing matters that typically should not have received attention beyond GSTATs. Supreme Court has recognized the effect of not having GSTATs and has recently raised the following query in one of its orders:

We would like to first know at the earliest why the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal has not been made functional till this date.  

The Union is supposed to reply to the above query in three weeks, but do not expect any fireworks and new revelations. 

Supreme Court’s question was prompted after it noted that the petitioner had the remedy to file an appeal under CGST Act, 2017 but had to approach the High Court via writ petition due to GSTATs not functioning. Many such cases that did not deserve or should not have been heard by High Courts and Supreme Court are currently in limbo because these constitutional courts do not have the advantage of GSTATs judgments and fact finding.   

Previously, the Allahabad High Court also tried to make the Union act quickly. But, despite the High Court’s eagerness to constitute GSTATs in the State of UP, there wasn’t much headway. 

Additionally, GSTATs are necessary to ensure harmony in interpretation and coherence in jurisprudence which has, for a long time, been at the mercy of AARs and AAARs. Both are intended to be interpretive bodies, not dispute resolution bodies but their several sub-par interpretations have caused tremendous confusion on various matters.

To conclude, I cannot say for sure when GSTATs will start functioning, but it is imperative that they do. And they function efficiently. A reform such as GST cannot be truly called a bold or a transformative reform until the accompanying rule of law infrastructure is operational. And GSTATs are a vital cog of that infrastructure. Until then, GST has certainly transformed the landscape of indirect tax in India. But, the promise of fair and speedy resolution of disputes remains a distant and unfulfilled promise.  

Income Tax Bill, 2025: In Search of a Big Idea

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The Department of Revenue claims that Income Tax Bill, 2025 – tabled in the Parliament on 13 February 2025 – marks a significant step towards simplifying the language and structure of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Does it? Yes. Was it needed? Yes. Is it a major reform? No, and herein lies the rub.  

The Press Release accompanying the IT Bill, 2025 makes it clear that the ‘simplification exercise’ did not implement any major tax policy changes to ensure continuity and certainty for taxpayers. This statement presumes two things: first, that there isn’t much uncertainty in the current IT Act, 1961 or certainly not worth immediate attention; second, that simplification and policy changes are easily separable. Both contain an element of truth without being completely true. 

In more than six decades of its existence, the IT Act, 1961 has ensured some stability and continuity in the direct tax domain, despite repeated amendments. But that does not mean that any major policy change in direct taxes should be frowned upon and sacrificed at the altar of certainty. There is enough ambiguity on various issues in income tax that could do with more clarity and better policy direction. Capital gains tax is one example. 

Equally, if the underlying policy is muddled, then the legislative language can only be that ‘simple’. Merely because the Provisos have been rearranged into sub-sections, Schedules have been appended, or ‘notwithstanding’ has been replaced with ‘irrespective’ will not be enough to reduce income tax litigation and disputes. Straightforward policy decisions usually lead to simpler statutes. Ad hoc policy changes cause frequent amendments and an eventual bloating of the statute. As it happened with IT Act, 1961. To aim for simplification of language without ensuring adequate clarity in policy is a limited exercise.   

In this post, I intend to highlight three major things: one achievement of IT Bill, 2025; one major flaw, and the way forward. 

IT Bill, 2025: Improves Readability, Not Comprehension  

IT Bill, 2025 has achieved one thing: it has improved reading flow of the proposed statute, the provisions are easier to locate without unnecessary alphanumeric numbers and caveats obstructing one’s view. The multiple Explanations, Provisos, non-obstante clauses, some with prospective, others with retrospective effect have been realigned into sub-sections to make the provisions easier to follow. Schedules are more informative, some redundancies have been eliminated, and overall, it is much easier to navigate the law as compared to the IT Act, 1961. But the ease of readability, and improved navigation is only for tax professionals. 

I don’t intend to speak for an ‘average’ taxpayer, but I’m going out on a limb to say that any claim that IT Bill, 2025 will be easier to comprehend for an average taxpayer is a bit of a stretch. The proposed law does not in any way remove the legalese to such an extent that the average taxpayer can fully understand the tax implications of their transactions. It is self-serving for tax administration to sell hope on the back of this simplification exercise, but let us draw a line and stop them from selling a fantasy. Let me illustrate: 

Section 9(1), IT Bill, 2025 states that income deemed to accrue or arise in India shall be the incomes mentioned in sub-sections (2) to (10). Section 9(2) then states that any income accruing or arising, directly or indirectly, through or from the transfer of capital asset situated in India shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. Section 9(9) refers back to Section 9(2) and elaborates the latter via seven clauses with almost each clause containing various sub-clauses. We expect an average taxpayer to not only read this legal language, but also understand it, make a reasonable prediction as to how the tax officers and courts will interpret it? It should not even be an expectation. It is pure fantasy.

And if anyone still doubts my assertion, let us show an average taxpayer the Revenue Department’s explanation of what is a ‘tax year’ and the need for its introduction. The clueless expression that a taxpayer may respond with will give us some answers about the simplicity of language and lucidity of the IT Bill, 2025. Don’t get me wrong, tax year as a concept is welcome and can be easily understood by tax professionals. Not by a layman. And the claim that somehow by rearranging the provisions and improving flow of the statute may make it easier for an average taxpayer to comprehend it is something that I’m unable to accept.

In fact, improved readability is all the simplification exercise offers to tax professionals. For all intents and purposes, the changes in the IT Bill, 2025 will not make it easier to understand and interpret. IT Bill, 2025 remains as complicated and dense a statute as its predecessor and is likely to attract similar volume of litigation and same nature of interpretive disputes.      

Simplistic Understanding of Simplification  

Is simplifying the language of statute a ‘significant step’? Rarely. 

Simplification of legal language is a desirable step. It is not necessarily a significant one. 

Tax law, like every other law, is a constant site of interpretation. Judiciary performs the prime role in statutory interpretation. One can then argue that simplifying the language of statutory provisions may make it easy for the judiciary to understand ‘legislative intent’. It is a phrase that is often-invoked by the Revenue Department. However, the expectations should be muted on this front. A simple language in a statute does not guarantee that the judiciary will always agree with the Revenue’s interpretation. An outcome that the latter terribly desires, but rarely achieves. 

IT Bill, 2025 contains provisions of charge, exemptions, deductions, corporate taxation, tax evasion, assessments, clubbing of income, powers of tax officers, to name just a few. Each of these provisions require constant interpretation and re-interpretation depending on the transactions and facts that emerge. It is the dynamic nature of personal and commercial transactions, their shape shifting nature that provides scope and opportunity for tax officers to interpret the law and determining tax liabilities of taxpayers. And depending on the fate of disputes, the law changes frequently to address the emerging circumstances. If the Revenue Department disagrees with a particular interpretation, changes to income tax law happen soon thereafter. Why? Because protecting revenue’s interest is primary, policy direction is easily divorced. Simplification, is thus, rarely about drafting provisions in easy-to-understand language. Simplification emerges from clear policy.    

Simplification of provisions of IT Act, 1961 currently seems like a desire that legislative language will be easier to decipher during adjudication of tax disputes. The desire will only become a fact once the judiciary starts interpreting the ‘simple’ statutory provisions. And if one goes by the track record of Department of Revenue, each time the judiciary disagrees with it, the statute is amended to reflect its position and interpretation via an Explanation, a Proviso, an insertion or deletion of a clause. Will that not happen in the future? We don’t know because there have been no such commitments. Also, because we don’t know what tax policies are driving the simplification of provisions, apart from generic statements such as ‘improving ease of business’, ‘rationalisation of tax law’, ‘improving compliance’, etc.  

In Search of a Big Idea 

There is no big idea that underscores the IT Bill, 2025. Admittedly, if the official Press Release itself admits no major policy change has been introduced, then highlighting lack of substantive changes is an obvious comment. But it doesn’t and shouldn’t distract us from the fact that India’s direct tax policy is not ideal. The claim that direct tax policy shouldn’t be disrupted to prevent ‘instability’ is shallow and insincere. To be sure, India’s income tax has witnessed some changes in recent times, the primary one being the introduction of new tax regime. And, of course, the recent introduction of income tax exemption on income upto 12 lakhs per annum. What else? Nothing. Political parties continue to enjoy a durable income tax exemption, there is no movement to tax agricultural income, charitable organisations keep facing undue scrutiny and onerous compliance requirements, tax officers continue to enjoy unbridled powers of search, seizure, and survey without any meaningful scrutiny. Faceless assessments and attempts to limit powers of reassessments were well intentioned reforms, but both are embroiled in tangles that seem to have limited their administrative reform potential. 

We had the opportunity to create a trailblazing direct tax policy for cryptocurrencies, instead we opted for and continue with a punitive regime that all but discourages all kinds of cryptocurrency transactions in India. Digital taxation continues to hang in balance, with India participating in the OECD’s attempts to overhaul the corporate and international tax landscape without being able to fully retain its autonomy and wriggle space for autonomous domestic policies. How about capital gains tax? No major idea on the anvil. Tax evasion? GAAR, introduced as a reaction to Vodafone case, alongside the Principal Purpose Test in tax treaties require constant reassurance to calm investors. But no major clarity has emerged on applicability and scope of either. Certainly not until the Revenue’s clarifications are tested in actual cases. Presence of wide-ranging anti-tax evasion provisions while conferring extensive and intrusive powers to tax officers are not typical hallmarks of a tax law attempting to inspire confidence in taxpayers. And, certainly do not boost taxpayer morale. 

Finally, burgeoning bots, robots, and deployment of artificial intelligence seem to have not made a dent in India’s substantive direct tax policy. We are still waiting for someone else to show us the path and then incorporate derived version of AI-related tax policy in India. AI is the biggest idea in today’s tech obsessed world and needs a tax response. How about promoting environment friendly activities? Better and more encompassing tax policies for electric vehicles? Environment taxes on polluting corporates? We refuse to engage with such ideas and instead and are focusing on renumbering our statute instead of unveiling new tax ideas.        

Conclusion 

India’s direct tax policy needs big ideas. Simplification of statute is not one. It is a reform, but we do ourselves a disservice by calling it a major milestone or a significant step. We need better ideas as to how to rethink source rules in a digital world, and how to guard our revenue interests while engaging with OECD, evolving a suitable anti-tax avoidance approach – domestically and in our tax treaties – as well as ensuring that our residence principles do not remain stuck in the past while the contemporary world increasingly inhabits digital nomads. And, not the least, ensure tax administration reforms are not just about ‘using’ AI, data processing, big data but also sowing seeds of substantive tax policies towards these technologies. We also need a first principles approach towards powers of tax officers to ensure that they have sufficient powers, but are not unaccountable for their actions. The only solace is that the simplification of language of IT Act, 1961 may prove to be the launchpad of such major reforms of income tax law. Time will tell if there is appetite for such reforms.  

Skeletal Timeline of Income Tax Reform in India

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1860-1886: 

Income tax was introduced in India for the first time in 1860 to overcome the financial difficulties due to First War of Independence of 1857. The period of 1860-1886 saw the Govt alternating between income tax and license tax as a source of revenue. Income tax became the preferred option when the first systematic form of income tax law was passed in 1886. 

1860: Income Tax Act, 1860 enacted in India

  • First income tax law of India 
  • Income was divided into four schedules to be taxed separately 
  • Four schedules were: income from landed property, income from professions and trades, income from securities, and income from salaries and pensions

1863: Income Tax Act, 1860 ‘expired’ 

1869: Income tax was reintroduced due to financial difficulties faced by the British Govt 

1873: Income Tax Act, 1869 ‘expired’  

1878: Income tax was replaced by license tax to raise money for famine insurance

1886: Income Tax Act, 1886 enacted with important changes 

  • Income was divided into four classes
  • Four classes were: salaries, pensions or gratuities, net profits of companies, interest on securities of Govt of India, and income from other sources 
  • Agricultural income was exempt from income tax and so were properties devoted to charitable and religious purposes  

1918-1961: 

The foundation for modern Indian income tax law – as we know it today – was laid with enactment of 1918. Income tax reforms were initiated after the First World War and eventually led to a broad review of income tax collections leading to enactment of Income Tax Act, 1922, foundational legislation for the current Income Tax Act, 1961. The foundation for tax administration was also laid during this period.   

1918: Income Tax Act, 1918 replaced the Income Tax Act, 1886 

  • Broad shape of contemporary income tax law started emerging  
  • Act of 1918 replaced ‘schedular income tax’ with ‘total income tax’ 

1922: Predecessor to the Income Tax Act, 1961 enacted 

  • Income Tax Act, 1922 was enacted based on recommendations of All India Committee
  • Income tax rates were determined annually via ‘Finance Acts’ (Annual Budget) and were not encoded in the Income Tax Act itself 

1939: Special Enquiry Committee comprised of experts from India and England 

1941: Income Tax Appellate Tribunals were established 

  • First specialist tribunals constituted in India 

1956: Union of India stresses on reform of IT Act, 1922

  • It was acknowledged that IT Act, 1922 had grown in an unplanned manner 
  • It was decided to re-examine the IT Act, 1922 to simplify it and make it more intelligible and referred the task to Law Commission of India  

1958: Law Commission of India submits it report 

  • 12th Report of the LCI made extensive suggestions for rearrangement of provisions
  • LCI stated that income tax law was in a state of ‘hopeless confusion’ due to constant tinkering with the IT Act, 1922 via short sighted amendments 

1959: Tyagi Committee submitted its report 

  • The Committee was formally called ‘Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry Committee’ 
  • The Committee acknowledged that simplification of tax laws was not an easy task. It recommended that provisions of IT Act, 1961 should be rearranged more logically and expressed in clearer language to remove ambiguities in the law

1961: Income Tax Act, 1961 was enacted 

Promise of IT Act, 1961

Promise of Income Tax Act, 1961: 

Morarji Desai promised the following when introducing the income tax law in 1961: 

Simplification has been sought to be obtained by replacing obscure and ambiguous expressions with clear ones and by re-arranging the provisions of the Act so as to make them more easy of comprehension than they are at present. 

1961-Present: 

Over years, Income Tax Act, 1961 grew complex, longer, and difficult to decipher due to various reasons. The Union of India’s propensity to amend the law every year, frequently with retrospective effect, emergence of novel forms of business transactions, incomes, tax evasion techniques, and divergence between the Revenue Department’s understanding of income tax law provisions and judicial interpretation of such provisions contributed to the complexity. Not least was the use of extensive ‘Provisos’, ‘Explanations’ in the statute which made the law difficult to understand and administer.   

1963: Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963 passed 

  • Repealed the Central Board of Revenue Act, 1924 
  • Central Board of Revenue was replaced by two entities: Central Board of Direct Taxes and Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs. Former is the ape administrative body for income taxes in India  

1991-92: Raja Chelliah Committee examined India’s entire tax landscape 

  • Formally called the ‘Tax Reforms Committee’, it recommended a series of tax reforms for direct and indirect taxation 
  • The Committee though did not suggest enacting a new income tax law, only suggested various changes including but not limited to corporate taxes, interest taxation, agricultural income, and gift tax  

2009: First notable attempt to replace the IT Act, 1961 

2010: Revised version, Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 presented in the Parliament 

  • Revised version incorporated some comments received on the 2009 version
  • Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 referred to the Standing Committee on Finance

2012: Standing Committee on Finance submitted its Report on Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 

2014: Revised version of Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 was again put up for comments 

  • Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 lapsed with dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha 
  • No clear commitment by the new BJP Govt to take the process forward 

2017: Task Force on Direct Tax Code setup 

  • Initially the Task Force was led by Mr. Arbind Modi and later by Mr. Akhilesh Ranjan 

2019: Task Force submitted its Report 

  • Report was never released to the public 

2024: Ms Nirmala Sitharaman announces a review of IT Act, 1961

  • CBDT forms an ‘Internal Committee’ to substantively review IT Act, 1961 
  • It was announced that the review will be completed within 6 months 

2025: Ms Nirmala Sitharaman announces that new income tax bill will be introduced 

  • Promises that new income tax law will be based on ‘trust first, scrutinize later’ principle 
  • New law will be substantively shorter and simpler as compared to IT Act, 1961
  • Also indicates that the income tax bill will be referred to the Standing Committee 

Promise of Income Tax Bill, 2025: 

Nirmala Sitharaman promised the following in her Budget Speech of 2025 

New IT bill will carry forward the spirit of  ‘nyaya based on the concept of trust first, scrutinise later’ and ‘the new bill will be clear and direct in text with close to half of the present law, in terms of both chapters and words. Also ‘It will be simple to understand for taxpayers and tax administration, leading to tax certainty and reduced litigation.’ [Not verbatim]

Why Should Tax Lawyers Care About the Annual Budget?

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Tax law, especially Indian tax law discussions are far too often contained by self-sustaining logic of statutory provisions and case laws. Tax lawyers, including me, feel validated and satisfied having decoded a particular judgment or the meaning of a provision. The satisfaction is often short lived because another judgment or amendment is on the horizon. Else, another Press Release, Circular, Notification, Clarification of the Circular, Amendment to the Notification, Guideline, Order that needs to be read. If we don’t keep abreast, we risk losing clients for missing a deadline of tax return, or failure to obtain tax refunds, or for our failure to render a timely advice. Where does the Budget fit in such daily scheme of things for a tax lawyer? 

In not many places. But, it should.  

In the Budget of 2020-21, for example, it was announced that the Union of India has decided to abolish Dividend Distribution Tax (‘DDT’). It was crucial information. As a tax lawyer I certainly need to know that w.e.f. 1.04.2020, shareholders and not companies are obliged to pay income tax on dividends. Unfortunately, the curiosity of most tax lawyers stops here. 

Ideally, and this is where I aspire to make my case: a tax lawyer should also know why the change was introduced? Union of India introduced DDT in 1997 reasoning that it was easier to collect tax on dividends in the hands of companies itself? It was easier to administer tax law over companies than large swathe of shareholders. Subsequently, ‘Buyback Tax’ was also introduced to plug the loophole of companies avoiding payment of DDT. What changed in 2020 to prompt the Union to upend its policy of taxing dividends in hands of companies? Especially when the no. of shareholders had increased multifold since 1997. Is it because the earlier was policy ill-conceived to begin with? Or is it that despite the large no. of shareholders it was easier track online payment of dividends? Dividends ‘should’ always be taxed in hands of shareholders is not a convincing explanation. For such an explanation impliedly castigates the introduction of DDT and its continuation for close to two decades. 

Now, of course, most practicing tax lawyers are likely to consider the above as superfluous inquiries. Or inquiries that are best addressed by academic lawyers. But that hardly changes the reality that most tax lawyers aren’t curious beyond the immediate needs of their clients. And many don’t have the luxury to meet such curiosity. But I would like to state that understanding reasons for major tax policy changes helps us better anticipate future changes, if not predict them. And ability to anticipate policy changes is an underrated but core quality for many lawyers, not just tax lawyers. 

To take another example, the Budget of 2022-23 revealed that cryptocurrency transactions are no longer in a tax vacuum and will be subject to a flat tax rate of 30%. Not much explanation was forthcoming for the punitive tax for cryptocurrency. But most tax lawyers worth their salt knew that the tax rate was a clear signal to discourage cryptocurrency transactions in India. The prelude to ‘crypto tax’ where RBI attempted to shackle cryptocurrency exchanges should have offered enough clue about the direction of regulatory environment for cryptocurrency in India. But, is it enough for a tax lawyer to know that the Budget has introduced new provisions relating to cryptocurrency transactions in the Income Tax Act, 1961? I guess you know my answer by this point. In my view, timely advice for clients for cryptocurrency transactions was ‘before’ the provision was introduced, not ‘after’. Thus, merely knowing the provisions once they are on the book is not enough. We need deeper and better understanding of the winds of change and their direction.       

But does the Budget tell us more? 

Yes, it does. (Especially if you can sit through the entire Budget Speech!)

Sometimes it tells us that when it comes to taxation, the Union of India operates in mysterious ways. And making anticipating changes may not always be a straightforward task. Because, I think, sometimes it is a mystery to the Union itself as to what tax policies it is enacting and why is it making certain tax policies. The Union of India, can, for example, attempt to ‘rationalise’ capital gains tax by completely doing away with indexation benefits in one sweeping announcement as in the Budget of 2024-25. Done and dusted. Or so it thought.   

And once the Union of India failed to fully explain its decision and received a wave of backlash, it amended its rationalization by introducing a grandfathering provision to ensure that the investments made before 23.07.2024 continued to receive the indexation benefits. 

One explanation for removing indexation benefits was to remove difficult and complicated calculations from the IT Act, 1961. Instead, the Union of India argued, it was better to prescribe a single capital gains tax of 12.5%. But what we now have instead is that for properties bought before 23.07.2024, taxpayers have the option of choosing between an indexation benefit or a capital gains tax of 12.5% from 2024 onwards. Simplification, they said. Dual options for taxpayers were created instead. And no, more is not merrier in every context.   

On second thoughts, maybe Union of India’s approach to tax policy is not a mystery. Maybe the goal is to try and see if through ‘shock and awe’ a policy change can be pushed through. If not, it is prepared make some prudent concessions that should have been incorporated in the first instance itself.    

Apart from the ‘whys’, Budget thus also reveals the ‘hows’ of tax policy changes. Is it a sledgehammer approach, a genteel incremental path, or a passionate persuasion for a change that the Government in power is advocating. Example: rumors that the Budget of 2025 will introduce a new Income Tax Bill. And there isn’t much disbelief about the rumor. An entirely new legislation on income tax is rumored to be introduced in a couple of days and the public is yet to see a draft version. When the Government in power is not averse to such a ‘hide and seek’ way of operating, it becomes a necessity for tax lawyers to be in tune with the Annual Budget. 

Further, the Budget reveals a lot about the nature of time. 

It is trite that laws can be amended or repealed. Statutory provisions can be replaced. And effect of unfavorable judgments can be nullified. But each year the Budget tells us that time does not move only in one direction. Linearity of time is a myth. Tax laws can be amended in 2025 ‘with effect from’ 2017, 2000 or even 1961. For example, there is a distinct possibility that through the Budget of 2025, CGST Act, 2017 will be amended to replace the words ‘plant or machinery’ with ‘plant and machinery’ to negate Supreme Court’s judgment in Safari Retreats case. The GST Council has recommended the amendment be effectuated retrospective effect, i.e., from 2017. Tax lawyers are so used to retrospective amendments that they no longer battle an eyelid when another such amendment is announced. But maybe we should battle an eyelid and more. And ask the tough question: why? Why is it not enough to amend the law w.e.f. 2025? Why do we have to travel back in time and amend it w.e.f. 2017? Can the Union of India, for once, accept it made a legislative oversight/error, change the law and move forward.    

English grammar tells us that conjunctions are important. The expected turn that the Safari Retreats case will take can tell us that conjunctions can be fulcrum of a long litigation battle that may award half a win to the taxpayer, but the Budget will convert it into a full loss. And tax lawyers are none the wiser. Not a great commentary on tax law and its practitioners.  

In formal legal language, Annual Union Budget is many things at the same time. It is the Annual Financial Statement as per Article 112 of the Constitution, Finance Bill when introduced, Finance Act once Parliament approves it, a tool to amend past financial mistakes, and a platform to unveil not a financial but also socio-economic vision of the future. 

In common parlance, Annual Union Budget presents an opportunity to demand ‘relief for middle class’, ‘create investment opportunities’, ‘attract FDI’, and of late hurtle us towards the promised land of ‘Viksit Bharat’. 

But for us tax lawyers, the Budget is also an opportunity to examine if the tax policies are adhering to the enduring canons of taxation propounded by Adam Smith. About time that the examination is public, expressive, and articulate instead of just being reactionary.  

Finally, Budget reveals numbers. It a statement of expenditures and revenues of the past financial year. And proposed expenses for the upcoming financial year. But that’s only one part of a larger story. 

Of late, tax collections are soaring. Undoubtedly. GST collections have only shown an upward trend post-COVID. And the trajectory will likely continue in that direction if there an income tax relief in the Budget of 2025. Income tax relief generally increases cash in hand for taxpayers which in turn will likely spur consumption and generate revenue via GST. So, a further bump in GST collections means a chance to spin the success story of Indian tax policy, including but specifically of GST. But numbers should never be enough. 

To use an analogy: as a tax lawyer, receiving client fee is crucial. Even necessary. But fee cannot be the only barometer of success, no matter how tempting it is to equate money with success.    

If numbers were the ‘be all and end all’, equalization levy was a roaring success and angel tax mopped up some revenue as well. Former is being phased out and latter was abolished via the Budget of 2024-25. Ending the life of both taxes should not be a cause for celebration if numbers are the only touchstone on which success of taxes is to be judged.  

Numbers reveal a story and hide another one. It is upto us what we make of them. If the no. of people filing income tax returns has increased, it is worth applauding. Not so, if they are only filing returns and not paying any effective income tax. Reducing corporate tax rates was supposed to be an incentive for spurring investments, but reduced corporate tax collections since the rate reductions may tell a different story. Ever increasing GST collections may reveal success, but if the burden of GST is primarily being borne by low earning groups, it calls into question the fairness of such a tax. And as much as tax lawyers believe that questions of fairness, justice, and equity are outside their realm, they stare us back in the face every now and then. We may choose to ‘hide’ behind the ‘logic’ and ‘coldness’ of statutory provisions, it won’t change the reality. And neither can we deny how Indian tax policy is increasingly being shaped without a meaningful contribution from tax lawyers.  

CERC Is Exempt from GST: Delhi HC 

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The Delhi High Court in a recent judgment held that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (‘Commission’) were not liable to pay GST. The Revenue sought to levy on the fees and tariff that Commission received from the power utilities. The Revenue contended that functions performed by the Commission were ‘support services to electricity transmission and distribution services’ under a 2017 Notification issued by CBIC. The Revenue clarified that while no GST was payable on services provided via electricity transmission and distribution services, but support services rendered in the contest of electricity transmission and distribution were subject to GST. 

The Delhi High Court ruled in favor of the Commission. 

Facts and Arguments 

Commission receives various amounts under different heads such as filing fee, tariff fee, license fee, annual registration fee and miscellaneous fee. Commission took the stance that GST is not payable on such amounts since it is performing statutory functions under the Electricity Act, 2003 and is essentially not engaged in any trade or commerce. 

Revenue’s argument – derived from its Show Cause Notices (SCNs) – before the High Court was that the Commission awards licences for distribution and transmission of electricity and charges licence fees. Thus, the definition of business read with consideration under CGST Act, 2017 makes it amply clear that the Commission is supplying services. And any such amount received is taxable under GST.  

The Revenue relied on two major elements to strengthen its argument about liability of the Commission to pay GST: 

First, it relied on FAQs where the CBIC had clarified that Commission is not a Government for the purpose of GST but is appropriately classified as a regulatory agency. And any financial consideration received by the Commission for any service provided by it was liable to GST. Since the regulatory activities performed by the Commission for which it received money amounted to ‘business’, the Commission was classified as a business entity under the said FAQs.  

Second, and the Revenue reasoned this in its SCN as well: the Commission performs both regulatory and adjudicatory functions. That regulatory functions of the Commission fall outside the purview of quasi-judicial functions and while performing such functions it does not have the trappings of a full-fledged court. Further, the licence fee is received by the Commission for its regulatory functions. The Revenue argued that it is immaterial if the regulatory functions of the Commission are mandated by the statute or not, as long as consideration is received by it is for supply of, services it amounts to a supply for which GST is liable to be paid.   

The Commission questioned the Revenue’s bifurcation between its regulatory and adjudicatory functions and contended that discharge of statutory duties by it in public interest cannot be subjected to GST. 

Relevant Provisions of GST 

The High Court reproduced the relevant provisions of CGST Act, 2017 relating to supply, business, and consideration. 

Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 defines supply to include all forms of supply of goods or services or both made for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of business. 

Clause 2, Schedule III, CGST Act, 2017 states that services provided by a Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force will not be considered either as supply of goods or supply of services.  

Definitions of business and consideration under CGST Act, 2017 are as follows: 

―2. Definitions. —In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- 

      xxxx                    xxxx                    xxxx

(17) ―business‖ includes— 

(a) any trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any other similar activity, whether or not it is for a pecuniary benefit; 

(b) any activity or transaction in connection with or incidental or ancillary to sub-clause (a); 

(c) any activity or transaction in the nature of sub-clause (a), whether or not there is volume, frequency, continuity or regularity of such transaction; 

(d) supply or acquisition of goods including capital goods and services in connection with commencement or closure of business; 

(e) provision by a club, association, society, or any such body (for a subscription or any other consideration) of the facilities or benefits to its members; 

(f) admission, for a consideration, of persons to any premises; 

(g) services supplied by a person as the holder of an office which has been accepted by him in the course or furtherance of his trade, profession or vocation; 

(h) activities of a race club including by way of totalisator or a license to book maker or activities of a licensed book maker in such club; and; 

(i) any activity or transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State Government or any local authority in which they are engaged as public authorities;‖ 

―2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— 

      xxxx                    xxxx                    xxxx

(31) ―consideration‖ in relation to the supply of goods or services or both includes—

(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government; 

(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government: 

Provided that a deposit given in respect of the supply of goods or services or both shall not be considered as payment made for such supply unless the supplier applies such deposit as consideration for the said supply;

The Delhi High Court examined the above two definitions in detail to reject Revenue’s contention. 

Decision 

The Delhi High Court noted that the Commission certainly acts as a tribunal, but the Revenue seeks to distinguish between the adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the Commission. The bifurcation warranted an examination of the definition of business and consideration in tandem with supply as defined under Section 7, CGST Act, 2017. 

As regards the definition of business, the Delhi High Court observed that clause (a) was the applicable clause. But the High Court observed that it cannot fathom how the power of regulation statutorily vested in the Commission can be included in any of the activities enlisted in the definition of business. Further, while clause (i) included activities undertaken by the Central or State Governments, the High Court noted that the Commission being a statutory body could not be equated with either of the two entities. 

As regards the definition of consideration, the Delhi High Court noted that it draws colour from the definition of business and it needs to be in relation or response to inducement of supply of goods or services. And here two elements need to be satisfied: first, the payment received must be outcome of an inducement of supply of goods or services; second, the supply must be in the course of or furtherance of business. 

As regards the first element, the High Court noted that: 

Suffice it to note that it was not even remotely sought to be contended by the respondents that the payments in the form of fee as received by Commissions were an outcome of an inducement to supply goods or services. (para 29) 

The above observation is not entirely accurate, since the SCN did mention that the Commission was providing support services for electricity transmission and distribution services. 

Nonetheless, even if one accepts that the money received by the Commission was in response to inducement of supply of goods or services, the said money must be in course or furtherance of business. To this end, the Delhi High Court observed that the functions performed by the Commission cannot be included in the term ‘business’ as defined under Section 2(17), CGST Act, 2017 and concluded: 

We find ourselves unable to accept, affirm or even fathom the conclusion that regulation of tariff, inter-State transmission of electricity or the issuance of license would be liable to be construed as activities undertaken or functions discharged in the furtherance of business. (para 33)

Finally, what about the bifurcation between regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the Commission? As per the Delhi High Court that the Electricity Act made no distinction between regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the Commission and that the statute had enjoined the Commission to regulate and administer electricity distribution. 

Conclusion 

The Delhi High Court’s decision stands on firm footing. And despite the CBIC and the GST Council having recommended otherwise, the High Court arrived at a clear and well-reasoned decision that the Commission was a tribunal. Even if it was accepted that the Commission received consideration in exercise of regulatory functions, it was not in course or furtherance of business. 

Finally, the Delhi High Court clarified that merely because was a heading: “Support services to electricity, gas and water distribution” which is placed under Group Heading 99863 of the CBIC Notification does not mean that the statutory exemption under Schedule III where services provided by a tribunal are excluded can be bypassed. The High Court helpfully clarified: 

What we seek to emphasise is that a notification would neither expand the scope of the parent entry nor can it be construed as taking away an exemption which stands granted under the CGST Act. There cannot possibly be even a cavil of doubt that a Schedule constitutes an integral part and component of the principal legislation. (para 36) 

Whether the Revenue will appeal against this decision will be revealed in due course, but for now, a well-reasoned decision of the Delhi High Court has clarified the GST implications of the Commission’s functions. 

Shimla HC Decodes Scope of Sec 43-B, IT Act, 1961

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In a recent judgment, the Shimla High Court had to adjudicate on the conditions prescribed in Section 43-B, IT Act, 1961 for an assessee to claim deductions. The issue related to Section 43-B(f) which envisages deductions to an employer for payments made to employees on encashment of cash leaves.

Facts 

For the Assessment Year 2002-03, the assessee inter alia claimed expenses of Rs 45,00,000/-, a sum it paid to LIC on contribution to Credit Leave Encashment Trust. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of such expense and added it to the income of the assessee. The assessee was unsuccessful in appeal before the ITAT. The dates are relevant to understand the issue at hand: 

The fund was established on 29.10.2002 and contribution of Rs 45,00,000/- to LIC was made on the same date.

Provision for contribution of Rs 45,00,000/- was not made by the assessee after closure of financial year 2001-02, i.e. on 31.03.2002. 

The assessee was not following the mercantile system of accounting during the financial year 2001-02. 

The liability of payment of Rs 45,00,000/- did not accrue nor was it paid during the financial year 2001-02.    

Summary of arguments adopted by the assessee and the Revenue is as follows: the assessee argued that the payment of Rs 45,00,000/- was part of the entire past liability of Rs 1.80 crores assessed by the insurer. The liability was not a contingent liability. And since the liability was met before due date of submission of returns, i.e., 31.10.2002, it was a permissible deduction under Proviso to Section 43-B(f), IT Act, 1961. Revenue, on the other hand, contended that the amount was not deductible under the IT Act, 1961 and even if it was, since it was not ascertained during the relevant financial year could not be a permissible deduction under Proviso to Section 43-B, IT Act, 1961. 

Section 43-B, IT Act, 1961 

Section 43-B, IT Act, 1961 allows for certain deductions to an assessee only on actual payment. Section 43-B(f) states ‘any sum payable by the assessee as an employer in lieu of any leave at the credit of his employee;’ and the Proviso states: 

Provided that nothing contained in this section [[except the provisions of clause(h)]] shall apply in relation to any sum which is actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date applicable in his case for furnishing the return of income under sub-section (1) of section 139 in respect of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred as aforesaid and the evidence of such payment is furnished by the assessee along with such return.

Shimla HC Answers Two Questions 

The first question that the Shimla High Court decided to answer was whether the contribution made by a corporate employer to a fund for payment of leave encashment to its employees was entitled to deduction. The High Court disagreed with the ITAT and held that it is not accurate to state that such a fund has not been statutorily recognized. The inclusion of Section 43-B(f), as per the High Court, proved otherwise. The High Court cited Exide Industries case to rightly conclude that amount of contribution made by an assessee towards a fund for payment of leave encashment to its employees was a deductible expense. 

The second question then was: did the assessee meet requirements of Section 43-B and its Proviso? The High Court answered in the negative. The High Court noted that Proviso allows only allows an assessee to claim a deduction if the sum payable as an employer in lieu of any leave was incurred by the assessee according to the regular method of accounting employed by him and the sum was actually paid in the previous accounting year. The second condition is not a correct interpretation of the Proviso, as it clearly states the payment can be made after the accounting year but before due date of filing returns. 

Nonetheless, the Shimla High Court denied the assessee’s claim for deduction on the ground that the liability of Rs 45,00,000/- had already been incurred as a past liability. The assessee’s assertion that the amount was part of a past liability of Rs 1.80 crores determined by the insurer, the High Court noted had not been substantiated. And since the finding of fact is not controverted the High Court denied assessee’s claim for deduction. 

Conclusion 

The insight this case offers us is that the payment towards a fund for encashment of leave is a permissible deduction under Section 43-B, IT Act, 1961. The payment can be made after the end of accounting year but before the due date to successfully claim deduction. But, the payment must be for satisfaction of a past liability incurred during the previous accounting year and the accounting method adopted by an assessee must reflect the liability. The observation that Section 43-B alongwith Proviso also requires payment before the end of accounting year does not align with a plain reading of the provision and does not hold on scrutiny.     

Assignment of Leasehold Rights is Immovable Property under GST: Guj HC 

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Introduction 

In a recent and much discussed judgment, the Gujarat High Court has held that assignment by sale and transfer of leasehold rights of a plot of land amounts to transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property. The High Court concluded that the transfer would not amount to a supply under Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 read with Schedule II of the Act.  

My usual lament is about length of judgments. This judgment is 280 pages and could very well have been less than half. But the Judges felt the need to reproduce the entirety of arguments and copiously cite precedents relied on by the parties to the case, even if several of them had no proximate bearing on the High Court’s conclusion. While this lament may sound repetitive, I believe it is important to constantly strive for more brevity and more clarity in our judgments.   

Regardless, a quick summary of the case is below. 

Issue before the Gujarat High Court 

The brief facts of case are: Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (‘GIDC’). GIDC acquires land and develops the same for industrial estate by creating infrastructure such as road, drainage, etc. and allots a plot of land on long term lease for 99 years to a person/entity. A registered deed is executed between GIDC and the lessee. The lease deed allows the lessee to further assign the leasehold rights and any interest in the land to a third person with approval of GIDC. In the impugned case, Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industries was the lessee and its case was that the transfer of leasehold rights to a third party did not attract GST. 

In the impugned case, the land was leased to the lessee, and the latter constructed a building on it. And the leasehold rights that were assigned related to both the land and the building so constructed.  The High Court thus framed the issue specifically as: whether assignment of leasehold rights alongwith the building thereon would be covered by the scope of supply to levy GST as per the CGST Act, 2017 or not?  

Arguments and Relevant Provisions 

The crux of lessee/petitioner’s argument was that leasehold rights are benefits arising out of land. A succinct logical flow of the argument can be stated as follows: 

  1. The definitions of immovable property under the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Registration Act, 1908 both include ‘benefits that arise out of land’.   
  2. Leasehold rights are benefits arising out of an immovable property. 
  3. Thus, transfer/assignment of leasehold rights amounts to transfer of an immovable property. 
  4. Since transfer of immovable property is not within the scope of ‘supply’ as defined under CGST Act, 2017 it cannot be subjected to GST. 

The Revenue’s case was that while sale immovable property is outside the scope of supply of GST laws, interest in immovable property like leasehold rights which is transferred by way of sale is a ‘supply of services’ is liable for GST. The Revenue further argued that transfer of right to occupy a land by GIDC to lessee constitutes a supply of service. And that the nature of interest in land would not change merely because the lessee makes an absolute transfer of leasehold rights to a third party. 

To buttress its argument that leasehold rights were benefits arising out of a land, the petitioner’s relied on a galaxy of judgments in the context of TPA, 1882 where courts have elaborated on what constitutes a movable or immovable property.

Supply has been defined under Section 7, CGST Act, 2017 to include sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration in the course or furtherance of business. Further, Clause 5(a), Schedule II, CGST Act, 2017 states that renting of immovable property shall be treated as supply of services. Thus, while renting/leasing is within the scope of supply the assignment of leasehold rights is not specifically included in the definition of supply.  

Reasoning and Conclusion 

The Gujarat High Court did not accept the Revenue’s argument. The High Court noted that the first transaction between GIDC and lessee merely transferred the right of possession to the latter as the right of ownership of the plot remained with GIDC. The second transaction wherein the lessee assigned all the leasehold rights in the property to a third party involved transfer of absolute rights. The High Court added: 

when the lessee-assignor transfers absolute right by way of sale of leasehold rights in favour of the assignee, the same shall be transfer of “immovable property” as leasehold rights is nothing but benefits arising out of immovable property which according to the definition contained in other statutes would be “immovable property”. Therefore, the question of supply of services or place of supply of services does not arise … (para 52)

Thus, transfer of land for lease of 99 years by GIDC to lessee is taxable under GST as per clause 5(a), Schedule II, CGST Act, 2017. But transfer of such leasehold rights would be nothing but transfer of immovable property since the consideration paid is as much an alienation as sale or mortgage. (para 64) The High Court also invoked the meaning of term ‘assignment’ to mean that it includes transfer of all rights of a property, the whole interest with rights and liability to sue and be sued. (para 67-68) And the implication of the above understanding of assignment was that the lessee was removed from the picture on transfer of leasehold rights.   

But can the lessee transfer a title superior to the one they received? If the lessee only received leasehold rights from GIDC can it transfer/assign absolute rights to a third party? To this end, the High Court emphasised that GIDC only leased the plot of land and the lessee constructed a building and developed a land for the purpose of business. The entire land and building was therefore transferred along with leasehold rights and interests in land which is a capital asset in the form of immovable property. The lessee, therefore, earned profits by operating a building which constitutes ‘profit a pendre’ which in turn constitutes as immovable property as per the Anand Behra case. 

Legislative Intent or Strict Interpretation? 

The Gujarat High Court has relied on both: strict interpretation of tax statutes and legislative intent to hold that assignment of land the building does not amount to a supply under GST. Using both interpretive techniques in a single judgment is a bit strange. The default approach in interpreting tax statutes is – strict interpretation. Courts usually resort to discovering legislative intent if there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the relevant provisions. In the impugned case, the Gujarat High Court declared that it must follow strict interpretation of law since regard must be given to clear meaning of the terms since entire issue is governed by language of the provisions. (para 58) And yet in the succeeding paragraphs the High Court goes into legislative intent and history in detail before arriving at its conclusion. (paras 60-62)

The Gujarat High Court specifically invoked legislative intent when it noted that when legislative intent is not to levy GST on sale of immovable property, the Revenue’s argument of treating assignment of leasehold rights as equal to renting of immovable property would be contrary to legislative intent. (Para 82) This issue could have been easily adjudicated upon by relying on the strict interpretation of statutes by holding that Clause 5(a), Schedule II, CGST Act, 2017 only mentions ‘renting of immovable property’ and cannot by interpretive gymnastics be held to include ‘assignment of leasehold rights’.   

 This interpretive approach where the High Court was trying to rely on two different interpretive methodologies without reconciling them is indicative of a ‘let cover all bases’ approach instead of a narrow inquiry into the issue at hand.        

Conclusion 

It is important that the ratio of this case is understood in the specific context of this case. The specific context is that the lessee received leasehold rights of a plot of land from GIDC. The lessee in turn developed the land, constructed a building, and assigned the leasehold rights over the land and building to a third party. The High Court stressed on the development of land made by the lessee after receiving the leasehold rights and that the assignment by sale by the lessee was of both the land and building. The conclusion may have been different if the land received on land was further leased to a third party on ‘as is where is’ basis.      

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